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Abstract 
 
This thesis develops a biopolitical perspective on Western states’ longstanding opposition to 
the formation of a Tamil state (Tamil Eelam) in the northeastern parts of the island of Sri 
Lanka (Ceylon). It does so by adopting and applying the concept of biopolitics as developed 
by Michel Foucault in the 1970s. Foucault used the idea of biopolitics to explain power 
relations and to consider peace through the matrix of war. He was especially interested in 
using this to understand power relations that emerged in the eighteenth century and especially 
in terms of the tensions between military confrontation and commercial expansion.  
This thesis adopts and applies the idea of biopolitics to the concept of liberal peace and 
its core principle, the security of global commerce, to offer a new interpretation of the 
rationale behind the opposition of Western states to the Tamil demand for political 
independence and their collaboration in Sri Lanka’s biopolitical transformation of the island 
into a Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocracy. As practitioners of the biopolitics of liberal peace, 
Western states have waged wars and collaborated in the wars of their Southern counterparts, 
allowing populations, including liberalised ones, to be killed, condoning the subversion of 
civil liberties, human rights and other democratic freedoms, including the right to self-
determination of nations, that they simultaneously promote. The thesis explores the extent to 
which the collaboration of the West with the Sri Lankan state’s racist policies and counter-
insurgency efforts is a continuation of the colonial policies of the British Empire in Ceylon. 
In developing a biopolitical perspective on the liberal state-building practices of the 
British Empire in colonial Ceylon, Sri Lanka’s adoption of the same practices, and the West’s 
own efforts to neutralise the Tamils’ armed struggle, the thesis explores the ways that power 
relations produce the effects of battle, and thus the way that peace becomes a means of 
waging war. When the power relations of law, finance, politics, and diplomacy produce the 
effects of battle, they become ways of waging war by other means. 
As well as being a thesis on Western policy in the war in Sri Lanka, the work is 
therefore also to some extent an attempt to see how far Foucault’s work on biopolitics might 
be pushed and developed and thus, at the same time, an attempt to turn the Foucauldian focus 
to an area thus far unexplored by those who have sought to engage with Foucault’s work. 
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Introduction 
 
The post-colonial history of Sri Lanka (Ceylon)1 is full of state violence, marked by racist 
policies, discriminatory laws, and large scale human rights abuses and war crimes against the 
island’s Tamil population. Initially, when Tamils resisted state-aggression through non-
violent means, Western states largely turned a blind-eye to their plight. However, when the 
Tamils’ non-violent mode of resistance transformed into an armed struggle in 1972 to 
establish their own state (Tamil Eelam2) in the northeastern parts of the island under the 
principles of the right to self-determination of nations, Western states initially responded by 
aiding the Sri Lankan state’s counter insurgency efforts, and later, as the armed conflict 
intensified, took a parallel initiative to neutralise the Tamils’ armed struggle. Why did 
Western states, which have since the end of the Second World War promoted, under the 
banner of liberal peace, civil liberties, human rights and other democratic freedoms, including 
the right to self-determination of nations, first ignore the plight of Tamils, then aid Sri 
Lanka’s counter-insurgency efforts, and later took a parallel initiative to neutralise the 
Tamils’ armed struggle? Was it because the concept of liberal peace metamorphosised in 
practice into the power calculations of political realism, or is there a deeper contradiction 
within the concept itself? This is the key question of my doctoral research. 
In this thesis, expanding on a number of key concepts and ideas that the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault developed in the 1970s to explain power relations, I trace the 
                                                            
1 The  island‐state of Sri Lanka  is a colonial contruction of the British Empire. For many centuries, the Tamils 
and  the  Sinhalese  divided  the  island  between  themselves,  with  the  Tamils  having  their  kingdoms  and 
principalities in the northeastern parts, and the Sinhalese in the southern and central parts. Under British rule, 
these  kingdoms  and principalities were unified  into  a  single  administrative unit, which on 4  February 1948 
became the newly contructed state of Ceylon, renamed in 1972 as Sri Lanka (see Chapter IV). In this thesis, I 
use the names Ceylon and Sri Lanka interchangeably to refer to the island, depending on the historical periods. 
2 The island of Ceylon was referred to as Eelam in ancient Tamil literatures and as Lanka in Sinhala chronicles. 
In 1922, with the rise of Tamil nationalism, Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam, a Tamil politician, coined the name 
Tamil Eelam  to  refer  to  the Tamil homeland  in  the northeastern parts of Ceylon, meaning  the Tamil part of 
Eelam  (Wilson,  1988:8).  However,  in  the  later  years,  the  name  Eelam  began  to  be  misconceived  as  the 
acronym  for  Tamil  Eelam,  resulting  in  the  use  of  the  term  ‘Eelam War’  to  denote  only  the  Tamils’  armed 
struggle.  In  this  thesis,  conceptualising war  beyond military  action,  I  use  the  term  to  refer  to  the  Tamil  – 
Sinhala conflict  from  the day  the  island‐state was  created:  it  includes Sri  Lanka’s ethno‐theocratic practices 
before the emergence of the armed conflict, Tamils’ non‐violent mode of resistance, and the armed conflict. 
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rationale behind Western policy in the Eelam War to the biopolitics of liberal peace. In the 
biopolitics of liberal peace, commercial globalisation is understood to be the key to making 
life live by bringing an end to the miseries that military confrontations between states can 
bring upon populations. It is as practitioners of this biopolitics that Western states have since 
the end of the Second World War waged wars and collaborated in the wars of their Southern 
counterparts to eliminate non-liberal actors who are considered to be a threat to global 
commerce and thus global populations. It is in these biopolitical wars to make life live by 
eliminating threats to life that Western states allow populations, including liberalised ones, to 
be killed, and condone the subversion of civil liberties, human rights and other democratic 
freedoms, including the right to self-determination of nations, that they simultaneously 
promote. These wars are waged not only in the form of military action, but through all power 
relations, i.e., law, finance, politics, and diplomacy, that produce the effects of battle. 
Foucault first coined the term biopolitics in 1976, in Volume I of The History of 
Sexuality. Later, in his lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics, delivered at the College de 
France in 1979, Foucault provided an alternative account of liberal peace as a concept that 
emerged in the middle of the eighteenth century for ending military confrontations between 
European powers through commercial globalisation (2008: 54-58). Applying these two ideas 
to understand Western policy in the Eelam War, I reveal the biopolitics of liberal peace and 
demonstrate its collaboration with Sri Lanka’s biopolitics centred on transforming the island 
into a Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocracy. To this end, I also build on from the concept of war 
that Foucault developed in his works Discipline and Punish, first published in 1975, and 
Volume I of The History of Sexuality, and the lecture series, “Society Must Be Defended”, 
delivered at the College de France in 1976.3 In developing a biopolitical perspective on the 
liberal state-building practices of the British Empire in colonial Ceylon, the ‘liberal’ Sri 
Lankan state’s post-colonial ethno-theocratic practices against the Tamils, and Western 
states’ own efforts to neutralise the Tamils’ armed struggle, I am able to establish that all 
                                                            
3 Although Foucault introduced his concept of biopolitics in Volume I of the History of Sexuality and some of his 
expositions on war can be found in Discipline and Punish, he developed his arguments further in the lectures 
that he  delivered  at  the  College  de  France  between  1976  to  1979. Although  some of  those  lectures were 
translated and published during Foucault’s lifetime, most of them have only become available in recent years. 
For a full discussion on Foucault’s expositions on war and his concept of biopolitics, see Chapter I. 
  6   
power relations that produce the effects of battle are ways of waging war. Those effects 
include: death, injury and the expulsion of the enemy; destruction of the enemy’s assets; 
appropriation of the enemy’s land/property; and the submission of the enemy.  
The distinct and original contribution this thesis forms to knowledge in the discipline of 
International Relations is twofold: on the one hand, the specific biopolitical perspective that 
has been developed in this thesis had never been tried before to explain Western policy in the 
Eelam War; on the other hand, none of the scholarly studies (including Foucauldian) that 
have examined the colonial and post-colonial practices of Western states in the global South 
have used this specific biopolitical perspective. Thus, as well as providing a new perspective 
on Western policy in the conflict in Sri Lanka, this thesis has also developed a novel way of 
using Foucault’s work in an area thus far unexplored by many Foucauldian scholars. 
A number of competing arguments are advanced to explain Western policy in the 
Eelam War. Those taking the realist standpoint argue that Western states are reluctant to heed 
the Tamil call for independence in order to avoid antagonising India, which has a much larger 
Tamil population than Sri Lanka and fears that the division of the island would in turn fuel 
secessionist demands in its own southern regional state of Tamil Nadu.4 According to 
                                                            
4 Even though most Tamils in Tamil Nadu support the secessionist demands of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and in 
March 2013 the Tamil Nadu State Assembly passed a resolution calling upon the Indian central government to 
intervene in the island and initiate a UN‐sponsored referendum to facilitate the creation of the state of Tamil 
Eelam (Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 2013: 1), the general public in Tamil Nadu has not shown interest in 
breaking away  from  India.  In  the 1930s, when  India remained under British colonial rule,  there was popular 
support in Tamil Nadu for the creation of an independent South Indian state. However, this secessionism was 
not based on Tamil nationalist sentiments or the idea of carving out a Tamil state. Instead, it was based on the 
idea of carving‐out a Dravidian country out of India. Although this Dravidian movement sought to incorporate 
the populations of  the South  Indian states of Kerala, Karnataka and Andra Pradesh, and even  the people of 
Bengal, in the proposed Dravidian country, it did not include the Tamils of Ceylon whose homeland lies only 20 
miles  away  from  Tamil  Nadu  (Krishna,  2000:  81).  Yet,  other  than  gaining  popularity  in  Tamil  Nadu,  this 
movement failed to have an impact on the other populations of South India. In 1956, when the Indian central 
government  devolved  more  power  to  the  Tamil  Nadu  Assembly  (formerly  the  Madras  State  Assembly), 
Dravidian secessionist sentiments  in  the state began  to wane and  finally died down  in 1967 when  the main 
Dravidian party, the Dravida Munnetra Kalagzam (DMK) came to power in Tamil Nadu (Krishna, 2000: 83). The 
Dravidian secessionist movement met  its death when Tamil nationalism was on the rise  in Ceylon and some 
sections of the Tamils in the island were contemplating launching an armed struggle to establish the state of 
Tamil Eelam. Although Tamil Nadu has  stood by  the  freedom  struggle of  the people of Tamil Eelam, as  the 
Indian intervention of 1987 to crush the Tamils’ armed struggle and India’s continuing military support for Sri 
Lanka shows,  it has not been able  to prevent  India  from adopting an anti‐Tamil Eelam stance, even  though 
before the conclusion of the armed conflict some scholars had predicted that the Tamils’ armed struggle in Sri 
Lanka  ‘cannot  be  suppressed’  without  ‘provoking  strong  reactions  from  Tamil  Nadu’  and  that  ‘regional 
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Wickramabahu Karunaratne, a Sinhala scholar and politician, ‘Western powers are always 
guided by the Indian interest’ when it comes to dealing with the Tamil question in Sri Lanka: 
‘Western countries listen to the Indian leadership and India doesn’t want the country to 
split’.5 In this regard, Jeffrey Lunstead, a former US ambassador to Colombo, also claims that 
India and the US are ‘in general accord in their analysis of Sri Lanka and its ethnic problem’ 
as both believe ‘that the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka needed to be preserved’ 
(2007: 25). However, those taking a liberal standpoint claim that the violent nature of Tamils’ 
freedom struggle was the key factor that turned the West against them. Simon Hughes, the 
deputy leader of the Liberal Democrats, argues that had Britain supported Tamils’ armed 
struggle for secession, it would have gone against its own policy of not supporting military 
insurrections: ‘The official position is – the British government has always been – we don’t 
support military insurrection against a government until it is clear that the military 
insurrection has the majority support of the people’.6 Some Tamil Diaspora figures even 
argue that the West sided with Sri Lanka because the Tamils failed to convince it of the 
legitimacy of their political grievances and counter Sri Lanka’s intense lobbying. According 
to S.V.Kirubaharan, the secretary general of Paris-based Tamil Centre for Human Rights: 
 
You cannot underestimate the propaganda lobby of the Sri Lankan government... 
The lobby of the Sri Lankan government is so smart, even today. So the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
governments in southern India could lend substantive covert and overt support to the Tamil cause against the 
wishes of the federal government and provoke a federal‐regional showdown’ (see Muppidi, 2001: 63‐64).  
5 This statement was made by Karunaratne during an interview with me on 17 April 2012. Karunaratne is the 
leader of the Left Front in Sri Lanka and has a close rapport with Western diplomats in Colombo. 
6 Hughes made this statement to me during an interview on 28 September 2010. Hughes is well known for his 
close relationship with the Tamil Diaspora  in Britain. Between 1996 and 2001, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), who spearheaded the Tamils’ armed struggle for political independence, had their international 
secretariat  in Southwark,  the constituency of Hughes. During  this period and after  the closure of  the LTTE’s 
international  secretariat  following  Britain’s  proscription  of  the  organisation,  Hughes  is  known  to  have 
interacted with the LTTE’s UK‐based high ranking political leaders. During the peak of the armed conflict in Sri 
Lanka (in the months of April and May 2009) he also acted as an unofficial  intermediary between the British 
government and the pro‐LTTE Tamil Diaspora protesters who occupied the Parliamentary Square for over two 
months demanding a Western‐sponsored ceasefire in the island. During this time, he arranged Tamil Diaspora 
representatives to travel to New York and Geneva to discuss with UN officials on the crisis in Sri Lanka.  
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international community couldn’t do anything because they were forced to listen 
to the state as well; whereas, I will say... the Eelam Tamils or Tamil Diaspora or 
the Tamils’ lobby, compared to the government lobby, was very weak... In 1977, 
we Tamils voted for the external right to self-determination of the Tamils... How 
many of us are lobbying within this context? How many of us are taking this 
forward and telling the people that in 1977 we had a democratic mandate of our 
people to have the external right to self-determination? We did not correctly 
inform the world.7  
 
Hughes also echoes Kirubaharan’s argument on the failure of the Tamils to set out their 
political grievances clearly to the outside world. For Hughes, ‘the British government’s view 
has been that there has been no recognised majority voice for independence in Tamil 
Eelam’.8 However, in developing a biopolitical perspective on Western policy in the Eelam 
War, I am able to reveal that these are not the most plausible explanations on Western 
support for Sri Lanka, nor their longstanding opposition to the formation of a Tamil state in 
the island. 
Although India has today emerged in the South Asian region as a partner of Western 
states, collaborating in the fields of trade and investment, maritime security, counter-
terrorism, and nuclear energy, the relationship between the West and India during the Cold 
War had not always been unproblematic (Lunstead, 2007: 23-25). Before obtaining dominion 
status for Ceylon, its Sinhala elites sought assurances from Britain that it would come to their 
aid if the island-state’s security was threatened by India or any other external forces. Britain 
responded by reaching an agreement with the Sinhala elites that its armed forces would be 
responsible for the island-state’s security until Ceylon developed the capacity to have its own 
military (Jayewardene, 1974: 42 & 46). When this arrangement was made, it was not done 
out of concern for Indian interests. As will be explained further in Chapter VI, from 1977 to 
1987, Sri Lanka also became the battleground of a proxy war between the West and India. 
                                                            
7 Kirubaharan stated this to me during an interview on 18 April 2012. 
8 Hughes stated this to me during the interview on 28 September 2010. 
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During this period, in the backdrop of its struggle against communism, the West enhanced 
military ties with the pro-liberal and pro-Western government of Sri Lanka, antagonising the 
then socialist government of India, which at that time considered outside influences in the 
South Asian region to be inimical to its national interest.9 In an attempt to steer Sri Lanka 
away from the influence of the West, and thereby put a check on Western influence in its 
backyard, India armed, trained and financed the Tamil armed resistance movement and 
hosted exiled Tamil politicians in its territory (Lunstead, 2007: 24-25). Thus, while it is true 
that Indian influence remains one of the reasons behind Western opposition to the formation 
of a Tamil state in the island today, this is only a development of the post-Cold War period.  
On the other hand, although the Tamils’ armed struggle for political independence was 
violent, it hardly had any spill-over effects outside the borders of Sri Lanka, with the 
exception in the 1970s and 1980s when India allowed the Tamil rebels to use its territory to 
set up their training camps, and in 1991 when the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
was assassinated by a Tamil suicidal attacker.10 Despite the claims of the Sri Lankan state, 
the Tamils’ armed struggle also did not have extra-territorial ambitions (Weiss, 2011: 77; 
Moorcraft, 2012: 90). Unlike many insurgent groups in other parts of the world, in particular 
those in the Middle East, the LTTE was also not influenced by any religious ideologies, but 
                                                            
9 Under  the premiership of  Indira Gandhi, between 1966‐1977 and 1980‐1984,  India  remained  intolerant  to 
‘external intervention in a conflict situation in any South Asian country if the intervention’ was deemed to have 
‘implicit or explicit anti‐Indian implication’; South Asian government’s were expected by New Delhi not to ‘ask 
for external  assistance’  if  such  assistance was  intended  to have  ‘an  anti‐Indian bias’  (Gupta, 1983,  cited  in 
DeVotta, 1998: 457). Scholars have referred to this policy as the ‘Indira Doctrine’ (see Rao, 1988: 422; DeVotta, 
1998: 457; also see Chacko 2012: 141). During a debate in the Indian Parliament on 5 August 1983, in response 
to  Sri  Lanka’s  violence  against  the  Tamils  and  Western  support  for  the  island‐state’s  counter‐insurgency 
efforts, Indira Gandhi spelled‐out this policy, although she did not enunciate it as a doctrine to bear her name: 
‘In this matter, India cannot be regarded just any country. Sri Lanka and India are the two countries who are 
directly concerned. Any extraneous involvement will complicate matters for both our countries’ (1986: 409).  
10 In contrast to the anti‐Sri Lankan policies of his mother Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi sent Indian troops to the 
Tamil homeland  in  July 1987  to  crush  the Tamils’ armed  struggle. However,  the new government of Prime 
Minister V.P.Singh that came to power in New Delhi in December 1989 withdrew Indian troops from the Tamil 
homeland in March 1990 and even followed a non‐interventionary approach in the Eelam War (see Chapters 
VI & VII). Rajiv Gandhi criticised this and even made pledges in public forums that if he returned to power, he 
would  reverse  the non‐interventionary  approach of  Singh’s  government. On  this basis,  Indian  investigators 
have accused the LTTE of assassinating Rajiv Gandhi using a Tamil female suicidal attacker as a retribution for 
sending  Indian  troops  to  the  Tamil  homeland  and  to  deter  India  from  carrying  out  another  military 
intervention (see Subramaniam, 1998). However, the LTTE has consistently denied involvement in the killing. 
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followed secular policies (Murray, 2006: 194; Moorcraft, 2012: 90-91). Moreover, 
throughout the armed conflict, the LTTE not only distanced itself from terrorists and 
insurgent groups that were hostile to Western interests, in particular Islamist Jihadists, but 
also carefully avoided targeting Western tourists and investments, both within and outside the 
island. Western diplomats have acknowledged this (Lunstead, 2007: 15).  
Although Western states have deplored the use of suicidal attackers by the LTTE in its 
military campaigns against the Sri Lankan state, this cannot be attributed to deaths caused to 
civilians in some of the attacks. Compared to other insurgent groups, while the LTTE is 
known to have carried out the highest number of suicidal attacks (Murray, 2006: 194), in 
most of those attacks civilians had hardly been the targets. As Namini Wijedasa, a Sinhala 
journalist who won the European Commission’s Lorenzo Natali prize for her reporting on the 
conflict, notes, the LTTE does not ‘usually deploy suicide cadres on civilian targets’ (2008). 
According to Gordon Weiss, who served as the UN’s spokesperson in Colombo during the 
last phase of the armed conflict, the LTTE used suicidal attackers as ‘an efficient deployment 
of resources’ in its military campaigns against the Sri Lankan state: they were used as ‘the 
poor man’s tactical weapon or smart bomb’ (2011: 77). For Weiss, even the suicidal attackers 
of the LTTE cannot be called suicide bombers. They were ‘suicide attackers only in the sense 
that the daring and destructive capacity of their attacks entailed almost certain death’ for 
them: ‘With their training and dedication they were, to the Tamils at least, the equivalent 
perhaps of the British SAS or the US army’s elite Rangers corps’ (Ibid.: 77 & 79). There 
were even occasions in which some of the suicidal attackers of the LTTE returned to their 
bases alive after successfully carrying out attacks against the Sri Lankan military11 (Ibid.: 79). 
It would therefore be incorrect to assert that the West did not support the Tamils’ armed 
struggle because the LTTE used suicidal attackers to target civilians. Instead, Western 
opposition to the LTTE’s use of suicidal attackers was, as the FBI had noted, based on the 
belief that the latter’s ‘tactics have inspired terrorist networks worldwide’ (2008). 
                                                            
11 This was also confirmed by a former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia during an interview with 
me in 2010.  
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Even this opposition is a development of the post-Cold War period. The LTTE carried 
out its first suicidal attack in July 1987 on a military base of the Sri Lankan state 
(Balasingham, 1993: 39), fifteen years after the armed struggle began in 1972. However, no 
further suicidal attacks were carried out for the next three years, even though the armed 
conflict continued. It was from July 1990 that the LTTE resumed suicidal attacks targeting 
the Sri Lankan military, which were later extended to the state’s political leadership and often 
its economic infrastructures, culminating into a total of 137 of such recorded attacks when the 
armed conflict came to its conclusion on 18 May 2009 (Weiss, 2011: 77). However, Western 
states have collaborated with Sri Lanka’s counter insurgency efforts long before the LTTE 
began using suicidal attackers in its armed struggle. It was only after Palestinian suicide 
bombers began imitating the methods of the LTTE in their attacks on Israeli civilians in the 
mid-1990s that Western states began turning their attention to the latter’s suicidal tactics. 
Therefore, Western opposition to the use of suicidal attackers by the LTTE is also a 
development of the post-Cold War period, whereas their collaboration in Sri Lanka’s counter 
insurgency efforts goes as far back as to 1977 when the island-state’s pro-Western 
government of J.R.Jayewardene liberalised the economy (as I shall show in Chapter VI).  
In addition, despite their hostility to the Tamils’ armed struggle, Western diplomats and 
political leaders have time and again openly stated that the Tamils had legitimate political 
grievances in terms of their rights as citizens of Sri Lanka. For example, during his address to 
the House of Commons in June 2000, the British Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain stated 
that his government expected any political settlement in the island to respect ‘the territorial 
integrity of Sri Lanka’ as well as ‘the rights of the Tamil community’ (HC Deb 20 June 
2000). Similarly, commenting on US policy in relation to the Tamils, Lunstead notes that the 
American government has recognised that ‘the Tamils of Sri Lanka have legitimate 
grievances which the [Sri Lankan] government must address’ (2007: 39). Moreover, the 
Tamils had long spelled out their desire to form a state of their own in the general election of 
1977, in which the Tamil political party, Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), that 
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advocated secession in its election manifesto won the majority of Tamil votes and became, 
for the first time in the post-colonial history of the island, the country’s main opposition.12  
It is therefore a fallacy to assert that Western states did not support the Tamils’ armed 
struggle for political independence because of India or because it was violent; nor is it correct 
to assert that Western states supported Sri Lanka because the Tamils failed to set-out their 
political grievances clearly to the world and counter Sri Lanka’s lobbying. 
This being the case, why has the West, from the day that the island-state of Ceylon 
came into existence, followed the policy of supporting it and opposing the Tamils’ demand 
for secession? During the Cold War, Western states threw their weight behind Sri Lanka on 
the basis that it was a ‘liberal democracy’ that stood against communism and for the best part 
of the Cold War upheld liberal economic policies, even though from 1956 to 1972 it 
incorporated semi-statist economic policies and from 1972 to 1977 adopted socialist 
economic policies. As Lunstead notes, the US government’s ‘engagement with Sri Lanka 
after independence was driven significantly by the Cold War and the worldwide struggle with 
the Soviet Union’ (2007: 12). This rationale of the West in supporting Sri Lanka became 
more apparent with the Tamil national liberation movement13 setting out its manifesto for 
secession in 197614 largely in line with the socialist policies of the Indian Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi, who, despite advocating non-alignment, maintained close military ties with 
the Soviet Union. Thus, during his meeting with the Sri Lankan President Jayewardene at the 
White House on 18 June, 1984, the US President Ronald Reagan not only applauded his 
                                                            
12 On 8 August 1983,  six years after Tamils voted  for  independence  in  the general election of 1977,  the Sri 
Lankan government amended the island‐state’s constitution, criminalising secessionist demands. 
13  In using  the  term Tamil national  liberation movement,  I mean Tamil political parties, civil  society groups, 
politico‐military organisations, which  include  the  LTTE,  and  Tamil Diaspora organisations  that  advocate  the 
political  independence of Tamils. However,  in using  the  term Tamil armed  resistance movement,  I am only 
referring  to  sections of  the Tamil national  liberation movement  that waged  the armed  struggle. During  the 
1970s and 1980s, although the LTTE remained the dominant Tamil politico‐military organisation, it was not the 
only  organisation  that waged  the  armed  struggle. However,  by  1990  the  LTTE  emerged, having  disbanded 
other militant groups, as the sole politico‐military organisation that waged the armed struggle. Thus, when  I 
use  the  term Tamil armed  resistance movement  in  the context of  the armed  conflict during  the 1970s and 
1980s,  I am referring both to the LTTE and other Tamil armed organisations. However, when  I use the same 
term for the period commencing 1990, I am only referring to the LTTE.   
14 This manifesto for independence was later put before the Tamil public in the general election of 1977. 
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counterpart for the latter’s pro-market economic policies but also for following a ‘genuine’ 
policy of non-alignment (an issue we shall consider at length in Chapter VI).  
In the post-Cold War period, despite the absence of the communist threat, Western 
diplomats and political leaders reiterated their support for Sri Lanka on the basis of their 
commitment to promoting democracy and liberal economic policies across the globe. Writing 
in 2011, two years after of the conclusion of the armed conflict, Lunstead claimed that the 
United States supported Sri Lanka as the latter had ‘democratic government’ (2011: 71). Nine 
years prior to this, Ashley Wills, another former US ambassador to Colombo, claimed during 
an interview to a Colombo-based weekly that his government supported Sri Lanka as part of 
its global efforts to promote democracy, human rights and ‘free market approaches to 
organising a nation’s economic life’ (2002). Sri Lanka’s democracy was, Wills lamented, 
‘being tested and torn by conflict, in particular ethnic conflict’ (2001). Tamils’ demand for 
political independence was neither ‘possible’ nor ‘even desirable’, and instead they must 
learn to live as Sri Lankans, Wills argued (Ibid.). These statements, among many others that I 
will be citing in Chapters IV to VIII, demonstrate that from the day that the island-state of 
Ceylon was created by the British Empire, Western policy towards it and the Tamils’ demand 
for political independence have been underpinned by the concept of liberal peace. 
Although much of the official statements that I will be citing in this thesis to explain 
Western policy in the Eelam War are from US diplomats and political leaders, this does not 
mean that Britain or other Western states have followed a different policy. During the Cold 
War, it was the US, with Britain playing a complementary role, that took the lead to promote 
Western liberal values and counter the Soviet threat in the global South while other Western 
states largely played the role of allies. This was no different in the case of Ceylon. As will be 
explained further in Chapter IV, even though until 1972 Ceylon was headed by the British 
monarchy15 and was part of the British Commonwealth,16 it was the US that played a key role 
in ensuring that the island-state did not become a satellite state of the Soviet Union. In this 
                                                            
15 Even after  independence  in 1948, the British monarchy remained Ceylon’s Head of State until 1972, when 
the island‐state was renamed Sri Lanka and became a republic, replacing the British monarchy with an elected 
president. In 1978 further constitutional changes were made, establishing an elected executive presidency.  
16 Even today, Sri Lanka is part of the Commonwealth. 
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regard, in an internal policy statement circulated during the Korean War in 1951, the US 
Department of State noted that it expected ‘Ceylon to develop an attitude which would enable 
the US to obtain, and the UK to retain, facilities required in time of peace or in the event of 
war’ and ‘prevent the USSR from obtaining any form of military support or other assistance 
from Ceylon’ (1977: 2013). The US Department of State also noted that it expected Ceylon to 
‘uphold the UK-Commonwealth point of view’ in foreign affairs (Ibid.). Thus, as Dominic 
John Chilcott, a former British ambassador to Colombo has acknowledged, although ‘the US 
has, from time to time, taken a contrary view from Britain in world affairs’, when it comes to 
‘Sri Lanka’s conflict, Britain has been in agreement with America’ (2006). 
This is also the case with other Western states. During the Cold War, even though many 
Western states did not have tangible interests in Sri Lanka, they nevertheless benefitted from 
the engagements of the US and Britain with the island-state. For example, during the Korean 
War17 and the conflicts in Indo-China, the US and Britain as well as their other Western allies 
found Ceylon to be beneficial to them as a refuelling base for their ships and aircrafts 
(Jayewardene, 1974: 41). With the end of the Cold War, those Western states began to play 
an active role in the conflict, complementing those of the US and Britain. This role has 
ranged from facilitating a ceasefire and supervising its implementation, hosting the 
belligerents for peace talks, and providing development aid, to tilting the military balance in 
favour of the Sri Lankan armed forces by proscribing and isolating the LTTE as a terrorist 
organisation, taking legal action against its international operatives, sharing intelligence with 
Sri Lanka on the LTTE’s overseas fundraising and arm procurements, and providing military 
assistance to the government forces (in the form of arms and the training of troops) to disrupt 
the LTTE’s military supplies and destroy its capacity to continue the armed struggle.  
Even though each Western state has played its part in the conflict independent of its 
Western allies, in most cases (as we will see in Chapters VII and VIII), these roles have been 
co-ordinated.18 Acknowledging this, Erik Solheim,19 Norway’s former cabinet minister who 
                                                            
17  During  the  Korean  War,  troops  from  Australia,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  France,  Greece,  Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, UK, and US fought alongside South Korean forces. 
18 By the time the Norwegian‐sponsored ceasefire broke down in July 2006 (though the ceasefire continued to 
remain in theory as neither the LTTE nor the Sri Lankan government abrogated it), the US, UK, Canada and 26 
other EU countries had proscribed  the LTTE as a  terrorist organisation. This was  in addition  to a number of 
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played a key role in the Norwegian-led Western intervention20 in Sri Lanka, has noted that 
Oslo’s efforts to end the armed conflict were not undertaken in isolation but as a contribution 
to global security: ‘Basically we believe that this is the security policy for the twenty-first 
century. If we want a peaceful world we must contribute and if we want a peaceful Norway 
we must have a peaceful world’ (2009). Similarly, in his reflections on the role of the US in 
Sri Lanka from 2001 onwards, Lunstead notes that there had been an unofficial ‘division of 
labour’ among Western states during the intervention (2007: 5-6). While the US took a harder 
line towards the LTTE, other Western states, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and 
international financial institutions (IFIs) played a softer role (Ibid.: 5-7 & 35). The objective 
of this carrot-and-stick policy of the West towards the LTTE (Ibid.: 16), as Richard Armitage 
(2002), the then US Deputy Secretary of State, spelled out during a mini-donor conference in 
Oslo in November 2002, was to compel the LTTE to renounce ‘its armed struggle for a 
separate state’. In this regard, Suthaharan Nadarajah, a UK-based Tamil academic who acted 
as a resource person in the LTTE’s peace delegation, notes that the Norwegian-led Western 
intervention in the Eelam War ultimately sought ‘a solution that would maintain Sri Lanka’s 
unity and lead to the LTTE’s disarmament’ (2008: 88).  
Some recent studies (both official and academic) on the Eelam War have traced the 
origins of liberal peace in Sri Lanka to the Norwegian-sponsored ceasefire in 2002 
(Goodhand, Spencer & Korf, 2011: 3; Sorbo et al., 2011: 71). According to a study 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
legal restrictions which were imposed on the LTTE in Australia and New Zealand. However, when the ceasefire 
agreement was signed in February 2002, the LTTE remained a proscribed organisation only in the US and UK, in 
addition to the restrictions imposed following 9/11 on its ability to raise funds in Australia and Canada.  
19 When  the Norway entered  the  conflict  in  Sri  Lanka  in 1999  seeking  to  facilitate a  ceasefire and political 
negotiations, Erik Solheim was first appointed by Oslo as the special envoy to Sri Lanka, the post which he held 
until 17 October 2005, when he became Norway’s minister for international development. From then onwards 
until the conclusion of the armed conflict in May 2009, Solheim oversaw Norway’s role in the conflict.  
20 Although the Norwegian‐facilitated ceasefire and peace negotiations in the Eelam War are referred to in the 
mainstream media and official documents as  the  ‘Norwegian peace process’, given  its strong  interventionist 
characteristics and  the way  that  ‘Norwegian officials were muscular  in setting both  the agenda and pace of 
talks’, some scholars, as well as some senior Sri Lankan government officials and ministers, have characterised 
it as an intervention (see Nadarajah, 2008: 88; Moorcraft, 2012: 112). In this thesis, I refer to it not simply as 
the Norwegian intervention but as the Norwegian‐led Western intervention because it was part of the West’s 
war to defeat the LTTE through means other than military action, i.e., law, finance, diplomacy, and politics. 
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commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad) in 2011, 
when Norway successfully mediated the ceasefire in 2002 many international actors saw Sri 
Lanka as ‘a potential liberal peacebuilding success story’ (Sorbo et al., 2011: 44). Even 
though the study commissioned by Norad (Ibid.: 71 & 73) claims that ‘not all international 
actors were conscious agents of liberal peacebuilding’ and that ‘Norway was not a conscious 
proponent of liberal peacebuilding’, it acknowledges that all international actors were 
‘influenced’ by many of the ‘key components and underlying assumptions’ of liberal peace: 
 
The assumptions were that a peace settlement could be reached through a 
mediated settlement; that a peace deal would need to be linked to political reforms 
involving the democratization of the state through some form of devolution 
package; that economic growth achieved through liberalisation and a 
reconstruction package would help build security by creating a peace dividend and 
shared interests for peace; and that these three elements were inter-dependent and 
mutually reinforcing. The ‘liberal peace’ therefore can be understood, not just as 
an academic construct, but as a concrete phenomenon which implicitly or 
explicitly shaped the ground rules and approach to the peace process (Ibid.: 71). 
 
Despite acknowledging the Norwegian-led Western intervention to have been underpinned by 
the concept of liberal peace, these studies have erred in tracing the latter’s origins in Sri 
Lanka to 2002. In this thesis, I am able to demonstrate that liberal peace has a longer 
genealogy in Sri Lanka, going back to 1948 when the island-state was created, and has a 
continuity with the liberal state-building practices of the British Empire in the island. 
In using the term the ‘West’, I am referring to the states that exist in the continents of 
Europe, North America and Australia, and the two market democracies of East Asia (Japan 
and South Korea) that are wealthy and have political and economic systems largely mirroring 
those in the states of the former three continents. During the days of European colonialism, 
the term ‘West’, as well as the term ‘Occident’, was used largely to refer to Europe 
(Huntington, 1996: 32). After America’s entry in the First World War, the term ‘West’ began 
to be used more commonly to refer to Europe and the states created in the continents of North 
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America and Australia as a result of European colonial settlements. Later, scholars also used 
the term ‘North’ to refer to the West to signify its economic status (Huntington, 1996: 33). 
With the end of the Cold War, liberal scholars divided the world into two zones: the ‘zones of 
peace’ and the ‘zones of turmoil’ (Ibid.: 32). While the former was understood to include the 
‘West and Japan’, the latter was understood to encompass the rest of the world (Ibid.), even 
though Michael Doyle (1986: 1164), whose works of the 1980s remain central to the liberal 
peace literature of the twentieth century, placed many non-Western states (such as Sri Lanka 
and India) within the ‘zone of peace’. However, James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 
who use the terms ‘liberal core’ and ‘Western core’ to refer to the West as the ‘zone of 
peace’, claim that it encompasses ‘Western Europe, North America, and parts of East Asia’ 
(2001: 3 & 6). As this study is centred on the concept of liberal peace, in this thesis I will be 
using the term ‘West’ to collectively refer to the states that are understood to exist within this 
‘liberal zone of peace’, i.e., and not to refer to a single geographical location in the world.  
Although the non-Western world has been referred to by scholars using the terms the 
‘East’, the ‘third world’, the ‘periphery’, and the ‘global South’, in this thesis I only use the 
term ‘global South’ to refer to it in the present context because other terms reflect more 
accurately the previous historical periods. Using the colonial term ‘East’ to distinguish the 
rest of the world from the West no longer makes sense because large sections of ‘Eastern’ 
populations have become, especially in the post-Cold War period, part of Western 
populations by migrating to the West. The term only makes sense when it is used to refer to 
the countries of Asia and Africa during the colonial period. Similarly, the terms ‘third world’ 
and ‘periphery’ also do not make any sense today as the world is no longer divided into three 
parts, as it was understood to have been during the Cold War; nor are relations between the 
West and the rest of the World conducted on the basis of domination and subordination (see 
Chapter II). While these three terms reflect different historical periods, the term ‘global 
South’ or ‘South’ cannot be situated in any such periods. It therefore remains a better term 
today to refer to the rest of the world. Even though the term is used today by many scholars to 
loosely refer to all non-Western countries where poverty is still a major issue (Huntington, 
1996: 33; Duffield, 2002: 4), in using the term, I do not attach to it any such meaning. I am 
also not using it to mean a single geographical location: I am not using it in its literal sense. 
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However, in my studies on the colonial liberal state-building practices of the British Empire, I 
use the term ‘East’ instead of the term ‘South’ to refer to its colonies in Asia and Africa.  
What are we to understand by the concept of liberal peace? During the Cold War, it was 
used by liberal scholars to explain theoretically the reasons behind the absence of military 
confrontations since the end of the Second World War between Western liberal democracies. 
While some have argued that the democratic nature of Western states has led to the absence 
of military confrontations between them (Babst, 1964), others have credited this to Western 
states’ commitment to liberty, the rule of law, a free market economy, and representative 
government (Doyle, 1983). This concept has a geneology in the thoughts of early liberal 
thinkers such as Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant and the liberal statesman Woodrow Wilson.  
With the end of the Cold War, the concept of liberal peace became the dominant 
paradigm in Western political thought and practice. On the one hand, many Western states 
began to articulate and conduct their foreign policies within the framework of liberal peace 
(Clinton, 1993; Blair, 1999; Bush, 2008; Obama, 2010). On the other hand, IGOs, IFIs, 
Western non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and human rights groups also began 
pursuing their activities in the global South within this framework (Duffield, 2002: 12). 
Espoused as the key to global peace, liberal peace was embedded in many of the Western-led 
post-Cold War humanitarian interventions, ‘peacebuilding’ missions, conflict resolution 
efforts, aid programmes, and the Global War on Terror (GWoT). Western states took the lead 
in institutionalising a liberal democratic system of government in the states of the global 
South, seeking to transform them into market democracies that adhered to the principles of 
rule of law, respected civil liberties and human rights, conducted periodic and genuine 
elections, and guaranteed the security of a free functioning and globalised market within their 
borders (Paris, 2009: 5). At the same time, as will be explained in Chapters III, VII and VIII, 
Western states also undertook interventions in the former colonies of European powers to 
reinstate and consolidate liberal democratic institutions of the colonial period. This is not to 
say that the concept of liberal peace was only embedded in Western interventions of the post-
Cold War period. During the Cold War, the concept was also embedded in most of the 
Western interventions undertaken under the banner of containment and development. A full 
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discussion of the theoretical aspects of the concept of liberal peace will be made in Chapter 
II, followed by a further discussion in Chapter III about how it has unfolded in practice. 
Despite having embedded in their foreign policies a concept that claims military 
confrontations between states can be brought to an end through political and economic 
liberalisation, why do Western states, in the name of bringing peace to the entire globe, wage 
wars as well as collaborate in the wars of their Southern counterparts, condoning the use of 
violence against certain groups of populations within the latter’s borders and the subversion 
of human rights, civil liberties and other democratic freedoms, as in the case of Sri Lanka? In 
the post-Cold War period, with the increase in the number of Western interventions in the 
global South, a body of scholarly work has emerged claiming to ‘critique’ the concept of 
liberal peace. Much of it, however, has focused on the failure of Western interventions and 
suggesting ways of better managing liberalisation or alternative peacebuilding strategies, 
rather than explaining the rationale behind such interventions and the role of war. 
For example, in At Wars End, Roland Paris attributes the failure of many liberal 
‘peacebuilding’ missions to naive assumptions on the part of ‘peacebuilders’ that 
democratization and marketization automatically leads to peace, and suggests that in order to 
ensure the success of liberal peace, ‘peacebuilders’ should institutionalise authoritative and 
effective mechanisms of government before undertaking political and economic 
liberalisation: ‘Only when a working governmental authority has been re-established should 
peacebuilders initiate a series of gradual democratic and market oriented reforms’ (2009: 
151-152 & 188). Oliver P. Richmond and Mitchell Audra, however, attribute the failure of 
liberal peace to its ‘pragmatically implausible and intellectually or culturally alien’ character 
to some of the ‘developing states’ of the world (2011: 326). The solution to overcoming such 
obstacles is to conceive resistance to liberal peace ‘as important and valuable critiques’ and 
make changes accordingly, or treat resistance as ‘sources of alternative practices that more 
accurately reflect the needs, goals, and aspirations of local actors, and thus increase the 
legitimacy and durability of peace processes in question’ (Ibid.: 327).  
On the other hand, claiming that neo-liberal economic policies implemented as part of 
liberal ‘peacebuilding’ exacerbate conflicts, Marxist scholars such as Neil Cooper, Mandy 
Turner and Michael Pugh suggest an alternative strategy of peacebuilding that would lead to 
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‘a dialogue between heterodoxies’, accommodating alternative economic systems such as 
‘tribal, religious and customary forms of production and exchange’ of the global South with 
neo-liberal and state welfarist, centralised, decentralised, protectionist, integrative, and 
modernising economic systems  (2011: 6 & 11-12). Acknowledging ‘the variety of political 
economies’ in the South ‘as varied forms of peace’ by Western peacebuilders would be a 
right step in this direction (Ibid.: 12). Another step would be to reform ‘global economic 
structures’ and address the ‘gross inequalities and forms of exploitations in the global 
economy’ (Ibid.). Until Southern societies are allowed to adopt protectionist and social 
welfare policies on which Western societies had ‘based their original development’, 
undertaking ‘peacebuilding’ would be similar to ‘training a goldfish in a desert’ (Ibid.).  
David Chandler (2010: 1) characterises ‘critiques’ of this nature, as well as some those 
that have sought to explain the rationale behind Western interventions (for example Duffield, 
2007; Dillon & Reid, 2009), to be ‘uncritical critique of “liberal peace”’. They are uncritical, 
he argues, in that instead of criticising ‘liberalism for its inability to overcome social, 
economic and cultural inequalities’, they seek to explain the failure of liberal ‘peacebuilding’ 
on the assumption that ‘democracy or development are somehow not “appropriate” 
aspirations’ for non-Western societies ‘or that expectations need to be substantially lowered 
or changed to account for difference’ between Western liberal societies and the non-liberal 
‘other’ societies (Chandler, 2010: 10). In essence, for Chandler, in portraying ‘the non-liberal 
other’ as the ‘barrier’ to the success of liberal ‘peacebuilding’, these critiques become 
apologies for the failure of liberal ‘peacebuilding’ (Ibid.: 10 & 12).21  
Chandler also claims that it is conceptually incorrect to situate post-Cold War Western 
interventions within the framework of liberal peace: ‘It would appear that the key concepts 
and values of the “liberal peace” held to have been promoted with vigour with the “victory of 
liberalism” at the end of the Cold War were never as dominant a framing as their radical and 
policy critics have claimed’ (Ibid.: 12). While noting that ‘reconstruction or rebuilding of 
                                                            
21 With the exception of the works of Paris, Duffield, and Dillon and Reid, although Chandler’s criticism of the 
works of Richmond, Cooper, Turner, and Pugh were based on those published prior to those cited above,  it 
nevertheless remains a valid criticism  in that  in their  later works the  latter have upheld the arguments they 
had advanced before.  
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states’ had been at the core of many post-Cold War Western interventions, Chandler argues 
that such interventions had never been ‘aimed at the construction of a liberal international 
order’ (Ibid.). Instead, they were intended to ‘keep the lid on or to manage the “complexity” 
of non-Western societies’, which are usually ‘perceived in terms of fixed ethnic and regional 
divisions’: the objective was to internationalise ‘the mechanisms of governance’, thereby 
‘removing substantive autonomy’ of non-Western states (Ibid.).  
While making such claims, Chandler (Ibid.: 11-12) neither substantiates them – other 
than referring to some of the official reports of World Bank (some of which are from the 
closing years of the Cold War, i.e., 1989 and 1990) in which it had been argued that Western 
interventions cannot simply rely on promoting political and economic liberalisation – nor 
addresses policy statements of political leaders of leading Western states (such as the US and 
UK) that have consistently justified post-Cold War Western interventions within the 
framework of liberal peace. For example, in his address to the forty-eighth session of the UN, 
the then US President Bill Clinton argued that the ‘overriding purpose’ of America ‘must be 
to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies’ (1993). 
Following Clinton, justifying Western intervention in Kosovo, the British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair claimed that it is in the ‘national interests’ of the West to ‘establish and spread the 
values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society’ (1999). In similar 
manner, justifying liberal state-building in Iraq, the American President George W.Bush 
claimed in 2004 that ‘America is a nation with a mission’ for ‘democratic peace’ (2008: 203). 
Therefore, in this respect, Chandler’s arguments rest on shaky grounds. However, 
Chandler’s characterisation of ‘critiques’ of liberal peace as uncritical are not unwarranted, in 
that despite claiming to critique liberal peace they end up, at least implicitly, implicating non-
Western societies for the failure of liberal ‘peacebuilding’ (see Duffield, 2007: 30; Paris, 
2009: 159-175; Dillon & Reid, 2009: 83; Cooper, Turner & Pugh, 2011: 12; Richmond & 
Audra, 2011: 328-329). This is not to say that the works of scholars cited above do not 
provide any insights on the concept of liberal peace. The works of Richmond (2006) provide 
insights into the operation of various strands of liberal peace both at normative and 
institutional levels (this will be taken-up further in Chapter II). Similarly, despite their 
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limitations (which will be discussed below), the work of Foucauldian scholars have also 
succeeded in partially explaining the rationale behind post-Cold War Western interventions. 
Using a Foucauldian framework, Mark Duffield has sought explain the rationale behind 
Western interventions in the South by conceptualising development undertaken as part of 
liberal ‘peacebuilding’ as ‘a regime of biopolitics that generically divides humankind into 
developed and underdeveloped species-life’ (2007: 16). In this biopolitical perspective of 
Duffield, Western populations are understood to belong to the developed part of the 
humankind while Southern populations are understood to constitute the underdeveloped life 
(Ibid.: 16 & 17). Citing a number of official publications of Western governments and IGOs, 
Duffield argues that Western political leaders and policy makers have understood that in light 
of globalisation they cannot remain blind to instability in the South because it can have a 
direct impact on Western societies: ‘The ripple effects of poverty, environmental collapse, 
civil conflicts or health crisis require international management, since they do not respect 
geographical boundaries. Otherwise, they will inundate and destabilize Western society’ 
(Ibid.: 1). It is therefore in an attempt to secure Western populations and their way of life 
from the effects of instability in the South that the West undertakes interventions (Ibid.: 2 & 
30). In the first instance, Western states as well as Western non-state actors (such as NGOs) 
seek to improve the lives of Southern populations by developing their ‘self-reliance’ 
capabilities ‘in terms of their general economic, social and welfare requirements’ (Ibid.: 18).  
Whenever the self-reliance capabilities of Southern societies break down, Western 
interventions become ‘a regime of international social protection of last resort’ (Ibid.). In 
other words, whenever order within Southern societies breaks down, the West undertakes 
interventions within those societies to construct a liberal state-order, thereby assuming a 
‘developmental trusteeship’ over them until such a state-order is established (Ibid.: 7-8). 
Duffield also argues that Western interventions are partly underpinned by the moral impulses 
of Western societies to improve the lives of Southern populations – which he calls 
‘enlightened self-interest’ (Ibid.: 2). In essence, Duffield’s biopolitical perspective of 
development explains Western interventions to be underpinned by both the self-interest of 
Western states and the moral impulses of Western societies (Ibid.). 
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Also using a Foucauldian framework, Michael Dillon and Julian Reid have sought to 
explain the rationale behind Western interventions by conceptualising them as biopolitical 
endeavours underpinned by liberalism’s commitment to bringing ‘peace and prosperity’ to 
the humankind through the removal of ‘the scourge of war’ from life (2009: 42). On the one 
hand, liberalism seeks to fulfil this commitment by making ‘more states and societies look 
like liberal states and societies’ on the belief that if ‘we were all the same there would be no 
one to fight and nothing to fight over’ (Ibid.: 48). On the other hand, it also seeks to fulfil this 
commitment by ‘assaying life’ that it considers to be ‘inimical to the promotion of life’ (Ibid.: 
87). In other words, having committed to the peace and prosperity of the humankind, 
liberalism wages war on life that is seen to be a threat to fulfilling this commitment: ‘It 
decides, implicitly or explicitly, whom to correct and whom to punish, as well as who shall 
live and who shall die, what life forms will be promoted and which will be terminated’ 
(Ibid.). Thus, the biopolitical perspective of Dillon and Reid explains Western interventions 
to be underpinned by liberalism’s commitment to liberalising states and populations, with 
peace and prosperity for the humankind being the ultimate objective. 
As noted earlier, it has long been established that liberalisation remains at the core of 
most of the interventions undertaken by the West in the states of the South. In this sense, 
Duffield, and Dillon and Reid have correctly identified that by promoting, undertaking, and 
consolidating liberalisation programmes, the West seeks to liberalise global populations. It 
cannot also be denied that Western interventions in the South are linked to the safety and 
security of Western populations and their way of life, as Duffield, and Dillon and Reid argue. 
However, a number of limitations can be identified in their biopolitical perspectives. 
Duffield’s claim that Western interventions are partly underpinned by the moral 
impulses of Western societies is a misplaced one. It cannot be denied that some of the 
interventions undertaken by the West (such as those undertaken in the aftermath of natural 
disasters) have certainly been underpinned by the moral impulses of the West. However, not 
all Western interventions have been underpinned by such moral impulses. As we will see in 
Chapters VII and VIII, the Norwegian-led Western intervention in the Eelam War cannot be 
construed to have been underpinned by any moral impulses that the West may have had 
towards the island’s Tamil population. Instead, it was undertaken to compel the LTTE to 
  24   
give-up its secessionist armed struggle and accept Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. In other words, 
the intervention sought to tilt the military balance in favour of the Sri Lankan state that was 
responsible for perpetrating mass-scale human rights abuses against the Tamils. Thus, 
Duffield’s claim on the enlightened self-interest of the West makes sense only in certain 
cases; it cannot explain every intervention the West has undertaken in the South.   
The same can be said of Dillon and Reid’s claim that the West wages war to fulfil 
liberalism’s commitment of bringing peace and prosperity to the humankind by promoting 
the liberal way of life. As will be explained in Chapters IV to VIII, under British colonial 
rule, the Tamils in Ceylon embraced liberal principles more than the Sinhalese: when the 
island-state was created in 1948, the Tamils were more liberalised than the Sinhalese. Yet, 
following decolonisation, despite being very well aware that the Tamils were facing state-
aggression and discrimination, the West did not intervene in their favour to bring peace and 
prosperity them. Instead, it initially turned a blind-eye to their plight and later collaborated 
with Sri Lanka in its war to create a Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocratic identity for the 
island’s population through its liberal democratic apparatus of governance. Clearly, these 
actions and inactions on the part of the West cannot be construed as having been underpinned 
by liberalism’s commitment to bringing peace and prosperity to the humankind. Moreover, if 
promoting the liberal way of life for the humankind remains central to Western wars, why did 
the West not turn against Sri Lanka when a liberalised population within its borders faced 
aggression? The biopolitical perspectives of Dillon and Reid cannot explain these. 
The limitations of the biopolitical perspectives of Duffield, and Dillon and Reid can be 
attributed to their tendency to either ignore or underplay the commercial dynamics of most of 
the Western interventions. Whereas the biopolitics of development used by Duffield to 
explain Western interventions in the global South does not take into account the central role 
played by global commerce in the manifestations of the concept of liberal peace, the 
biopolitics of peace and prosperity used by Dillon and Reid underplays the centrality of 
global commerce in Western efforts to liberalise Southern states and populations. To an 
extent, this tendency, as the work of Dillon and Reid indicate, is the result of two 
misconceptions: firstly, there is a misconception that recognising the central role that 
commerce plays in liberal biopolitics leads automatically to following ‘traditional Marxist 
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accounts of the political economy of liberal rule and war’; secondly, there is a misconception 
that economy no longer remains central to liberal biopolitics (2009: 24 & 29).  
Using the theoretical framework of imperialism, Marxist scholars Tarak Barkawi and 
Mark Laffey have sought to conceptualise Western interventions as imperial endeavours that 
have been undertaken to produce ‘liberal spaces’ so that ‘territories and populations’ can be 
administered in ways that are ‘understood by US state manager to be consistent with US 
interests and with the preservation and extension of a US-centred liberal and capitalist order’ 
(1999: 419). The production of liberal spaces, however, is not intended to extend the political 
and civil rights enjoyed by Western populations to their Southern counterparts (Ibid.: 418). 
Instead, it is intended to preserve order outside the West and defend ‘economic rights for 
local and external elites’ (Ibid.). In their view, the acclaimed commitment of the West to 
spread liberal democracy to the South through political liberalisation is nothing but a rhetoric. 
In essence, for Barkawi and Laffey, Western interventions are imperial endeavours 
undertaken by the capitalist West to exploit the South through economic liberalisation.  
Unlike Duffield, and Dillon and Reid, although Barkawi and Laffey recognise the 
commercial dynamics of Western interventions, a number of flaws can nevertheless be 
identified in the way that they have sought to conceptualises them.  
As will be explained in Chapter II, in pursuing liberalisation in the states of the South, 
the West does not seek to extend economic rights only to local and external elites: through 
the institutionalisation of the rule of law, the West seeks to extend commercial and property 
rights to all Southern populations (elites and non-elites alike) as well as to Westerners who 
are interested in maintaining commercial ties with Southern societies. Although the neo-
liberalisation programmes promoted as part of liberal ‘peacebuilding’ have often led to 
capitalist exploitation of some sections of Southern populations, this does not mean that only 
Southern elites and Western capitalists have gained from those programmes; other sections 
within Southern populations have also benefited from those programmes.  Thus, the claim of 
Barkawi and Laffey that the West only seeks to extend economic rights to Western capitalists 
and Southern elites through economic liberalisation programmes is a misplaced one.  
In Chapter IV, using the case of liberal state-building undertaken by the British Empire 
from the middle of the nineteenth century in Ceylon, I also demonstrate that the extension of 
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civil and political rights to Southern populations is not a Western rhetoric, as Barkawi and 
Laffey claim, but a real commitment centred on creating conditions for global commerce (in 
colonial Ceylon’s case Britain’s global commerce). It is based on the assumption that liberal 
institutions and freedoms create conditions for global commerce. As we will see in Chapters I 
and II, the security of global commerce is understood to depend on the consumer freedom 
that states are able to produce within their borders: for commerce to be undertaken securely 
within states, a number of freedoms, such as ‘the freedom of the market, freedom to buy and 
sell, the free exercise of property rights, freedom of discussion’ and the ‘freedom of 
expression’ must exist within their borders (Foucault, 2008: 63). In other words, political and 
economic liberalisation are understood in liberal thought to be inextricably linked. 
As we will see in Chapter II, the conceptualisation of Western interventions as imperial 
endeavours by Barkawi and Laffey is also a problematic one. It is certainly true that Western-
dominated IFIs and IGOs such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) do seek to influence the economic policies of Southern 
states, as Barkawi and Laffey argue (2001: 6). It also cannot be denied that in some parts of 
the South, such as Kosovo and Bosnia, Western officials have subverted elections to bring to 
power liberal regimes (Ibid.: 9). However, as we will see in Chapter II, the adoption of the 
imperial practices of the past by the West in contemporary interventions is not a sufficient 
ground to conceptualise them as imperial endeavours. Moreover, the concept of liberal peace 
that underpins those interventions is opposed to imperialism on the basis that the latter 
produces political monopolies, which lead to economic monopolies that hinder commercial 
interdependence between states. As we will also see in Chapter II, and as Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri have pointed out in Empire, the days of imperialism are over (2001: xiv).  
The fallibility of the theoretical framework of imperialism used by Barkawi and Laffey 
becomes more apparent when examined within the context of Western policy in the Eelam 
War. As we will see in Chapters IV to VIII, since the island-state of Ceylon was created by 
the British Empire, Western collaboration with it has been to ensure that it continues to 
remain a self-governing market democracy devoid of threats and influences from non-liberal 
forces and ideologies, and not for exercising direct or indirect imperial control over the island 
for capitalist exploitation. Moreover, reducing Western collaboration with Sri Lanka as the 
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collaboration of capitalist elites in the West with their counterparts in the global South to 
exploit resources would not make sense because the indigenous Tamils have, since colonial 
times, been pro-capitalist than the Sinhala-Buddhists (see, for example Bloom, 2003: 58-59; 
Stokke & Ryntveit, 2000: 298). As we will see in Chapter IV, despite Sri Lanka incorporating 
semi-statist economic policies from 1956 to 1972 and adopting from 1972 to 1977 socialist 
economic policies, the West sought to appease it and turned a blind-eye to the plight of the 
pro-capitalist and liberalised Tamils because the island-state was opposed to communism. In 
doing so, during those years the West actually worked to the detriment of capitalism.  
Therefore, despite recognising the commercial dynamics of contemporary Western 
interventions, by relying on the theoretical framework of imperialism to explain them, 
Barkawi and Laffey only reduce the concept of liberal peace as a contemporary form of 
capitalist exploitation and misconceive the West as an imperial state.  
Given these limitations of existing Foucauldian and Marxist critiques, how can the wars 
waged by Western states under the banner of liberal peace and their collaboration in the wars 
of their Southern counterparts, especially with Sri Lanka, be explained theoretically? This 
thesis does this by developing a new biopolitical perspective on Western interventions using 
Foucault’s account of liberal peace, his concept of biopolitics, and his expositions on war. 
Using this biopolitical perspective, it is also possible to conceptualise war beyond military 
action to include all power relations that produce the effects of battle (which will be 
discussed further in Chapter I). As will be argued in Chapters I and II, commercial 
globalisation remains central to the concept of liberal peace in that the economic 
interdependence it produces between states is understood to be capable of sustaining the state 
of ‘peace’ (understood in terms of the absence of military confrontations between states) that 
exists between Western states since the end of the Second World War, and would possibly 
lead to the extension of this state of affairs in their relationship with their Southern 
counterparts. In other words, commercial globalisation is understood to be the key to 
removing the miseries that military confrontations between states can bring upon populations. 
Therefore, in promoting, undertaking, and consolidating liberalisation programmes in the 
states of the South, Western states seek to create conditions for unhindered commerce within 
their borders. In this sense, liberal peace is a biopolitical project of making global populations 
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live. It is in this biopolitical endeavour of making global populations live that Western states 
wage wars and collaborate in the wars of their Southern counterparts to eliminate non-liberal 
actors who are considered to be a threat to the security of global commerce, and thus global 
populations. It is as practitioners of this biopolitics of making life live and killing life to make 
life live that Western states allow the subversion of civil liberties, human rights, and other 
democratic freedoms that they also simultaneously promote. It is also as practitioners of this 
biopolitics that Western states turn a blind-eye to as well as collaborate in the killing of 
populations (often liberalised populations such as the Tamils) by their Southern counterparts. 
In this biopolitical endeavour, wars, whether they be direct or collaboratory, are waged not 
only using military might but using all power relations, in particular law, finance, politics, 
and diplomacy, that produce the effects of battle (as we will see in Chapters I to VIII). 
Therefore, if liberalisation continues in the same way that it is being undertaken since the end 
of the Second World War and every state in the world eventually becomes liberalised, we 
may see the expansion of the current liberal zone of ‘peace’ into a global liberal zone of 
‘peace’. However, as the history of the manifestations of the concept of liberal peace and the 
fact that wars are increasingly being waged through means other than military action shows, 
creation of a global liberal zone of ‘peace’ may not mean the eradication of war. 
As will be explained further in Chapters IV to VIII, Western policy in the Eelam War 
has been underwritten by two long-standing and complementary assumptions. On the one 
hand, Western support for Sri Lanka has been premised on the belief that if its liberal 
democratic system of government was to provide security to global commerce within its 
borders, it must be helped to overcome the secessionist threat of the Tamils. On the other 
hand, Western opposition to the formation of a Tamil state has been centred on the perception 
that dividing the island into two ethnologically homogeneous states would only exacerbate 
ethnic tensions that had prevailed between two rival nations, which would in turn threaten 
commercial intercourse. As the ancient history of Sri Lanka before European colonial powers 
set foot in the island shows, the Tamil – Sinhala struggle for control of the island has a 
genealogy of nearly two thousand two hundred and fifty years22 (see Mahavamsa, 1912: 142-
                                                            
22  The  ancient  Sinhala  chronicle  Mahavamsa  has  recorded  of  occasions  when  Tamil  and  Sinhala  kings 
competed for control of the entire island of Sri Lanka, the earliest date of which is 237 B.C.  
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178). This fear is further compounded by the fact that the island is ‘located at the nexus of 
crucial maritime trading routes in the Indian Ocean connecting Europe and the Middle East to 
China and the rest of Asia’ (United States Senate, 2009: 3). This is something that has been 
acknowledged by Western statesmen from the seventeenth century to the present day (see 
Ribeiro, 1909; Blake, 2011). Instability in Sri Lanka is therefore seen as having the potential 
to ‘disrupt maritime trade’ through the Indian Ocean (United States Senate, 2009: 3). 
While there is already a significant amount of scholarly work available today on the 
historical, political and economic dynamics of the Eelam War (see, for example Stokke & 
Ryntveitt, 2000; Gunasinghe, 2004; Uyangoda, 2011), and the Norwegian-led Western 
intervention in the armed conflict (see Lunstead, 2007 & 2011; Goodhand, Spencer & Korf, 
2011; Sorbo et al., 2011), none of them have explained them using the specific biopolitical 
perspective that I have developed in this thesis. Although within recent years a number of 
scholars have explained Western policy in the Eelam War within a Foucauldian 
governmentality framework and demonstrated how the dynamics, trajectories, and outcomes 
of the Norwegian-led Western intervention can be understood as a ‘clash of 
governmentalities’ (see Nadarajah, 2010) and how liberal peace has appropriated, 
strengthened, and redeployed ‘in its own service the practices’ of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-
Buddhist ‘governmental project’ to establish a liberal order in the island (see Rampton & 
Nadarajah, 2012: 3), their study also ignores Foucault’s account of liberal peace. 
One criticism levelled at Foucault’s concepts and ideas concerns their relevance to our 
understanding of international relations. Jan Selby, for example, claims that in using 
Foucault’s methods in international relations, Foucauldian scholars are engaged in 
‘“internationalising” a theorist whose focus was primarily on the “domestic” social arena’ of 
Europe (2007: 325 & 339). When Foucault’s work is ‘translated and “scaled up” to inform 
analysis of the current world order’, it becomes ‘less an interrogation of liberalism than a 
prop to reworked liberal accounts of the international arena’ (Ibid.: 326). For Selby, Foucault 
was preoccupied with biopower and governmentality in the ‘domestic arenas of modern 
“governmentalised” societies’, and as such his writings are suited only to ‘analysing discrete 
techniques and practices of liberal governance’ in European societies (Ibid.: 334). In ‘scaling 
up’ Foucault’s work ‘from the domestic social arena’ to develop ‘a newly Foucauldian 
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picture of contemporary world order’, Foucauldian scholars are ‘ambitiously’ involved in 
producing ‘reworked and reworded liberal accounts of international politics’ (Ibid.).  
On the other hand, while also accusing Foucauldian scholars of ‘scaling up’ Foucault, 
Chandler (2010a: 136) takes them to task for an additional reason. Foucault, Chandler (Ibid.: 
141) argues, ‘asserted an intimate relationship between politics and power’: he explored ‘the 
centrality of the state and its relationship to society as the foundational basis for differing 
rationalities of governing’ (Ibid.). In contrast, Foucauldian scholars assume there to be ‘the 
global disjunction between politics (confined to the nation-state) and power (alleged to be 
free-floating and unaccountable)’ (Ibid.: 141-142). In doing so, Foucauldian scholars not only 
go against Foucault’s methods of studying governmentality and biopolitics, but also 
incorrectly conceive power to lie ‘beyond the contested claims of political reason’ (Ibid.).  
Some Foucauldian scholars have taken the inspiration for studying power as existing 
outside and beyond the state from a famous statement that Foucault made in Volume I of The 
History of Sexuality – that the critique of power should go beyond law and the state. The 
assumption that ‘ideally and by nature, power must be exercised in accordance with a 
fundamental lawfulness’ is not always correct, Foucault argued (1998: 88). In the Middle 
Ages ‘the representation of power’ had ‘remained under the spell of monarchy’, despite being 
different ‘in epochs and objectives’ (Ibid.). As a consequence, in contemporary ‘political 
thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king’ (Ibid.: 88-89). Taking this 
statement at face value, some Foucauldian scholars have sought to explain power relations by 
‘cutting off the king’s head’ (the state) and analysing how the social body can function 
without the head. However, in an interview to a Marxist journal in 1976, Foucault clarified 
that in calling on for ‘the king’s head to be cut off’ from political thought and analysis, he did 
‘not mean in any way to minimise the importance and effectiveness of state power’, but 
intended to highlight the dangers of taking power as the exclusive domain of the state: 
 
I simply feel that excessive insistence on [the state] playing an exclusive role 
leads to the risk of overlooking all the mechanisms and effects of power which 
don’t pass directly via the State apparatus, yet often sustain the State more 
effectively than its own institutions, enlarging and maximising its effectiveness. In 
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Soviet society one has examples of a State apparatus which has changed hands, 
yet leaves hierarchies, family life, sexuality and the body more or less as they 
were in capitalist society (Foucault, 1980: 72-73). 
 
In another interview in 1977, Foucault reiterated this point: ‘I don’t want to say that the State 
isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must 
be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State’ (Ibid.: 122). Later, in the 
lecture series Security, Territory, Population, delivered at the College de France in 1978, 
Foucault noted that the ‘microscopic’ analysis of power outside and beyond the state would, 
‘without paradox or contradiction’, lead to understanding the ‘general problems of the state’ 
as well as government: ‘an analysis in terms of micropowers comes back without any 
difficulty to the analysis of problems like those of government and the state’ (2007: 358).23     
Within this context, Chandler’s criticisms of some Foucauldians’ understanding of 
power and politics are justified. However, the claims of Chandler, as well as those of Selby, 
that Foucault’s writings are not suited for understanding international relations do not have 
any grounding. It is true that Foucauldian accounts of international relations recognise that 
the current global order is by and large a liberal one. However, the claim that Foucault’s 
writings are irrelevant to international relations represents a misreading of the French 
philosopher’s meticulous study of power. Even though Foucault’s analysis of power did not 
go beyond the West, it must be borne in mind that before the end of the Second World War, 
most states of the South had either remained as colonies or protectorates of European powers, 
where liberal modes of governance were exercised, though this differed from country to 
country. Notwithstanding this, in “Society Must Be Defended”, Foucault himself asserted the 
link between biopolitics and European colonialism (2004: 257). This is a clear indication on 
the part of Foucault that his writings on Western societies can also have relevance in 
explaining the governmental practices of Europe’s former colonies and protectorates, as well 
as Western states’ relationship with them during the colonial period and after decolonisation. 
                                                            
23 A full discussion on how one could conduct a study on  law and the state using Foucault’s methods will be 
made in Chapter I. 
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Thus, as Anna M. Agathangelou notes, ‘Foucault’s recognition of colonialism opens up space 
for us to reconstruct a much longer genealogy of the international, not contained by European 
borders’ (2010: 703; in this regard, also see the works of Prakash, 2000; Hussain, 2003; 
Neocleous, 2008). Moreover, in The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault (2008) also extended his 
study of liberal biopolitics and governmentality from Europe to America in the twentieth 
century and even made some attempts to link his ideas to international relations; he 
understood liberal governmentality in terms of the globalisation of commerce (Kiersey, 2009: 
39; Agathangelou, 2010: 703). Many years before the publication of those lecture series, a 
number of scholars (for example Said, 1977; Hyam, 1990; Stoler, 1995; Escobar, 1995) 
successfully used the concepts and ideas of Foucault to explain power relations outside the 
West and the relations between Western and non-Western societies. It is therefore a fallacy to 
assume that Foucault’s writings are only suitable for studying Western societies.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
My research methodology was qualitative in character. From the outset, I did not adopt 
quantitative methods. Quantitative methods, which involve the use of surveys and statistics, 
are generally accepted to be ‘rational, logical, planned and systematic’ in the study of the 
behaviour of populations (Pierce, 2008: 42). However, as politics is ‘an intra- and inter-group 
activity’, quantitative methods ‘often provide relatively limited information’ (Burnham et al., 
2004: 31; Pierce, 2008: 46). In contrast, qualitative methods are better suited for research in 
politics in that they enable ‘theory to be created by induction’ (Pierce, 2008: 42).  
Given the fact that Western policy in the Eelam War can only be understood by 
critically examining the liberal peace literature and conducting a detailed study of the policies 
of Western states towards the belligerents in Sri Lanka and vice versa, and not by obtaining 
the opinions of the general public either in Sri Lanka or the West, it was clear to me that in 
my doctoral research I had to rely entirely on qualitative methods and not quantitative ones. 
Notwithstanding this, it was also not realistic to send questionnaires either to Western 
government officials or the belligerents as many of them that I approached during my 
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research for interviews (all unstructured) either declined them or simply did not respond to 
my requests. Many of the key actors in the Eelam War were also killed in the conflict. 
Therefore, the qualitative approach that I adopted was largely one of analysing existing 
documents on Western policy in the Eelam War. This mode of qualitative research is known 
as documentary analysis (also known as textual/content analysis) (Burnham et al., 2004: 165; 
Pierce, 2008: 264). It involves a close reading and interpretation of primary, and secondary 
sources. In political research, primary sources are understood to be best suited for 
documentary analysis in that they are evidence which are produced as part of an event or by 
the event (Lichtman & French, 1978: 18). However, secondary sources can complement 
primary sources in that they are also related to the event (Ibid.).  
Even though my research was concerned with Western policy in the Eelam War, I was 
very well aware that if I was to develop the most plausible explanation on Western policy, I 
could not confine my studies to documents that emanated only from Western states but also 
had to cross reference them with documents that emanated from other actors in the conflict. 
This method of cross referencing is known in political research as triangulation. While some 
scholars have defined triangulation to be the use of ‘a variety of research methods’ for ‘cross-
checking data’, and thus could involve a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods 
(Bryman, 2001: 206; Burnham et al., 2004: 31), others have defined it as involving ‘seeking 
accounts from three or more perspectives’, and could therefore include the use of either 
methods on their own or together (Burgess, 1982: 162; Pierce, 2008: 90). In this respect, my 
study involved cross referencing primary sources from Western states with primary sources 
from the belligerents in Sri Lanka (the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state). While some of the 
secondary sources were from outside observers in the Eelam War, such as academics and 
journalists, most of the secondary sources were from the belligerents as well as those who 
were closely associated with Western states during the conflict. Although both the primary 
and secondary sources that I gathered and analysed were not readily available for immediate 
analysis, as a journalist who had covered the Eelam War from the Norwegian-led Western 
intervention to its catastrophic conclusion, and being a keen observer before that, I knew 
where I could access relevant documents for my research. Therefore, I was able to gather 
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relevant documents without much difficulty. Interviews and discussions with individuals who 
played a key role in the Eelam War were also my methods of cross referencing. 
When I began my doctoral research, there was already in existence a body of scholarly 
work that recognised the Norwegian-led Western intervention in the Eelam War to have been 
largely underpinned by the concept of liberal peace (Bastian, 2004 & 2008; Shanmugaratnam 
& Stokke, 2004; Walton, 2008). However, this body of scholarly work failed to trace the 
longer genealogy that the concept of liberal peace has in Sri Lanka; nor did this body of 
scholarly work acknowledge that Western policy in the Eelam War had a continuity with the 
liberal state-building practices of the British Empire in Ceylon before the island-state was 
created. Moreover, it also ignored the violent dynamics of liberal peace.  
Therefore, in seeking to reveal the rationale behind Western states’ longstanding 
opposition to the formation of a Tamil state in the island and their decision to collaborate 
with Sri Lankan state, I embarked on a detailed study of the concept of liberal peace as well 
as Western states’ policies towards Sri Lanka and the secessionist demands of Tamils.  
In “Society Must Be Defended” Foucault argues that what is established as truth by one 
could also be established by another as being completely false (2004: 163-164). In The Birth 
of Biopolitics, Foucault further claims that a ‘regime of truth’ is capable of making 
‘something that does not exist’ to ‘become something’ (2008: 20). Making direct reference to 
politics and economy, in that lecture series Foucault also argues that they ‘are things that do 
not exist and yet which are inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the 
true and false’ (Ibid.). In Foucault’s view, truth is something that is produced by power: 
 
The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in 
power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, 
truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the 
privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of 
this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it 
induces regular effects of power. Each society has it regime of truth, its ‘general 
politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes 
function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish 
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true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques 
and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who 
are charged with saying what counts are true (1980: 131). 
 
Thus, for Foucault, truth is not something that is to be ‘discovered and accepted’. Instead, it 
should be ‘understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation and operation of statements’; it is also ‘linked in a circular relation 
with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces 
and which extend it’ (Ibid.: 133). Does this mean that in seeking to reveal the rationale 
behind Western policy in the Eelam War, this thesis challenges Foucault’s claim on ‘truth’? 
Certainly not. In developing a biopolitical perspective on Western policy in the Eelam 
War, this thesis makes a contribution to what Foucault (2004: 7) calls the ‘insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges’. Foucault defines subjugated knowledges as either ‘historical 
contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal 
systematizations’ or ‘a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as 
nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges’ (2004: 7). The empirical 
findings of this thesis are historical contents that have largely remained buried and masked 
under structural theories (such as realism, liberalism and Marxism). In excavating and 
unmasking these historical contents, this thesis makes a contribution to the insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges. Moreover, Foucault’s account of liberal peace, his concept of 
biopolitics, and his expositions on war are, despite their usage in International Relations, 
insufficiently elaborated ones. Therefore, in using Foucault’s work to develop a biopolitical 
perspective on Western policy in the Eelam War, and thereby elaborating and expanding 
further on his concepts and ideas, this thesis also makes a contribution to the insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges. For Foucault, the reappearance of subjugated knowledges pave the 
way for the critique of existing knowledges (2004: 8). Thus, in making a contribution to the 
insurrection of subjugated knowledges, this thesis paves the way for the development of a 
critique of the concept of liberal peace in International Relations. 
My research was initially undertaken on six fronts. Firstly, I undertook a study of 
liberal peace literature and the works of liberal thinkers from the seventeenth century 
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onwards, in whose thoughts the concept of liberal peace was asserted to have its roots. 
Secondly, I examined other theories of international relations, in particular, realist theories 
that claimed to present an alternative account to liberal theories of international relations, and 
Marxist and Foucauldian critiques that challenged the concept of liberal peace. Thirdly, I 
analysed the policy statements of Western political leaders and official reports of states, 
IGOs, and IFIs in which liberalisation was advocated as the key to global peace. Given the 
fact that there exists a wide array of policy statements and official reports in this regard, and 
examining all of them would be an impossible task, I developed the strategy of examining the 
key ones, which are widely cited in the liberal peace literature and scholarly works that are 
critical of it. Most of those policy statements and official reports were readily available on 
official online portals, often in the format that they were originally published. Fourthly, I 
analysed the policy statements of Western political leaders and diplomats in relation to Sri 
Lanka and the Eelam War. Again, given the fact that there exists a large volume of such 
policy statements, I developed the strategy of examining the key ones that were centred on 
important events in the history of the island (both colonial and post-colonial) and the Eelam 
War. Although most of the colonial literatures were available in UK libraries as well as some 
online archive portals (in original format), I had to obtain the rest from Sri Lanka through my 
contacts. Where it was not possible to obtain primary colonial literature, I used secondary 
sources. Fifthly, I undertook a study of the official statements of Sri Lankan political leaders, 
the LTTE, and first hand accounts of the conflict as well as the history of the island. Even 
though I was able to gather most of the official statements of Sri Lankan political leaders in 
official government publications and online portals, this was not the case with those of the 
LTTE because the organisation no longer exists. I therefore had to gather official documents 
of the LTTE from Tamil media outlets and Diaspora organisations which were known to have 
functioned as front organisations of the LTTE during the armed conflict. Finally, I conducted 
interviews and had discussions with a number of Western politicians, former political 
officials of the LTTE, Tamil parliamentarians, Tamil Diaspora lobbyists and activists, and 
Sinhala politicians. I also attended public meetings and panel discussions in which Western 
politicians (including former ministers) and senior UN officials gave keynote speeches, 
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during which I was able to ask them questions. Most of these studies, analyses, interviews, 
and discussions were not undertaken in isolated stages but largely at the same time. 
My intention in undertaking a study of the liberal peace literature and the works of 
liberal thinkers was to gain a full understanding of the concept of liberal peace and ascertain 
any theoretical contradictions which may be inherent to it that enables it to become violent. 
Through this study, I was able to gain a full understanding of the concept of liberal peace and 
its various strands that operate both at normative and institutional levels. However, I could 
not explain Western policy in the Eelam War only by studying the liberal peace literature. 
This was also largely the case with my study of realist accounts of international 
relations, and Marxist and Foucauldian critiques of liberal peace. My study of realist accounts 
of international relations failed to take me beyond the conventional wisdom of realism that 
states collaborate with each other to further their national interests (Morgenthau, 1966). This 
conventional wisdom was helpful for understanding neither the rationale behind Western 
support for Sri Lanka nor their longstanding opposition to the formation of a Tamil state; it 
was very much apparent that there was no convergence of the national interests of the West 
with that of Sri Lanka which made the former collaborate with the latter. As noted earlier, 
this was also the case with existing Marxist as well as Foucauldian critiques of liberal peace.  
However, this was not the case when I examined the writings and lecture series of 
Foucault. Although Foucault did not provide a critique of liberal peace either in his writings 
or lecture series, the concepts and ideas that he advanced in the 1970s enabled me to develop 
the theoretical framework for my thesis. Building on from Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, 
his account of liberal peace, and his expositions on war, I was able to develop a new 
biopolitical perspective on Western policy in the Eelam War and conceptualise war to include 
all power relations that produce the effects of battle (for a full discussion, see Chapter I).  
Firstly, to ascertain the validity of Foucault’s account of liberal peace, and to develop 
my own theory of the biopolitics of liberal peace, I re-examined the writings of Smith and 
Kant, the two key liberal thinkers of the eighteenth century whose works Foucault (2008: 54-
59) cites in his lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics to introduce his account of liberal peace. 
I then also re-examined the works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, which have also 
helped shape the concept of liberal peace (as we will see in Chapter II). I also re-examined 
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the works of John Locke, who is sometimes referred to as a ‘student’ of liberal peace (see 
Paris, 2009: 6), even though he was writing in the seventeenth century. As a result of re-
examining the works of some key liberal thinkers through the work of Foucault, I was able to 
conclude that although each liberal thinker has contributed to the concept of liberal peace in 
different ways, all of them, with the exception of Locke, had defined commercial 
globalisation as the key to ending military confrontations between European powers. In this 
regard, Kant (1917: 136) and Mill (1965: 594) went a step further and advocated commercial 
globalisation as the key to global peace. However, none of those liberal thinkers believed that 
war could be eradicated completely within or between states (see Chapter II). Moreover, with 
the exception of Kant, all of those liberal thinkers believed war to be an acceptable means for 
opening-up global markets and ensuring the security of global commerce (Smith, 1957: 54 & 
386; Bentham, 1839: 546-547; Mill, 1984: 111). These ideas were also mirrored in the works 
of Joseph Schumpeter of the twentieth century (1991: 143, 185 & 196).  
Secondly, in order to establish the empirical validity of my theory, I re-examined the 
large volume of policy statements of Western political leaders, ranging from Wilson (1916 & 
1918) to Blair (1999; 2002; 2002a) and Bush (2002; 2004; 2008). I also re-examined the 
official statements of Western policy makers, ministers and diplomats, the United Nations 
and other IGOs, and IFIs. Through these studies, as will be explained further in Chapter III, I 
was able to establish empirically that it is as practitioners of the biopolitics of liberal peace 
that Western states wage wars and collaborate in the wars of their Southern counterparts, 
allowing the subversion of the principles that they simultaneously promote. 
Thirdly, I was also able to establish empirically that this biopolitics of liberal peace had 
long underpinned Western policy in the Eelam War by re-examining a large volume of legal 
and policy documents, statements, speeches, media interviews and publications of Western 
politicians, diplomats, and policy makers in relation to Sri Lanka, including some of the 
cables of the US embassy in Colombo released by Wikileaks. In addition, after examining the 
memoirs and other publications of British colonial officials on Ceylon, I was able to establish 
that the biopolitics of liberal peace had a continuity with the British Empire’s biopolitics of 
liberal state-building in colonial Ceylon. Cross referencing them with some of the other 
British colonial publications revealed that these methods were also used in India. Moreover, 
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by examining a wide array of documents and works from the side of the Sri Lankan 
government, the LTTE, Tamil, Sinhala and Indian academics, journalists and civil society 
leaders, I was able to establish both theoretically and empirically that the Sri Lankan state’s 
ethno-theocratic practices were also a form of biopolitics (see Chapters I and IV).  
In an attempt to cross reference my findings, I also tried to interview senior Western 
politicians and diplomats who either played a key role in implementing the policies of their 
respective states during the Norwegian-led Western intervention and at the peak of the armed 
conflict or acted as unofficial intermediaries between their states, and the LTTE and the pro-
LTTE Tamil Diaspora. British politicians who acted as unofficial intermediaries between the 
UK government, and the LTTE and the Tamil Diaspora agreed to my requests and were 
helpful in providing insights in this regard. However, many Western politicians and 
diplomats who played a key role in the conflict either failed to respond to my interview 
requests or evaded them when I revealed that I was pursuing a research that was critical of 
Western policy and the concept of liberal peace. A notable Western politician in this regard 
was the former Norwegian minister Solheim. When I first approached him, he agreed to meet 
me, on the condition that I send him my interview questions beforehand, and even suggested 
that he would be able to arrange meetings with the Norwegian team that played a key role in 
facilitating the ceasefire and peace negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government. However, after receiving my interview questions he backed-off, claiming that he 
could not meet me as he was occupied with other matters. This was also the case with the 
former British Foreign Secretary David Milliband, who played a key role in the final stages 
of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka, and Gareth Thomas, who served as a minister in the UK’s 
Department for International Development during the Norwegian-led Western intervention 
and at the peak of the armed conflict. Other British, US and Norwegian politicians and 
diplomats whom I approached did not respond to my interview requests. Nevertheless, I was 
able to gain insights from the same Western politicians (in particular Solheim and Milliband) 
who evaded my interview requests by participating in public meetings and panel discussions 
relating to the conflict in Sri Lanka in which they gave keynote speeches. I was also able to 
have discussions with key UN officials who were involved in the conflict in Sri Lanka by 
attending panel discussions in which they gave keynote addresses. In addition, I held 
  40   
discussions with senior officials of human rights groups in public conferences. As part of my 
efforts to gain further insights into Western policy limited by direct access to Western 
officials, I also held interviews as well as discussions with Tamil Diaspora lobbyists, Tamil 
parliamentarians, academics, and Sinhala politicians who had a close rapport with Western 
states. During the armed conflict, as well as conveying their messages directly to the LTTE, 
Western states also used these individuals as their unofficial intermediaries. My interviews 
and discussions with them were therefore useful in gaining further insights. 
In order to also gain insights into the ideological dynamics of the Tamil armed 
resistance movement, I also interviewed and had discussions with a number of exiled former 
middle-ranking political officials of the LTTE, academics who had acted as resource persons 
in the LTTE’s peace delegation, and Tamil politicians based in Sri Lanka who were known to 
have had a close relationship with the LTTE’s leadership. Since the entire political and 
military leadership of the LTTE was wiped out in the last phase of the armed conflict, these 
individuals were the ones best placed to provide insights on the LTTE’s armed struggle. I was 
also able gain further insights by accessing the archives of Tamil Diaspora media outlets that 
had publications relating to the conflict in Sri Lanka and some of the correspondences 
between Western leaders and the LTTE that were not made public. 
Moreover, I also held interviews and discussions with former Tamil political prisoners, 
lawyers, parliamentarians and political activists. My objective in interviewing these 
individuals was to gain further insights on the dynamics of Sri Lanka’s emergency laws as 
well as to cross reference my existing findings derived through documentary analysis.   
Using all the insights gained through these studies, analyses, interviews, and 
discussions, I was able to establish both theoretically and empirically the biopolitics of liberal 
peace and Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic biopolitics, as well as the collaboration of the former 
with the latter. Moreover, I was also able to establish both theoretically and empirically that 
all power relations that produce the effects of battle are ways of waging war.  
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Overview of Chapters 
 
In Chapter I, expanding on Foucault’s expositions on war, I theoretically establish that all 
power relations that produce the effects of battle are ways of waging war. In that chapter, I 
also examine Foucault’s concept of biopolitics and show how war remains central to it. I then 
apply Foucault’s account of liberal peace to his concept of biopolitics to develop my theory 
of the biopolitics of liberal peace. I also situate Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocratic 
ambitions within Foucault’s concept of biopolitics to theoreticise it as a form of biopolitics.  
Thereafter, in Chapter II, I examine the operation of liberal peace at normative and 
institutional levels and establish that it is centred on commercial globalisation. I also explain 
that it is not a concept that seeks to create a Western empire, despite its biopolitics having 
roots in the British Empire’s biopolitics of liberal state-building in the colonies. In Chapter 
III, I examine how liberal peace was embedded during the Cold War, under the banner of 
containment and development, in the West’s struggle against communism, and extended in 
the post-Cold War period to humanitarian interventions, ‘peacebuilding’ missions, conflict 
resolution efforts, aid programmes, and the GWoT. Where Chapter II examines the 
theoretical dynamics of liberal peace, Chapter III examines its manifestations in practice. 
Applying the theoretical insights of Chapters I and II to the case of British rule in 
colonial Ceylon, I demonstrate in Chapter IV how the security of Britain’s global commerce 
remained central to its biopolitics of liberal state-building in the island. I then show how after 
its creation, the ‘liberal democratic’ state of Ceylon appropriated liberal mechanisms of 
government, in particular law, left behind by the British Empire, to wage war against the 
island’s Tamil population. In addition, by undertaking a study of Western states’ decision, in 
light of their concerns for the security of global commerce in the Cold War period, to turn a 
blind-eye to Ceylon’s racist policies and practices, I demonstrate how as practitioners of the 
biopolitics of liberal peace Western states condoned Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic biopolitics 
in order to prevent the island from coming under the influence of communism. 
Chapter V examines further the use of law as a way of waging war in light of Sri 
Lanka’s use of emergency laws in its war to crush the Tamils’ armed struggle for political 
independence. Tracing the origins of Sri Lanka’s emergency laws to Britain’s colonial 
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emergency regime, I show that in the same way that the British Empire used martial law as 
part of its biopolitics of liberal state-building in colonial Ceylon and to secure its global 
commerce in the island, Sri Lanka used its liberal emergency laws as part of its biopolitics. 
In Chapter VI, I demonstrate how during the 1970s and 1980s, underpinned by 
continuing concerns for the security of global commerce, the West collaborated with Sri 
Lanka’s counter insurgency efforts to crush the Tamils’ armed struggle. As a consequence, 
the island became the battleground of a proxy war between India and the West. 
Pulling together all of the theoretical and empirical insights of the previous chapters, I 
conceptualise in Chapters VII and VIII  Western efforts from 1997 onwards to neutralise the 
Tamils’ armed struggle as a war that was waged parallel to that of the Sri Lankan state. While 
Sri Lanka’s war was underpinned by ethno-theocratic ambitions, the West’s war was 
underpinned by continuing concerns for the security of global commerce. The distinct nature 
of these two biopolitical wars was the mobilisation of the power relations of law, finance, 
politics, and diplomacy, in addition to military might, to achieve their goals. 
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Chapter I 
Foucault, war, and biopolitics 
 
Although Foucault’s ideas have remained influential in the study of power since he 
introduced them, arguably it was with the onset of the GWoT that they gained significance in 
the discipline of International Relations. However, much of the scholarly work that has built 
on from Foucault’s ideas to explain international relations have ignored his expositions on 
war. In the first section of this chapter, expanding on Foucault’s expositions on war, I 
establish theoretically that all power relations that produce the effects of battle are ways of 
waging war. In that section, I also demonstrate that it is possible to conceptualise law as a 
way of waging war without going against Foucault’s (1998: 90) suggestion for the study of 
power beyond law. I then examine Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, in light of competing 
interpretations of the term that have been developed after him, and explain how war remains 
inscribed in it. In the final two sections, I present two forms of biopolitics that are central to 
this thesis: the biopolitics of liberal peace, and the biopolitics of the Sri Lankan state.  
 
 
Conceptualising war 
 
In his treatise On War, Carl von Clausewitz defined war as ‘a duel on an extensive scale’ 
(1832/1997: 5). This definition has become the conventional wisdom that war is generally 
understood in terms of violence that involves military action. As a consequence, when wars 
are waged through other means, they are not seen as wars, except when the term is used 
metaphorically, i.e., ‘war on drugs’, ‘war on gun crime’, and so on. However, when 
Clausewitz wrote his treatise, there existed more than one definition of the term ‘war’. This 
was acknowledged by Clausewitz himself, even though he did not elaborate what these 
different definitions of war were: ‘We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of 
war used by publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel’ (1997: 5).  
In the lecture series “Society Must Be Defended”, Foucault considered power relations 
through the matrix of war on the basis that force remains central to them (2004: 15). For 
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Foucault, politics ‘sanctions and reproduces the disequilibrium of forces manifested in war’; 
it achieves this by ‘perpetually’ reinscribing the ‘relationship of force’ in ‘institutions, 
economic inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals’ (Ibid.: 16). Similarly, as 
a form of power, law is, even in its most regular form, inscribed with the mechanisms of war 
(Ibid.: 50-51). This was also a point that Foucault made when he touched on the subject of 
the violent dynamics of law in Volume I of the History of Sexuality, published in the same 
year that he gave his lecture “Society Must Be Defended”: ‘Law cannot help but but be 
armed, and its arm, par excellence, is death; to those who transgress it, it replies, at least as a 
last resort with that absolute menace. The law always refers to the sword’ (1998: 144).  
In “Society Must Be Defended”, Foucault (2004: 47-48) also inverted Clausewitz’s 
(1997: 22) principle that war was the continuation of politics by other means. In this regard 
Foucault (2004: 48) claimed that he was not inverting Clausewitz’s principle but restating a 
thesis that had actually been in circulation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before 
it was inverted by Clausewitz. Even though Foucault did not unearthen any scholarly work of 
those two centuries that specifically referred to politics as the continuation of war, to uphold 
his claim he cited the works of a number of English and French thinkers of those centuries – 
of which the works of the English jurist Edward Coke and the French aristocrat and historian 
Henri de Boulainvilliers were the key ones – that formed the basis of political struggles to 
limit the powers of the absolute monarchy. Referring to those works as a ‘historico-political 
discourse’, Foucault (2004: 49) argued that the latter understood war as ‘a permanent social 
relationship, the ineradicable basis of all relations and institutions of power’. Citing the works 
of Coke in which Saxon laws were invoked to advance the claim that before the Norman 
invasion the king ‘exercised absolute and unchecked sovereignty over the social body’ only 
in times of war, and those of Boulainvilliers in which it was argued that by possessing 
unlimited power the monarch was exercising the powers which were conferred to him in 
ancient French aristocratic societies only in times of war, Foucault (2004: 106 & 148) 
claimed that the works of both thinkers conceptualised the exercise of absolute power by the 
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monarchy in times of peace to be the continuation of war. For Foucault (Ibid.: 165), it was 
this thesis that later inspired Clausewitz to conceptualise war as the continuation of politics.24  
Although Foucault’s arguments in this regard were actually his own interpretations of 
the works of Coke and Boulainvilliers (as well as some of their contemporaries and 
successors), most of them were certainly credible interpretations. For example, in The First 
Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England (first published in 1658), Coke defined peace to 
be the time ‘when the Courts of Justice be open, and the Judges and Minsters of the same 
may by Law protect men from wrong and violence, and distribute Justice to all’ (2003: 732). 
In contrast, ‘when by invasion, Insurrection, Rebellions, or such like, the peaceable course of 
Justice is disturbed and stopped, so as the Courts of Justice bee as it were shut up, Et silent 
leges inter arma [amidst the clash of arms the laws are silent]’, it becomes the time of war 
(Ibid.). Coke elaborated further on his definitions of war and peace in following terms: ‘So as 
hereby it also appeareth, that time of peace is the time of law and right, and time of warre is 
the time of violent oppression, which cannot be resisted by the equall course of Law’ (Ibid.: 
733). When read together with The Petition of Right 1627 (3 Cha. 1, c. 1), which was enacted 
in the English Parliament in 1628 under the guidance of Coke, these definitions reveal how 
the exercise of absolute powers by the monarch was understood at that time as war by other 
means. As well as seeking to curtail the monarch’s powers to raise forced loans to fund wars, 
section VIII of The Petition of Right 1627 also sought to end the use of martial law in times 
of peace and to ensure that ordinary laws prevailed when the country was not at war: 
 
And that the aforesaid Comissions for proceeding by Martiall Lawe may be 
revoked and annulled. And that hereafter no Comissions of like nature may issue 
forth to any person or persons whatsoever to be executed as aforesaid, lest by 
colour of them any of your Majesties Subjects be destroyed or put to death 
contrary to the Lawes and Franchise of the Land (3 Cha. 1, C. 1).  
 
                                                            
24  In his  later  lecture series Security, Territory, Population, delivered two years  later  in 1978, Foucault (2008: 
300‐301) also stated that Clausewitz’s principle was based on the fact that war functioned as an instrument of 
diplomacy/politics in the ‘Balance of Europe’ system that emerged at the end of the Thirty Years War. 
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In other words, in defining the ‘time of violent oppression’ as the time of war, which martial 
law under the reign of Charles I produced in England, Coke (2003: 733) implied that when 
the monarch exercises absolute power in times of ‘peace’, politics becomes war. 
Can we then conceptualise war beyond military action on this basis? Certainly not. In 
inverting Clausewitz’s principle and by establishing that he was restating a thesis that had 
actually been in existence before Clausewitz, even though Foucault challenged ‘the idea that 
politics and war are in principle separate and different’ (Spieker, 2011: 7), the historico-
political discourse that he relied on to justify his arguments cannot be used as the basis for 
conceptualising war beyond military action in contemporary societies. Firstly, in 
contemporary Western societies that have constitutional monarchies (such as Britain), the 
monarch no longer exercises absolute power over the social body, either in times of ‘peace’ 
or in times of war. If this state of affairs is analysed within the context of the historico-
political discourse that Foucault relied on to invert Clausewitz’s principle, politics would 
signify peace, and not war. Secondly, law does not signify peace (even though Coke (2003: 
733) argued as such), which Foucault (1998: 144; 2004: 50-51) pointed out in Volume I of 
The History of Sexuality and in “Society Must Be Defended”. As Mark Neocleous (2008: 50) 
established in Critique of Security (and as we will see in Chapter V in the context of the Sri 
Lanka’s emergency laws), the very martial law that Coke and his contemporaries sought to 
confine to times of war through The Petition of Right 1627 has today become part and parcel 
of ordinary laws in ‘the logic of emergency’. How then do we conceptualise war beyond 
military action? To do this, we need to turn to Foucault’s other expositions on war. 
In “Society Must Be Defended”, Foucault pointed out that before the ‘state acquired 
monopoly on war’, in the Middle Ages there existed a form of war known as ‘day-to-day 
warfare’, which was also called ‘private warfare’ (2004: 48). The state, ‘endowed with 
military institutions’, replaced ‘the day-to-day and generalised warfare’ as well as ‘a society 
that was perpetually traversed by relations of war’ (Ibid.: 49). This was also a point that 
Foucault made in Volume I of The History of Sexuality and reiterated later in the lecture 
series Security, Territory, Population (1998: 87; 2008: 300-301). For Foucault, before the 
monarchy established its supremacy over society, war had existed both as a private 
relationship (between individuals) as well as a public relationship (between princes): 
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What, after all, was war in medieval conceptions? I was going to say that war was 
basically a judicial behaviour. Why did one go to war? One waged war when there 
was injustice, when there was a violation of right, or anyway when someone 
claimed a right that was challenged by someone else. In the medieval world there 
was no discontinuity between the world of right and the world of war. There was 
not even any discontinuity between the universe of private law, in which it was a 
matter of settling disputes, and the world of confrontations between princes, 
which was not, and could not be called international and public law. One was 
always in the realm of disputes, of the settlement of disputes – you have taken my 
inheritance, you have seized one of my lands, you have repudiated my sister – and 
one fought, wars developed, within this juridical framework of public war and 
private war. It was public war as private war, or private war that took on the 
public dimension. It was a war of right, and the war was settled moreover exactly 
like a juridical procedure, by a victory, which was like a judgement of God. You 
lost, therefore right was not on your side (2008: 300-301).  
 
Foucault also argued that the ‘great institutions of power that developed in the Middle Ages’ 
in the form of the ‘monarchy’ and ‘the state with its apparatus’ actually rose as ‘agencies of 
regulation, arbitration, and demarcation’ over other forms of war, i.e., ‘feudal and private 
wars’ as well as ‘the private settling of lawsuits’, that existed at that time (1998: 86-87). In its 
attempt to transcend all forms of war, the monarchy used law, through the ‘mechanisms of 
interdiction and sanction’, both as ‘a weapon’ as well as the ‘mode of manifestation and the 
form of its acceptability’ (Ibid.: 87). In this sense, law performed a war-making functions for 
the monarchy, paving the way for the latter to establish its supremacy over medieval society. 
Cross referencing these claims of Foucault with the works of two key social contract 
theorists of the Enlightenment brings to light that even in the early modern period, war as a 
relationship between individuals was not erased from society’s memory. In De Cive, 
published in 1651, Thomas Hobbes claimed that ‘the natural state of men, before they entered 
  48   
into society, was a mere war’: it was ‘a war of all men against all men’ (1949: 29).25 Later, in 
The Second Treatise of Government, published in 1690, John Locke also argued that ‘force, 
or a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior 
on earth to appeal for relief, is the state of war’ (1980: 15). However, this state of war 
between individuals was understood to cease when they enter civil society. For Hobbes, on 
becoming part of civil society, individuals are understood to have ‘conveyed their whole right 
of war and peace’ to ‘some one man or council’ (1949: 73). Similarly, Locke also argued that 
when individuals become part of political societies, they ‘give up all the power’ that they had 
in the state of nature (1980: 53). Coke also advanced similar arguments, even though not 
within the framework of social contract theory. For Coke, individuals did not have the right 
to wage war and this right only belonged to the king: ‘no subject can levie warre within the 
Realme without authority from the King, for to him it only belongeth’ (2003: 969). In 
advancing these arguments, although Hobbes and Locke, as well as Coke, sought to denounce 
the right of the individual to wage war, in doing so they also revealed that war as a 
relationship between individuals had not been erased from the memories of society.  
A close reading of the works of other political thinkers in the later years of the 
Enlightenment also reveals that even at the end of the eighteenth century, war as a 
relationship between individuals was not erased from society’s memory. A number of 
political thinkers of the eighteenth century not only saw the order established by the state 
through law as the substitute for the relationship of war between individuals, but also 
believed that when this order is challenged, it should trigger the response to war from the 
state. They classified an individual who broke the law as the enemy of society, against whom 
the power mechanisms of the state had to be mobilised; he had to be treated as ‘the common 
                                                            
25 In “Society Must Be Defended”, Foucault (2004: 92) claimed that Hobbes’s ‘war of all men against all men’ in 
the state of nature was not actually about any  ‘primitive wars’  that predated political societies but about a 
‘state of war’. There are no battles, blood, or bodies  in  this  state of war;  instead  there are  ‘presentations, 
manifestations, signs, emphatic expressions, wiles, and deceitful expressions’ (Ibid.: 93). Hobbes’s state of war 
was a  ‘relationship of  fear’  in a  ‘theatre where presentations are exchanged’  (Ibid.). For Foucault  (Ibid.: 59), 
Hobbes was not a  theorist of war, and his works did not belong  to  the historico‐political discourse.  In cross 
referencing Foucault’s arguments on war as a relationship between individuals with the works of Hobbes, I am 
not challenging Foucault’s claims on the former. Instead, I am citing the works of Hobbes to establish that war 
as a relationship between individuals was not erased from the memories of society in the early modern period. 
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enemy’, a ‘traitor’ and ‘monster’, against whom ‘all the forces, all the power, all the rights’ 
had to be used (Foucault, 1991: 90). This was in contrast to the arguments of Coke in the 
seventeenth century that only certain actions on the part of the individual can be construed as 
wars against the king. For Coke, when an individual rises to ‘expulse strangers, to deliver 
men out of prisons, to remove Counsellors, or against any statute, or to any other end, 
pretending Reformation of their heads, without warrant’, this becomes the ‘levying of war 
against the King’ (2003: 970). Similarly, if an individual rises to ‘alter Religion established 
within the Realme, or Laws, or to go from Town to Town generally, and to cast downe 
enclosures’, this also becomes ‘a levying of war’ (Ibid.). However, in The Social Contract, 
published in 1762, Jean-Jacques Rousseau26 argued that when an individual breaks the law of 
his country, he makes ‘war on it’, and needs to be destroyed in order to preserve the state as 
well as the lives of his fellow countrymen (1999: 71). The offender ‘becomes a rebel and a 
traitor to his country’ and is put to death as ‘an enemy rather than as a citizen’: ‘He who wills 
that his life may be preserved at the expense of others must also, when necessary, give his life 
for their sake’ (Ibid.). In 1796, Immanuel Kant also made similar arguments. In Part I of the 
Metaphysics of Morals,27 Kant argued that when an individual commits a crime, he endangers 
the ‘Commonwealth’ and can therefore be destroyed: ‘It is better that one man should die 
than that the whole people should perish’ (1887: 195-196). The right to punish a criminal, 
Kant claimed, was ‘the Right of Retaliation (jus talionis)’ (Ibid.: 196). This was also the case 
with resistance against the sovereign’s laws. In Kant’s view, when an individual rises against 
the ‘ruling Authority’ of the state, ‘he would expose himself as a Citizen, according to the 
law and with full right, to be punished, destroyed, or outlawed’ (Ibid.: 174). For Kant, 
resistance ‘on the part of the people to the Supreme Legislative Power of the State’, even 
                                                            
26 In The Social Contract, Rousseau also argued that ‘a private war between man and man cannot exist’ either 
in the ‘state of nature’ or ‘in the social state’ on the basis that in the former ‘there is no permanent possession 
of  property’,  and  in  the  latter  ‘everything  is  controlled  by  laws’  (1999:  51).  However,  the  very  fact  that 
Rousseau tried to deny the right of the individual to wage wars is an indication that at the time he wrote his 
treatise, war as a private relationship between individuals had not been erased from the memories of society. 
Moreover, despite these arguments, Rousseau (Ibid.: 51) noted that during the reign of Louis IX, private wars 
were authorised in France, even though he denounced them as ‘an abuse due to feudal government’.  
27 The first part of Kant’s Metaphysics of Moral has been translated as The Philosophy of Law, An Exposition of 
the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as The Science of Right (also known as the Doctrine of Right).  
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when the monarch abuses his power, ‘is in no case legitimate’ (Ibid.: 176). Therefore, any 
effort on the part of the people to rise against the ruling order constituted high treason: 
 
[W]hen the Supreme power is embodied in an individual Monarch, is there any 
justification under the pretext of his abuse of power, for seizing his person or 
taking away his life (monarchomachismus sub specie tyrannicidi)? The slightest 
attempt of this kind is High Treason (proditio eminens); and a traitor of this sort 
who aims at the overthrow of his country may be punished, as a political 
parricide, even with Death. It is the duty of the People to bear any abuse of the 
Supreme Power, even though it should be considered to be unbearable (Ibid.: 176-
177). 
 
These arguments clearly indicate that in the early modern period the concept of ‘war’ had at 
least three meanings. Firstly, it was understood as a power relation between individuals. 
Secondly, it was understood as a power relation (primarily in terms of military action) 
between states. Thirdly, it was understood as a power relation (in terms of military actions 
against internal rebellions, legal actions against individuals who broke the law, and politics as 
the exercise of power that managed military actions and law) between a state and its citizens.  
Foucault’s key expositions on law’s war-making function can be found in Discipline 
and Punish, published a year before his lecture series “Society Must Be Defended” and 
Volume I of The History of Sexuality. In that text, Foucault gave examples of how crimes 
from the Middle Ages to the early modern period triggered a response to war from the 
sovereign. For Foucault, in those years, the prince’s ‘right to punish’ the criminal was 
understood to be ‘an aspect of the sovereign’s right to make war on his enemies’; in this 
respect, law, in the form of punishment that it meted on the criminal, preserved ‘something of 
the battle’ (1991: 48 & 51). In reference to the presence of the sovereign’s troops, both armed 
and in large numbers, around the scaffold where the criminal was executed, Foucault claimed 
that, as well as having been intended to ‘prevent any escape or show of force’ by the criminal 
and ‘to prevent any outburst of sympathy or anger on the part of the people’, it was also 
intended to be ‘a reminder’ that every crime was ‘a rebellion against the law’ and ‘that the 
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criminal was an enemy of the prince’ (Ibid.: 50). Thus, in executing the criminal, the prince 
was actually performing his functions as the head of justice and as the head of war: 
 
As a ritual of armed law, in which the prince showed himself, indissociably, both 
as head of justice and head of war, the public execution had two aspects: one of 
victory, the other of struggle. It brought to a solemn end a war, the outcome of 
which was decided in advance, between the criminal and the sovereign; it had to 
manifest the disproportion of power of the sovereign over those whom he had 
reduced to impotence (Ibid.). 
 
Crime was therefore understood to be ‘an act of hostility’; it was the ‘first sign of rebellion’ 
(Ibid.: 57). In witnessing the execution of the criminal and accepting the invitation to insult 
him, and often by attacking him, the people performed a ‘scaffold service’ to the sovereign: 
‘the people had to bring its assistance to the king when the king undertook “to be avenged on 
his enemies”, especially when those enemies were to be found among the people’ (Ibid.: 59). 
Although by the end of the eighteenth century public executions began to be looked 
upon with horror by the general public and the ‘scaffold service’ that they were expected to 
offer to the sovereign became that of ‘confrontation between the violence of the king and the 
violence of the people’, crime and the response of the state that it triggered nevertheless 
continued to be understood in terms of war (Foucault, 1991: 73 & 90). Foucault attributes this 
continuing state of affairs to the emergence of the social contract theory; having entered into 
the social pact the ‘citizen is presumed to have accepted once and for all, with the laws of 
society, the very law by which he may be punished’ (Ibid.: 89-90). As a result, when an 
individual breaks the law, he is understood to make war on society (Ibid.: 90). War, through 
law, is no longer waged on behalf of the sovereign but the entire social body: ‘The right to 
punish has shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defence of society’ (Ibid.).  
While advancing these arguments, Foucault also claimed that in modern societies 
punishment is no longer controlled by law but by the ‘autonomous’ prison apparatus (1991: 
222-223, 231, 246 & 307-308). For Foucault, unlike in the Middle Ages when the body of the 
criminal was treated as ‘the king’s property’ on which ‘the sovereign left his mark and 
  52   
brought down the effects of his power’, in modern societies the criminal has become the 
‘property of society’ for its collective appropriation and use (Ibid.: 109). In modern societies, 
law detaches the criminal from society and sends him to prison where he is interned and 
disciplined to be returned to society as its good member upon completing the sentence 
imposed on him (Ibid.: 110-111, 122-123, 126-127; also see Foucault, 1976/1980: 39). While 
the prison punishes the criminal by depriving him of his liberty during the time he is interned 
there, it also acts like a military barrack, a strict school and a dark workshop that disciplines 
him (Foucault, 1991: 233; also see Foucault, 1980: 40). In other words, the prison, through its 
disciplinary mechanisms, helps to re-qualify the criminal as a good member of society. 
Although the prison functions within the framework set out by the state’s law, the latter does 
not have immediate control over the former’s disciplinary activities once the criminal is taken 
away from society and interned for re-qualification (Foucault, 1991: 223 & 246). Thus, in 
functioning autonomously from law, the prison apparatus performs a productive function: 
 
That the prison is not the daughter of laws, codes or the judicial apparatus; that it 
is not subordinated to the court and the docile or clumsy instrument of the 
sentences that it hands out and of the results that it would like to achieve; that it is 
the court that is external and subordinate to the prison. That in the central position 
it occupies, it is not alone, but linked to a whole series of ‘carceral’ mechanisms 
which seem distinct enough – since they are intended to alleviate pain, to cure, to 
comfort – but which all tend, like the prison, to exercise a power of normalization. 
That these mechanisms are applied not to transgressions against a ‘central’ law, 
but to the apparatus of production – ‘commerce’ and ‘industry’ – to a whole 
multiplicity of illegalities, in all their diversity of nature and origin, their specific 
role in profit and the different ways to which they are dealt with by the punitive 
mechanisms (Ibid.: 307-308). 
 
These arguments of Foucault create the impression that law, despite continuing to make war 
on the criminal on behalf of society, has lost its significance in modern power relations. In 
turn, this leads to the misconception that law’s war-making function has become ceremonial. 
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This is further compounded by the fact that in Volume I of The History of Sexuality 
Foucault suggested that ‘we must construct an analytics of power that no longer takes law as 
a model and a code’ (1998: 90). This was, Foucault argued, because modern power relations 
‘go beyond the state and its apparatus’ and do not simply deal with ‘deduction’ and ‘death’, 
as law does, but also operate on the basis of technique, normalisation and control (Ibid.: 89). 
Later on in the text, Foucault came back to this point and asserted that while ‘law always 
refers to the sword’, other modern power relations that are not controlled by law, rather than 
displaying themselves in their ‘murderous splendour’,28 ‘qualify, measure, appraise, and 
hierarchize’ life and thus distribute ‘the living in the domain of value and utility’ (Ibid.: 144).  
As a consequence of these suggestions and the impression of the ceremonial role of law 
that Foucault created from Part II of Discipline and Punish, many Foucauldians have become 
accustomed to ignoring law (both in its domestic and international manifestations) in their 
studies on power relations. Although some scholars have examined the counter-terrorist 
practices of Western states during the GWoT within a Foucauldian framework, they have 
done so (as will be explained below and later in Chapter V) by placing counter-terrorism laws 
in a space without law (see, for example Neal, 2008; 2010; also see Duffield, 2007). Yet, as 
the works of some scholars have demonstrated (for example Aradau, 2007; Neocleous, 2008), 
it is possible to conduct a study on law which involves Foucault’s methods.  
A close reading of Foucault’s writings reveals that he suggested a study of power 
beyond law on three assumptions: firstly, law only deals with repression; secondly, law is not 
central to all power relations; thirdly modern power relations are not simply repressive but 
are also productive. On this basis, if one wishes to conduct a study on the productive (or the 
positive) dynamics of power, then it would certainly be necessary go beyond law (even 
though law cannot be ignored entirely, given the fact that, as will be explained below, the 
repressive functions of law can also have some productive consequences). Similarly, if one 
wishes to conduct a study on all forms of power relations, again the focus needs to go extend 
beyond law (but as before, cannot ignore law entirely). However, if one intends to examine 
                                                            
28 In touching on the subject of the ‘murderous’ nature of other power relations that are not controlled by law, 
Foucault implied that all power relations, regardless of their productive dynamics, have a violent face.  
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the war-making functions of the state (whether internally or externally) then one cannot 
ignore law. The state (particularly the one that upholds the rule of law) does not deal with its 
citizens without law. As Foucault himself acknowledged in Volume I of The History of 
Sexuality, modern power relations do not make the law fade into the background (1998: 144). 
This is a point that Foucault reiterated in the lecture series Security, Territory, Population 
(2007: 10). In that lecture series, Foucault also stated that it is law that, as well as setting out 
what is to be permitted and what is to be prohibited, sets out the punishment for crime (Ibid.: 
5). By making this statement, Foucault (1998: 144) not only reiterated his earlier claim that 
law always means the sword but also implied that this sword remains as forceful as before, 
and is thus capable of producing the effects of battle, i.e., death, injury, submission, 
expulsion, or the appropriation of persons or property. In essence, in equating law with the 
sword, Foucault did not underplay the former’s war-making function in modern societies. On 
this basis, and given the fact that Foucault himself devoted the first part of Discipline and 
Punish to law’s war-making function from the Middle Ages to the early modern period, one 
would not be going against Foucault’s suggestion of conducting a study of power beyond law 
if the concern of the study is the repressive actions of states. Even this kind of study, as we 
will see below, would not ignore the productive dynamics of law.  
Scholars often criticise Foucault for equating ‘law with pre-modern forms of power’ 
(see Hunt & Wickham, 1998: 59; Rose, 1984: 191-192; Neocleous, 1996: 67). For Alan Hunt 
and Gary Wickham, Foucault’s ‘conception of law as the commands of a sovereign backed 
by sanctions imposed on bodies of the transgressors correspond to a somewhat simplistic, if 
albeit common, view of law which equates “law” with the punitive forms of criminal law’ 
(1998: 59). This ‘entirely ignores, eliminates, suppresses’ the ‘other faces of law’ that ‘make 
up its great bulk of provisions’ and deal with ‘the detail of economic and kinship relations 
and the distribution of social authority’ as well as other social relations (Ibid.: 60). Law not 
only represses crime but also lays down ‘detailed rules and procedures for a host of 
specialised areas of activity’ such as ‘detailed provisions concerning welfare entitlements, 
construction standards, product safety, credit transactions, and so on’ (Ibid.: 67). In this 
regard, Gillian Rose also accuses Foucault of having simplified ‘legal development by 
conflating sovereignty with monarchy and government with sovereignty’ and thus making 
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law seem ‘monolithic and uniform’ (1984: 191-192). In Administering Civil Society, 
Neocleous takes Foucault to task for holding on to a ‘command theory of law’ (1996: 67). 
For Neocleous, law is not only ‘concerned with saying “no”’, but acts ‘as a constitutive force 
across and throughout the whole of society’ (Ibid.). Referring to the growth of tribunals in 
Britain ‘during the early part of the twentieth century’ to deal with issues such as ‘health, 
social security’ and ‘professional discipline’ outside the ‘ordinary court system’, Neocleous 
points out that as well as repressing crime, law also administers ‘disputes between the 
individual and the state’ (Ibid.: 69). Thus for Neocleous, law not only performs the repressive 
function but also carries out ‘constitutive, regulative, and policing functions’ (Ibid.: 67). 
There is no denying that Foucault’s expositions on law were confined largely to the 
Middles Ages and the early modern period. However, this cannot be used as the reason to 
dismiss them as being suitable for understanding only forms of law that function in repressive 
mode today, i.e., criminal law. Even today, force remains central to all forms of law, whether 
they be civil or criminal. If law cannot be enforced, it would only remain in text books. Force 
is the key to the enforceability of law. In this sense, Foucault’s (1998: 144) assertion that law 
always signifies the sword is certainly a valid one. However, the sword that law signifies is 
not a sword that is only concerned with repression. The sword that performs the repressive 
function is also the same sword that protects: it is the same law that prohibits theft that 
simultaneously protects the property of the individual; it is the same law that prohibits murder 
that protects the life of the individual; it is also the same law that empowers the individual to 
seek damages for negligence that takes away from the wrongdoer part of his wealth in the 
form of damages. Law therefore always performs a dual function: repression and protection. 
In this sense, even though Foucault was correct to equate law with the sword, he erred in 
asserting that it is only concerned with repression and does not have a productive function. 
A criticism that one encounters in using Foucault’s expositions on war is the danger of 
making the term meaningless by broadening its parameters. In “Society Must Be Defended”, 
Foucault claimed that ‘a battlefront runs through the whole of society’, both ‘continuously 
and permanently’, placing everyone ‘on one side or the other’ (Foucault, 2004: 51). In 
making this statement, Foucault left every exercise of power to be conceptualised as war. In 
this regard, Neocleous (1996: 86) notes that this broad conceptualisation, in addition to 
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Foucault’s ‘rejection of the state-civil society distinction’, only ‘encourages us to conflate all 
struggles into one universal struggle, rename it social warfare, and leave it at that’. Rose 
(1984: 193-194) also criticises Foucault for using the terminologies of war to explain power 
relations, in particular law and sexuality. However, it must also be borne in mind that before 
broadly conceptualising war, in “Society Must Be Defended” Foucault also pointed out that 
in using war as the ‘matrix’ for analysing power relations, he was ‘simply taking an extreme 
[case] to the extent that war can be regarded as the point of maximum tension, or as force 
relations laid bare’ (2004: 46). This statement is a clear indication on some of the reservations 
that Foucault had in conceptualising all forms of power relations as war. 
There can be no doubt that all forms of power relations are capable of having recourse 
to force (whether they be the power relations of the family or that of the state). There can also 
be no doubt that most institutions of power today are modelled on the military institution, as 
Foucault pointed out in Discipline and Punish (1991: 168). However, this does not mean that 
force is always exercised in every power relations. Even when force is exercised, it does not 
always produce the effects of battle, i.e., death, injury, destruction of property, and so on.  
How then can war be conceptualised beyond military action without at the same time 
rendering the term meaningless? In this thesis, building on from Foucault’s expositions on 
war, while I assert war to be inscribed in all power relations, I only treat power relations that 
produce the effects of battle to be ways of waging war. Those effects include: death, injury 
and the expulsion of the enemy; destruction of the enemy’s assets; appropriation of the 
enemy’s land/property; and the submission or the disarming of the enemy. Using the cases of 
liberal state-building undertaken by the British Empire in Ceylon, Sri Lanka’s post-colonial 
ethno-theocratic practices against the Tamils, and the West’s war to neutralise the Tamils’ 
armed struggle, I demonstrate in chapters IV to VIII that law, finance, politics, and diplomacy 
are ways of waging war in that they produced the effects of battle in the Eelam War. 
Within recent years, a body of work known as lawfare has emerged, affirming the 
relationship between law and war. Charles J.Dunlap (a US military judge), who first coined 
the term lawfare, defined it as ‘the use of law as a weapon of war’ and claimed that it has 
become ‘the newest feature of 21st century combat’: it is ‘a method of warfare where law is 
used as a means of realizing a military objective’ (2001: 1, 2 & 4). Later, expanding further 
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on his earlier definition, Dunlap conceptualised lawfare as a ‘strategy of using – or misusing 
– law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective’ (2010: 
122). Building on Dunlap’s concept of lawfare, and the legal scholar David Kennedy’s (2006: 
33) characterisation of war as a ‘legal institution’, Eyal Weizman claims that ‘the use of law 
as a weapon of war’ (when war is understood in terms of military action) has two dimensions: 
on the one hand, law can be used by a weaker, non-state actor to ‘constrain military action 
against it by claiming that war crimes have been committed’; on the other hand, states can 
also use law (in particular international humanitarian law) in wars as the ‘ethical vocabulary 
for marking legitimate power and justifiable death’ (2010: 13). Unlike Dunlap, Weizman 
traces the original use of law in war to colonial times. Law was used in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries to legitimise the ‘tactics of Western warfare’ in the colonies and to 
‘delegitimize the subaltern violence of the colonised’ (Weizman, 2010: 13). 
Even though this new body of work certainly acknowledges the relationship between 
law and war, three key weaknesses can be identified in its formulations. Firstly, it fails to go 
beyond the conventional understanding of war in terms of military action. Secondly, it 
misconceives the use of law in wars to be the development of the twenty-first century. 
Thirdly, it only assumes law to be a weapon in military conflict and not a way of waging war. 
As discussed earlier in this section, Foucault traced the genealogy for the functions of law 
both as a weapon as well as a way of waging war to the Middle Ages (1998: 86-87). In doing 
so, Foucault established the ground for conceptualising war beyond military action and for 
examining the actions of states from the Middle Ages through the matrix of war. 
By law, I do not only mean ordinary laws but also emergency laws that exhibit violence 
in its naked form. In State of Exception, Giorgio Agamben claims that although the state of 
exception – the basis of emergency laws –  today appears in the form of laws, it is in fact ‘the 
legal form of what cannot have legal form’: it ‘is not a special kind of law (like the law of 
war)’, but ‘a suspension of the juridical order itself’ (2005: 4). The state of exception, 
Agamben argues, lies ‘at the limit between politics and law’ (Ibid.: 1). Challenging this 
notion of Agamben, and scholars after him, Neocleous argues that emergency laws do not 
exist in a ‘space without law’, but being ‘entirely constitutional’ they are themselves part of 
law: ‘far from suspending the law, violent actions conducted in “emergency conditions” have 
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been legitimated through law on the grounds of necessity and in the name of security’ (2008: 
41 & 71). In his study on the history of British colonialism in India, Nasser Hussain also 
argues that it is incorrect to assert emergency laws to be existing outside the rule of law 
(2003: 20). Similarly, in her study on the post-9/11 ‘exceptional’ practices of the American 
and British governments, Claudia Aradau also points out that such governmental practices are 
not undertaken in a space without law, but rather signify the ‘ongoing transformation of law’ 
(2007: 490). As law ‘governs the “realities” of society’ it also adjusts to the ‘imperatives of 
necessity’ (Ibid.: 499). A full discussion on how emergency laws function as part of law, both 
as a weapon as well as a way of waging war, will be undertaken in Chapter V. 
 
 
Grasping biopolitics 
 
Although Foucault coined the term ‘biopolitics’ in Volume I of The History of Sexuality, it 
was in the lecture series Security, Territory, Population that he provided a concise definition:  
 
By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, 
namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the 
human species became the object of political strategy, of a general strategy of 
power, or, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern 
Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human 
beings are a species. This is roughly what I have called biopower (2007: 1).29 
 
On the basis of this definition and a number of expositions Foucault made in his works and 
other lecture series, the concept of biopolitics can be understood in the following terms. 
Firstly, biopolitics deals with life at the level of populations (Foucault, 1998: 137). In 
this regard, Foucault noted that biopolitics ‘aims to treat the “population” as a set of 
                                                            
29 In his works and lecture series, Foucault used the terms ‘biopolitics’ and ‘biopower’ as synonyms. Although 
Hardt and Negri distinguish the term ‘biopower’ from ‘biopolitics’ on the basis that the latter can be a form of 
resistance against capitalism (2001: 411), many Foucauldian scholars continue to use both terms as synonyms. 
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coexisting living beings with particular biological and pathological features’ (2007: 367). 
Unlike the ancient sovereign power that dealt with life at the level of the individual, 
biopolitics addresses the ‘multiplicity of men’ as a ‘global mass’; it is a ‘massifying’ power 
directed at ‘man-as-species’ (Foucault, 2004: 242-243). This does not mean that biopolitics is 
a system of power that ignores life at the level of the individual: it is not only a macro power 
relation. Biopolitics also deals with life at the level of the individual through disciplinary 
mechanisms: as well as infiltrating and embedding itself in disciplinary mechanisms, 
biopolitics also integrates them, dovetails into them, and to some extent modifies them 
(Foucault, 2004: 242). In this way, biopolitics disciplines the body of the individual as a 
machine to optimise its capabilities, extort its forces, increase its usefulness and docility, and 
integrate it into systems of efficient and economic controls (Foucault, 1998: 139).  
Secondly, biopolitics is not exterior to the exercise of political power. In this regard, 
Foucault noted that biopolitics should be understood on the basis of the theme of ‘the 
management of state forces’ (2007: 367). It is concerned with processes such as ‘birth, death, 
production, illness, and so on’ that affect the population in general (Foucault, 2004: 243). In 
this sense, biopolitics is about improving the life chances of populations by carrying out 
interventions and imposing regulatory controls on biological processes that affect them in 
general: it is about intervening and regulating the ‘propagation’ of life, ‘births and mortality, 
the level of health, life expectancy and longevity’ and ‘all the conditions that can cause these 
to vary’ in populations (Foucault, 1998: 140; 2004: 243; 2007: 367; 2008: 317). 
Thirdly, remaining part and parcel of the exercise of political power, biopolitics is also 
the power to take human lives; as well as being a power that makes life live, it is also a power 
that kills life. The ancient sovereign power over the life of the individual was largely 
exercised as the power of death (Foucault, 1998: 136). It was exercised ‘as a means of 
deduction’ that was ‘levied on the subjects’ to ‘appropriate a portion of wealth, a tax of 
products, goods and services, labor and blood’ (Ibid.). Although biopolitics emerged in the 
eighteenth century as a form of power concerned with administering bodies and managing 
life in a calculated way, it did not put behind the ancient sovereign power of death. Instead, it 
has supplanted the ancient sovereign power of death (Ibid.: 139-140). In this regard Foucault 
notes: ‘I wouldn’t say exactly that sovereignty’s old right – to take life or let live – was 
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replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right 
but which penetrates it, permeates it’ (2004: 241). In biopolitical rule, the power of death (or 
the right to kill) has shifted from the sovereign and is now manifested as ‘the right of the 
social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life’ (Foucault, 1998: 136).  
As a system of power that deals with life at the level of populations and concerned with 
making the human species live, how is the power of death (or the right to kill) exercised in 
biopolitics? This power of death/the right to kill is exercised by creating a binary division 
within the human species: the ‘good’ part of the human species that must be looked after and 
the ‘bad’ part of the human species that must be eliminated for the ‘good’ part of the human 
species to live (Foucault, 2004: 254-255). People of different races, political adversaries, the 
criminals, the mentally ill, and people with various anomalies become defined as biological 
threats to the existence of the ‘good’ part of the human species (Ibid.: 258-259 & 262). In the 
‘biopower system’, killings are undertaken in order for the ‘elimination of the biological 
threats to and the improvement of the species or race’ (Foucault, 2004: 256). In Mitchell 
Dean’s words, in biopolitical rule, the ‘criminal and dangerous classes, the feebleminded and 
the imbecile, the invert and the degenerate, the unemployable and the abnormal’ are 
considered to be threats to populations (2010: 119). Thus, as Foucault points out, in 
biopolitical rule ‘massacres have become vital’ for the human species to live (1998: 137). 
Today, ‘wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended’: 
instead, they are waged ‘on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are 
mobilised for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity’ (Ibid.). Within 
this context Foucault notes: if ‘genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not 
because of a recent return to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of 
life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population’ (Ibid.). 
Despite borrowing the term ‘biopolitics’ from Foucault, many scholars after him have 
developed competing definitions of the term that its usage today has become both ambiguous 
and contentious. As Jorg Spieker notes, biopolitics today ‘means different things to different 
thinkers’ (2011: 94). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine every scholarly work 
that has built on from Foucault’s concept of biopolitics. However, I will outline some of the 
key ones and state how they have either reinterpreted the term or circumscribed its meaning. 
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In Homo Sacer, claiming to correct and complete the Foucauldian thesis of biopolitics, 
and drawing on ancient Greek political thought, Giorgio Agamben (1998: 1 & 4) divides life 
as ‘bare life’ (meaning ‘the simple fact of living common to all living beings’) and ‘qualified 
life’ (meaning ‘the form or way of living proper to an individual or group’). Accusing 
Foucault of having misconceived biopolitics as a development of modern power politics, and 
citing the ancient Roman law figure of the Homo Sacer (the criminal whose execution is 
‘classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as homicide’) as an example, Agamben claims that the 
‘inclusion of man’s natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of power’ are not modern 
but ‘absolutely ancient’ (Ibid.: 9 & 82). Modern politics is not so much characterised by the 
inclusion of bare life in politics or the use of life as ‘a principal object of the projections and 
calculations of State power’, but the entry of both bare life and qualified life into ‘zone of 
irreducible indistinction’ coupled with the ‘processes by which the exception everywhere 
becomes the rule’ (Ibid.: 9). Although Agamben confines much of his study on biopolitics to 
the Nazi state, he also notes its thanatopolitical30 character in modern liberal democracies: in 
liberal democracies, as both the ‘bearer of rights’ and ‘sovereign subject’, every individual is 
a Homo Sacer, who may be killed when he commits a crime (Ibid.: 124 & 142). In essence, 
for Agamben, biopolitics is the thanatopolitics over the individual’s life.  
Contesting this claim of Agamben, in Biopower Today, Paul Rabinow and Nikolas 
Rose claim that biopolitics is not the power to take life but the power to foster life: biopolitics 
should be understood to ‘embrace all the specific strategies and contestations over 
problematizations of collective human vitality, morbidity and mortality; over forms of 
knowledge, regimes of authority and practices of intervention that are desirable, legitimate 
and efficacious’ (2006: 197). For Rabinow and Rose (Ibid.: 211), Foucault’s concept of 
biopolitics ‘operates according to logics of vitality, not mortality’. While acknowledging 
biopolitics to include ‘circuits of exclusion’, Rabinow and Rose argue that ‘letting die is not 
making die’ (Ibid.). Claiming the Nazi state to be ‘one configuration that modern biopower 
can take’, Rabinow and Rose (Ibid.: 201) criticise Agamben for characterising it as the 
‘hidden dark truth of biopower’. Biopower, under the Nazi state ‘was dependent upon a host 
                                                            
30 The politics of death. 
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of historical, moral, political and technical conditions’ that functioned alongside ‘a complex 
mix of the politics of life and the politics of death’ (Rabinow & Rose, 2006: 201).  
In “Society Must Be Defended”, Foucault noted the Nazi state’s appropriation of 
biopolitics to be ‘a paroxysmal development’ (2004: 259). Taking this characterisation at face 
value, Rabinow and Rose (2006: 199 & 201) claim that Foucault understood the Nazi state to 
be only an ‘exceptional’ development in the history of biopolitics: for Rabinow and Rose, 
Foucault understood biopolitics to be the techniques for ‘maximising the capacities of both 
the population and the individual’ within various domains of power – such as medicine, town 
planning, and so on – and not the power to kill. This is an incorrect assertion. As noted earlier 
in this section, in introducing the concept of biopolitics to the study of power relations, 
Foucault presented both its productive and violent dynamics. Moreover, Foucault did not 
refer to the appropriation of biopolitics by the Nazi state to be a paroxysmal development 
because it was the only state that exercised biopolitics as the right to kill. Instead, Foucault 
made this characterisation on the basis that the Nazi state was the only state that used 
disciplinary power and biopower so tightly since the emergence of those forms of power:  
 
After all, Nazism was in fact the paroxysmal development of the new power 
mechanisms that had been established since the eighteenth century. Of course, no 
State could have more disciplinary power than the Nazi regime. Nor was there any 
other State in which the biological was so tightly, so insistently, regulated. 
Disciplinary power and biopower: all this permeated, underpinned, Nazi society 
(control over the biological, of procreation and of heredity; control over illness 
and accidents too). No society could be more disciplinary or more concerned with 
providing insurance than that established, or at least planned, by the Nazis. 
Controlling the random element inherent in biological processes was one of the 
regime’s immediate objectives (2004: 259). 
 
In another work, Rose also argues that the death pole of biopolitics should not be understood 
as the power to kill but as the power to allow death to occur through ‘contraception, abortion, 
preimplantation, genetic diagnosis, debates about the right to die’ and so on (2007: 64). This 
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claim of Rose, as Spieker (2011: 103) points out, was not actually derived from Foucault’s 
writings or lecture series. Thus, in developing a concept of biopolitics based on race, 
reproduction and genomic medicine, both Rabinow and Rose effectively depoliticise it. 
This is not to say that Agamben’s conceptualisation of biopolitics is a faultless one. In 
his work, even though Agamben, unlike Rabinow and Rose, has recognised the violent 
dynamics of biopolitics, the Roman metaphorical figure of Homo Sacer that he uses to 
develop his concept of bare life has nothing to do with the concept of biopolitics. The 
metaphorical figure of Homo Sacer falls within the ambit of the ancient sovereign power of 
death that dealt with life at the level of the individual. As Foucault notes, biopolitics does not 
only deal with life at the level of the individual but at the level of populations (1998: 140). 
Agamben’s work can also be faulted for failing to ignore the fact that the power of death/the 
right to kill in biopolitics is intimately linked to the power of making life live. 
In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri define biopolitics as the form of power 
that is concerned with administering the ‘production and reproduction of life’ in service of 
global capitalism: ‘In the biopolitical sphere, life is made to work for production and 
production is made to work for life’; it is a power that ‘extends throughout the depths of the 
consciousness and bodies of population’ and ‘across the entirety of social relations’ (2001: 
23-24 & 32). While much of their work is concerned with the ‘productive dimensions of 
biopower’, and how biopower is being used today in the service of global capitalism, unlike 
Rabinow and Rose, Hardt and Negri (2001: 27 & 35) recognise its violent dynamics. 
On the other hand, in The Liberal Way of War, while recognising the violent dynamics 
of biopolitics and its intimate relationship with capitalism, Dillon and Reid define it as ‘an 
order of politics and power which, taking species existence’ of humans ‘as its referent object, 
circumscribes the discourse of what it is to be a living being to the policing, auditing and 
augmenting of species properties’ (2009: 24 & 29). The biological feature of human species 
are today used in ‘security and war’ (Ibid.: 29). For Dillon and Reid (Ibid.: 24-25), when 
Foucault coined the term biopolitics, economy (understood in terms of ‘capitalist modes of 
production and exchange’) was the key expression of species life in liberal biopolitics. 
However, as a result of the ‘confluence of the digital and molecular revolutions’, economy 
has today become one, among many, of the primary expressions of ‘species properties’ of 
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biopoliticised life (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 23-24 & 28-29). On this basis, Dillon and Reid 
argue that biopolitics today can only be understood by examining the life sciences (Ibid.: 46). 
In most of his works and lecture series, Foucault (1998: 140-143; 2007: 1 & 367; 2008: 
22 & 317) acknowledged biopolitics to be ‘an indispensable element in the development of 
capitalism’, even though, as Claudia Aradau and Tobias Blanke (2010: 44-45) have pointed 
out, much of his study was preoccupied with capitalism’s appropriation of biopolitics for 
disciplining individual bodies and governing circulation in Europe. For Foucault, capitalism 
would not have been able to develop without ‘the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic 
processes’ (1998: 140-141). It was the biopolitics of the human species that helped to adjust 
the ‘accumulation of men to that of capital’; biopolitics went hand-in-hand with the ‘growth 
of human groups’, the ‘expansion of productive forces’, and the ‘differential allocation of 
profit’ (Ibid.: 141). It also helped to prevent, contain, and often eliminate, threats – such as 
epidemics and famines – to the human species as well as capitalism (Ibid.: 142). With 
biopolitics working hand-in-hand with capitalism, the ‘Western man’31 gradually learnt the 
meaning of existing as ‘a living species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of 
existence, probabilities of life, and individual and collective welfare, forces that could be 
modified, and a space in which they could be distributed in an optimal manner’ (Ibid.: 142). 
Within this context, Hardt and Negri cannot be faulted for asserting the relationship between 
biopolitics and capitalism. However, this does not mean that biopolitics is only about the 
production and reproduction of life in the service of global capitalism. 
For Foucault, it was not only capitalism that appropriated biopolitics; it was also used 
by European colonialism, the Nazi State and Soviet-type socialist states (2004: 257 & 258-
263). It was European colonialism that first used biopolitics in thanatopolitical mode (Ibid.: 
257). Despite being capitalist, European colonialism did not initially use biopolitics in a 
productive way, but used it in a destructive way, which Foucault calls ‘colonizing genocide’: 
biopolitics under European colonialism was used to ‘justify the need to kill people, to kill 
                                                            
31  Although  in  Volume  I  of  The  History  of  Sexuality  and  the  lecture  series  Security,  Territory,  Population, 
Foucault  (1998; 2007) did not conduct his studies on capitalism’s appropriation of biopolitics  for disciplining 
bodies and governing circulation beyond Europe, he often referred to Europe as the West. 
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populations, and to kill civilizations’ in colonies (Ibid.: 275). This was also the case with the 
Nazi state, which was also capitalist. The Nazi state largely used biopolitics in its project of 
constituting the German race as the ‘superior race’ by seeking to eliminate and enslave other 
races (Ibid.: 259-260). Soviet-type socialist states (in particular Stalinist ones) also used 
biopolitics in a destructive manner to ‘deal with the mentally ill, criminals, political 
adversaries, and so on’ (Ibid.: 261-262). Thus, as Foucault spelled out in the last lecture of 
“Society Must Be Defended”, biopolitics not only functions in the service of capitalism. Nor 
is it a system of power in which the capitalist economy has become one among many of the 
species properties of the human species in liberal rule. Instead, biopolitics is a system of 
power that has been appropriated by various power complexes to manage populations in a 
calculated way. Each power complex promotes its own way of life for the human species and 
kills groups (the ‘bad’ part of the human species) that are seen to be a threat to promoting its 
way of life and the existence of the human species. Foucault refers to this relationship of life 
and death in biopolitics – that is ‘if you want to live, you must take lives, you must be able to 
kill’ – as the ‘relationship of war’ (2004: 255). It is a relationship that has origins in the 
‘principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to be capable of killing in order to go 
on living’ (Foucault, 1998: 137). Understood in this context, war is central to biopolitics not 
because it is inscribed, as in all power relations, with force, but because it is exercised using 
the principle underlying the tactics of battle and can produce the effects of battle. 
In this thesis, I am bringing a biopolitical perspective to bear on the complex of power 
relations constituted as the British Empire, liberal peace, and the Sri Lankan state. Although 
each of them have functioned with different ends, they have all exercised the power of life 
and death over populations, promoting their own way of life for the human species. The 
notable aspect of the biopolitics of liberal peace is that it has a continuity with the British 
Empire’s biopolitics of liberal state-building in its colonies. Therefore, the full dynamics of 
the biopolitics of liberal peace can only be grasped when examined together with the British 
Empire’s biopolitics of liberal state-building. Although this is not the case with the biopolitics 
of the Sri Lankan state, to further the ethno-theocratic ambitions of Sinhala Buddhism, it has 
relied heavily on the liberal mechanisms of government left behind by the British Empire.  
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The biopolitical perspective on liberal peace being developed in this thesis is different 
from the biopolitical perspective on capitalism developed by Hardt and Negri. As we saw in 
the Introduction, and as will be discussed further in the next section, in the biopolitics of 
liberal peace global commerce is understood to be the key to making global populations live 
by ending the miseries that military confrontations between states can bring upon them. 
However, in the biopolitical perspective of Hardt and Negri, the significance of global 
commerce is limited to facilitating the accumulation of capital: it is understood to be one of 
the conditions that leads to profit (2001: 190). In their work, Hardt and Negri (Ibid: 20) also 
conceptualise Western wars as police actions of the Empire to ensure order so that the 
production and reproduction of life in the service of capitalism can be ensured, and not as 
endeavours to make global populations live. Nevertheless, the contributions that Hardt and 
Negri have made in developing the concept of biopolitics cannot be discounted. Whereas 
Foucault’s work briefly examined the role of biopolitics in the development of capitalism 
during modernity, Hardt and Negri have extended his focus to the contemporary context. 
The same can be said of the way other Foucauldian scholars have developed the 
concept of biopolitics. Where the work of Duffield (discussed in the Introduction) provides 
insights on the way that biopolitics remains central to development, the work of Dillon and 
Reid brings to light the contributions made by the molecular (in relation to life forms) and 
digital revolutions in developing biopolitics as a sophisticated system of power. This is also 
the case with Agamben’s work. Despite misconceiving biopolitics to be a development of 
ancient times, Agamben has nevertheless expanded on Foucault’s brief expositions on the 
genocidal dynamics of biopolitics in Nazi Germany (in this regard, see Agamben, 1998: 136-
180). In similar manner, the work of Rabinow and Rose also provides insights on the 
productive dynamics of biopolitics in light of developments in medical and life sciences 
today.  
Although this thesis largely deals with the violent dynamics of the biopolitics of liberal 
peace in removing threats to unhindered global commerce, this does not mean that efforts to 
govern populations within states by improving their life chances – i.e., in the form of 
interventions in the areas of health, hygiene, circulation, and so on – are losing their 
significance. In the same way that Western states undertake interventions within their borders 
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to better the life chances of their populations, Southern states that undergo liberalisation are 
also expected to carry out similar interventions within their borders to improve the life 
chances of their own populations. The role of Southern states are complemented by 
humanitarian relief programmes and development activities of IGOs, IFIs, and INGOs. The 
biopolitical perspective of development used by Duffield provides insights in this regard.  
 
 
The biopolitics of liberal peace 
 
When liberal peace emerged as a concept in the eighteenth century, commercial globalisation 
was understood to be the key to ending military confrontations between European powers 
(Foucault, 2008: 57-58).With the end of the Second World War, the concept of liberal peace 
became embedded in the foreign policies and practices of Western states (as we will see in 
Chapters II & III). Today, the absence of military confrontations between Western states is 
understood to have come about as a consequence of the economic interdependence that 
commercial globalisation has produced between them (see Doyle, 2005: 464-465). In other 
words, commercial globalisation is understood to be the key to bringing an end to the 
miseries that military confrontations between states can bring upon populations. It is in this 
biopolitical endeavour of making life live through commercial globalisation that as part of 
their interventions32 Western states have promoted, undertaken, and consolidated 
liberalisation programmes in the states of the South. These liberalisation programmes are 
intended to institutionalise civil liberties, human rights, the rule of law, liberal democratic 
governance and free market economy (Paris, 2009: 5; Richmond & Audra, 2011: 294). 
Political liberalisation, together with economic liberalisation, is understood to be the key to 
making Southern populations become accustomed to liberal political and economic values, 
thus allowing global commerce to be undertaken in a secure environment, devoid of threats 
and influences from non-liberal forces and ideologies, such as extremism and communism. In 
                                                            
32  In using  the  term  intervention,  I mean military  interventions  (both humanitarian and non‐humanitarian), 
state‐building/‘peacebuilding’ missions, aid programmes, and mediatory efforts to resolve intra‐state conflicts.  
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other words, in undergoing liberalisation, Southern populations are expected to become 
capable of respecting civil liberties, human rights, the rule of law, adhere to liberal 
democratic governance, and  participate in a globalised free market economy. On this basis it 
can be seen that political liberalisation of the South is not a rhetorical commitment of the 
West, as some Marxists (for example Barkawi & Laffey, 1999: 418) have argued. 
As in all biopolitics, groups within the human species that either refuse to submit to or 
challenge the liberalising goal of liberal peace are considered to be the ‘bad’ part of the 
human species and become targets for elimination. During the Cold War, communist regimes 
and revolutionary movements that harboured or were seen to be harbouring the communist 
ideology were placed within this category. In the post-Cold War period, even after 
communism became a redundant ideology, armed national liberation movements, terrorist 
organisations and networks, and regimes that oppose liberal values continue to remain in this 
category. This is not to say that it is possible to find any official publications that refer to 
these groups explicitly as the ‘bad’ part of the human species. Instead, the terminologies of 
terrorists, extremists, barbarians, and rogue states are used to refer to them. As the way that 
the US-led GWoT was conducted demonstrates, liberty, human rights, and redress from 
international law are understood to be outside the reach of these groups (Aradau, 2007: 497; 
also see Aradau, 2008: 309). Through this dehumanisation, Western states are able to justify 
wars which violate the very principles – civil liberties, human rights and international law – 
that they also promote under the banner of liberal peace. 
These wars have not always been waged directly by Western states. Nor have they been 
waged only in the form of military action. As well as directly waging wars, Western states 
have also collaborated in the wars of their Southern counterparts to eliminate non-liberal 
actors. In these wars, whether direct or collaboratory, to eliminate the ‘bad’ part of the human 
species, the power relations of law, finance, politics, and diplomacy (as well as other power 
relations that produce the effects of battle), in addition to military might, have been 
mobilised. A notable aspect of these wars is that they have largely mirrored the wars waged 
by the British Empire as part of its biopolitics of liberal state-building in its Eastern colonies.  
When European colonialism set in motion from the end of the fifteenth century, it 
largely took the form of slave trade, plunder of resources in the colonies and the annihilation 
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of colonial subjects who challenged the conquerors (see, for example Fanon, 1963: 101; 
Nehru, 1994: 277, 280-281, 295-297 & 325). During those early years of colonialism, British 
imperialism was also no different in this respect. As the study of the Portuguese and Dutch 
rule of Ceylon in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and up to the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century in Chapter IV will demonstrate, before European colonialism became 
biopolitical, only a minority of colonial subjects, such as local rulers who accepted or helped 
to maintain colonial rule, mercenaries who served colonial armies, local merchants who 
helped the conquerors to plunder resources and further the slave trade, and converts who 
helped to spread Christianity, were fostered by their colonial masters. Even this was not 
undertaken at the level of populations but at the level of individuals. Although this was not 
the case with some of the mass killings that took place in the colonies (such as those in 
America, Africa, and Australia), those killings cannot be termed as biopolitical killings 
because they were not undertaken as part of the strategy of eliminating the ‘bad’ part of the 
human species in order for the human species to live. Instead, those killings were undertaken 
as part of the strategy of colonising lands and plundering resources found therein. Many of 
those who were killed by the European conquerors were the ones who rose against the 
colonisation of their lands or the plunder of their resources. Those who submitted to the 
colonial order were allowed to live. However, nothing substantial was done by the colonial 
rulers to better the lives of those who refrained from challenging the colonial order.  
Even when biopolitics became part of European colonialism in the eighteenth century, 
it was largely destructive in character (Foucault, 2004: 257). This is not to say that nothing 
was done to better the lives of the colonial subjects. With the entry of biopolitics, some 
interventions, such as efforts to contain epidemics, were carried out among the populations in 
the colonies. Despite these limited productive dynamics, in the initial stages the biopolitics of 
European imperialism was by and large dominated by the ancient sovereign power of death.  
However, this gradually began to change from the middle of the nineteenth century 
onwards, in particular in Britain’s Eastern colonies. Having already emerged as the empire in 
which the sun never set, it was from this time onwards that Britain initiated liberal state-
building in its colonies. While liberal institutions similar to those that existed at home were 
gradually built in the colonies, efforts to better the lives of colonial populations expanded 
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from containing epidemics to the introduction of better health, hygiene, transport, and often 
housing as well as educational facilities. The slave trade was also abolished in the colonies. 
As a consequence, more and more colonial subjects became involved in the colonial civil 
service as well as in colonial commerce. The beginning of liberal state-building changed the 
life and death relationship of biopolitics in the colonies. This is not to say that the biopolitics 
of liberal state-building in Britain’s colonies was entirely peaceful. It was as violent as the 
biopolitics of liberal peace today. However, compared to the period when liberal state-
building was not initiated in the colonies, the life and death relationship was no longer tilted 
largely in favour of the power of death: it was not as asymmetrical as it had been. 
In the same way that the terminologies of ‘terrorists’ and ‘extremists’ are used today to 
dehumanise the ‘bad’ part of the human species, the term barbarian was used extensively 
during the British Empire’s biopolitics of liberal state-building. Colonial subjects who 
showed willingness to become liberalised were understood to be capable of embracing order, 
culture and civilisation. However, those who resisted colonial rule were understood to be 
‘barbarians’ who continued to live in ‘chaos and disorder’ (Cooper, 2002: 11). Thus, the 
colonial subjects who refused to enter ‘civilisation’ became the ‘bad’ part of the human 
species against whom the power of death/the right to kill was exercised. 
A study of Adam Ferguson’s (1782) An Essay on the History of Civil Society provides 
interesting insights into the development of the terminologies of ‘civilisation’ and 
‘barbarism’. Although these terminologies were largely used during the Enlightenment to 
distinguish Europeans from non-Europeans, it was Ferguson who defined those terms on the 
basis of legally governed property relations (Foucault, 2008: 306). Property relations 
governed by law, Ferguson argued, signified ‘civilisation’ (1782: 135-136). While the 
principle object of ‘barbarians’ is the ‘care and desire of property’, relations among them are 
not guaranteed by law (Ibid.: 136). In contrast, in a civilisation, ‘by the authority of law, 
every citizen’ secures ‘the protection of his personal rights’ (Ibid.: 315 & 316). For Ferguson, 
law ‘has a principle reference to property’: law ‘would ascertain the different methods by 
which property may be acquired, as by prescription, conveyance, and succession; and it 
makes the necessary provisions for rendering the possession of property secure’ (Ibid.: 260-
261). Many liberal thinkers of the Enlightenment also considered the primary function of law 
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to be either guaranteeing the right of the individual to own property or take part in commerce. 
Locke defined political power as the ‘right of making laws’ for ‘the regulating and preserving 
of property’ (1980: 8). Later, Jeremy Bentham argued that ‘property and law were born 
together, and would die together’ (1914: 146-147). Law exists, Bentham claimed, to protect 
the property of the individual (Ibid.). For Adam Smith, law’s role was to provide security to 
the market from internal threats (1954: 163-164). Unless the buyer and seller are equal in the 
eyes of law and justice is administered according to law, prosperity through trade cannot be 
achieved (Ibid.). This idea was also mirrored in the thoughts of John Stuart Mill in the 
nineteenth century. For J.S.Mill, the benefits of trade can only be realised if both the seller 
and the buyer are allowed to conduct their business as equals before law (1985: 60 & 164). 
However, unlike other liberal thinkers before him, J.S.Mill (1836/1977) provided a 
definition of the term ‘civilisation’ that largely mirrored that of Ferguson. His definition is 
significant in that it emerged when liberal state-building was in its rudimentary stages in the 
British Empire’s Eastern colonies. For J.S.Mill, to be called a ‘civilisation’ a people must 
have all of the following four qualities: it must be made up of ‘a dense population’ that 
dwells in ‘fixed habitations’ and ‘largely collected together in towns and villages’; the 
country in which it dwells must be ‘rich in the fruits of agriculture, commerce, and 
manufactures’; it should ‘act together for common purposes in large bodies’ (such as in the 
form of organised militaries in wars) and also enjoy ‘the pleasures of social intercourse’; and 
its ‘arrangements of society’ (in the the form of law and the administration of justice) for 
‘protecting the persons and property of its members’ should be ‘sufficiently perfect’ to 
maintain internal peace (1977: 120). The people who did not possess these four qualities, 
J.S.Mill claimed, constitute the ‘savages’ or ‘barbarians’ (Ibid.). Ferguson distinguished the 
‘barbarians’ from the ‘savages’ on the basis that while the latter are not ‘acquainted with 
property’, the former, despite having the ‘care and desire’ of property as their principle 
object, do not have laws to govern property relations (1782: 135-136 & 315-316). However, 
J.S.Mill did not make such distinction but simply classified those who did not fall within his 
definition of ‘civilisation’ as living in the modes of ‘rudeness’ and ‘barbarism’ (1977: 120). 
Using Ferguson as well as J.S.Mill’s definitions as the matrix for understanding the 
usage of the terminology of ‘civilisation’ in Britain’s colonies in the nineteenth century, it 
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becomes apparent that liberal state-building was largely about institutionalising the rule of 
law to govern property relations. As we will see in Chapter II, establishing property rights 
and the rule of law are important aspects of liberal state-building in the states of the global 
South today, as it was in the British Empire’s liberal state-building in its Eastern colonies.   
Liberal state-building in Britain’s colonies did not automatically result in ‘political and 
civil liberties’ being granted to the colonial subjects (Hobson, 1902: 25). In the initial stages, 
colonial rule continued to remain as despotic as it had been before. J.S.Mill, who justified 
imperialism to be a mission for ‘civilising’ the Eastern races (1985: 69), claimed despotism to 
be an acceptable method of governing them, provided that it had ‘civilisation’ as its end: 
 
Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time 
when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal 
discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an 
Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are fortunate to find one (1985: 67). 
 
This was, though, not the case with law. Before liberal state-building was initiated, two 
separate legal systems were maintained in the colonies: while the legal system that was used 
to govern the settlers resembled that at home, the legal system that was used to govern the 
colonial subjects was made up of different laws. A number of liberal thinkers of the 
Enlightenment, such as Bentham and James Mill, justified this on the basis that ordinary laws 
that applied in Britain to a ‘civilised race’ could not also apply to the ‘uncivilised’ colonial 
subjects (Hussain, 2003: 40). This began to change when liberal state-building was initiated 
in the middle of the nineteenth century. As liberal state-building progressed, by the dawn of 
the twentieth century Britain’s colonial legal system began to mirror the one at home.  
This is not to say that law assumed the role of governing property relations and 
commercial intercourse in the colonies in a peaceful manner. As we will see in Chapters IV 
and V, law became a way of waging war within the colonies, eliminating threats to liberal 
state-building as well as to the security of Britain’s global commerce. During occasions when 
the use of ordinary laws in the colonies failed to overcome threats to Britain’s commercial 
interests or the emerging liberal state-order, martial law took its place. Although by the turn 
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of the nineteenth century martial law had been replaced in Britain with a number of 
legislations that normalised the violent functions of law, in the colonies, however, it was not 
codified into law but unleashed in its naked form to put on show its violent characteristics 
(Rossiter, 1948: 136-137 & 141-142; Neocleous, 2008: 44). It was the use of martial law in 
the colonies that reminded the subject population that law always signified the sword. It 
reminded them that law would always assume its extreme form whenever the liberal state-
order being built in the colonies or the security of Britain’s global commerce was threatened 
(this subject will be discussed further in Chapter V). While those who did not challenge 
liberal state-building were fostered to become ‘civilised’ in accordance with liberal political 
and economic values, the fate of the indigenous populations of America, Australia and, some 
parts of Africa befell those who resisted it: they were dehumanised and annihilated. 
It was only after the indigenous populations became accustomed to the new colonial 
legal system that political and civil liberties were granted to them. As Frederick Lugard was 
later able to claim proudly in The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, the British 
Empire was discharging its ‘civilising’ mission by establishing ‘Courts of Law’ and creating 
within the indigenous populations ‘a sense of individual responsibility, of liberty and of 
justice’ (1922: 5). However, as the limited role the indigenous populations continued to play 
in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of many colonies, and the strict military 
codes that were imposed on local soldiers depriving them access to newspapers shows, the 
grant of political rights and liberties to the indigenous populations was not understood 
primarily in terms of their self-governing rights (see Nehru, 1994: 329). Liberty for the 
indigenous populations did not entail liberty in its strict sense. Instead, it was largely centred 
on creating conditions for Britain’s global commerce to be undertaken freely and securely 
within the borders of the colonies. As Foucault (2008: 62-65) notes, in liberal thought liberty 
is understood as a condition that allows commerce to be undertaken freely: it is a freedom 
that is created to ensure that ‘the freedom of economic processes’ are not endangered: 
 
[T]his governmental practice in the process of establishing itself is not satisfied 
with respecting this or that freedom, with guaranteeing this or that freedom. More 
profoundly, it is a consumer freedom. It is a consumer freedom inasmuch as it can 
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only function insofar as a number of freedoms actually exist: freedom of the 
market, freedom to buy and sell, the free exercise of property rights, freedom of 
discussion, possible freedom of expression, and so on (Ibid.: 63). 
 
The biopolitics of British liberal state-building reached its end-stage in the inter-war years of 
the twentieth century when universal franchise was introduced and liberal democratic system 
of government was institutionalised in the colonies. With power being concentrated neither in 
the hands of one or many, a check on political monopolies, which have the potential to lead 
to economic monopolies, was effectively placed in the colonies. By the time this occurred, 
much of the colonial populations had become accustomed to adhering to the rule of law, 
respecting civil liberties, and were actively participating in Britain’s global commerce. Thus, 
when decolonisation began after the end of the Second World War, many of Britain’s 
colonies had evolved into market democracies. They had, armed with law, and other power 
relations of the state, inherited the functions earlier performed by the British Empire’s 
colonial apparatus. The end result of the liberal state-building undertaken by Britain in its 
colonies was the creation of self-governing market democracies in the global South.    
The emergence of Britain’s colonies as market democracies at the end of the Second 
World War also coincided with the decline of the former’s global military might. In the 
nineteenth century, with its global military might and monopoly over global markets, and 
claiming to be the guardian of ‘civilisation’, Britain sought ‘a political and economic role as 
the economic mediator between Europe and the world market’ (Foucault, 2008: 60). J.S.Mill, 
who worked for the British East India Company, argued that even though Britain’s colonial 
victories over ‘barbarian forces’ had placed ‘it in a position to command liberty of trade’ 
across the globe, it continued to work for the benefit of ‘all mankind’: Britain was not 
interested in making ‘treaties stipulating for separate commercial advantages’ as it desired 
‘no benefit to itself at the expense of others’ (1984: 111). Similar claims were also made by a 
number of other British colonial officials who argued that by ‘civilising’ the Eastern races 
and opening-up their lands for commerce, the British Empire was helping European 
enterprises to develop in the East (see, for example Clarence, 1899). However, with the 
decline of its global military might and the emergence of its colonies as market democracies 
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at the end of the Second World War, Britain opted for decolonisation and gave-up its 
monopoly over global markets. It also aligned with America and other Western states to 
create conditions for unhindered global commerce. This became possible with the emergence 
of ‘a strong belief amongst allied Powers that the protectionist trade policies of the 1930s had 
contributed significantly’ to war, and opting for global free trade, with ‘an appropriate role 
for state intervention in the market’, would lead to ‘peace’ (Thomas, 2005: 649).  
Frantz Fanon argues that decolonisation in the third world was fundamentally about 
throwing colonies that waged violent struggles for independence ‘back to the Middle Ages’, 
in the form of withdrawing colonial capital and investors ‘and setting up around the young 
State the apparatus of economic pressure’, or turning those who sought national liberation 
through peaceful means into ‘economically dependent’ states (1963: 96-98). While Fanon’s 
claims are true in the case of colonies which sought independence through armed struggles, 
in the case of colonies which resorted to non-violent methods of achieving independence, 
decolonisation signified their evolution as self-governing market democracies capable of 
providing security to global commerce within their borders. One example would be Ceylon 
(India would be another). A full discussion in this regard will be undertaken in Chapter IV.  
The liberalisation programmes undertaken by Western states today, whether directly, 
through other liberal non-state actors, international institutions, or through their Southern 
counterparts,  to institutionalise the rule of law, liberal democratic governance, and free trade 
in the states of the South and make them and their populations become accustomed to 
respecting civil liberties and human rights are a continuation of the liberal state-building 
activities undertaken by the British Empire in its Eastern colonies. In this respect, the 
biopolitics of liberal peace cannot be differentiated from that of the British Empire in 
methods. However, both forms of biopolitics can be distinguished in their objectives.  
The biopolitics of the British Empire was centred on creating conditions for its own 
global commerce to be undertaken securely in its Eastern colonies.33 In the biopolitics of the 
                                                            
33 This does not mean that liberal state‐building in the colonies did not serve any other purpose for the British 
Empire. Through liberal state‐building the British Empire was also able to minimise the costs of administering 
and defending the colonies,  i.e.,  it did not have to bring  in a  large number of civil servants and soldiers from 
Britain or rely on local princes and their troops to administer and defend the colonies, but was able to recruit 
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British Empire, efforts were undertaken to improve the living conditions of the local 
populations (making life live) and the power of death/the right to kill exercised over them for 
the enrichment of Britain’s home populations (both in Britain and in the colonies), even 
though it also resulted in the enrichment of some sections of the colonial populations. In this 
sense the biopolitics of the British Empire in its Eastern colonies was intimately linked to its 
biopolitics of governing its home populations. In essence, it was a biopolitics centred on 
monopolising global markets and remained subordinate to the economic interests of Britain’s 
home population. It cannot be denied that it is as part of the biopolitics of governing their 
home populations that today under the banner of liberal peace Western states collectively 
promote, undertake, and consolidate liberalisation programmes in the states of the global 
South, often assisted by liberal non-state actors, international institutions, and their Southern 
counterparts, and exercise the power of death/the right to kill over Southern populations. 
Western states are very well aware that if the miseries that military confrontations between 
states can bring upon their populations are to be avoided, as well as maintaining a 
harmonious relationship with their Western counterparts, they must also extend this state of 
affairs in their relationship with their Southern counterparts: in the same way that Western 
states are no longer tempted to engage in military confrontations with each other, Southern 
states must also in the long run be made to avoid the temptations of engaging in military 
confrontations with Western states as well as with their Southern counterparts. In this way, 
both Western as well as Southern populations can avoid the miseries that military 
confrontation between states can bring upon them. It is this that makes unhindered global 
commerce, in which no individual state (including those from the West) is expected to have 
monopoly over global markets, central to the biopolitics of liberal peace. Western states 
believe that in the same way that economic interdependence through commercial 
globalisation has produced a harmonious relation between them, it will also help to sustain 
this state of affairs and possibly lead to its extension in their relationship with their Southern 
counterparts. Thus, although the biopolitics of liberal peace, like the biopolitics of the British 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
at low cost a large number of its colonial subjects for the same purpose. Nevertheless, creating conditions for 
commerce to be undertaken securely in the colonies was central to the British Empire’s liberal state‐building.  
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Empire, is intimately linked to the biopolitics of Western states for governing their home 
populations, it is not a biopolitics that remains subordinate to the economic interests of the 
home populations of Western states. Being a biopolitics centred on unhindered global 
commerce, both Western and Southern populations have stakes in it. In this way, the 
biopolitics of liberal peace can be differentiated from that of the British Empire in objectives. 
 
 
The biopolitics of the Sri Lankan state 
 
Although ethnicity has often remained central to nationalism (Snyder, 2000: 23), it is no 
longer possible to find states in the West existing purely along ethnological or theological 
lines. In contrast, outside the West, it is possible to find both ethnocracies and theocracies. 
Even in states that had not originally been constituted as such (as in the case of Sri Lanka), 
ethnicity and religion often dominate state policy and the way that populations are governed. 
While in liberal political thought both ethnocratic and theocratic forms of government are 
understood to be ‘primitive’ and ‘irrational’, and thus a threat to liberal values (Fukuyama, 
1992: xi, 45 & 201), in practice, liberal states often find it convenient to collaborate with non-
liberal regimes (as the case of longstanding collaboration with the monarchies of the Middle 
East and other non-liberal regimes demonstrates), while also promoting liberal values under 
the banner of liberal peace elsewhere (Rampton & Nadarajah, 2012; Laffey & Nadarajah, 
2012). However, collaboration with Sri Lanka is distinctly different. Collaboration with Sri 
Lanka is not a case of liberal democracies collaborating with a non-liberal state. It is the 
collaboration of liberal democracies with a state that possesses liberal democratic institutions 
and uses them to further its ethno-theocratic ambitions. Although Sri Lanka claims to be ‘one 
of Asia’s oldest functioning democracies’ (Rajapaksa, 2011) and Western states have 
justified their collaboration with it on this basis (Lunstead, 2011: 71), the Sinhala-Buddhist 
ethno-theocratic values that it has upheld since its creation by the British Empire in 1948 
makes it difficult for it to be placed alongside Western liberal democracies. 
As will be explained in detail in Chapter IV, Sri Lanka’s national identity, constitution, 
institutions of state, and the name of the state itself reflect Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocratic 
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values. Even though the Tamils, along with the Sinhalese, constitute the original people34 of 
the island with a distinct national identity of their own and a historical homeland in the 
northeastern parts of the island, since the state was created, the Sinhala-Buddhists, 
monopolising the numerical advantage they began to enjoy as a consequence of the electoral 
system of government left behind by the British Empire, have sought to transform the island 
into a Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocracy. Although the state leads this project of transforming 
the island into a Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocracy, the island’s Sinhala-Buddhist clergy, 
political parties, grass-root groups, and other social organisations also play their part.  
In his studies on the conflict in Sri Lanka, Neil DeVotta uses the term ‘ethnocracy’ to 
refer to the island-state (2002: 19; 2004: 76; 2007: 19). For DeVotta, a state can be 
characterised as an ethnocracy ‘when the dominant ethnic group’ within its borders ‘eschews 
accommodation, conciliation, and compromise with the state’s minorities and instead seeks to 
institutionalize its preferences so that it alone controls the levers of power’ (2007: 56). In 
light of Sri Lanka’s racist policies and practices towards the Tamils since its creation, and the 
fact that it has given the ‘foremost place’ to Buddhism and the ‘pre-eminent position’ to the 
Sinhala language in its two republican constitutions, DeVotta finds it fit to refer to the island-
state as an ethnocracy, rather than as a liberal democracy (Ibid.: 19). In The Politics of 
Transformation, Suthaharan Nadarajah and Luxshi Vimalarajah also use the term ethnocracy 
to refer to the island-state. They make this characterisation on the basis that Sri Lanka’s 
system of government provides uneven protection for political and civil rights ‘across ethnic, 
class and territorial units’, and because the island-state’s last two ‘mono-ethnic’ constitutions 
had ‘enshrined Buddhism as a specially protected religion and endorsed the unitary model of 
governance’ (Nadarajah & Vimalarajah, 2008: 16-17). Although these definitions take into 
account both the ethnological and theocratical dynamics of Sri Lanka’s project, the term itself 
underplays its theocratical dimensions. Therefore, I use the term ‘ethno-theocracy’ to refer to 
Sri Lanka’s project of creating a Sinhala-Buddhist identity for the island and its population. 
For one thing, this ethno-theocratic project of Sri Lanka is a biopolitical one. It divides 
the island’s population along Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocratic lines: while the Sinhala-
                                                            
34 For a discussion on Sri Lanka’s ethnic groups, see Chapter IV. 
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Buddhists and all other ethnic and religious groups that accept the supremacy of the Sinhala 
language and Buddhism are fostered through interventions to improve their health, hygiene, 
living standards, education, employment opportunities, and so on, the Tamils, and other 
ethnic and religious groups (such as the Muslims, the Burghers and the Sinhala Christians), 
who either claim a distinct identity for themselves or refuse to accept the supremacy of 
Sinhala-Buddhism are understood to constitute the ‘bad’ part of the human species who need 
to be eliminated. As we will see in Chapter IV, Sri Lanka’s biopolitics is based on ancient 
myths that assert the island to be the holy land of Sinhala-Buddhism. These myths were 
revived under British rule in the nineteenth century by Sinhala-Buddhist scholars to create 
national consciousness among the Sinhala-Buddhist masses. Although Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism did not go well with British imperialism, and the latter was largely hostile to the 
former, much of the liberal state-building practices undertaken by the British Empire in 
Ceylon, in particular the amalgamation of the separate administrative apparatuses of the 
territories of the island’s former Tamil and Sinhala kingdoms and principalities into a single 
administrative unit and the institutionalisation of an electoral system that pushed the Tamils 
to the status of an ethnic minority, went hand-in-hand with the former’s desire to bring the 
island under a single state and institutionalise ancient myths after independence.  
A notable feature of Sri Lanka’s biopolitics is its appropriation of liberal mechanisms 
of government to further its ethno-theocratic ambitions. Moreover, from the day that it was 
created to the emergence of the Tamil armed resistance movement in 1972, claiming to 
guarantee the security of global commerce within the island’s borders from the threat of 
communism, Sri Lanka managed to make the West turn a blind-eye to its racist policies and 
practices towards the Tamils (see Chapter IV). One thing needs to be made clear. The 
biopolitics of the Sri Lankan state is not the same as that of liberal peace. Whereas Sri 
Lanka’s biopolitics is concerned with developing a Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocratic 
identity for the island and its populations, the biopolitics of liberal peace discourages the 
formation of such identities and instead promotes unhindered global commerce as the 
solution to ending ethnic and religious rivalries and building harmonious relationship 
between global populations. In other words, the biopolitics of the Sri Lankan state and the 
biopolitics of liberal peace stand at opposite poles. Nevertheless, before the emergence of the 
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Tamil armed resistance movement, the West allowed Sri Lanka to wage war against the 
Tamils because it wanted to prevent communists – whom it considered to be the ‘bad’ part of 
the human species – from taking control of governmental power in the island. Up until the 
end of the Cold War, Sri Lanka also managed to mobilise the support of the West in its 
counter-insurgency efforts against the Tamil armed resistance movement on the basis that it 
was fighting the ‘bad’ communist human species on behalf of the West, even though, as we 
will see in Chapter VI, the Tamil armed resistance movement only posed an armed challenge 
to Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic ambitions. In the post-Cold War period, although the Tamil 
armed resistance movement was no longer identified with communism, Sri Lanka was able to 
keep the West on its side as the latter understood armed struggles to be a threat to the security 
of global commerce, especially when these struggles are undertaken against liberal 
democracies (see Chapter III). It was by invoking arguments centred on the security of global 
commerce that Sri Lanka was able to portray the Tamil armed resistance movement as the 
‘bad’ part of the human species. It was through this that Sri Lanka was able to mobile 
Western support for its counter-insurgency efforts in the post-Cold War period, which 
eventually led to the West launching a parallel war to neutralise the Tamils’ armed struggle 
(see Chapters V, VII and VIII). Sri Lanka defeated the Tamil armed resistance movement and 
thereby removed the armed challenge to its ethno-theocratic ambitions only after the West 
enhanced its collaboration with the island-state by launching and later intensifying a parallel 
war to neutralise the Tamils’ armed struggle. Thus, from a biopolitical perspective, Western 
collaboration with the Sri Lankan state can be explained in the following terms: for the Sri 
Lankan state, the Tamil population, the communists (including the Sinhala Marxist youth), 
and the Tamil armed resistance movement constituted the ‘bad’ part of the human species; in 
the eyes of the West, as the communists and the Tamil armed resistance movement also 
constituted the ‘bad’ part of the human species who had to be eliminated, Sri Lanka’s 
massacre of Tamil civilians in its efforts to eliminate the ‘bad’ part of the human species, and 
thus turn the island into an ethno-theocracy, was unpreventable. 
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With the elimination of the communist threat and the annihilation of the Tamil Tigers,35 
the relationship between the West and the Sri Lankan state is gradually descending from 
collaboration to confrontation. However, as this thesis is concerned with Western policy in 
the Eelam War until end of the armed conflict, it will not be examining these developments. 
Instead, it will only be examining their relationship of collaboration. Before undertaking a 
full study in this regard, the next chapter will examine the theoretical dynamics of the concept 
of liberal peace and reveal that the security of global commerce remains central to it. 
                                                            
35 Tamil Tigers is the acronym for the LTTE. 
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Chapter II 
Liberal peace in theory 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first two sections, I examine the normative 
and institutional operations of the concept of liberal peace. I then scrutinise the credibility of 
construing post-Cold War Western interventions underpinned by the concept of liberal peace 
as global missions for creating an empire and show that such attempts ignore the fact that as a 
concept centred on unhindered global commerce, liberal peace is opposed to imperialism 
because imperial control of global markets has the potential to lead to economic monopolies.  
 
 
Normative operations 
 
In contemporary Western political thought and practice, the concept of liberal peace operates 
at two levels: normative and institutional. Oliver Richmond identifies four strands in its 
normative operation: victor’s peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace and civil peace 
(2006: 293). In addition to these, democratic peace theory can be included as the fifth strand 
of the concept of liberal peace, even though many scholars use it as a synonym for the latter. 
During the Cold War, liberal scholars often avoided framing democracy as the central 
tenet of liberal peace. This can be attributed to two reasons: firstly, the term ‘democracy’ was 
used by communists to denote one-party dictatorship; secondly it was not understood to 
‘stand for political rights and liberties’ (Ivie, 2005: 96). With the defeat of communism and 
the end of the Cold War, liberal scholars have become accustomed to using the terms 
‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’ as synonyms. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey argue that the 
distinction between democracy and liberalism has ‘collapsed’ because liberalism has become 
the ‘dominant ideology of modern state in the contemporary West’ (2001: 13). As a 
consequence, the concept of liberal peace is now also referred to as democratic peace theory. 
Thus, Michael Doyle, who referred to Western states as ‘liberal states’ in his writings of the 
Cold War period, now uses the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’ interchangeably. In one of 
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his works of the post-Cold War period, ‘Three Pillars of Liberal Peace’, Doyle refers to 
liberal peace both as ‘democratic peace’ and ‘liberal democratic peace’ (2005: 463).  
Despite these conceptual tensions, on the basis that some scholars (see, for example 
Russett, 1993) do not consider economic liberty to be one of the conditions that leads to 
peace, at the normative level democratic peace theory can be classified as a distinct strand of 
liberal peace than as its synonym. In Grasping the Democratic Peace, Bruce Russett defines 
democracy in terms of universal franchise and argues that democracies are peaceful towards 
their counterparts regardless of their respect for ‘economic liberty’ (1993: 15). Although 
Richmond does not define democratic peace theory as another strand of liberal peace, in a 
work co-authored with Mitchell Audra he claims it to be one of its sources (2011: 326). 
However, treating liberal peace as a single concept, Adam Quinn and Michael Cox define 
democratic peace theory as the ‘sister theory’ of the former: the concept of liberal peace 
varies from democratic peace theory ‘in also emphasising a broader set of specifications than 
simple democracy, most notably the adoption of liberal capitalist economics, and also more 
specifically liberal interpretations of how democracy should be defined’ (2007: 500-501).  
Of the four strands operating at the normative level within the concept of liberal peace, 
victor’s peace is based on the idea that peace depends on war (Richmond, 2006: 293). Doyle 
(1986: 1151), using the term ‘liberal imperialism’, traces the origins of this idea to Niccolo 
Machiavelli’s work, The Discourses. Machiavelli, who believed republics to be the prudent 
forms of government best suited for upholding the liberty of the individual, also argued that 
conquering foreign territories to be the best way of bringing peace and security to republics. 
Foreign conquests, he claimed, would provide republics with defence from external invasions 
and a diversion from internal unrest (Machiavelli, 1972: 154 & 158-159). In addition to 
Machiavelli, some scholars have also traced the war making tendencies of liberal peace to the 
works of John Stuart Mill. For example, Beate Jahn (2005: 599) argues that, as a leading 
British official of his time directly involved in governing the Indian subcontinent, J.S.Mill 
espoused an imperialism that has been ‘reproduced through liberal practices in the 
contemporary world’. Although, as I shall establish at the end of this chapter, it is 
conceptually incorrect to equate contemporary manifestations of liberal peace with 
imperialism, being a biopolitical project it is, as we saw in Chapter I, inscribed with war. 
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Roland Paris (2010: 351) denounces Richmond’s characterisation of victor’s peace as a 
strand of liberal peace and argues that it is a ‘dubious’ assertion that does not hold ground 
either theoretically or empirically. Victor’s peace, he argues, is theoretically associated with 
realism, and, in empirical terms, peacebuilding operations of the post-Cold War period have 
not been based on ‘preference for military victory’, but have largely been consensual (Ibid.).  
Countering these claims of Paris, Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner and Michael Pugh point 
out that war victory has been a driving force of many ‘liberal peacebuilding’ missions of the 
post-Cold War period. Citing the cases of Western-led interventions in Croatia,36 Bosnia, 
Somalia and Sierra Leone, they argue that ‘peacebuilding’ operations of the post-Cold War 
period conducted within the framework of liberal peace have not always been consensual but 
have largely depended on military might and war victories. Thus, in a direct attack on Paris, 
they argue that in empirical terms he has failed to ‘acknowledge the far more extensive 
gradations that exist between poles of “pure” peacebuilding after conquest and “pure” 
peacebuilding after ceasefire and consent’, and point out that ‘peace operations can move 
backwards and forwards along a spectrum of consent and coercion over time’ (Cooper, 
Turner & Pugh, 2011: 5). This has exactly been the case in the Norwegian-led Western 
intervention in the Eelam War, which will be dealt with in detail in Chapters VII and VIII. 
Notwithstanding these, in contrast to Paris’s claim, in theoretical terms war is not an 
absent feature of liberal peace. In this regard, many liberal scholars accept that liberal states, 
despite being peaceful in their relations with their liberal counterparts, are ‘prone to war’ with 
non-liberal states (see, for example Doyle, 1986: 1152; 2005: 464; also see Owen, 1994: 95-
96). For Michael Doyle, the liberal peace equation only relates to peace between liberal 
states; not in terms of relations between liberal states and non-liberal states. Challenging this 
‘separate peace’ thesis of Doyle and other liberal scholars after him, in On Liberal Peace 
John MacMillan (1998: 16) argued that ‘pacifism is interwoven’ and is a ‘constitutive 
                                                            
36  Although  the  UN mission  (United Nations  Transitional  Administration  for  Eastern  Slavonia,  Baranja  and 
Western Sirmium) in Croatia was staffed by military and police personnel from fifteen non‐Western countries, 
it can be classified as a Western‐led intervention on the basis that fifteen Western countries also contributed 
military and police personnel to the mission and because its key institutions were headed by officials from the 
US (the transitional administration), Belgium (the military force), and Austria (the police force). Moreover, the 
mission itself was conducted within the broad framework of liberal peace (see Paris, 2009: 107‐110). 
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element of liberalism’. For MacMillan, wars between liberal states and non-liberal states can 
be attributed to ‘the failure, weakness, or circumvention of liberal constitutional-institutional 
constraints, the influence of non-liberal ideological currents, and the complexities of the 
political process itself’, and not because of any defects in liberalism as a ‘body of political 
philosophy’ (1998: 273). In a recent work, citing the case of the reluctance of the US in 2002 
to intervene in Venezuela to support the pro-Washington opposition that briefly overthrew 
the democratically elected anti-American government of Hugo Chavez, MacMillan argues 
that ‘there is some evidence that liberal norms have been consequential in limiting the 
capacity of large democracies to do harm to small democracies’ (2012: 356). Yet, in the same 
work, MacMillan acknowledges that the historical trends in ‘violence between democratic 
states, the violence of democratic states (and their proxies) towards democratic movements 
within states, and violence within democracies’ indicate that ‘the development of a universal 
Democratic Peace – one that includes the periphery – will be challenging and difficult’ (Ibid.: 
359-360). This state of affairs, MacMillan notes, suggests that instead of manifesting as a 
‘universal “just” peace’, liberal peace is becoming in practice a ‘hegemonic peace’ (Ibid.: 
359). Also citing the cases of social violence in Western societies (in particular the political 
violence in France in 2005 and the riots in London in 2011 as well as the ‘rise of criminality, 
drugs, gangs, anti-social behaviour, and the exacerbation of racial, religious, and ethnic 
divisions’ in general), and the ‘rise of more invasive and repressive state practices’ in 
response, MacMillan acknowledges that these state of affairs are ‘surely not “peace”’ (Ibid.: 
357-358). While these acknowledgements of MacMillan come close to one of the key claims 
of this thesis (as outlined in the Introduction and Chapter I) that the absence of military 
confrontation between states is not peace per se (the absence of war), they also recognise the 
fact that in its manifestations war is not an absent feature of liberal peace. 
The idea of war as the means for achieving liberal peace can be found in the speeches 
of the American statesman Woodrow Wilson, who is cherished by some liberal scholars as ‘a 
political messiah’ of liberal peace (see, for example Mandelbaum, 2002: 17 & 21), and whose 
name is sometimes used to refer to the concept of liberal peace as Wilsonianism (see Paris, 
2009: 6). Wilson believed that military confrontations between states can be brought to an 
end through liberalisation. However, in order to do this, it was necessary to use military 
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force. During a meeting with the British envoy Sir William Tyrell in November 1913, Wilson 
was reported to have not only justified the interventions of his predecessors in Latin America 
but also spelled out his intention to intervene in Mexico by claiming that he would ‘teach 
South American republics to elect good men’ (cited in Wolfensberger, 2004: 1-2; also see 
Ikenberry, 2008: 14). A year before steering USA into the First World War, Wilson even 
argued that America would use its military might to establish peace centred on liberal values: 
 
America is always going to use her army in two ways. She is going to use it for 
the purpose of peace, and she is going to use it as a nucleus for expansion into 
those things which she does believe in, namely, the preparation of her citizens to 
take care of themselves (1916: 234-235). 
 
With the onset of the GWoT, President George W. Bush, who is often referred to as Wilson’s 
heir (see Kaplan, 2003: 21; Kennedy, 2005: 36), also advanced similar arguments. In his 
State of the Union address of 2004, Bush announced that America would use its military 
might to advance the mission for liberal peace, although he used the term ‘democratic peace’: 
 
America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic 
beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is a 
democratic peace, a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and 
woman (2008: 203). 
 
Thus, from Wilson to Bush, war has been understood as the key to realising liberal peace. 
In contrast to victor’s peace, institutional peace, the second normative strand of liberal 
peace, is founded on the principles of multilateralism in international relations. It is based on 
liberal ideas that seek to ‘anchor states within a normative and legal context in which states 
multilaterally agree how to behave and how to enforce or determine their behaviour’ 
(Richmond, 2006: 293). The theoretical origins of this strand of liberal peace can be traced to 
the works of Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham. According to Tim Dunne (2005: 188-
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189), the peace ‘manifestos’ of Kant and Bentham ‘contain the seeds of core liberal ideas, in 
particular the belief that reason could deliver freedom and justice in international relations’.  
In Perpetual Peace, Kant argued that one of the conditions for establishing peace is the 
creation of a ‘federation of free states’ that would ‘secure conditions of freedom among states 
in accordance with the idea of the law of nations’ (1917: 128 & 134-135). Universal 
hospitality, which meant the recognition of the right of every individual to enter foreign 
territories for peaceful and commercial intercourse, was Kant’s another condition for peace 
(Ibid.: 137). This ‘cosmopolitan right’, he claimed, would complement existing 
‘constitutional’ and ‘international law’ and lead to ‘the realisation of perpetual peace’ (Ibid.: 
142). However, Bentham was more explicit in suggesting the institutionalisation of 
international law to deal with inter-state disputes. In A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual 
Peace, while calling upon statesmen to conduct diplomacy in a transparent manner, Bentham 
argued that states should seek to resolve their disputes through a non-coercive ‘common court 
of judicature’ (1839: 547 & 552). The theoretical elements of institutional peace can also be 
found in Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech of 8 January, 1918. Like Kant’s articulation of the 
creation of a federation of states and Bentham’s plan for a common international tribunal, 
Wilson also envisaged the creation of an ‘association of nations’ to guarantee the ‘political 
independence’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of existing states (1918). The founding of the League 
of Nations, the United Nations, and other inter-governmental bodies that emerged in the 
twentieth century can thus be situated within Kant, Bentham and Wilson’s ideas on 
multilateralism. Given the position that Wilson occupies in two contrasting strands of liberal 
peace (victor’s peace and institutional peace), John Ikenberry (2008: 13) claims that Wilson’s 
ideas embody ‘impulses toward “liberal internationalism” as well as “liberal imperialism”’.  
The third normative strand of liberal peace, constitutional peace, complements the 
former by seeking to embed the principles of liberty, the rule of law, free trade and liberal 
democracy in the constitutions of states. Again, its theoretical origins can be traced to Kant’s 
writings (Richmond, 2006: 293; Doyle, 1983: 207). Kant argued that the ideal constitution of 
a state would be one that enshrines the freedom of the individual to pursue his desires, with 
the individual being dependent on and equal before law (1917: 121). Although Kant 
advocated elective aristocracy as the ideal form government (which he called republicanism) 
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and opposed democracy on the grounds that it had the despotic potential to suppress the 
freedom of the individual (Ibid.: 125 & 127), today liberal scholars find it acceptable to 
associate Kant’s republicanism with liberal democracy on the grounds that modern Western 
liberal democracies uphold the principles of ‘freedom (with legal equality of subjects), 
representative government, and the separation of powers’ that Kant had envisaged (Russett, 
1993: 4). However, while articulating these ideas, Kant also argued that every state that 
guarantees the rights of the individual is entitled to ‘demand’ its neighbours to uphold the 
same principles (1917: 128). Moreover, Kant claimed that external interventions in foreign 
states were acceptable, provided that the end result was the prevention of anarchy (Ibid.: 
113). Similar arguments are also to be found in the speeches of Wilson and Bush. In his 
Fourteen Points speech, Wilson claimed that America’s ‘programme’ to promote 
liberalisation was the ‘programme of the world’s peace’ (1918). Similarly, justifying his 
intention to spread liberal values across the globe, Bush claimed that ‘liberty and self-
government’ were universal values which ‘God has planted in every human heart’ (2008: 
202). Echoing these sentiments, Tony Blair also argued that ‘the values of liberty, the rule of 
law, human rights and a pluralistic society are universal and worthy of respect in every 
culture’; spreading them does not mean ‘trampling on local sensitivities’ (2002a: 121).   
In contrast to these three normative strands (victor’s peace, institutional peace and 
constitutional peace), which place an emphasis on the state and international institutions, civil 
peace ‘requires individual agency’ to achieve its objective of attaining or defending 
‘individualism and rights’ at the global level. It derives from ‘the phenomena of direct action, 
of citizen advocacy and mobilisation’ (Richmond, 2006: 293-294). The works of J.S.Mill, 
which also exist within the victor’s peace strand of liberal peace, and that of Bentham, which 
belongs to the institutional peace strand, can be situated within this strand as well. In On 
Liberty, J.S.Mill claimed that individual agency was a powerful weapon against the ‘tyranny 
of opinion’ (1985: 131-32). Similarly, Bentham also argued that it was the duty of every 
Christian to advocate peace, and employing the press as his ‘engine’ he would work towards 
preparing ‘men’s minds for the reception’ of his own ideas for peace (1839: 546).  
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Institutional operations 
 
Despite their contradictions at the normative level, each strand complements the other in the 
manifestation of liberal peace at the institutional level in Western interventions. Espoused in 
the post-Cold War period as having the capacity to create ‘self-sustaining peace within 
domestic, regional and international frameworks of liberal governance’ where ‘both overt and 
structural violence are removed and social, economic and political models conform to a 
mixture of liberal and neo-liberal international expectations in a globalised and transnational 
setting’, the concept of liberal peace has been incorporated in ‘most policy documentation 
associated with peace and security issues’ (Franks & Richmond, 2008: 83). With 9/11, it has 
also become part of the ‘discourse of counter terrorism’ (Goodhand & Walton, 2009: 305).   
The operation of liberal peace at this level is ‘predominantly state-centric’ and is 
characterised by ‘a balance of consent, conditionality, and coercion’ (Richmond, 2006: 296 & 
298). Western states, which predominantly act as ‘custodians’ for ‘reform of governance’ in 
the global South, undertake liberalisation through ‘a combination of inducement, consent, and 
co-operation, occasionally verging upon the coercive, or even the outright use of force’ (Ibid.: 
299). Given the fact it is Western states, the victors of the Cold War, that primarily promote, 
undertake, and consolidate liberalisation programmes in the South, it will be no exaggeration 
to say that at the institutional level liberal peace is largely underpinned by victor’s peace. It is 
victor’s peace that also ‘underpins’ the operation of ‘constitutional and institutional’ strands 
of liberal peace at the institutional level (Richmond, 2006: 298). This is further 
complemented by the ‘bottom-up’ approach of civil peace, where NGOs and civil society 
groups act as the agents of liberal peace (Richmond, 2006: 299; MacGinty, 2008: 144). 
Western states, also assisted by liberal non-state actors, international institutions, and 
often Southern states, promote, undertake, and consolidate ‘marketization’ and ‘austerity 
programmes’ in the states of South on the claim ‘that the market will provide the motive 
force for peace and reconstruction’ (MacGinty, 2008: 144). At the same time, political 
liberalisation programmes are also promoted, undertaken, and consolidated in Southern states 
on the basis that liberal democracy and market economy correspond with each other: 
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First, individual choices are paramount. The popular sovereignty by which states 
are selected in democracies corresponds to the principle of consumer sovereignty 
in the market, by which individual preferences determine what gets produced and 
the prices at which products are sold. Second, the reach of the state is limited, 
with certain areas – political rights in the case of democracy, private property in a 
market economy – fenced off from government control (Mandelbaum, 2002: 268-
269). 
 
Liberal scholars argue that in the same way that the institutional arrangements of Western 
liberal democracies ideologically commits them to maintain ‘peace’ internally, their 
commitment to a ‘commercial spirit’ also helps them to develop and sustain peaceful 
relations with their liberal counterparts: commercial interdependence between liberal states 
through commercial globalisation is understood to help ‘create cross-cutting transnational ties 
that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation’ (see Doyle, 2005: 464-465). Thus, as Georg 
Sorensen points out, establishing a post-Cold War global liberal order by promoting, 
undertaking, and consolidating political and economic liberalisation in the states of the global 
South is justified on the assumption that ‘interdependence’ between states leads to ‘social and 
economic interaction’ and results in the ‘mutual benefit’ of global ‘peace’ (2006: 253 & 257).  
In his lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault (2008: 58) identified commercial 
globalisation to be central to liberal peace. Tracing the ideological origins of liberal peace to 
the physiocrats, Adam Smith, and Kant, Foucault (Ibid.: 54-55) argued that it emerged in the 
middle of the eighteenth century as a concept for ending military confrontations between 
European states through ‘unlimited economic progress’ in the form of the ‘globalisation of 
the market’. In contrast to mercantilism and the idea of European equilibrium, liberal peace 
was premised on the idea that opening up global markets for competitive trade would lead to 
the collective enrichment of Europe, and thereby ‘avoid the conflicts which derive from a 
finite market’ (Ibid.). In essence, the absence of military confrontations between European 
states was not to be guaranteed by the ‘enrichment of some and the impoverishment of 
others’ but their collective enrichment through ‘commercial globalisation’ (Ibid.: 55-58).  
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In The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, Smith argued that the power of commerce 
can only be realised in an unrestricted market (1957: 15). This, however, Smith lamented, 
was being hindered by wars between European states for monopoly over global markets. The 
solution to this, Smith claimed, lay in opening up global markets for competitive trade: 
 
Europe, however, has hitherto derived much less advantage from its commerce 
with the East Indies than from that with America. The Portuguese monopolized 
the East India trade to themselves for about a century, and it was only indirectly 
and through them that the other nations of Europe could either send out or receive 
any goods from that country. When the Dutch, in the beginning of the last 
century, began to encroach upon them, they vested their whole East India 
commerce in an exclusive company. The English, French, Swedes, and Danes 
have all followed their example, so that no great nation in Europe has ever yet had 
the benefit of a free commerce to the East Indies (Ibid.: 394). 
 
Smith believed that, in the same way that when left to function freely the domestic market 
can provide ‘a dual profit’ in the form of ‘maximum profit for the seller’ and ‘minimum 
expense for the buyers’, free trade would collectively enrich Europe (Ibid.: 54 & 386).  
However, this did not imply the collective enrichment of the world; nor did it imply the 
eradication of war in Europe’s relation with the rest of the world. Instead, it implied that 
commercial globalisation would summon the whole world ‘around Europe to exchange its 
own and Europe’s products in the European market’ (Foucault, 2008: 55). In order to achieve 
and secure this, individual European states had to maintain their armies, Smith argued: 
 
The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society from the 
violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows gradually more and 
more expensive as the society advances in civilization. The military force of the 
society, which originally cost the sovereign no expense either in time of peace or 
in time of war, must, in the progress of improvement, first be maintained by him 
in time of war, and afterwards even in time of peace (1954: 197). 
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Smith was not an opponent of war: he opposed inefficient wars of his time that yielded no 
benefit to individual European states. In calling on individual European states to end their 
sole monopoly over global markets, Smith was not hesitant to assure them that keeping 
global markets open would lead to waging wars efficiently without hindering commerce: 
 
It is not always necessary to accumulate gold and silver in order to enable a 
country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant 
countries. Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and silver, but with 
consumable goods. The nation which, from the annual produce of its domestic 
industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, labour, and consumable 
stock, has wherewithal to purchase those consumable goods in distant countries, 
can maintain foreign wars there (1957: 386). 
  
Smith was not the only liberal thinker of the eighteenth century to advance such arguments. 
Nineteen years after Smith published The Wealth of Nations, Kant argued in Perpetual 
Peace that commercial spirit would be the key to peace: for Kant, as ‘commercial spirit’ takes 
‘possession of every nation’, war would find it difficult to ‘co-exist’ with it (1917: 157). 
Tomas Baum (2008: 434) takes to task scholars, beginning with Doyle, for tracing the 
ideological origins of liberal peace to Kant and argues that there is a need ‘for a reorientation 
towards Bentham’, whom he claims to be ‘a more suitable source of insight, policy, and 
hope’ for liberal peace. Baum (2008: 438, 443 & 446) claims that while mentioning ‘the 
spirit of commerce and the role of trade’ as ‘a counterbalance to war and conflict’, Kant 
failed to develop in detail how it will guarantee perpetual peace, and was instead preoccupied 
with nature as its guarantor, rather than free trade. Unlike Kant, Baum (2008: 442) asserts, 
Bentham was a defendant of free trade and his peace plan was ‘a plea for the free market’, 
more than the Perpetual Peace of Kant. For Baum (2008: 448), while much of the 
contemporary liberal peace literature is preoccupied with Kant’s work, it is ‘Bentham’s 
philosophy’ that ‘reflects the thrust’ of the liberal peace more ‘than the Kantian flag’. 
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While it is true that Bentham was a proponent of free trade, Baum makes an incorrect 
assertion in claiming that Kant’s argument that nature would act as the guarantor of perpetual 
peace ignored the power of commerce. As Foucault (2008: 58) points out, Kant believed that 
nature would act as the guarantor of perpetual peace through the commercial spirit: 
‘Perpetual peace is guaranteed by nature and this guarantee is manifested in the population of 
the entire world and the commercial relationships stretching across the whole world’. Kant 
himself made this clear in the First Supplement of his treatise. In the same way that nature 
would through war make people in every part of the world to ‘submit to the restraint of public 
law’, through ‘the commercial spirit’ it would also ‘appeal to their mutual interests’, and 
thereby act as the guarantor of perpetual peace: ‘nature guarantees the coming of perpetual 
peace, through the natural course of human propensities’ (Kant, 1917: 152 & 157).  
Despite presenting his treatise as a plan for global peace, Kant also outlined, in the 
treatise as well as in another work published thereafter, the rights of states to wage war.  
In the Third Preliminary Article of Perpetual Peace, despite calling for ‘standing 
armies’ to ‘be abolished in course of time’, Kant claimed that citizens of every state cannot 
be deprived of their right to take part in ‘voluntary periodical military exercise’ to ‘secure 
themselves and their country against attacks from without’ (1917: 110-111). A close reading 
of this article with the First Supplement of the treatise reveals that Kant preferred armies 
drawn from civilians to defend the state rather than from those in society who found honour 
in the martial courage and have had war as a hereditary occupation. For Kant, the ‘martial 
courage’ can be ‘looked upon as of great value in itself’ in wars; however, it cannot be looked 
upon as a great value ‘in order that there should be war’ (Ibid.: 151). Kant’s opposition to the 
existence of armies made up of the warrior caste is also evident in the Third Definitive 
Article of his treatise in which he despised the ‘men-of-war’ (Ibid.: 137). For Kant, there was 
no question of states disbanding their armies; however, these armies had to be civilian ones. 
Kant’s desire for armies drawn from civilians is also apparent in the First Definitive Article 
of Perpetual Peace in which he claimed that republicanism (in which armies would be drawn 
from citizens) was the ideal form of government that had the potential to lead to perpetual 
peace (Ibid.: 121-122). In that Article, Kant argued that when citizens are under the duty to 
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defend themselves, given the miseries that war can produce, they would ensure that full 
consideration is given to the benefits and drawbacks of waging wars against other states: 
 
Now the republican constitution apart from the soundness of its origin, since it 
arose from the pure source of the concept of right, has also the prospect of 
attaining the desired result, namely, perpetual peace. And the reason is this. If, as 
must be so under this constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to 
determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they 
should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad business. For in 
decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the miseries of 
war upon their country. This implies: they must fight themselves; they must hand 
over the costs of the war out of their own property; they must do their poor best to 
make good the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning ill, 
they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even peace itself, and 
which they can never pay off on account of the new wars which are always 
impending (Ibid.: 121-123). 
   
In this regard, Timothy R.W.Kubik (2001: 100) points out that the creation of ‘a citizen 
militia is a central tenet of Kant’s republican program’ and his idea of perpetual peace. Kant 
also expressed his support for the formation of militaries drawn from civilians in Part I of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, published a year after Perpetual Peace. In that text, Kant argued that 
in all wars declared and undertaken with the ‘free consent’ of the citizens through their 
representatives, the state had the right to demand the services of the former (1887: 217). 
In that text, Kant also explicitly set out the rights of nations as states to wage war (Ibid.: 
215-224). For Kant, states may legitimately ‘go to war’ and ‘carry on hostilities’ if ‘they 
regard themselves as injured’ (Ibid.: 218). Similarly, if a ‘threat or menace may be given by 
the active preparation of Armaments’ or ‘by acquisition of Territory’ by a state towards 
another, the latter has the ‘Right of Prevention (jus proeventionis)’ to go to war against the 
former (Ibid.). A state that is ‘forced to war’ has the right to take ‘defensive measures and 
means of all kinds’ (Ibid.: 220). The end result of wars should be, Kant argued, ‘a lasting 
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peace’ (Ibid.). In other words, wars can be waged for peace. Kant also set out the unlimited 
rights of states to wage war against ‘an unjust Enemy’ (Ibid.: 223). For Kant, an enemy 
‘whose publicly expressed Will, whether in word or deed’ would ‘make a state of Peace 
among the nations impossible’ should be treated as an unjust enemy (Ibid.). Against this kind 
of enemy, a state may use ‘all those means that are permissible and in reasonable measure in 
so far as they are in its power, in order to assert its Rights to what is its own’ (Ibid.).  
In Perpetual Peace, Kant claimed that the formation of a ‘federation of nations’ would 
help nations as states to deal with disputes between them without resorting to war (1917: 
136). In Part I of the Metaphysic of Morals, he referred to this federation as the ‘Permanent 
Congress of Nations’ (Kant, 1887: 224). However, in both works, Kant never believed that 
the formation of a body of nations, whether it be a federation of nations or a Permanent 
Congress of Nations, would be one of indefinite duration. For Kant, this body can exist only 
as ‘a voluntary combination of different states that would be dissoluble at any time’ (1887: 
225). Moreover, Kant never believed that this body would be able to establish ‘a real state of 
peace’ (Ibid.: 224). For Kant, ‘a real state of peace could be established’ only ‘in a universal 
Union of States analogous to that by which a Nation becomes a state’ (Ibid.). However, even 
if this universal body was to come into existence, given its inability to protect ‘its individual 
members’ across the world, it ultimately ‘would bring round a state of war’ (Ibid.). Thus, it 
would be no exaggeration to say that despite presenting his ideas as plans for perpetual peace, 
Kant recognised that states, as well as all types of bodies that may be formed to deal with 
inter-state disputes, would ultimately have to make recourse to war. In other words, Kant’s 
ideas for perpetual peace brings states in full circle back to waging war. 
Kant, along with Smith, is often portrayed by liberal scholars as an opponent of 
imperialism (see MacMillan, 1998: 102). This is largely due to his expression of aversion to 
the ‘injustices’ exhibited by European states of his time on ‘visiting foreign lands and races’ 
and his idea of ‘universal hospitality’ (Kant, 1917: 137-142). However, a closer examination 
of Kant’s writings reveal that he opposed imperialism on the belief that it yielded no real 
economic benefits, and instead led to the continuation of war between European states:  
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The worst, or from the standpoint of ethical judgment the best, of all this is that no 
satisfaction is derived from all this violence, that all these trading companies stand 
on the verge of ruin, that the Sugar Islands, that seat of the most horrible and 
deliberate slavery, yield no real profit, but only have their use indirectly and for 
no very praiseworthy object – namely, that of furnishing men to be trained as 
sailors for the men-of-war and thereby contributing to the carrying on of war in 
Europe (Ibid.: 142). 
 
Retrospectively, had imperialism produced economic benefits and led to the cessation of 
hostilities between European states, Kant may have had no reason to object to it.  
Bentham, Kant’s contemporary, argued that imperial endeavours should be undertaken 
only for commercial purposes. In A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace, published six 
years after Kant’s Perpetual Peace, Bentham (1839: 550) argued that foreign land should be 
conquered and colonies maintained only ‘for the compelling of trade or the formation of 
commercial treaties’. The principle ‘avowed’ reason for maintaining colonies is for the 
‘benefit of trade’; however, where maintaining colonies results in the loss of capital, such 
endeavours should be abandoned (Ibid.: 547). As long as the ‘conquerors fatten’, colonialism 
would deem to have ‘some sense’ and ‘a rational object’ (Ibid.: 557). Navies, for Bentham, 
should be maintained also for opening-up new territories for trade, for the defence of 
colonies, and for countering threats to commerce from pirates (Ibid.: 546 & 550). However, 
colonising lands to monopolise global markets would only lead to the continuation of war 
between ‘civilised’ nations, Bentham argued. Therefore, appealing to Britain to end its 
colonial wars with France for monopoly over global markets, Bentham stated that the former 
should not seek to make commercial treaties only to its own advantage: ‘it is not in the 
interest of Great Britain to have any treaty with any power whatsoever, for the purpose of 
possessing any advantage whatsoever in point of trade, to the exclusion of any nation 
whatsoever’ (Ibid.: 546). This, Bentham noted, also applied to France (Ibid.).  
In the twentieth century, similar arguments were also advanced by Joseph Schumpeter, 
whom Doyle (1986: 1152) refers to as a liberal pacifist who believed that capitalism and 
democracy had the potential to lead to global peace. Although Schumpeter denounced 
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imperial conquests that had the glory of the monarch and the expansion of his dominions as 
their objectives to be ‘objectless’ endeavours, he nevertheless argued that colonial conquests 
that had free trade as their end and result in ‘foreign raw materials and foodstuffs’ becoming 
‘accessible to each nation as though they were within its own territory’ to be objectful, and 
thus acceptable endeavours: ‘Where the cultural backwardness of a region makes normal 
economic intercourse dependent on colonization it does not matter, assuming free trade, 
which of the “civilized” nations undertakes the task of colonisation’ (1991: 143, 185 & 196). 
Under such circumstances, the navies of colonial powers that take the responsibility of 
providing security to global commerce act as ‘maritime traffic police’ (Ibid.: 196). On the 
basis of these arguments, Schumpeter’s liberal pacificism can be summarised in the following 
terms: imperialism that leads to free trade is acceptable; in this sense imperialism is a 
‘civilising’ mission; and military strength is the key to realising this ‘civilising’ endeavour. 
In this respect, it would be no exaggeration to say that Schumpeter’s liberal pacifism 
was actually the twentieth century version of J.S.Mill’s justifications on imperialism. In his 
works of the nineteenth century, as well as supporting colonialism on the basis of the 
economic benefits that it was understood to be capable of yielding, J.S.Mill went a step 
further and argued that commercial intercourse it produces between nations would ultimately 
lead to global peace. For Mill, as ‘civilisation’ spreads through colonialism and ‘barbarians’ 
become ‘civilised’, people in distant parts of the world would begin interacting with each 
other (1965: 594). This would in turn develop commercial intercourse between nations, 
which would ultimately make war redundant and create peace between them: 
 
Commercial adventurers from more advanced countries have generally been the 
first civilizers of barbarians...
 
It is commerce which is rapidly rendering war 
obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which are in 
natural opposition to it. And it may be said without exaggeration that the great 
extent and rapid increase of international trade, in being the principal guarantee of 
the peace of the world, is the great permanent security for the uninterrupted 
progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race (Ibid.).  
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Given these liberal views in favour of imperialism, can we call contemporary Western 
interventions underpinned by the concept of liberal peace as new missions for imperialism? 
 
 
Towards a liberal empire? 
 
With the onset of the GWoT, it has often been suggested by some Western policy makers that 
the liberalisation of the South can be undertaken by reverting to ‘the rougher methods’ of 
European colonialism (Cooper, 2002: 16). Writing in the aftermath of the US invasion of 
Afghanistan, Robert Cooper, an advisor to the then British Prime Minister Blair, claimed that 
the ‘most logical way to deal with chaos’ in ‘failed states’ that had become breeding grounds 
of terrorism was to turn to colonialism: ‘a new kind of imperialism’ was the only way to 
‘export stability and liberty’ to ‘failed states’ of the South and create conditions conducive for 
‘investment and growth’ (2002: 16-17). This ‘postmodern imperialism’, he argued, should 
take the form of armed interventions to transform ‘failed’ states into market democracies: 
 
Postmodern imperialism takes two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism 
of the global economy. This is usually operated by an international consortium 
through international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank – 
it is characteristic of the new imperialism that is multilateral. These institutions 
provide help to states wishing to find their way back into the global economy and 
into the virtuous circle of investment and prosperity. In return they make demands 
which, they hope, address the political and economic failures that have 
contributed to the original need for assistance. ...The second form of postmodern 
imperialism might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in our 
neighbourhood poses threats which no states can ignore. ...Osama Bin Laden has 
now demonstrated for those who had not already realised, that today all the world 
is, potentially at least, our neighbour (Ibid.: 18-19). 
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Although not all Western policy makers have subscribed to this view of Cooper, a number of 
liberal, Foucauldian and Marxist scholars have equated post-Cold War Western interventions 
in the global South with imperialism, albeit for different conceptual reasons. 
Those conceptualisations differ from those of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. In 
referring to the contemporary global order underpinned by the concept of liberal peace as an 
empire, they are not equating it with European imperialism or other empires of ancient times 
(Hardt & Negri, 2001: xiv). Instead, they use the term to mean the ‘new global form of 
sovereignty’ which they claim has been ‘composed of a series of national and supranational 
organisms united under a single logic of rule’ (Ibid.: xii). Whereas European imperialism was 
‘an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries’, 
the empire that has emerged today ‘establishes no territorial centre of power’ nor relies ‘on 
fixed boundaries or barriers’: instead, it regulates the ‘globalisation of economic and cultural 
exchanges’, along ‘with the global market and global circuits of production’, (Ibid.: xi, xii & 
xv). In essence, the empire of Hardt and Negri is ‘an impersonal empire of market laws’ 
(Chandler, 2003). It is an empire that is not ‘imperialist’ (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002: 117).  
In Empire Lite, Michael Ignatieff, however, directly refers to Western interventions of 
the post-Cold War period as the ‘imperial exercise of power’ (2003: 11). Throughout his 
work, Ignatieff largely uses the term ‘empire’ to denote America’s global power which seeks 
to ‘order the World of states and markets to its national interests’, even though he also 
occasionally conflates it with a ‘humanitarian empire’ within ‘which Western powers, led by 
the United States, band together to rebuild state order and reconstruct war-torn societies for 
the sake of global stability and security’ (Ibid.: 2 & 19). However, at the end of the text, he 
claims that the ‘new humanitarian empire’ is not an ‘American empire’ but a Western empire 
under the ‘leadership’ of America, with ‘other Western powers’ having ‘formidable stakes’ in 
its success (Ibid.: 112). In the contemporary world, ‘imperialism has become a precondition 
for democracy’: without imperialism, it would not be possible to maintain ‘order over 
barbarian threat’ (Ibid.: 22 & 24). For Ignatieff, the success of this Western empire depends 
on the liberalisation of states that exist outside that West (Ibid.: 112 & 124).  
Following Ignatieff, in Development, Security and Unending War, Duffield also 
conceives liberal peace to be a ‘new empire’ of ‘developmental trusteeship’ of the West ‘that 
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allows the powers of freedom to be learned and safely applied’ by Southern states (2007: 7-
8). In his earlier work, Global Governance and the New Wars, Duffield, denounced the 
characterisation of liberal peace by some Marxists37 as the ‘reworking of imperialism’ for the 
‘manipulation and oppression’ of the South to be ‘outmoded solidarity politics’ that 
exchanged ‘critical analysis for silent faith’ and reflected ‘an inability to imagine that the 
nature of power and authority may have changed radically’: whereas imperialism was based 
on ‘direct territorial control where populations were ruled through juridical and bureaucratic 
means of authority’, liberal peace is ‘a non-territorial, mutable and networked relation of 
governance’ in which ‘economic, political and social processes’ are managed and regulated 
(2002: 33-34). Nevertheless, in reconceptualising liberal peace as a Western empire in his 
later work, Duffield does not concede to the criticisms of Marxists. Instead, he reiterates his 
earlier claim that the ‘ultimate goal of liberal peace’ is stability (Duffield, 2002: 33-34; 2007: 
2). For Duffield, because liberalism had in the past both criticised ‘imperial excess and 
violence’ and accepted ‘colonial rule when the responsibility of trusteeship was deemed to be 
humanely’ and ‘effectively discharged’, as long as this continues to be the case in 
contemporary Western ‘imperial’ interventions, they are acceptable (2007: 4 & 7). This is 
premised on his belief that ‘since the beginning of modernity a liberal rationality of 
government has always been based on the protection and betterment of the essential 
processes of life associated with population, economy and society’ (Ibid.: 4).  
In contrast to Ignatieff and Duffield, while also characterising liberal peace as 
imperialism, Marxist scholars such as Barkawi and Laffey (1999) take a different approach. 
For Barkawi and Laffey, democratic peace (which they use as a synonym for liberal peace) is 
characterised by ‘a zone of peace among core states’ and ‘international relations of 
domination and subordination in the periphery’ (Ibid.: 407). In justifying their use of the term 
‘imperialism’ to denote liberal peace, Barkawi and Laffey maintain that despite its lack of a 
central authority, liberal peace can be classified as imperial since historically empires have 
not displayed ‘the centralisation of authority’ – even at the peak of their glory – but have 
‘included both direct and indirect rule, through clients and private companies’ as the means 
                                                            
37 In this respect, Duffield (2002) referred to the works of Frank Furedi (1994) and Noam Chomsky (1999). 
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of governing their colonial subjects (Ibid.: 414). In this sense, liberal peace is no different to 
the former ‘imperial project of extending European rule and social institutions’ to the ‘states 
and populations’ in the other parts of the world (Ibid.). Western states are currently embedded 
‘in geostrategic and political economic relations that buttress international state and capitalist 
power in hegemonic’, in particular in ‘non-violent ways’ (Ibid.: 419). It is an imperial project 
of the contemporary ‘Western or transnational state’ – which they also call ‘a Western 
international state’: it is an imperial peace that is ‘consistent with US interests and with the 
preservation and extension of a US-centred liberal and capitalist world order’ (Ibid.: 414, 417 
& 419). The powers of this Western international state have been internationalised since the 
end of the Second World War ‘through a proliferating set of institutions and arrangements, 
with the US always at its core’ (Barkawi & Laffey, 2002: 124-125).  
Similar arguments have also been advanced by B.S.Chimni (2004) to characterise 
liberalisation programmes undertaken by international institutions as imperialism, even 
though he does not explicitly use the term ‘liberal peace’. According to Chimni, international 
institutions have constituted ‘a nascent global state’ with ‘an imperial character’ to ‘realise 
the interests of transnational capital and powerful states in the international system to the 
disadvantage of third world states and peoples’ (Ibid.: 1-2). For Chimni, international 
institutions place an ‘emphasis on civil and political rights’ to facilitate the ‘pursuit of the 
neo-liberal agenda’ outside the West: liberalisation is undertaken by international institutions 
in ‘a bid to pry open markets, help transnational capital take over public sector assets at 
throwaway prices, and avoid regulation of its activities in public interests’ (Ibid.: 8 & 11).          
Whereas for Ignatieff and Duffield the imperialism of liberal peace characterises a 
humanitarian empire, for Barkawi, Laffey and Chimni it is the imperialism of the capitalist 
West for the exploitation of the South: it is a Western imperialism of class exploitation. 
Similar arguments have also been advanced by other Marxist scholars who either claim 
liberal peace to be an agenda of capitalist subjugation (see Pugh, 2005), or as a US-led 
imperialist method of controlling the global economy (for example Harvey, 2005). 
Chandler also uses the term ‘imperialism’ to denote post-Cold War Western 
interventions ‘which breach the formally established rights of sovereign equality and state 
sovereignty, in areas peripheral to the world economy’ (2003). The empire that has emerged 
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with the end of the Cold War, Chandler argues, is both formal and informal and has resulted 
in ‘direct hierarchical regulation of international relations, and the degrading of political and 
legal equality between Western and non-Western states’ (Ibid.).  
A counter argument to such positions is to be found in Paris’s work, Saving Liberal 
Peace. While conceding that parallels can be drawn between the way imperialism was 
justified before the end of the Second World War on ‘the belief that European colonial 
powers had a duty to improve the people living in their overseas possessions’ to the 
‘contemporary parlance of “capacity building”’ and ‘good governance’ of Western 
interventions underpinned by the concept of liberal peace, Paris denounces attempts to 
analogise the two on the grounds that ‘colonialism was practiced largely to benefit the 
imperial state’, whereas in contemporary Western interventions, resources flow ‘from 
international actors to the host state’, although these have not always been ‘wholly altruistic’ 
and largely reflect ‘the interests of the World’s most powerful countries’ (2010: 348-350). 
Due to ‘echoes of colonialism in peacebuilding’, liberal peace may be ‘viewed as a modern 
version of the old’ colonial ‘mission civilisatrice’; however, it is inappropriate to assert ‘their 
equivalence’, and doing so only ‘serves to discredit and delegitimise peacebuilding’ (Ibid.).  
Given these competing claims, how plausible is it to conceptualise contemporary 
Western interventions underpinned by the concept of liberal peace as imperialism?  
As explained in the study on the biopolitics of liberal peace in Chapter I, the difference 
between imperialism, especially that of British imperialism, and liberal peace are not 
arbitrary: the British Empire’s biopolitics of liberal state-building in its Eastern colonies is 
largely mirrored in the biopolitics of liberal peace in the states of the global South today. 
However, this is not a sufficient ground for equating the concept of liberal peace with 
imperialism. Whereas British imperialism was largely monopolistic in nature, liberal peace is 
centred on creating conditions for global commerce to be undertaken freely and securely. As 
the interventions of the post-Cold War period demonstrate, in promoting as well as 
undertaking liberalisation in the states of the South, Western states have not sought to 
establish either direct or indirect imperial control over global markets. Instead, Southern 
states that undergo liberalisation are expected to uphold the rule of law, respect civil liberties 
and human rights, adopt a representative system of government and free trade, and thereby 
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make their populations become accustomed to liberal political and economic values. This is 
understood to be the key to creating conditions for global commerce to be undertaken freely 
and securely within Southern states. Thus, Southern states that become liberalised are 
expected to keep away from the market mechanism. States are only expected to step in when 
the security of the market is threatened (Mandelbaum, 2002: 272). Creating a Western 
empire, whether it be of direct or indirect control, would only lead to state-interference in the 
market mechanism that would in turn lead to economic monopolies.  
In Imperialism, published in 1917, claiming monopoly to be ‘deepest economic 
foundation of imperialism’, Vladimir Lenin defined the latter as ‘a specific historical stage of 
capitalism’ that is characterised by ‘(1) monopoly capitalism; (2) parasitic, or decaying 
capitalism; (3) moribund capitalism’ (1999: 100 & 124). In Lenin’s view, by the dawn of the 
twentieth century imperialism succeeded in completing ‘the division of the world among a 
handful of states’, allowing them to occupy a ‘monopoly position in the world market’ (Ibid.: 
106). In doing so, imperialism had pushed capitalism in the direction of its own death (Ibid.: 
125). For Lenin, ‘imperialism is moribund capitalism, capitalism in transition to socialism: 
monopoly, which grows out of capitalism, is already dying capitalism, the beginning of its 
transition to socialism’ (Ibid.: 125). As Hardt and Negri note, even though imperialism 
initially contributed to ‘capital’s survival and expansion’, in doing so, as ‘a machine of global 
striation, channelling, coding, and territorializing the flow of capital, blocking certain flows 
and facilitating others’, it also threatened the latter’s future by blocking ‘the free flow of 
capital, labor, and goods’ (2001: 332-333). On this basis, Hardt and Negri argue that 
‘imperialism would have been the death of capital had it not been overcome’ (2001: 333).  
Fifteen years before Lenin, in his study of imperialism, and referring particularly to 
British imperialism, John A. Hobson (1902: 380) denounced it as a policy that ‘marks a 
straight road to ruin’. Given its tendency to place a major strain on the state’s resources to 
defend the interests of an individual investor who seeks to gain by investing in hostile foreign 
countries, Hobson held that imperialism constituted a ‘supreme danger’ to modern states: 
‘Analysis of Imperialism, with its natural supports, militarism, oligarchy, bureaucracy, 
protection, concentration of capital and violent trade fluctuations, has marked it out as the 
supreme danger of modern national states’ (Ibid.: 381). In Hobson’s view, it is only in a 
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world of ‘strong, secure, well-developed, and responsible nations’ that harmonious relations 
between states can be established, and for this to happen imperialism must end (Ibid.: 383).  
Being a concept that seeks to create conditions for unhindered global commerce in 
which no individual state is expected to have monopoly over global markets, leading to 
harmonious relations between states, liberal peace cannot co-exist with imperialism. As the 
great wars between European colonial powers in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries had demonstrated, imperialism, through the economic monopolies it created, lead to 
military confrontations between major powers in their attempts to control global markets. In 
contrast, as the harmonious relationship that prevails between Western states since the end of 
the Second World War demonstrates, abandoning imperialism, and thus individual state-
monopoly over global markets, has brought an end to military confrontations between them. 
As noted in Chapter I, with the emergence of Britain’s former colonies at the end of the 
Second World War as market democracies, Western states have recognised that the security 
of global commerce, and thus the unhindered flow of capital across the globe, can be 
guaranteed by promoting, undertaking, and consolidating political and economic 
liberalisation in the states of the global South. Therefore, if Marxists are to hold on to the 
theory of imperialism to explain the contemporary manifestations of liberal peace, they 
cannot do so without admitting that Lenin was wrong in characterising imperialism as the 
death-stage of capitalism. As the history of capitalism for the past one hundred years 
demonstrates, having gone through the stage of imperialism, the former has not met its death. 
Instead, it has triumphed over its rivals. This is not because Lenin was wrong but because 
Western states abandoned imperialism at the end of the Second World War and sought to 
establish a global economic order centred on unhindered global commerce. 
 In this regard, even the thoughts of liberal thinkers whose works have become central 
to the concept of liberal peace cannot be used as a ground for equating it with imperialism. 
Even though all of those liberal thinkers supported (either directly or tacitly) imperialism 
(which was conditional on the economic benefits it was understood to be capable of 
yielding), the central thrust of their arguments was unhindered global commerce.  
Within this context, like their Marxist counterparts, both liberal and Foucauldian 
scholars also err in characterising contemporary Western interventions underpinned by the 
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concept of liberal peace as imperialism. These characterisations only serve to exaggerate 
Western interventions as altruistic missions. Even though Western military personnel have 
risked their lives in some missions to rescue Southern populations from genocide and racial 
violence, as the case of the interventions in East Timor and Kosovo demonstrate, they were 
nevertheless not driven purely by the moral impulses of the West. As Ignatieff (2003: 111) 
admits, it is beyond the interests and capabilities of the West to change the lives of all 
populations of the world. Western powers would, as the post-Cold War interventions 
demonstrate (and as we will see in Chapter III), only seek to better the lives of Southern 
populations ‘where it is safe to do so’ and the costs ‘are known to be worth the risk’ 
(Ignatieff, 2003: 111). Moreover, despite being a biopolitical project of making life live, 
liberal ‘peacebuilding’ has, as well as bringing benefits to Southern populations, often 
brought miseries to them, as the cases of neo-liberalisation programmes implemented in 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mozambique that exacerbated economic inequalities 
within the populations of these countries demonstrate (see Paris, 2009: 113, 146 & 153). 
In The Case for Goliath, Michael Mandelbaum denounces the use of the term 
imperialism to denote America’s post-Cold War interventions. For Mandelbaum, America’s 
efforts to spread the ideas of ‘peace, democracy, and free markets’ outside the West should 
not be construed as imperial exercise of power but instead be understood as the actions of a 
‘World Government’ (2005: 9 & 27). The defining features of an empire, Mandelbaum 
argues, are ‘subordination’ and ‘coercion’ of political societies by another political society 
that is different in ‘ethnic, national, religious, or racial’ terms: an empire is quintessentially 
characterised by ‘command’ (Ibid.: 4-6). However, the term government, he claims, connotes 
the ‘more nearly neutral’ action of steering societies into the right path and providing them 
with services (Ibid.: 6). For Mandelbaum, in the same way that individual states provide 
services to their subject-societies, America ‘furnishes’ services to ‘the society of sovereign 
states’ by making the world a safe place for them in the form of its actions to curtail the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, coping with the consequences of fiscal crises outside its 
borders, and keeping global markets open to trade (Ibid.: 7 & 196-226).  
Although Mandelbaum’s opposition to equating the post-Cold War interventions of the 
US as imperialism have grounds, his claim that it plays the role of world government is an 
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exaggeration. With the end of the Cold War, America has certainly taken the lead in most of 
the Western interventions that have been underpinned by the concept of liberal peace. 
However, these are not interventions in which America provides the services of a world 
government while other states – including other Western states – sit back and relax. Instead, 
these are missions predominantly led by America in which other Western liberal states and a 
myriad of non-state liberal actors play an active role. There have also been instances (as the 
case of political and economic liberalisation programmes undertaken in Somalia demonstrate) 
in which European states and IFIs have taken the lead in promoting liberalisation.  
In The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault claimed that in Western liberal democracies the 
market has become the centre of governmental rationality (2008: 121). The government 
accompanies ‘the market economy from the start to finish’ with the ‘market economy’ 
remaining ‘the general index for defining all governmental action’; the ‘overall exercise of 
political power’ is, he argued, modelled on ‘the principles of a market economy’ (Ibid.). 
Almost a decade later, Anthony Arblaster referred to Western liberal democracies as ‘limited 
democracies’ (1987: 78). They are limited democracies, he claimed, in the sense that they 
function within the framework of ensuring that the power of the demos does not threaten 
‘liberal values and institutions of personal freedom, private property and the market 
economy’ (Ibid.). In Western liberal democracies, the will of the demos cannot ‘change or 
abolish capitalism’; it remains ‘subordinate to the nature and processes of capitalist economy’ 
(Ibid.: 85). The government represents the will of the people but the people is not empowered 
to exercise its own will independently of the government. Rather, political leaders who 
compete in elections are empowered to exercise the will of the people. In elections, political 
leaders may renew or lose their mandate to govern. Nevertheless, elections do not alter the 
role of government to provide security to commercial intercourse. Thus, for Arblaster, in 
liberal states freedom and democracy oscillate within the limits of capitalism: ‘Tolerance is 
only extended to those who do not seriously threaten capitalism’ (1987: 85).  
Although such claims are open to criticism and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
examine their validity in contemporary Western liberal democratic societies, it is certainly the 
case in the West’s relationship with the states of the global South. In promoting, undertaking, 
and consolidating liberalisation in the global South, Western states ensure that Southern 
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states become capable of providing security to global commerce within their borders. Where 
insurgencies within the borders of an already liberalised state of the South threaten the 
security of global commerce, Western states endorse the respective state’s use of its war-
making mechanisms of liberal democratic governance to crush the insurgency, in addition to 
providing necessary military, financial, political, and diplomatic support (as in Sri Lanka). 
Where the Southern state in question is unable to crush the insurgency, Western states 
intervene directly either using their military might (as in Sierra Leone) or other forms of 
power relations (as in Sri Lanka) to reconstitute the liberal order. Similarly, where peace 
within the borders of non-liberal Southern states threatens the security of global commerce, 
Western states wage both covert and overt wars to overturn the illiberal peace and instil a 
liberalised state-order (as in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Chile and Nicaragua during 
the Cold War). In those interventions, eliminating threats to the security of global commerce 
over-rides concerns for civil liberties, human rights and other democratic freedoms, and even 
the death of populations. The next chapter will consider these manifestations of liberal peace. 
 
  108   
Chapter III 
Liberal peace in practice 
 
In this chapter, I examine the manifestations of liberal peace in the foreign policies and 
practices of Western states since the end of the Second World War to the GWoT. In the first 
section, I examine the manifestations of liberal peace during the Cold War within the 
framework of the Western policy of containment and development. I then explore its 
contemporary manifestations from the end of the Cold War onwards, in particular its 
manifestations in most of the Western-led post-Cold War humanitarian interventions, 
‘peacebuilding’ missions, conflict resolution efforts, aid programmes, and the GWoT.  
 
 
Containment and development  
 
Among proponents of liberal peace, Woodrow Wilson, who steered America into the First 
World War, occupies a special place as the first statesman to have articulated liberalisation as 
the key to global peace (see Mandelbaum, 2002; Paris, 2009). In his Fourteen Points speech, 
Wilson (1918) argued that free trade, coupled with democratisation and the maintenance of 
military strength to ensure ‘domestic safety’ – which liberal scholars often conflate with 
disarmament (see, for example Mandelbaum, 2002: 21) – would lead to peace. Like Adam 
Smith and Jeremy Bentham, Wilson was opposed to individual states having monopoly over 
global markets and control of the seas for their sole advantage. In the second and third points 
of his speech, Wilson called for the ‘absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside 
territorial waters’, at times of war and peace, and the removal ‘of all economic barriers and 
the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the peace 
and associating themselves for its maintenance’ (1918). In his warning to Germany to give-up 
its quest for global economic and military supremacy, Wilson made this an explicit point: 
 
We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade 
if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of 
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the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to 
accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world – the new world in 
which we now live –  instead of a place of mastery (1918). 
 
Yet, Wilson’s ideas failed to influence the foreign policies of Western states during the inter-
war years and initially ‘his career came to be regarded as a failure’ (Mandelbaum, 2002: 17). 
It was only after the Second World War that Wilson’s vision materialised and the concept of 
liberal peace came to be embedded in the foreign policies and practices of Western states.  
With the decline of its imperial military might, and foreseeing the political and 
economic dangers that Europe would face if America returned to ‘her pre-war isolation’, 
Britain gave-up its monopoly over global markets and opted for a global economic order 
centred on ‘free trade’ (Howard, 2008: 104-105). This is not to say that free trade was a post-
war phenomenon or an idea of Wilson. As noted in the previous chapter, leading liberal 
thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Smith, and Bentham were strong proponents of free trade. 
In addition, as European imperialism progressed through the nineteenth century, despite 
continuing their monopoly over colonial markets, individual European powers also partially 
eased their protectionist policies. Nevertheless, it was only after the end of the Second World 
War that individual European powers abandoned their monopoly over global markets and 
opted for free trade; they sought a global economic order centred on unhindered commerce. 
However, with the spread of communism and the onset of the Cold War, this Western 
quest for a global economic order centred on unhindered commerce came under serious 
threat. Western political leaders and policy makers feared that if left unchecked, communism 
would engulf the emerging global economic order by overthrowing capitalism in Europe as 
well as in their former colonies and bring nuclear destruction to Western liberal democracies. 
As a counter-measure, the policy of containment and development was articulated. It was 
advanced on the claim that unhindered global commerce was the key to realising democratic 
freedoms and peace that would defeat communism (Mandelbaum, 2002: 266 & 268). 
In On the Slogans for a United States of Europe, published two years before the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, Vladimir Lenin stated that ‘after expropriating the capitalists 
and organising their own socialist production, the victorious proletariat’ of the first country 
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that overthrows capitalism ‘will rise against the rest of the world – the capitalist world – 
attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, stirring uprisings in those 
countries against the capitalists’ and where necessary use ‘even armed forces’ to achieve its 
objective (1915/1974: 342). Citing this statement of Lenin, George F. Kennan, the architect 
of the policy of containment, argued in 1947 that communism was not only an ideology that 
was centred on the assumption that capitalism ‘contains the seeds of its own destruction’ but 
was also underpinned by the belief that a ‘final push was needed from a revolutionary 
movement in order to tip over the tottering structure’ of capitalism (1947/1987: 852-853). For 
Kennan, it was on the basis of this belief that the Soviet Union felt obliged to assist 
communist revolutions in other parts of the world to overthrow capitalism (1987: 858). In 
Kennan’s view, the Russians were looking ‘forward to a duel of infinite duration’ with the 
‘free world’ (Ibid.: 862). Under these circumstances, America, assisted by its allies, should 
seek to contain Soviet pressure to ‘the free institutions of the Western world’ by skilfully and 
vigilantly applying ‘counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political 
points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy’ (Ibid.: 862 & 868). 
Kennan’s policy of containment can thus be summarised in the following terms: the Soviet 
Union intends to re-create the world in its communist image; in order to realise this objective, 
the Soviet Union is looking forward to a war of infinite duration with the ‘free world’; 
therefore, it is inevitable that America, assisted by its allies, takes necessary steps to counter 
this threat; the counter-force of the ‘free world’ should not only be applied to certain part of 
the world but to every part of the world where efforts are undertaken by communists to 
overthrow capitalism. In essence, war was understood to be key to containment: Western 
states led by the United States of America had to conduct interventions in the states of the 
South to prevent the spread of communism and thereby guarantee unhindered commerce. 
Similarly, development was also understood to be another method of countering the 
communist threat and securing the emerging global economic order. Western policy makers 
believed that with the market functioning as ‘the engine of growth’ economic liberalisation 
would result in the development of Southern states, thereby making them hostile to 
communism (Thomas, 2005: 649-650). Writing during the Cold War, W.W.Rostow argued 
that the final stage of economic growth in any society is its entry into ‘the age of high mass-
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consumption’ – which he claimed America had entered; when the Soviet Union enters this 
stage, he predicted, its leaders would ‘face difficult political and social problems’ (1991: 4 & 
10-11). Retrospectively, Rostow implied that development in the form of economic 
liberalisation would eventually lead to the defeat of communism. 
As Lenin argued in Imperialism, one of the objectives of European colonialism had 
been the acquisition of ‘new lands to settle surplus population’ in Europe and ‘to provide new 
markets for the goods produced’ in European ‘factories and mines’ (1999: 84). Central to 
Lenin’s (1984: 84) argument was that by ‘exploiting the periphery’ (in this case the colonies) 
the ‘bourgeoisie in the core countries’ were able to ‘improve the lot of their own proletariat’, 
thereby preventing civil wars at home – the basis of world-system theory developed by 
Immanuel Wallerstein and the scholars of the Latin American Dependency School (Hobden 
& Jones, 2005: 231). However, the development policies of the Cold War period had not 
been premised on preventing civil wars within the borders of Western states, as world-system 
theorists had argued. Those policies certainly favoured a small group of Western states and 
resulted in economic inequalities within the South and between Western and Southern states 
(Thomas, 2005: 649 & 654). Nevertheless, central to those policies was the belief that 
development would entice states of the South towards free trade, and thus eliminate threats to 
global commerce. This was evident in the way that structural adjustment policies of the IMF 
and World Bank – under the guidance of Western powers – were implemented in the 
Southern states during the 1980s. These policies were intended to steer Southern states away 
from communism and towards global free trade by compelling them to open-up their 
economies for foreign investment, while at the same time helping them to earn foreign 
exchange through exports – in order that they would have the financial means to repay their 
debts – rather than transforming them into dependencies of the West (Thomas, 2005: 654). 
A notable aspect of the incorporation of the Cold War policy of containment and 
development in US foreign policy was that America’s security interests were broadly framed 
to include free trade outside its borders. In 1952, in its report that set out the course of action 
to be taken by America in South East Asia to counter the communist threat from China, the 
US National Security Council (NSC) argued that ‘communist domination, by whatever 
means, of all South East Asia’ would not only endanger the ‘free world’, but also ‘seriously 
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endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security 
interests’ (1952: 127). However, in spelling out the ‘security interests’ of the United States, 
the NSC referred to the ‘economic interests’ of post-colonial market democracies of Asia as 
well as those in other parts of the world. For example, in reference to Malaya and Indonesia, 
the NSC warned that if any of those two countries came under the influence of communism, 
this would affect the flow of ‘natural rubber, tin’ and ‘petroleum and other strategically 
important commodities’ to the ‘world’. Similarly, in reference to Burma and Thailand, the 
NSC cautioned that if they become under the influence of communism, the flow of rice to 
‘Malaya, Ceylon, and Hong Kong’, as well to ‘Japan and India’, which it defined as 
‘important areas of free Asia’ would be affected ‘critically’ (1952: 127). 
One of the measures that the NSC set out for America to undertake in the South East 
Asian region – in addition to spreading anti-communist propaganda, extending economic and 
technical assistance, obtaining military assistance from its Western allies, conducting covert 
operations, and undertaking other defensive measures – was to ‘encourage the countries of 
South East Asia to restore and expand their commerce with each other and with the rest of the 
free world, and stimulate the flow of the raw material resources of the area to the free word’ 
(1952: 128-129). The report, which was commissioned by the then US President Harry S. 
Truman, mirrored his ideas on free trade enunciated in his special message to the Congress on 
the Marshall Plan in 1947. In his special message, Truman claimed that Americans have long 
understood that ‘enduring peace must be based upon increased production and an expanding 
flow of goods and materials among nations for the benefit of all’ and it was in line with this 
that his government had ‘taken the lead in world-wide efforts to promote industrial and 
agricultural reconstruction and a revival of world commerce’ (1947). 
Thus, with Britain and other Western allies playing a complementary role, under the 
banner of containment and development America took the lead to guarantee the security of 
global commerce from the threat of communism by conducting interventions in the South. 
Some of those interventions took the form of development aid and counter-insurgency 
support. Southern states that opposed communism, and thus contributed to securing the 
emerging post-war global economic order, became ‘part of the “Free World”’ (Howard, 
2008: 113). Efforts were made to liberalise the populations of those states in order for global 
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commerce to be undertaken securely within their borders: Western states promoted free trade 
and showered anti-communist regimes with development aid (as in the case of South Korea 
and Taiwan). Counter-insurgency support was also provided to Southern market democracies. 
Regardless of their political ideologies or affiliations, many armed nationalist and 
revolutionary movements that posed a threat to market democracies of the South were largely 
seen as ‘clients of Moscow’ (Howard, 2008: 113) and active measures were taken to 
eliminate them. It was partly based on the tendency in the West to judge ‘any violent political 
challenge to a liberal-democracy or even to any polity that meets the formal requirements of a 
liberal-democracy’ to be illegitimate and thus terrorist (Guibernau, 1999: 127). 
In addition, covert military operations were also conducted against democratically 
elected Southern states (as in the case of US operations in Guatemala, the Dominican 
Republic, Chile and Nicaragua) that were perceived to harbour communist ideologies (Mann, 
2001: 71). Although some liberal scholars have justified such interventions to be prudent and 
defensive ‘popular wars fought to promote freedom, to protect private property’ and ‘to 
support liberal allies against nonliberal enemies’ (see Doyle, 1986: 1156 & 1160), these 
justifications contradict with the underlying claim of democratic peace theory that 
democracies do not fight each other. Bruce Russett, who defines war to be an inter-state affair 
that had to result in at least ‘one thousand battle fatalities’ (with the exception of the UK-
Argentine war), denies such interventions to be wars between democracies. For Russett, those 
states in which the US intervened during the Cold War (such as Guatemala, the Dominican 
Republic, Chile and Nicaragua) were not democracies but anocracies and therefore such 
interventions cannot be termed as wars between democracies, but interventions by a 
democracy in anocracies (1993: 16 & 121-122). Michael Mann dismisses such 
categorisations to be ‘massaged’ conceptions of war and democracy (2001: 71). However, a 
biopolitical analysis of such interventions reveals that they were largely underpinned by 
concerns for the security of global commerce, coupled with geopolitical interests. Southern 
democracies that incorporated communist ideologies in their economic policies were seen as 
threats to the emerging global economic order centred on free trade. It did not matter whether 
those regimes had the popular mandate of their respective people. As Allen Dulles, the head 
of CIA during Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency, had argued justifying US interventions in 
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Iran and Guatemala, as soon as a regime expressed its desire to adopt communist ideologies 
in it economic policies, its existence became intolerable in the eyes of the ‘free world’: 
 
In Iran, a Mossadegh, and in Guatemala, an Arbenz had come to power through 
the usual processes of government and not by any Communist coups as in 
Czechoslovakia. Neither man at the time disclosed the intention of creating a 
Communist state. When this purpose became clear, support from outside was 
given to loyal anti-communist elements in the respective countries – in one case to 
Shah’s supporters; in the other, to a group of Guatemalan patriots. In each case the 
danger was successfully met (2006: 223).  
 
In other words, every regime that was sympathetic to the communist ideology was considered 
a threat to the free world, and thus the post-war global economic order centred on free trade. 
 
 
Post-Cold War manifestations 
  
With the end of the Cold War, the concept of liberal peace moved away from containment 
and development and was embedded in most of the Western-led humanitarian interventions, 
peacebuilding missions, conflict resolution efforts, aid programmes, and later the GWoT.  
During the 1990s, the existence of armed national liberation movements in the market 
democracies of the global South continued to be perceived as a threat to the security of global 
commerce. This was largely on the basis that by continuing to use violence to further their 
goals, they were creating a climate of insecurity for the flow of capital within the borders of 
Southern market democracies. The liberal belief that violent challenges to liberal democracies 
should not be allowed to continue also compounded hostility towards armed struggles: 
 
Liberal peace has questioned violent conflict as a legitimate vehicle for social 
change. We live in a world that, potentially, already has the best possible mix of 
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social relations, economic structure and political institutions. The task is not to 
challenge this order but to make it work better (Duffield, 2002: 129-130).  
 
Therefore, as during the Cold War, nationalist movements that waged armed struggles within 
the borders of Southern market democracies continued to be criminalised. They were 
perceived to be a threat to liberalising global populations as well as for global commerce. 
Interventions were therefore undertaken by Western states in the conflict zones. 
However, not all interventions were conducted primarily to eliminate or disarm armed 
nationalist movements. Some interventions, as in the case of those undertaken in the Balkans 
and Haiti, were conducted largely with the objective of curtailing the flow of refugees from 
the conflict zones to Western countries (Mandelbaum, 2002: 194). Yet, these cannot be 
construed as having been undertaken in isolation with concerns for the security of global 
commerce. Firstly, the flow of refugees from the conflict zones created an additional labour 
force that often brought instability to the home labour market of Western countries: jobs of 
local population often went to immigrants at cheap wages. In this sense, conflicts in the South 
were causing instability in the domestic markets of Western countries. Secondly, the 
continuation of armed conflicts in the South prevented Western entrepreneurs from making 
investments there and bringing the benefits home. In this sense, conflicts in the South were 
also preventing Western countries from reaping the benefits of commercial globalisation. 
Recognising this, particularly in stressing the importance of initiating political and economic 
liberalisation in the states of the former Communist bloc, the then American President Bill 
Clinton noted thus in his State of Union Address of 25 January, 1994: 
  
We will continue to urge Russia and the other states to press ahead with economic 
reforms. And we will seek to cooperate with Russia to solve regional problems, 
while insisting that if Russian troops operate in neighbouring states, they do so 
only when those states agree to their presence and in strict accord with 
international standards.  But we must also remember as these nations chart their 
own futures – and they must chart their own futures – how much more secure and 
more prosperous our own people will be if democratic and market reforms 
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succeed all across the former Communist bloc. Our policy has been to support that 
move, and that has been the policy of the Congress. We should continue it (1994). 
 
Thus, the concept of liberal peace remained central to all of the interventions undertaken by 
Western states in the conflict zones of the South, although this was not always stated 
explicitly (Paris, 2009: 5). The ‘conflict resolution and prevention’ programmes that were 
promoted as part of those interventions undertaken to reconstruct ‘social networks’, 
strengthen ‘civil and representative institutions’, promote ‘the rule of law’, and reform the 
‘security sector’ were largely ‘in the context of a functioning market economy’ (Duffield, 
2002: 11). The role of Western states in those interventions were complemented by IGOs, 
IFIs, NGOs, private security companies, and commercial enterprises (Ibid.: 12).  
As will be discussed in Chapters VII to VIII, those interventions also sought to limit the 
concept of the right to self-determination to the populations of former communist states of 
Eastern Europe.38 This policy resembled in many ways Wilson’s claim in the Fourteen Point 
speech that the right to self-determination only applied to the Western World (1918). 
Mandelbaum argues that since the ‘claim to be nations has no limits’, honouring all claims 
would result in ‘international chaos’ (2002: 188). However, the former UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali was more explicit in linking secession to global economic instability: 
‘if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to 
fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more 
difficult to achieve’ (1992). In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali suggested that instead of 
honouring secessionist demands, measures should be taken to promote human rights, 
democratic governance, and ‘sustainable economic and social development’ in the conflict 
zones (1992). Commenting on this conflict resolution strategy, Roland Paris notes thus:  
 
The typical formula for peacebuilding included promoting civil and political 
rights, such as the right to free speech and a free press, as well as freedom of 
                                                            
38  Eritrea,  East  Timor,  and  recently  South  Sudan  are  the  only  expectations  in  this  regard. Of  those  three 
countries, Eritrea is the only one in which political and economic liberalisation has not been undertaken. 
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association and movement; preparing and administering democratic elections; 
drafting national constitutions that codified civil and political rights; training or 
retraining police and justice officials in the appropriate behaviour for state 
functionaries in a liberal democracy; promoting the development of independent 
“civil society” organisations and the transformation of formerly warring groups 
into democratic political parties; encouraging the development of free-market 
economies by eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital and goods within and 
across a country’s borders; and stimulating the growth of private enterprise while 
reducing the state’s role in the economy (2009: 19).  
 
In other words, liberalisation was understood to be the key to resolving nationalist conflicts. 
In addition, economic interventions were also carried out in the states of the South that 
faced economic crisis. Western states, IGOs, and IFIs extended financial assistance to 
Southern states that showed willingness to embrace free market economic policies. Such 
assistance was provided through ‘a system of carrots and sticks’, where co-operation entailed 
‘development assistance’ while ‘non-cooperation’ meant ‘isolation’ (Duffield, 2002: 34). It 
resembled the strategy adopted by Western states and IFIs during the early 1980s when Latin 
American countries which sought debt relief were required to adopt ‘liberal economic 
measures’ in the form of ‘selling off state-owned assets, reducing government oversight and 
direction of economic activity, and the opening of their countries to goods and capital from 
abroad’ (Mandelbaum, 2002: 283). India was one such country that was required to radically 
reform its economy. Although during the Cold War India was a liberal democracy in name, in 
practice it did not adhere to market economic policies. Instead, it was closely aligned with the 
Soviet Union and adopted a statist economic system modelled on Soviet-style Socialism (see 
Chapter VI). However, in 1991, when India faced ‘a balance of payment crisis’, in order to 
become eligible for receiving financial aid, it was required by the IMF to ‘open its economy, 
to cut back on its regulations, and to pare its state-owned industrial sector’ (Mandelbaum, 
2002: 283-284). These conditionalities also applied to East Asian countries which could not 
cope with the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s (Ibid.: 285). Thus, as in the case of 
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interventions undertaken in countries that were affected by nationalist conflicts, economic 
liberalisation was prescribed as the remedy for Southern states that faced economic crisis. 
Comparatively, most Western interventions in the 1990s were not as violent as those 
undertaken as part of the GWoT. This was because efforts to liberalise Southern populations 
were neither pursued whole-heartedly nor aggressively (as in the case of Somalia). It was 
only in the regions where the flow of refugees threatened to cause instability to their home 
labour-market that Western states expended their resources. In conflicts that did not have a 
major impact on the home labour-market, Western interventions were either ‘so modest’ with 
‘only minimal investments’ that they failed miserably, or in worst cases there was simply no 
intervention (as in Chechnya and Rwanda) (Mandelbaum, 2002: 194-195). This was largely 
due to lack of ‘enthusiasm’ on the part of Westerners to shed ‘blood’ and ‘money’ for 
interventions outside their borders (Ibid.: 196). For many Westerners, the collapse of 
communism meant the elimination of a major threat to their security and way of life (Ibid.). 
However, this changed with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Under the banner of the 
GWoT, Western states were able to undertake aggressive interventions to liberalise Southern 
populations. The climate of insecurity that 9/11 created paved the way for this. In the same 
way that they were able to justify interventions during the Cold War under the banner of 
containment and development to defeat the communist threat, following 9/11 Western states 
were able to expend their resources under the banner of the GWoT to eliminate threats to 
global commerce. Thus, as well as targeting Islamist terror groups, Western states also turned 
the full swing of the GWoT on armed national liberation movements and non-liberal states. 
In this regard, George Bush declared: ‘Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it 
does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped and defeated’ (2008: 68). Bush made it clear that one of the key objectives of the 
GWoT was to spread free trade across the world. America would, Bush declared, use the 
‘moment of opportunity’ afforded by the GWoT ‘to extend the benefits of freedom across the 
globe’ by actively working ‘to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and 
free trade to every corner of the world’ (2002: v). ‘Free markets and free trade’, Bush stated, 
were ‘key priorities’ of America’s ‘national security strategy’ (2002: 23). For Bush, 
‘economic openness’ coupled with ‘democracy’ were ‘the best foundations for domestic 
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stability and international order’ (2002: v). These sentiments were also echoed by Tony Blair 
who claimed that participation in ‘global markets’ was ‘central to every nation’s prosperity’. 
For Blair, free trade should not be construed simply as ‘an economic phenomenon’ but 
understood as the key to ‘political change’ and for overcoming security threats (2002a: 119). 
As in the 1990s, during the GWoT secessionism continued to be classified as a threat to 
global economic instability. With regard to the territorial integrity of existing states, Blair 
announced that ‘boundaries’ would remain ‘virtually fixed’ and ‘any territorial ambition’ 
would be seen as a threat to ‘stability’ and ‘prosperity’ (2002). In effect, the GWoT 
reinforced the liberal conception of linking territorial integrity ‘to prosperity and the 
successful working of the global market’ (Elden, 2009: 147). Only in exceptional cases was 
statehood granted to nations that aspired for a state of their own. Even this largely depended 
on the the aspiring nation becoming accustomed to political and economic liberalisation, as in 
the case of the Kosovar Albanians (see Franks & Richmond, 2008: 81). 
Another aspect of the GWoT was the tacit acceptance that war can be waged through 
all power relations. As Bush noted in his National Security Strategy: ‘To defeat this threat we 
must make use of every tool in our arsenal – military power, better homeland defenses, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist finances’ (2002: iv).   
Paris argues that it is incorrect to situate the GWoT within the framework of liberal 
peace. While admitting that ‘elections, constitutional processes, market oriented economic 
adjustment and institution-building were central to the US plan in Iraq and also part of the 
standard formula for UN-mandated peace operations’, he maintains that it is wrong to 
analogise ‘UN peacebuilding and the American-led “war on terror”’ as the US invasion of 
Iraq and the peacebuilding that followed were non-consensual, ‘whereas most peacebuilding 
missions since the end of the Cold War had been’ consensual (Paris, 2010: 345 & 348). 
However, as Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner and Michael Pugh point out, the US-led invasion of 
Kosovo and the liberal ‘peacebuilding’ that followed were no different to what took place in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (2011: 4). As Paris himself concedes reluctantly, Kosovo is not the only 
case where liberal peace was imposed through war, but there are also other ‘examples of 
post-Cold War peace operations that began in less consensual conditions’ (2010: 348). Thus, 
Paris’s attempts to distinguish liberal peace from the GWoT rest on shaky grounds. 
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This is not to say that every violent intervention undertaken under the banner of the 
GWoT was intended to guarantee the security of global commerce. For example, the Western 
invasion of Afghanistan was undoubtedly in response to the security threat that al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban posed to the West. Even though political and economic liberalisation remained 
central to state-building in Afghanistan after the invasion, the invasion itself cannot be 
characterised as having been undertaken to guarantee the security of global commerce. 
Instead, it was largely undertaken with the objective of depriving al-Qaeda and the Taliban of 
a permanent base to launch attacks on Western countries and their populations. 
However, the same cannot be said of the invasion of Iraq. Although Saddam Hussein 
made attempts to develop nuclear weapons, those efforts never materialised. Even President 
Bush’s claims before the invasion that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destructions and was 
promoting Islamist terrorism proved to be false after the invasion. The only apparent threat 
that Saddam’s regime posed to the West was the free flow of oil from Iraq. This was clearly 
an economic threat that endangered unhindered global commerce (Mandelbaum, 2002: 404). 
Thus in removing Saddam’s regime, America and its allies eliminated a threat to unhindered 
global commerce in the Middle East by opening-up Iraq’s energy resources. France was the 
only Western state that was left in a disadvantaged position as its ‘commercial interests in 
Iraq, including contracts to exploit its oil reserves’ were jeopardised following the fall of 
Saddam’s regime (Mandelbaum, 2002: 407). The commercial rationale behind the US 
invasion of Iraq became apparent a few weeks after the fall of Saddam’s regime. In his 
Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina in May, 2003, President Bush 
proposed ‘the establishment of a U.S. – Middle East free trade area within a decade’ in the 
Middle East. Bush justified this on the basis that ‘free market and trade have helped defeat 
poverty and taught men and women the habits of liberty’ across the world and would 
‘encourage creativity and tolerance and enterprise’ in the region (2003). 
A notable aspect of the GWoT was that ‘civilisational’ arguments were repeatedly 
invoked, most notably by President Bush. In his televised address following the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, Bush noted that America’s ‘way of life’ and ‘freedoms’ were attacked by 
terrorists (2008: 57). A week later, in his address to the Congress, Bush announced that the 
GWoT would not simply be ‘America’s fight’ but the ‘civilization’s fight’: ‘This is the fight 
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of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom’ (Ibid.: 70). In essence, 
for Bush, the GWoT was ‘civilisation’s’ struggle to sustain its way of life. A year later, in his 
National Security Strategy, Bush claimed freedom to be ‘the non-negotiable demand of 
human dignity; the birthright of every person – in every civilization’ (2002: vi). In the same 
document, Bush also defined ‘real freedom’ in terms of the relationship of commerce: 
 
The concept of “free trade” arose as a moral principle even before it became a 
pillar of economics. If you can make something that others value, you should be 
able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able 
to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person – or a nation – to make a 
living (Ibid.: 18). 
 
Bush elaborated further on his usage of the term civilisation in 2006 in his address to the 
nation on the fifth anniversary of 9/11. In his speech, Bush argued that the GWoT was not ‘a 
clash of civilizations’ but a ‘struggle for civilization’; it was a war ‘to maintain the way of 
life enjoyed by free nations’ (2008:427). These are clear indications that use of the term 
‘civilisation’ during the GWoT had a political as well as an economic meaning attached to it; 
it was used more or less in the same way it had been used by liberal thinkers in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries and when liberal state-building was undertaken in Britain’s colonies. 
This was also evident from the way that with the onset of the GWoT regimes in the 
South that upheld liberal values were provided with wide-ranging support by the West. A 
notable case in this respect was India. In his National Security Strategy, Bush applauded 
India for ‘moving towards greater economic freedom’ and claimed that as ‘two large 
democracies’ both America and India had ‘a common interest in the free flow of commerce, 
including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean’ (2002: 27).39 Another notable case 
in this regard and relevant to this thesis was the Sri Lankan government of Ranil 
Wickremasinghe, which was showered with military, political, diplomatic, legal, and 
                                                            
39 Given the fact that  India also faces threats from  Islamist Jihadists and has the potential to balance China’s 
influences in the South Asian region, America has much to gain by aligning with the former.  
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financial support for its armed forces to gain an upperhand against the Tamil Tigers. Bush 
described America’s relationship with Sri Lanka more or less in the same way that he 
described the latter’s relationship with India: ‘the United States and Sri Lanka have enjoyed 
close relations based on common support for the values of democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and free trade’ (2005) (for a full discussion, see Chapters VII and VIII).  
During the GWoT, Islamist terror groups and non-liberal regimes (in particular, the 
regimes of Saddam and the Taliban) were frequently referred to by both Bush (2008: 76, 117, 
423 & 560) and Blair (2002a: 124) as ‘barbarians’, and often as ‘savages’. A few months 
before the end of his second presidential term, Bush even claimed that his ‘greatest 
achievement’ was ‘the liberation of 50 million people from the clutches of barbaric regimes’ 
(2008a). However, a close reading of the statements of Bush and Blair indicate that unlike the 
use of the term ‘civilisation’, no political or economic meaning was attached to the usage of 
the terms ‘barbarian’ (as well as the term ‘savage’). Instead it was simply used to refer to the 
brutal tactics of Islamist terror groups and governments that opposed liberal values. Thus, 
unlike the periods in which the British Empire undertook liberal state-building in its colonies, 
the terminologies of ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarian’ (as well as ‘savage’) were not used with 
corresponding meaning in the manifestations of liberal peace in the GWoT. 
The rest of this thesis will undertake a study on the manifestations of liberal peace in 
the Eelam War in Sri Lanka from the day the island-state was created to the end of the armed 
conflict. The next chapter will begin this study by examining the British Empire’s biopolitics 
liberal state-building in Ceylon to show their continuity in the biopolitics of liberal peace.  
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Chapter IV 
Liberal state-building and ethno-theocratic ambitions 
  
The period that Foucault (2008) identifies in The Birth of Biopolitics as the time that the 
concept of liberal peace emerged (the middle of the eighteenth century) was an important 
epoch in the history of the island of Ceylon. It was at this period of time that European 
colonial powers, especially the Dutch, the British and the French, competed for control of the 
island in order to secure their colonial possessions and markets in India. In 1796 the British 
took control of the coastal territories40 of Ceylon from the Dutch. In the following years, the 
British conducted military operations against local rulers in the interior parts of Ceylon and in 
1815 brought the entire island under their control. The conquest of Ceylon provided the 
British Empire with a key military station to secure its markets in India and police colonial 
trade through the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. However, the British did not limit their 
presence in Ceylon to making use of the island as a military station. They also undertook 
liberal state-building in Ceylon in order to secure commerce within the island’s borders and 
to govern the indigenous populations. British liberal state-building in the island reached its 
endstage at the end of the Second World War with the creation of the ‘liberal democratic’ 
state of Ceylon, which became the ally of the West in the latter’s fight against communism. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, I examine the rationale 
behind the desire of various European colonial powers to conquer Ceylon in the sixteenth, 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and show that the Portuguese and the Dutch rule of the 
island’s coastal territories was largely about plundering its resources. This is followed by a 
study on the liberal state-building practices of the British Empire in Ceylon in the nineteenth 
century. In the third section, I examine the dynamics of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that 
emerged under British rule and explain that liberal state-building undertaken by the British 
Empire in Ceylon, which included the unification of the Tamil and Sinhala kingdoms and 
principalities, helped to further the ethno-theocratic ambitions of Sinhala-Buddhists after the 
island-state was created. In the fourth section, I show that during the Cold War, making use 
                                                            
40 In British colonial literature the coastal territories of Ceylon are referred to as the maritime provinces. 
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of the liberal mechanisms of government left behind by the British Empire, the post-colonial 
state of Ceylon was able to wage its ethno-theocratic war against the Tamils without having 
the need to make recourse to military might. In the final section, I explain that during the 
Cold War, the concept of liberal peace remained central to the decision of Western states to 
turn a blind-eye to Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic war against the Tamils. 
 
 
The fight for the control of Ceylon 
 
Following Vasco da Gama’s discovery of the sea-route to India in 1498, the Portuguese, the 
Spanish, the Dutch, the French and the British competed for control of the island of Ceylon. 
Despite briefly occupying the Eastern port town of Trincomalee in 1782, the French failed to 
take control of the island. This was also the case with the Spanish; despite using the services 
of their Portuguese allies in the seventeenth century to obtain the island’s resources, the 
Spanish also could not take control of the island. Even though the Portuguese and later the 
Dutch managed to control the coastal territories of the island, Britain was the only European 
power that managed to bring the entire island under its writ. The principle objective of 
Portuguese and Dutch control of the island was trade, especially monopoly over the 
cultivation of cinnamon, and the procurement of elephants and pearl-fisheries (Clark, 1910: 
10). In a work addressed to his King in Lisbon in 1685, Captain Joao Ribeiro, a Portuguese 
commander, even suggested that they should abandon their ‘possessions in India’ and instead 
occupy the island of Ceylon, establishing settlements to obtain its resources (1909: 405).   
Unlike the Dutch and the Portuguese, the Spanish, however, recognised Ceylon, despite 
failing to take control of it, as the key to the security of their markets in India. In a letter 
written to the King of Spain in 1611, the Spanish commander Antonio Martins noted: 
 
[T]his island of Ceilao [Ceylon] is the key of the whole of India, in so far as 
concerns trade and merchandise, which is what aggrandizes and enriches it... All 
this being then the truth, as it is, it is clear that if the said Dutch enemies were 
masters of this said island, or of its point of Gale, which God forbid, with great 
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ease they would become masters of all the ships that called there; and the trade of 
India would infallibly be lost; and thus if Your Majesty does not command that 
this matter be taken up and remedied shortly, the said enemies will be masters of 
this country so fertile and so extremely valuable, and will very seriously injure the 
whole of India and its commerce... (cited in Ferguson, 1998: 340-341).   
 
Likewise, the British also recognised Ceylon as the key to the security of their Indian 
markets. Announcing the takeover of the island from the Dutch to the House of Commons in 
1798, the then British Prime Minister William Pitt noted that Ceylon was the ‘most valuable 
colonial possession on the globe’ that would give the British Indian Empire ‘a security which 
it had not enjoyed from its establishment’ (cited in de Silva, 1953: 20). Similarly, in a work 
addressed to the Duke of York in 1803, Robert Percival, a British commander in Ceylon 
claimed that the ‘acquisition’ of Ceylon was important ‘both in a commercial and political 
point of view’: ‘From the observation I then made, I am enabled to affirm that its retention in 
our hands must prove of the greatest benefit to our East India trade, and our commerce in 
general’ (1803: vi). Berating Portuguese commander Albuquerque for his failure to 
understand the significance of Ceylon in terms securing trade in India, Percival lamented: 
 
Ceylon in particular seemed designed by nature to secure the possessions, and 
extend the influence of the Portuguese in the Eastern world. ...Albuquerque, 
however, was too much engrossed with extending his conquests over the coasts of 
India, to pay due attention to these advantages; and Ceylon, instead of being made 
the centre and guardian of Portuguese possessions in India, continued to be 
cultivated by them chiefly on account of its own natural productions (Ibid.: 6-7). 
 
In the following year, during a debate in the House of Commons on sending additional troops 
to Ceylon, T.Creevy, an MP, also reiterated Pitt’s point on the importance of the island by 
describing it as the British Empire’s ‘most important colony’ (HC Deb 14 March 1804).  
With the plunder of resources being the central objective of occupying the coastal 
territories of Ceylon, both the Portuguese and the Dutch paid less attention to directly 
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governing the island’s populations than the British – even though they did show a keen 
interest in the safety of those who converted to Christianity (see Ribeiro, 1909: 408).  
When the Portuguese first set foot in Ceylon, they encountered at least ten kingdoms 
and a number of principalities within the island’s borders.41 Of these, five of them were 
Sinhalese, which were situated in the southwestern, southern and central parts of the island, 
and the remaining five were Tamil, coupled with their principalities, in the northern, eastern 
and northwestern parts of the island (Ribeiro, 1909: 3-4). For the best part of their presence in 
the coastal territories of Ceylon in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese 
allowed the local kings and princes to deal with the business of governing their own 
populations, with the condition that Lisbon had monopoly over the island’s resources and 
trade. It was only during occasions when the local kings and princes revolted against 
Lisbon’s commercial monopoly in their territories, refused to pay tributes, or prevented 
Christian missionaries from spreading the Christian faith that the Portuguese resorted to 
direct rule of the island’s coastal kingdoms and principalities (Perera, 1954: 19-35). 
After the Portuguese, the Dutch also followed suit. In parts of the coastal territories that 
did not have a local king or prince (dethroned by the Portuguese), the Dutch resorted to 
governance through their East India Company, and in the rest of the coastal territories they 
allowed the rule of local princes (for example in the Tamil principalities of Vanni). A study 
of the memoirs42 of Hendrick Zwaardecroon, a Dutch commander of the Tamil kingdom of 
Jaffna and its adjoining principalities of Vanni, indicates that the Dutch were more interested 
in extracting resources from the island than governing its populations. In his memoirs, while 
Zwaardecroon claimed that it was difficult to rule the indigenous populations, let alone know 
how many of them lived in the Dutch-controlled territories (1697/1911: 16), he nevertheless 
suggested that the Dutch East India Company can gain more profits from the island by 
instilling fear among the local populations and ignoring most of their ways of living: 
                                                            
41 According to the Portuguese commander Captain Joao Ribeiro, when Lisbon’s troops set foot in Ceylon, they 
encountered  the  Sinhala  kingdoms  of  Cotta, Uva,  Candia,  Ceitavaca  and  Jaula,  and  the  Tamil  kingdoms  of 
Batecalau, Trequimale, Jafnapatao, Mantota, Chilao and other principalities (1909: 3‐4).  
42 As the title of the memoir makes it clear, Zwaardecroon, wrote it for the guidance of the Council of Jaffna, 
when he went on a special duty as Commissioner to the Coast of Malabar in South India (1911: i & iii).  
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I will therefore now leave in Your Honours’ care the government of a 
Commandement from which much profit may be derived for the Company, and 
where the inhabitants, though deceitful, cunning, and difficult to rule, yet obey 
through fear; as they are cowardly, and will do what is right more from fear of 
punishment than from love of righteousness. I hope that Your Honours may have 
a more peaceful time than I had, for you are well aware how many difficulties, 
persecutions, and public slights I have had to contend with, and how difficult my 
government was through these causes, and through continual indisposition, 
especially of late (Ibid.: 89). 
 
As the Dutch control of the coastal territories of Ceylon had plunder of resources as its 
objective (like that of the Portuguese), hardly any state-building efforts were undertaken. The 
Dutch administration was so lax that even roads were not maintained within the coastal 
territories. Instead, the task of maintaining roads was entrusted to local landlords, who 
frequently extended their fences and encroached upon highways (Zwaardecroon, 1911: 87).  
According to Percival, instead of investing in governing the local populations, the 
Dutch expended most of their resources to ‘prevent any intercourse between the natives and 
foreigners’ and adopted cruel tactics (1803: 20 & 38). As a consequence, even though the 
‘natives’ had ‘not the smallest idea of political freedom’, they remained loyal to their own 
rulers as the latter seldom violated ‘their customs or the liberty of their persons’ (Ibid.: 20). In 
addition, as a consequence of the cruelties of the Dutch (as well as their Portuguese 
predecessors), the local populations developed hatred against all Europeans (Ibid.). 
Although European culture and lifestyle were introduced in Ceylon under the 
Portuguese and the Dutch, it was only the British who undertook liberal state-building in the 
island. Like the Portuguese and the Dutch, the British were also interested in extracting 
Ceylon’s resources and making commercial gains. However, unlike their predecessors, the 
British recognised that their commercial interests within Ceylon could be furthered by 
improving the lives of the island’s populations and undertaking liberal state-building.  
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Liberal state-building in colonial Ceylon 
 
Although the Dutch did not resist the British take-over of Ceylon’s coastal territories in 1796, 
the conduct of British troops towards the local populations was initially both violent and 
bloody (Schrikker, 2007: 133). However, after the British writ was established among the 
indigenous populations, the conduct of British troops became less violent and the conquered 
territories were made a dependency of the British East India Company (Schrikker, 2007: 133; 
Mills, 1933: 16). Two years later in 1798, the control of the coastal territories was ‘divided 
between the Crown and the East India Company’ and a dual government was established. 
However, by 1802, the Company’s governmental control was abolished and the coastal 
territories became a Crown Colony, under the direct control of the British Colonial Office 
(Mills, 1933: 27 & 41). This enabled London to directly oversee its military stations in 
Ceylon as well as govern the indigenous populations in the island’s coastal territories. 
Before the arrival of the British in Ceylon, under the Dutch, ‘native’ chiefs had ‘nearly 
unlimited’ authority over their local subjects; the ‘native’ chiefs were able to ‘exact unpaid 
forced labour for the cultivation of their own estates’ (Mills, 1933: 121-122). As a 
consequence, trade within the coastal territories was hampered. In an attempt to overturn this 
state of affairs, the British replaced local chiefs with civil servants and established a separate 
civil service for Ceylon (Ibid.: 42 & 122-123). The powers of local chiefs in judicial matters 
were also curbed (Schrikker, 2007: 144). In addition, a land survey department was 
established to handle land disputes (Mills, 1933: 44). A consequence of this was that local 
chiefs’ monopoly over land and trade was curtailed and commercial intercourse developed. 
However, the existence of the Tamil principalities of Vanni in the northeastern parts of 
the island and the Sinhala kingdom of Kandy – under the rule of a Tamil monarch – posed a 
threat to British interests and commerce in the island. Therefore, the British sought to 
dismantle the principalities of Vanni and the kingdom of Kandy.43 In 1803, after a violent 
                                                            
43 When the British sought to end the rule of indigenous kings and princes in Ceylon and turn the island into a 
Crown Colony, the Tamil prince of Vanni, Kulasegaram Vairamuththu Pandara Vanniyan, and the Tamil ruler of 
Kandy, Sri Wickramarajahsinge (Kannuchamy) joined forces and vowed to expel the British (Lewis 1895: 18). 
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campaign and a show of military might, the British dismantled the principalities of Vanni 
(Lewis, 1895: 18-20). This was followed by the dismantling of the kingdom of Kandy in 
1815. Although military might and the collaboration of local chiefs was the key to British 
success in dismantling the principalities of Vanni and the kingdom of Kandy, martial law 
became a way of waging war to overcome internal threats. Unlike under the Portuguese and 
Dutch rule, annihilation went beyond the tactic of plunder and became one of the techniques 
of building a colonial liberal order in the island. This will be dealt in the next chapter. 
In 1828, an independent judiciary for Ceylon was established, while the legislative and 
executive branches of government remained under the control of the colonial governor 
(Mills, 1933: 99-101). Judges were appointed by London and the Ceylon government 
remained answerable to the judiciary and the English Courts for breaches of law (Ibid.: 100-
101). As a consequence, the judiciary and the executive often collided (Ibid.: 48-49).  
Five years later, liberal economic policies were introduced in the island. While during 
the early years of British rule Ceylon’s economy was transformed from one of ‘domestic 
agrarian’ to a ‘commercial export economy’ (Perera, 1954: 205-206), it was only in 1833 that 
the imperial government’s monopoly over agriculture and trade was abolished (Mendis, 
1946: 37). Until 1833, cinnamon trade in Ceylon was also monopolised by the imperial 
government (in the early years of British rule it was monopolised by the British East India 
Company). In addition, despite replacing local chiefs with civil servants, the British 
continued to allow the local economy to be dominated by the caste system, which kept the 
indigenous populations under a state of serfdom (Mendis, 1946: 36-37). However, in 1833, 
Britain abandoned its monopoly over cinnamon, agriculture and trade in Ceylon, and ended 
its recognition for the caste-based socio-economic order. Although this did not result in the 
abolishment of the caste system, it certainly transformed the island’s society from a feudal 
one to a commercial one and paved the way for ‘trade and enterprise’ (Ibid.: 36-37).  
British liberal state-building in Ceylon also saw the development of transport and 
communication networks. This led to the creation of new towns in industrial and plantation 
areas, resulting in internal trade, which in turn resulted in the influx of foreign capital in the 
island. The introduction of Western education also led to the emergence of an English-
educated middle class (Perera, 1954: 223-224 & 226-227). With the onset of economic 
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liberalisation, the British colonial government also sought to eliminate obstacles to commerce 
within the borders of the island. One of the obstacles was the condition of the island’s 
peasantry. Therefore, the colonial government undertook measures to improve the lives of the 
island’s peasantry, without which internal trade or the movement of labour within the island 
would have not been possible (Ibid.: 233). As Sir West Ridgeway, who served as Ceylon’s 
colonial governor from 1896 to 1903, was able to claim later, the British Empire was 
upholding its ‘civilising’ mission of improving the lives of populations under its governance: 
 
England recognises her duties and responsibilities wherever she hoists her flag. 
The promotion of commerce and the development of the resources of the country 
are of paramount interest, but equally important is the amelioration of the lot of 
the native population and care for their physical and moral welfare. These are the 
principles on which England rules and which she expects us to follow in her 
territories overseas (cited in Perera 1954: 233-234). 
 
Although the island’s population was not granted the right to chose their own legislature and 
executive until the introduction of universal franchise in 1931, the political liberalisation of 
Ceylon nevertheless went hand-in-hand with economic liberalisation. In 1833, at the same 
time that economic liberalisation was introduced in Ceylon, its administrative apparatus was 
also reformed. Until 1833, the island’s Tamil kingdoms and principalities, and the Sinhala 
kingdoms, were governed as separate units by the British colonial governor. However, with 
the administrative reforms of 1833, a single administrative unit for the entire island was 
established. The governor’s legislative and executive functions were also replaced with 
separate legislative and executive councils, with some representation for the local 
populations. Separate laws that existed for Europeans and the locals were also abolished and 
Ceylon’s supreme court was vested with equal jurisdiction over Europeans and the local 
populations (Mendis, 1946: 38-39). As the Sinhala historian G.C.Mendis noted later:  
 
The administrative unification of the island gradually led to the people of Ceylon 
to be treated as if they belonged to one nation. The reforms in the judiciary gave 
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people civil liberty. The principle of representative government established 
through the Legislative Council prepared the way for the gradual introduction of 
representative and responsible government based on democratic principles (Ibid.: 
39).    
 
British liberal state-building in Ceylon was so extensive that John Ferguson, a member of 
Ceylon Legislative Council from 1903 to 1908, was able to claim in the opening years of 
twentieth century that under British rule, Ceylon’s population had become ‘far better housed, 
clothed, and fed, better educated and cared for in every way’ (1903: 86). In 1934, during a 
debate in the House of Commons on the government of Ceylon, Brigadier-General Sir Henry 
Croft,44 a Conservative MP, went a step further and claimed that had the British not taken 
control of the island from the Dutch in 1796, its population would have gradually died out: 
 
What has been the history of Ceylon in the 137 years since the British occupation? 
We found a people who were nerveless, who were poor, who were famine-
stricken, unhealthy and gradually dying out. There were only 800,000 inhabitants 
when we went there. Under British rule, the population has multiplied nearly 
seven times, and there is now a population of 5,300,000 souls. Since our 
occupation, I think we may claim that the Colony has reached a state of prosperity 
which is probably unequalled in any similar community in the world (HC Deb 21 
February 1934). 
 
Some of Croft’s claims in this regard are certainly contestable. Firstly, there exists no reliable 
records to ascertain as to how many people actually lived in Ceylon when the British took 
over the island’s territories from the Dutch. Secondly, there is no evidence to point that 
Ceylon’s population was gradually dying out when the British set foot in the island. Thirdly, 
                                                            
44 Although Croft made this point during the debate in the House of Commons on the feasibility of revoking the 
universal franchise  introduced  in Ceylon  in 1931, and even claimed that democracy  is a failure  in  ‘unsuitable 
soils’, of which he argued Ceylon was one (HC Deb 21 February 1934), I am nevertheless citing his statement to 
show  how  liberal  state‐building  undertaken  by  the  British  Empire  in  Ceylon  was  understood  by  British 
politicians as a project of improving the lives of their colonial subjects – the biopolitics of making life live.  
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the increase in the islands population can partly be attributed to the arrival of tens of 
thousands of Muslims and one million Indian Tamils (who, as we will see in the next section, 
were actually imported by the British to work in the island’s plantation sectors). Despite these 
reservations, it would not be an exaggeration to state that liberal state-building undertaken by 
the British Empire in Ceylon did certainly improve the lives of the island’s population.  
Rather than remaining a colony whose resources could be plundered at the colonial 
master’s will, Ceylon’s population was allowed to participate in commerce both within and 
outside the island. Thus, fifteen years before the island became an independent state, Lennox 
Mills, an academic of the University of Minnesota who sought to write a comprehensive 
account of British rule in Ceylon, was able to argue that the island’s population had ‘a far 
larger direct share in the export trade’ under the British than their former Portuguese and 
Dutch colonial masters (1933: 251). These claims were also echoed by Sinhala historians. In 
a work published two years before the island became independent, Mendis claimed that 
British liberalisation of Ceylon was influenced by Adam Smith’s advocacy of free trade: ‘The 
statesmen in England at this time [1833] were influenced by the ideas Adam Smith 
proclaimed in his Wealth of Nations. He had opposed government interference in agriculture 
and trade, and advocated free trade and the encouragement of private enterprise’ (1946: 37). 
Although it is not possible to find any historical records of the nineteenth century that 
specifically state that British statesmen were influenced by Smith’s advocacy of free trade in 
initiating political and economic liberalisation in Ceylon, a close reading of House of 
Commons debates during the 1830s does reveal that the liberal idea of minimal governmental 
interventions in commerce partly contributed to liberal state-building undertaken by the 
British Empire in the island. During a debate on 27 May, 1830 to establish a Select 
Committee to inquire into the revenues and expenditures of Ceylon’s colonial government, 
John Stewart, an MP, called for an end to government monopoly of trade (including 
cinnamon trade) in the island. Citing a letter sent by Sir Edward Barnes (who served as an 
officer in the British colonial administrative apparatus in Ceylon) to Lord Bathurst on 18 
August, 1820, Stewart suggested that introducing free trade in the island and undertaking 
administrative reforms, including a curb on the governor’s powers over the island’s colonial 
judiciary, would be in the interest of the island as well as that of the British Empire (HC Deb 
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27 May 1830). During the same debate, O’Connell, another MP, also denounced the colonial 
government’s monopoly of trade, and even claimed that government is ‘always a bad 
merchant’ (Ibid.). Like Stewart, O’Connell also called for curbs on the colonial governor’s 
powers. In O’Connell’s view, in Ceylon ‘the will of the Governor was the sole law’ with ‘no 
other legislator’ (Ibid.). Echoing similar sentiments, Joseph Hume, another MP, stated that 
Ceylon ‘was a case crying for inquiry and reform, not only as related to the pecuniary affairs 
of the colony, but as to its trade, its judicial administration and its government’ (Ibid.).      
The liberalisation of Ceylon under the British did not end with the economic, 
administrative and judicial reforms of 1833. In 1865, in three predominantly Sinhala cities, 
Colombo, Kandy and Galle, municipal councils were established with a majority of elected 
members. Elections were also introduced to village committees in 1871 (Jennings, 1949: 26). 
However, it was not until 1912 that elections were introduced to Ceylon’s Legislative 
Council, wherein four members of the twenty-one member council were elected by Western-
educated members of the island’s population (Mills, 1933: 266-267). This was followed in 
1921 with the increase in the number of elected officials (Ibid.: 269). An important 
development in the reforms of 1921 was the special place reserved for commercial interests 
in the legislature, wherein two elected members represented the island’s Chamber of 
Commerce and Low-country Product Association (Mendis, 1946: 124-125). Finally, in 1931, 
universal franchise was introduced in the island allowing all males and females of 21 years of 
age to vote in local and general elections. The Executive Council of Ceylon was also replaced 
with a Board of Ministers to run the business of governing the island’s population, and the 
governor’s authority became ‘supervisory rather than executive’ (Mills, 1933: 269-270). 
By the time Ceylon’s elites sought dominion status in 1942, it had emerged as a market 
democracy, with laws and martial law to provide security to commerce within its borders. 
Five years later, during the debate on the second reading of Ceylon Independence Bill, 
recognising that the liberal state-building undertaken by his government in Ceylon had 
reached its endstage, Creech Jones, UK’s Secretary of State for the colonies noted thus: 
 
What we are doing today is to register another fulfilment of our work and purpose, 
the attainment in the case of Ceylon, following our all-too-modest declarations of 
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policy, of independence and of responsible self-government... There is little need 
for me to relate to the House the political evolution of Ceylon during the past 30 
years... It is only necessary for me to mention the work of the Donoughmore 
Commission and the bold steps taken in the Constitution which emerged from that 
enquiry. It was an experiment in adult suffrage and in responsible democracy, and 
it contributed much to the political maturity and drive for effective democracy of 
the people of Ceylon. The system established by that Constitution worked for 15 
years, without serious political trouble, and it stood the strain of a world war. 
Another Constitution has since come into operation as the result of the Soulbury 
Commission. May I again pay a tribute to Lord Soulbury and the members of his 
Commission for the wisdom of their work? The meeting of the new Parliament 
under that Constitution will be the occasion next week of great rejoicing in 
Ceylon. Full Cabinet responsibility under a Prime Minister has been established, 
and the Government is now responsible to a Parliament of two Chambers (HC 
Deb 21 November 1947). 
 
This is not to say liberal state-building in Ceylon was undertaken in an entirely peaceful 
manner. Annihilation of those who challenged the colonial order was part of liberal state-
building. Notwithstanding the death of local civilians during the advance of British troops 
into the coastal territories of the island in 1796 and the dismantling of the principalities of 
Vanni and the kingdom of Kandy, at least 10,000 Sinhalese were estimated to have been 
‘killed in action or had died from disease or famine’ during the revolt of 1818 alone (Mills, 
1933: 163). As will be explained further in the next chapter, under British rule, both military 
might and martial law remained the key to annihilating threats to liberal state-building as well 
as Britain’s commercial interests in the island. This was the marked characteristic of British 
rule in Ceylon throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.  
The most violent development of British liberal state-building in Ceylon was, however, 
the birth of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that sought, after independence, to transform the 
island-state into an ethno-theocracy by either assimilating or annihilating the Tamils. As we 
will see in the following sections, with the creation of the state of Ceylon, Sinhala-Buddhist 
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nationalism assumed a biopolitical character in that it divided the island’s populations along 
Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocratic lines; the Tamils and other ethnic and religious groups, 
including the Christian Sinhalese, came to be understood as the ‘bad’ part of the human 
species who had to be eliminated in order for the island’s Sinhala-Buddhist population to 
flourish. Though its biopolitics stood at the opposite pole of the biopolitics of liberal peace, 
Ceylon nevertheless advanced it by using the liberal democratic mechanisms of governance 
left behind by the British Empire, and by claiming to guarantee the security of global 
commerce within its borders that remains central to the biopolitics of liberal peace. 
 
 
The dynamics of Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocratic nationalism 
 
The island of Ceylon is the home to four ethnic groups: the Tamils, the Sinhalese, the Tamil-
speaking Muslims and the Burghers. Although the tribal people (the Veddas) of Ceylon are 
often referred to as a distinct ethnic group, in reality they do not have a separate language or 
culture for themselves. While those from the central and southern parts of the island speak the 
Sinhala language, those in the eastern parts speak Tamil and follow the customs of Tamil 
tribes in South India. It is therefore incorrect to assert the Veddas to be a distinct ethnic 
group. Instead they constitute the tribal people of Ceylon’s Tamil and Sinhala communities.  
For at least two thousand five hundred years, the island of Ceylon has remained the 
historical habitat of the Tamils and the Sinhalese. While the majority of the Tamils are 
Hindus and the Sinhalese are Buddhists, from the sixteenth century onwards Christianity has 
become the second dominant religion within both communities. Although Sinhala chronicles 
depict the Tamils as ‘non-Buddhist invaders’ from South India and the Sinhalese ‘as the 
preservers and champions of Buddhism’ who migrated from the eastern Indian region of 
Bengal before the Tamils (Tambiah, 1986: 6), given the proximity of Ceylon to South India, 
some scholars believe that the Tamils were most likely to have been the earliest settlers in the 
island (see Jennings, 1949: 22; Wilson, 1974: 6). In this regard, Ivor Jennings notes:  
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Geography would suggest that there were Tamils in Ceylon before the Sinhalese 
arrived, for the Jaffna Peninsula45 is more like South India than the rest of Ceylon, 
and Tamil fishermen take their catamarans down the coasts when the monsoon is 
favourable. It is probable, therefore, that there were Tamil settlements before the 
Sinhalese migration began. There was in any case, as there still is, constant 
intercourse between India and Ceylon (1949: 22). 
 
Ironically, the same Sinhala chronicles that depict the Tamils as invaders also trace the 
maternal lineage of the Sinhalese to Tamil women from the Pandiyan Empire of Tamil Nadu, 
who were claimed to have married the first Sinhala ‘settlers’ in the island (Mahavamsa, 1912: 
59-61). These notwithstanding, archaeological and anthropological findings of the colonial 
period suggest that the Sinhalese constitute an intermixed race of speakers of an ancient 
eastern Indian language46 and the Tamils (see Obeyasekere, 1984: 154; McGowan, 1992: 
146). Given these factors, and coupled with the fact that the Sinhalese cannot be physically 
differentiated from the Tamils, some scholars opine that the Sinhalese are actually descended 
from settlers of eastern India who intermarried with the Tamils (Obeyasekere, 1984: 154; 
Kapferer, 1988: 35; Tambiah, 1992: 133-134; McGowan, 1992: 146; Krishna, 2000: 38).  
A thousand years ago, the Tamils and Sinhalese were joined by the Muslims (the 
Moors), who are the descendants of Arab traders (Balasingham, 2004: 1 & 3). The second 
wave of the immigration of Muslims took place in the seventeenth century when the Dutch 
brought in an army of Javanese (Malay) mercenaries who also settled permanently in the 
island (Wilson, 1974: 55-56). The third wave of Muslim settlement in the island took place in 
the nineteenth century under British rule. These Muslims, also known as the Hambayas, are 
of South Indian, Pakistani and Afghan origin (Ramanathan, 1916). Despite being made up of 
various ethnic groups, the Muslims of Ceylon have adopted Tamil as their mother-tongue. In 
addition to those three groups of Muslims, there also exists a group of Tamils who converted 
to Islam during Dutch rule. In the nineteenth century, the British also brought in one million 
                                                            
45 The Jaffna peninsula, in the north of the Tamil homeland, lies close to the South Indian coast of Tamil Nadu. 
46 The Sinhala language is believed to have originated from the now extinct ancient Indian language Pali. 
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Tamils from South India as labourers to work in the island’s plantation sectors, who also 
settled there permanently. There also exists another ethnic group known as the Burghers, the 
descendants of European settlers (mainly the Portuguese) many of whom have, over the 
centuries, intermingled with the Tamil and Sinhala communities through marriage. 
Unlike the Muslims and the Burghers, both the Tamils and Sinhalese have had their 
own kingdoms and principalities in the island, the boundaries of which shifted from time to 
time, and often competed for control of the entire island (Jennings, 1949: 22). Evidences of 
ancient power struggles between the Tamils and Sinhalese for control over the island can be 
found in one of the ancient Sinhala chronicles, Mahavamsa (1912: 175), which was 
composed in the sixth century C.E. by Sinhala-Buddhist monks. Many centuries before 
Western colonial conquests, the island also remained the centre of power struggle between 
two Tamil empires of South India – the Chola and Pandiyan empires. The Cholas, with the 
‘objective of making the Bay of Bengal a Chola lake’ and seeking to monopolise ‘trade to 
Malasiya and China’, frequently invaded the island, often with the support of local Tamil 
kings and princes, dethroning the Sinhala monarchies and driving them into exile (Wilson, 
1974: 8). Historical records indicate that in an attempt to put a check on the supremacy of the 
Cholas in the island, the Pandiyan Empire, despite being ethnically Tamil, maintained close 
matrimonial ties with the Sinhala dynasties in the island (Krishna, 2000: 37-38).  
Despite these, when the Portuguese first set foot on the island in 1505, the Tamils and 
Sinhalese had divided the island among them, with the Muslims having adopted the Tamil 
language as their mother tongue and residing within the Tamil and Sinhala kingdoms and 
principalities. Thus, after the takeover of the island from the Dutch at the end of the 
eighteenth century, Sir Hugh Cleghorn, the then British colonial Secretary noted in 1799: 
 
Two different nations, from a very ancient period have divided between them 
possessions of the island: first, the Sinhalese inhabiting the interior parts of the 
country, in its southern and western parts from river Walloure to that of Chilaw, 
and secondly the Malabars47 who possess the northern and eastern districts. These 
                                                            
47 The Tamils were often referred to as the Malabars in colonial literatures. 
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two nations, differ entirely in their religion, language and manners (cited in 
Balasingham, 2004: 3; also see Kemper, 1991: 144). 
 
In spite of this, the ethno-theocratic form of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that emerged in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century under British colonial rule continued to portray the 
Tamils as foreign invaders. It was a ‘divisive, racist, and aggressive’ form of nationalism 
(McGowan, 1992: 144) that emerged in response to the dominant role played by the Tamils 
in the British colonial administrative apparatus and the island’s economy. Under British rule, 
the Tamils embraced Western education and quickly rose as the white-collar elites in the 
island’s civil service. This was in stark contrast to the Sinhalese, who were prevented from 
embracing Western education by the Buddhist clergy and thus could not enter the civil 
service (Snyder, 2000: 277), with the exception of the Christian Sinhalese who learned 
English. In addition, with the increase in economic intercourse between Ceylon and India, 
Tamils from South India entered the island in large numbers as wage-labourers seeking to 
better their lives. In the 1840s, when the Sinhalese refused to work in British coffee and tea 
plantation sectors in the island’s hill country, Britain ‘imported’ a million Tamil labourers 
from the neighbouring South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. While thousands of them perished 
on their way and while working in the plantation sectors, majority of those who managed to 
survive formed settlements in predominantly Sinhala-Buddhist villages. Despite toiling in 
‘utter misery’ in the plantation sectors, the Tamil labourers of South India were considered by 
the Sinhala-Buddhists to be a threat to their existence in the island (Balasingham, 2004: 3-6). 
As the twentieth century dawned and the liberal state-building undertaken by the 
British Empire progressed, ‘under the slogan of Buddhist religious renaissance’, Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists began to speak of ‘the greatness of the Sinhalese Aryan race’, with 
‘strong sediments of Tamil antagonism’ in them (Balasingham, 2004: 6). Buddhist clergymen 
(the monks) portrayed the Sinhalese as the descendents of an ‘Aryan lion race’ that originated 
from the eastern Indian region of Bengal (Wickramasinghe, 2006: 122; Kapferer, 1988: 34), 
and the indigenous Tamils as ‘non-humans’ and ‘demons’ who possessed ‘super-human’ 
powers (Balasingham, 2004: 1; McGowan, 1992: 142). As Nira Wickramasinghe notes: 
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In the early twentieth century the Sinhalese literati considered the province of 
Bengal the land of the Aryans and the motherland of the Arya Sinhalas. Thus, 
those who could not trace their ancestry to Bengal and did not speak Sinhala as 
their mother tongue were perceived as ‘non-Aryans’ (2006: 122) 
 
A leading Sinhala-Buddhist scholar of that particular period of time who invoked this ‘Aryan 
lion race’ myth to glorify the ‘greatness’ of the Sinhalese was Anagarika Dharmapala: 
 
Two thousand four hundred and forty-six years ago a colony of Aryans from the 
city of Sinhapura, in Bengal, leaving their Indian home, sailed in a vessel in 
search of fresh pastures, and they discovered the island which they named 
Tambapanni, on account of its copper coloured soil. The leader of the band was an 
Aryan prince by the name of Wijaya, and he fought with the aboriginal tribes and 
got possession of the land. The descendants of the Aryan colonists were called 
Sinhala after their city, Sinhapura, which was founded by Sinhabahu, the lion-
armed king. The lion-armed descendants are the present Sinhalese, whose 
ancestors had never been conquered, and in whose veins no savage blood is found 
(1902/1965: 479). 
 
The roots of this ‘lion race’ myth can be traced to the Mahavamsa (1912: 3 & 53), which 
claims that the island was ‘conquered’ by Lord Buddha for his doctrine to ‘shine in glory’ 
and his religion to be protected by the Sinhala race. The Mahavamsa portrays the leader of 
the Sinhala ‘settlers’, prince Vijaya, as the grandson of a lion and a princess from Bengal. 
According to the chronicle, when the forefathers of the Sinhalese landed on the shores of 
Ceylon, they were confronted by ‘superhuman beings’,48 whom they defeated, and there were 
‘no men’ in the island to challenge them (Mahavamsa, 1912: 43, 55 & 59). Similar claims 
                                                            
48  In this regard, P.E.Pieris (1920: 2 & 21), a Sinhala historian, notes that the  ‘superhumans’ described  in the 
Mahavamsa were more likely to have been ordinary human beings who lived in the island among whom the 
‘the new settlers freely intermarried’, even though no ‘traces of their civilisation’ can be found today. Despite 
invoking the Mahavamsa to develop the ‘Aryan lion race’ myth of the Sinhala people, Dharmapala (1965: 479) 
also accepted that the ‘superhumans’ described in the chronicle were the ‘aboriginal tribes’ of the island. 
  140   
can also be found in Pujavaliya, a Sinhala prose composed in the thirteenth century C.E. In 
that prose, it is claimed that the island of Ceylon ‘belongs to Buddha himself’; therefore, the 
residence of non-Buddhist in the island ‘will never be permanent’ (Pujavaliya 1926: 656).  
Although another myth (known as the ‘Hela’ myth) emerged in the middle of the 
twentieth century dismissing the ‘Aryan lion race’ myth and claiming that ‘the Sinhalese did 
not have Aryan origins but were the descendents of the indigenous people of the island’, it 
was nevertheless also based on the idea of the racial purity of the Sinhalese: 
 
The proponents of a Hela identity refused to accept the Indian origin of the people 
of Sri Lanka. The people of the island had no extraneous origins. Even Pali was 
not considered a language fathered by the Hela people. Significantly the keystone 
of the Helese identity was the pure Sinhala (Elu or Hela) language 
(Wickramasinghe, 2006: 91). 
 
However, despite its racist characteristics, this ‘Hela’ myth failed to become as dominant as 
the ‘Aryan lion race’ myth in Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist thought and practice. In contrast, 
the ‘Aryan lion race’ myth has become inscribed into the official history of the contemporary 
Sri Lankan state; it ‘seems to have gradually and unproblematically imposed itself as the 
most significant foundational myth of the Sinhalese’ (Wickramasinghe, 2006: 92). 
The Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that emerged under British colonial rule lay claim to 
the entire island of Ceylon for the Sinhala-Buddhist people. According to Dharmapala: 
 
Ethnologically, the Sinhalese are a unique race, inasmuch as they can boast that 
they have no slave blood in them, and were never conquered by either the pagan 
Tamils or European vandals who for three centuries devastated the land, destroyed 
ancient temples and nearly annihilated the historic race... This bright, beautiful 
island was made into a paradise by the Aryan Sinhalese before its destruction was 
brought about by the barbaric vandals (1965: 479 & 482). 
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It was a nationalism that was antagonistic not only towards the Tamils, but also launched 
vicious attacks on the island’s Muslim population (see Dharmapala, 1965: 540). As a 
consequence of the economic liberalisation programmes undertaken by the British, like the 
Tamils in Ceylon’s civil service and plantation sectors, the Muslims dominated the island’s 
import and export trades. Moreover, as Tamil investors and British bankers controlled the 
island’s banking sector, the Sinhalese could not gain access to finances to compete with the 
Muslims. The majority of Sinhalese not only had to ‘vie with Burghers and Tamils for state 
and private employment’ but also had to confront the Muslims (Bloom, 2003: 59).  
In addition to targeting the Tamils and Muslims, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism also hit-
out at the Jews and Christians across the world (see Dharmapala, 1989: 14). It was an attack 
based on the claim that while the Sinhalese, along with ancient Greeks and Romans, belonged 
to the Aryan race of Indian origin, the other races of the world constituted the inferior ones: 
 
The ancient civilization of Greece was Oriental in character. The ancient Greeks 
thought like the ancient Aryans of India. The gods they worshipped were not of 
the Semitic type. Zeus was the chief god of the Greeks, and in the classic age the 
Aryan god was Indra. In dress, in manners, between the ancient Greeks and the 
ancient Aryans of India there was much similarity. The draped figures of the 
Greek poets and philosophers were exact representations of the statues of ancient 
Aryan Bhikkhus. The modern Indian Sari and the cloak worn by the ancient Greek 
women were similar. The classical dress of ancient Rome was purely Aryan. The 
religions of Persia, Egypt, Babylonia, and India helped the religious thought of 
Rome. The poets of Greece, and Rome before the latter country went under the 
domination of the Semitic religion, gave to the world their great thoughts in 
accordance with the spirit of harmony. The idea of an eternal hell came like a 
miasma poisoning the atmosphere of freedom. Despotism was enthroned and 
freedom of thought was no more possible (Dharmapala, 1989: 101-102). 
  
Parallels can be drawn between the way that the Aryan myth was invoked by the Sinhala-
Buddhist scholars in Ceylon and some Hindu nationalist scholars in North India in the 
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nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century to develop popular resistance 
to British rule. Both groups sought to establish a ‘civilisational’ link between the Asian 
‘Aryan’ races and the Germanic Aryans. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, a Hindu scholar, claimed that 
Indian Brahmins were descendents of Aryans who lived in the Arctic between 10,000 and 
8,000 B.C. and migrated to Europe and Asia in search of lands suitable for settlement; in 
many respects it resembled the Nazi’s Aryan myth (Goodrick-Clarke, 1998:36-37).  
This attempt of the Sinhala-Buddhists and Indian Hindu nationalists to establish a link 
between the Asian ‘Aryans’ and the Germanic European Aryans could partly be attributed to 
the writings of some European thinkers, including Immanuel Kant and G.W.F.Hegel, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For example, Friedrich Schlegel and Karl Ritter tried to 
trace the origins of European Aryans to Asia, in particular to India. Voltaire and Kant also 
tried to trace the origins of all arts and civilisation to India. Hegel and a number of other 
philosophers further contributed to this myth by providing speculations on the linkages 
between the Aryans of Europe and Asia (Goodrick-Clarke, 1998:29 & 33). Thus, Dharmapala 
was able to claim that the Sinhalese and European Aryans were related (1989: 101). 
Attempts to develop a link between the Sinhala-Buddhists and the Germanic Aryans 
culminated during the Second World War in the form of the glorification of Nazi symbols: 
 
[L]ike their German counterparts, Sinhalese intellectuals used Aryan theory to 
define their own glorious national identity and to denigrate minorities. A 
magazine called The Aryan was started in 1906 and a book of “Aryan” Sinhalese 
names was a best seller around that time, too. In the late thirties there was much 
cheering for Hitler’s racial programs, especially his policies banning mixed 
marriages. As Sinhala nationalists called for a struggle to cleanse their society of 
elements that were thuppahi – a derogatory term for something bastardized and 
impure – Nazi propaganda poured into the country and comparisons were drawn 
between the Thousand-Year Reich and the multi-millennial reign of the Buddha 
outlined in ancient myth (McGowan, 1992: 146). 
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Even though Max Muller had, at the time the Aryan myth developed, made it clear that it 
referred to the family of Indo-European languages, and not any family of races, Dharmapala 
and other Sinhala-Buddhist scholars continued to invoke it to develop a racist ideology for 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism (Kemper, 1991: 200). As Steven Kemper (1991: 200) notes, 
‘Dharmapala used “Aryan” as a racial category, which allowed him to portray the Sinhalese 
as an ancient people, different from other ethnic communities of Sri Lanka’. The use of the 
Aryan myth to develop Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism had a meaning similar to that of 
Hitler’s ‘Final Solution’: it meant that ‘to be Buddhist is to be Aryan Sinhalese by “race” and 
“language,” and to be Sinhalese by race gives the right to exclude, perhaps even exterminate, 
other “races” in Sri Lanka, especially the Dravidians’49 (Tambiah, 1986: 59). 
There were indications as early as the 1920s that as a consequence of political 
liberalisation undertaken by the British Empire, the Tamils and the Sinhalese would end up in 
a collision course. In 1921, when elections to the Legislative Council of Ceylon ‘returned 
thirteen Sinhalese to territorial constituencies as against three Tamils’ it immediately created 
a ‘rift between the Sinhalese and the Tamil leadership’ (Wickramasinghe, 2006: 59). The 
results of the elections reinforced Tamil fears that under the unitary electoral system that was 
being developed they would lose their status as a nation and instead become a minority. On 
the other hand, the Sinhalese feared that granting voting rights to Tamils of Indian origin who 
had settled in the central hill country would substantially diminish their representation in 
those parts of the country. Thus, while a number of Tamil political leaders demanded 
recognition of their people as a nation and many called for increased votes for non-Sinhala 
communities, the Sinhala political elites and the Buddhist clergy opposed such demands. 
This was even highlighted in the UK Parliament less than three months before Ceylon 
became independent. During the debate in the House of Commons on Ceylon Independence 
Bill in November 1947, Sir Leonard David Gammans, a Conservative MP, warned: 
 
                                                            
49 The word Dravidian in the context of Sri Lanka means the Tamils. However, in India the term is used to refer 
to the populations of the South Indian states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andra Pradesh, and Karnataka. 
  144   
Ceylon is not a single racial unit. There are two races in Ceylon, the Sinhalese and 
the Jaffna Tamils,50 who are in the northern part of the island, and number 
1,500,000, out of a total of 6,500,000. They differ from the Sinhalese in race, 
language, religion, and, to a large extent, in background... Where there is a racial 
minority in the country the danger is that it may become a permanent political 
minority, and if it does become a permanent political minority, Ceylon’s evolution 
on a democratic basis is bound to fail. This imposes on the two peoples of Ceylon 
a very great responsibility. It imposes on the Sinhalese the responsibility of seeing 
that they grant fair and, if necessary, rather more than fair, treatment to the 
minority not only in political power, but also in administrative responsibility, so 
that that minority is not inevitably driven to regard itself as a permanent political 
minority. There is also an obligation on the Tamils that they should not ask for 
more than is reasonable, above all that they do not keep on threatening the country 
that they will make affiliations with India, nor demand more than their just due 
(HC Deb 21 November 1947). 
  
This statement of Gammans is a clear indication that although British politicians were very 
well aware of the dangers of leaving behind a unitary state apparatus for Ceylon, they were 
nevertheless not prepared to accept the secessionist demands of the Tamils or even entertain 
the idea of making the Tamil homeland in Ceylon a part of Tamil Nadu in South India.  
In this regard, the solution espoused by the British colonial rulers was to encourage the 
Tamils and Sinhalese to forge a Ceylonese identity. As a way of containing ethnic tensions, 
British colonial rulers ‘looked for institutional forms that would maintain political order by 
delaying the emergence of political parties which they feared would become vehicles for 
ethnic interests’ (Kemper, 1991: 202). Rejecting calls for increased votes for non-Sinhala 
communities, Britain’s Donoughmore Commission, which proposed constitutional reforms 
for the island, argued in 1928 that asserting ethnic identities were ‘canker in the body politics, 
                                                            
50 Tamils of Ceylon have often been  referred  to as  Jaffna Tamils on  the basis  that  their  last kingdom  in  the 
island was known by  the name  Jaffna, which at  the peak of  its power controlled  the northern, eastern and 
western parts of the island. However, Jaffna today refers a district in the northern part of the Tamil homeland.  
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eating deeper and deeper into the vital energies of the people, breeding self-interest, suspicion 
and animosity, poisoning the new growth of political consciousness and effectively 
preventing the development of a national or corporate spirit’ (cited in Harris, 1990: 210).   
Using Ferguson and Mill’s definitions of ‘civilisation’ as a matrix for understanding the 
attempts of the British to forge a Ceylonese identity for the island’s population reveals that 
they were intended to consolidate efforts made earlier to liberalise the latter by erasing, at 
least politically, their ethnic and religious identities and make them become accustomed to 
liberal values that would pave the way for harmonious commercial intercourse between them 
which would not be affected by ethnic and religious differences. This was what the 
Donoughmore Commission meant in claiming that forging a common Ceylonese identity 
would help to develop a national and corporate spirit among the island’s communities. 
There is also evidence of naivety among British colonial rulers of the time that Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism would not emerge as powerful and violent as it is now. Developing a 
common Ceylonese identity was believed to be capable of putting a check on Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism. Moreover, with the exception of two rebellions, one in 1817 and 
another in 1848, and an ethnic riot against the Muslims in 1915, the Sinhalese had largely 
remained obedient to British rule. The first and last resistance that the British faced after 
setting foot on the shores of Ceylon was from the Tamils: the prince in the north and the king 
in the central hill country of the island who put up resistance against the British were both 
Tamils. It was also with the support of the local Sinhala chiefs of the central hill country that 
the British dethroned the Tamil king, whom the British often referred to as a ‘cruel monster’ 
and ‘tyrant king’ (Ferguson, 1903: 4 & 6). Thus, given the fact that the Sinhalese co-operated 
with the British when the latter took control of the island and largely remained obedient to 
British rule, it was mistakenly assumed that that they would not use state-power after 
independence against the Tamils or other ethnic groups. In this regard, during the debate in 
the House of Commons on Ceylon Independence Bill in November 1947, while Jones, the  
British Secretary of State for the Colonies, expressed confidence that the people of Ceylon 
‘will prove themselves a great free democracy’, another MP, Sir Harry Mackeson, claimed 
that the ‘Sinhalese and the people of Ceylon have had sufficient experience of running their 
own affairs’ and on this basis ‘they can be trusted to show a high standard of efficiency and 
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responsibility’ (HC Deb 21 November 1947). There was also a belief that constitutional 
arrangements would safeguard the rights of other communities against the encroachment of 
the Sinhalese. In 2006, a British High Commissioner to Sri Lanka regretted for this decision: 
 
When the British came to Ceylon in 1796 there were three distinct kingdoms. The 
British made it one country for purposes of administrative convenience. If one 
were to truly examine Britain’s role, one important aspect deserves special 
mention. That is the constitutional arrangement that Britain left behind. It left 
behind the Soulbury Constitution. Britain considered the Soulbury Constitution as 
having the necessary arrangements to provide for safeguards for minorities. 
Britain thought that the rights of the Tamils in particular would be safeguarded by 
these arrangements. However history has proved otherwise that these safeguards 
were inadequate and not robust enough. I regret that Britain’s policies have to 
such an extent been the cause for the problems (Chilcott, 2006). 
 
Notwithstanding these, developing a Ceylonese identity was for the British the most prudent 
way of governing the island and maintaining trade within its borders. It was both 
administratively convenient, as the British High Commissioner had noted (Chilcott, 2006), 
and an expedient way of developing commercial intercourse between the island’s 
communities, which would in turn help to sustain global commerce. However, allowing the 
historically antagonistic Tamils and the Sinhalese to have separate power centres, with  
control over commerce, would hinder trade within the island’s borders: if ethnic rivalry 
expanded into the economic domain, it could have potentially lead to monopolistic policies. 
Therefore, at independence, leaving behind a unitary state apparatus for the island would 
have seemed the best option for the British in terms of global commerce in the island. 
This decision of the British had far reaching consequences for Ceylon’s Tamil 
population. While the unitary state apparatus that Britain left behind survived, the Ceylonese 
identity that it attempted to develop crumbled after independence. On the one hand, the 
electoral system that Britain left behind reduced the Tamils from the status of a nation to an 
ethnic minority, denying the prospects of gaining governmental power, except by 
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bandwagoning with the Sinhala political parties. On the other hand, the numerical advantage 
enjoyed by the Sinhala-Buddhists as the majority community in the island gave them virtual 
monopoly over the state-apparatus and control of government. The unitary state apparatus 
also reinforced the claims of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists for ‘an all-island sovereignty’ 
to justify the killing of Tamils, which can be traced, as with the Aryan myth, to the ancient 
Sinhala chronicle Mahavamsa (Wilson, 1974:7). The chronicle glorifies the killing of Tamils 
as a historically acceptable phenomenon for asserting Sinhala-Buddhist supremacy in the 
island (Trawick, 2007: 24). Recounting the ancient war victory of the Sinhala King 
Dutthagamani51 over the Tamil King Ellalan52 in the second century B.C., the Mahavamsa 
depicts it as the glorious event in the Sinhala people’s claim for the entire island:  
 
[T]he army of the Damilas [Tamils] was scattered; nay, Elara turned to flee and 
they slew many Damilas. The water in the tank there was dyed red with the blood 
of the slain... When he had thus been victorious in battle and had united Lanka 
under one rule he marched, with chariots, troops and beasts for riders, into the 
capital... When he had thus overpowered thirty-two Damila kings, Dutthagamani 
ruled over Lanka in single sovereignty (1912: 174-175).  
 
Moreover, the Mahavamsa also justifies the killing of non-Buddhists on the basis that they 
are no different to beasts. In reference to the death of Tamils in the Ellalan-Dutthagamani 
war, the Mahavamsa recounts a conversation between Dutthagamani and Buddhist monks: 
 
The great king greeted them, and when he had invited them to be seated and had 
done them reverence in many ways he asked the reason of their coming.  
‘We are sent by the brotherhood at Piyafigudipa to comfort thee, O lord of 
men.’  
                                                            
51 Dutthagamani is also known in Sinhala literatures as Dutugemunu. 
52 In Sinhala chronicles, the Tamil king Ellalan is referred to as Elara. 
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And thereon the king said again to them: ‘How shall there be any comfort 
for me, O venerable sirs, since by me was caused the slaughter of a great host 
numbering millions?’  
‘From this deed arises no hindrance in thy way to heaven. Only one and a 
half human beings have been slain here by thee, O lord of men. The one had come 
unto the (three) refuges,53 the other had taken on himself the five precepts.54 
Unbelievers and men of evil life were the rest, not more to be esteemed than 
beasts. But as for thee, thou wilt bring glory to the doctrine of the Buddha in 
manifold ways; therefore cast away care from thy heart, O ruler of men!’ (1912: 
178). 
 
In this regard, Margaret Trawick notes that the Mahavamsa not only imposes upon the 
Sinhala-Buddhists the duty of unifying Sri Lanka but also advances the argument that such 
unification of the island under a single flag ‘entails warfare and bloodshed’ (2007: 24).  
With their virtual monopoly over the state apparatus and control of government, 
immediately after independence Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists embarked on asserting the 
supremacy of the Sinhala language and Buddhism. Although the Tamils were singled out as 
the main group, other ethnic communities were not left out. With the entry of biopolitics, 
states today wage wars ‘as managers of life and survival, of bodies and race’ (Foucault, 1998: 
137). In post-colonial Ceylon’s case, the state waged its war against the Tamils and other 
ethnic groups as the manager of the Sinhala-Buddhist race. The socio-economic and religious 
fears entertained by the Sinhala-Buddhists also contributed to this war of the Sri Lankan 
state: 
 
 [T]hese Buddhists, in particular their indigenous oriented elites, entertain fears in 
respect of two important minority groupings. They complain that the Ceylon 
                                                            
53 The three refuges of Buddhism are: Lord Buddha, the Dharma (moral code), and the Sangha (the council of 
Buddhist clergy). 
54 The five precepts of Buddhism are: avoid killing living creatures; avoid taking what is not given; refrain from 
sexual misconduct; avoid incorrect speech; and avoid taking intoxicating drinks and drugs. 
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Tamils have a disproportionate share of jobs in the public and private sectors, and 
when taken with the one million odd Indian Tamils they tend to regard the total 
Tamil population as a threat to the existence of the Sinhalese race especially when 
viewed in the context of neighbouring South India’s Dravidian millions. The 
Christians (the majority of whom are Sinhalese and the rest Tamils and Burghers) 
pose as big a problem. Their efficient organisation and the superior resources, the 
Sinhalese Buddhists opine, are a menace to the stability of their social and 
religious structures (Wilson, 1974: 15). 
 
Although the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that emerged under British colonial rule was 
pinned to the biological idea of ‘Aryan’ superiority, in post-colonial Ceylon, this was not 
often the case. In colonial Ceylon, being a Sinhala-Buddhist was considered a birth right. 
However, in post-colonial Ceylon, one could become a Sinhala-Buddhist by assimilating into 
the Sinhala-Buddhist community, either by becoming a Sinhala-Buddhist or by accepting the 
supremacy of Sinhala Buddhism. A number of examples can be cited in this respect.  
In the Western parts of the island, in particular in the districts of Puttalam and 
Negombo, as a consequence of the state’s socio-economic policies that privilege the 
Sinhalese, a large number of Tamils have gradually shed their ethnic and religious identities 
and have instead assimilated into the Sinhala-Buddhist community through marriage, 
religious conversions, and by adopting the Sinhala language as their mother tongue. Although 
a few decades ago they were Tamils, today they identify themselves as Sinhalese (see 
Spencer, 1990). Among the Muslim population of the island, this assimilation has taken a 
different form. Instead of shedding their ethnic and religious identities, the majority of 
Muslims have, despite continuing to identify themselves as a distinct ethnic group, built 
harmonious relationship with the Sinhalese by accepting the supremacy of Sinhala Buddhism.     
However, this process of assimilation is not limited to the non-Sinhala speaking 
communities. Ceylon’s second prime minister, S.W.R.D.Banadaranaike, who was a Sinhala 
Christian at birth, ascended to power by converting to Buddhism when he entered politics 
(Harris, 1990: 212). This was also the case of J.R.Jayewardene, Sri Lanka’s first executive 
president. Although both Sinhala leaders are well known for advocating and implementing 
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racist policies towards the Tamils, a number of Sinhala and Western historians have traced 
their ancestors as Tamils (see de Silva & Wriggins, 1988: 22; Kemper, 1991: 129).  
 
 
Waging war through law 
 
Before the emergence of the Tamil armed resistance movement, the post-colonial state of 
Ceylon waged its war against the Tamils through law to further its ethno-theocratic 
ambitions. With their monopoly over governmental power through liberal democratic 
electoral politics, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists were able to enact with immunity a number 
of racist and oppressive legislations against the Tamils. As the Tamils’ resistance at that time 
was non-violent, the state did not resort to military action. Nevertheless, police brutality was 
often let loose on non-violent Tamil protestors (Balasingham, 2004: 14). 
In addition, state-sponsored riots were also frequently unleashed on the Tamil 
population, the worse one being in July 1983 which lasted for nearly a week, known as the 
‘83 Black July Holocaust’ among the Tamils (Balasingham, 2004: 39; Kapferer, 1988: 29). 
They can be classified as state-sponsored riots in that the state’s armed forces and police 
stood back, and in many instances encouraged the Sinhala mobs, while Tamils were attacked 
and their properties looted. In reference to the riots of 1983, Bruce Kapferer notes: 
 
Gangs of Sinhalese thugs roamed the streets with lists of Tamil houses, buildings 
and businesses, systematically burning them and slaughtering their inhabitants. 
Added to this horror was the sight of large gatherings of ordinary Sinhalese who 
looked on while, in some instances, Tamil victims were burned alive. By the end 
of July most of the 300,000 Tamils of Colombo had fled the city or were in 
refugee camps. Many of the 800,000 Tamil tea-estate laborers were similarly 
driven away. The Sri Lankan government admits that something in the region of 
350 Tamils were killed. The numbers are certainly far greater. Some Sinhalese did 
shelter and protect Tamils, but the systematic way Tamils were attacked, the fact 
that it was Sinhalese murdering Tamils – virtually no Sinhalese were killed – and 
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the fact that for two or three days the government and its agents took no 
preventive action while the killings continued has led to some members of the 
Tamil population to draw stark parallels with Nazi pogroms (1988: 29). 
 
Justifying the actions of his armed forces in the aftermath of the 1983 riots, Jayewardene, Sri 
Lanka’s president at that time claimed that because ‘there was a big anti-Tamil feeling among 
the forces’, his troops ‘felt that shooting the Sinhalese who were rioting would have been 
anti-Sinhalese’, and thus stood back (cited in Tambiah, 1986: 25). According to Sri Lanka’s 
current Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa (2013), Jayewardene was responsible for the 
July 83 riots ‘because for three days he did not take action to arrest the situation’.  
Arguably, the first phase of the war that the post-colonial state of Ceylon launched 
through law was directed at one million Tamils of Indian origin who had settled in the central 
parts of the island. If in the nineteenth century Indian Tamils were viewed by Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists to be a threat to their economic life, in the twentieth century, as the 
island’s population became politically liberalised through electoral politics, they were 
perceived to be an obstacle for Sinhala-Buddhists to attain and monopolise political power:  
 
The Indians [Tamils] posed a threat to the Sinhalese only when the question of 
representation in the legislature became an issue in the 1920s and thereafter. To 
have given large number of Indians the vote, as the Donoughmore Commission 
recommended in 1928, would from a Sinhalese point of view have meant... a 
dilution of the electoral strength of the Kandyan Sinhalese in most of the 
constituencies in the Kandyan areas. (Wilson, 1974: 29) 
 
Glimpses of the hostility shown by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists towards the Indian Tamils 
can be found in some of the statements made by the former in the run up to the years before 
Ceylon became independent. During a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi in 1940, Jayewardene 
referred to the Indian Tamils as ‘exploiters’ and claimed that till ‘poet Tagore, Gandhiji, 
Pandit Nehru and a few other eminent Indians came to Lanka’ his people had ‘met only the 
exploiting Chettiars and the immigrant Indian labourers’ (de Silva & Wriggins, 1988: 109). 
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Hostility towards Indian Tamils was further compounded by the fact that at independence, 
they constituted twelve percent of the island’s total population (Wickramasinghe, 2006: 162).  
Thus, within a few months after attaining independence, using its elected legislature the 
post-colonial state of Ceylon enacted laws to disfranchise the Indian Tamils and made an 
overwhelming majority of them stateless (Wilson, 1974: 30-31). Although around 130,000 
Indian Tamils who owned property and had education were able to obtain citizenship, the rest 
were made stateless, and thus without voting rights (Balasingham, 2004: 7; Wickramasinghe, 
2006: 162). Of those stateless Indian Tamils, around 600,000 of them were deported to India 
in the following years (Harris, 1990: 212). However, as a large number of deportees could not 
prove their Indian origins, the Indian government also refused to accept responsibility for 
them, and they therefore had to remain in refugee camps in India as stateless refugees for 
many decades  (Wilson, 1974: 32). In effect, the post-colonial state of Ceylon managed to 
successfully cleanse large parts of its central hill country areas, which had before British 
colonial rule remained predominantly Sinhalese, by making them free of Indian Tamils. The 
state then turned its attention towards the remaining stateless Indian Tamils by enticing them 
to shed their ethnic and religious identities and assimilate them into the Sinhala-Buddhist 
community (Wilson, 1974: 34). Although it was the state’s police, immigration and other 
civil service departments that executed this ethno-theocratic war against the Indian Tamils, it 
was the state’s liberal democratic law making apparatus that gave them the authority to do so.  
Ceylon’s military, headed by the British monarchy and led by British army and navy 
officers, also played a part in this war. While the state’s police, immigration and other civil 
service departments rounded up Indian Tamils and deported them to India, from 1951 to 1963 
the Ceylon Army and the Royal Navy of Ceylon conducted a joint operation, codenamed 
MONTY, to prevent the further influx of Tamil immigrants from South India. This was the 
first operation launched by Ceylon’s military (Moorcraft, 2012:48). For the first four years of 
this operation Ceylon’s army was headed by two British military officers: Brigadier Sinclair 
The Earl of Caithness and Brigadier F.S.Reid. During those years Ceylon’s navy was also 
headed by British naval officers: Capt. W.E.Banks, Capt. J.R.S.Brown and Capt. 
P.M.B.Chavasse. According to Lt.Colonel H.W.G.Wijeyekoon, a Sinhalese officer in 
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Ceylon’s army at that time, preventing ‘illicit immigration from South India’ was ‘considered 
the national problem’ during those years (cited in The Sunday Times, 2005). 
The second phase of the state’s war was directed at Tamils all over the island and the 
English speaking Christian elites. This was in the form of an official language Act (widely 
known as the ‘Sinhala Only Act’)55 that made Sinhala the state’s official language. This Act 
was intended to ‘make it difficult in the future for the Ceylon Tamils to enter the public 
services’ (Wilson, 1974: 21). In 1955, a year before enacting the ‘Sinhala Only Act’, 
Ceylon’s Prime Minister Bandaranaike argued that the ‘fact that in the towns and villages, in 
business houses and in boutiques, most of the work’ was ‘in the hands of Tamil-speaking 
people’, it would ‘inevitably result in fear’, which he claimed to be not unjustified, ‘of the 
inexorable shrinking of the Sinhalese language’, and therefore it was necessary to rectify this 
through the state’s legislature (cited in Wilson, 1974: 25). A year later in 1956, as the Act 
was to be passed through the Parliament, a similar justification was also put forward by the 
country’s opposition leader Jayewardene, who argued: ‘The time has come for the whole 
Sinhalese race, which has existed for 2,500 years jealously safeguarding its language and 
religion, to fight without giving any quarter to save its birthright’ (cited in McGowan, 1992: 
161). As a result of the ‘Sinhala Only Act’, as the Sinhala leaders had expected, the number 
of Tamils in the public sector fell from thirty percent to six percent (Harris, 1990: 213).  
The third phase of the state’s war was intended to change the demographic composition 
of the Tamil homeland by establishing Sinhala-Buddhist settlements in predominantly Tamil 
villages and towns. It was undertaken by invoking the Mahavamsa’s myth of all-island 
sovereignty for the Sinhalese and in the name of developing agrarian lands. Many Sinhalese 
understood these actions of the state as the reversal of conquests by Tamils during the 
medieval period (Kemper, 1991: 161-163 & 144): the state was able to claim that it was 
regaining areas in the northeastern parts of the island that the Sinhalese had ‘lost’ to ancient 
and medieval Tamil invaders. As the state intensified its colonisation and Sinhalisation of the 
Tamil homeland, riots broke-out between the indigenous Tamils and Sinhala settlers 
(Wickramasinghe, 2006: 304). In response, the state armed Sinhala settlers by forming 
                                                            
55 The official name of the act is Official Language Act No.33 of 1956. 
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homeguard units. The consequence of this phase of the state’s war is that ‘nearly three 
thousand square miles of Tamil territory’ has become Sinhalised (Balasingham, 2004: 8). 
The fourth phase of the state’s war through law was directed not at the Tamils, but the 
disenchanted Sinhala youth. As a consequence of economic hardships, and inspired by 
Marxist revolutionary ideals, in 1971, the Sinhala youth, led by a Marxist militant 
organisation known as the JVP (Janatha Vimukti Peramuna or People’s Liberation Front), 
rose against the state’s ruling order (Harris, 1990: 214). The state responded to the rebellion, 
under the cover of its emergency laws, by massacring at least 10,000 Sinhala youths who 
were suspected of taking part in the insurgency (Harris, 1990: 214; McGowan, 1991: 32). In 
this instance, like the Tamils, the rebelling Marxist Sinhala youth became the enemies of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. Another massacre of Marxist Sinhala youth (this time 
amounting to around 100,000 of them) took place between 1987-1989 (see Chapter V). 
While the suppression of the Sinhala Marxist insurgency saved the state’s ruling order, 
it also sparked the fifth phase of the war on the Tamils. In 1972, the war was unleashed 
against the Tamils in the form of laws restricting their entry to university education. As a way 
of reducing unemployment among the Sinhala youth and solidifying the loyalty of the 
Sinhalese, the state introduced a method known as ‘the standardization of university entries’ 
(Harris, 1990: 215). Under this system brought into force by the University of Ceylon Act 
No.1 of 1972, the Sinhala youth were placed at an advantaged position over the Tamils, even 
when Tamils achieved higher marks in university entrance exams. For example, the 
qualifying mark for admission to the medical faculties for the Sinhalese was set differently 
from those for the Tamils: while the qualifying mark for the Sinhalese was set at 229, for the 
Tamils it was increased to 250. This was also the case with exams in English (Wilson, 2000: 
102). As a result, a large number of Tamil youth began migrating to the West in search of 
foreign university education, resulting in the beginning of the emergence of the Tamil 
Diaspora (Harris, 1990: 215). While the state succeeded in bringing further demographic 
changes to the Tamil homeland by compelling Tamils to leave the shores of the island, its 
policies also paved the way for the emergence of the Tamil armed resistance movement, 
founded by Tamil youths who were denied university education (Balasingham, 2004: 19). 
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As it had done during the Marxist insurgency of the Sinhala youth, the state confronted 
the Tamil armed resistance movement by unleashing its military might and emergency laws 
against the rebels and the Tamil civilian population in general. Those emergency laws, which 
included a counter terrorism legislation known as the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1979, 
‘provided the main legitimation for military and police actions against the Tamil community’ 
(Tambiah, 1986: 42). Widely denounced as ‘draconian’ by human rights groups and Tamils 
(Harris, 1990: 216), it empowered the state with ‘the power of detention without resort to 
charge or judicial review and without access to relatives or lawyers’ (Tambiah, 1986: 39). It 
not only allowed the state to use confessions obtained under duress (including torture) as 
‘admissible evidence’ in Courts, but also allowed for ministers to order the police to detain 
individuals who were suspected of involvement in ‘unlawful’ activities (Tambiah, 1986: 43). 
The question of Sri Lanka’s emergency laws will be considered in the next chapter. 
The state began the sixth phase of its war against the Tamils in the form of legalising its 
ethno-theocratic ideology. In 1972, Ceylon broke its administrative ties with the British 
monarchy and became a republic, changing its name to Sri Lanka. While the republican 
constitution gave Buddhism ‘the foremost place’ and the state was given the duty to ‘protect 
and foster’ it, it also ‘guaranteed a pre-eminent position’ for the Sinhala language (Wilson, 
1974: 234 & 246). This was a victory for Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists, who had, since 
independence, worked ‘symbolically to appropriate the principles of democracy’ and ‘pressed 
for a Buddhist prototype of democracy to give it an indigenous tint, and for the moral 
authority of the Sangha to be recognised by the state’ (Wickramasinghe, 2006: 157).  
When Ceylon was re-named Sri Lanka, Tamils strongly objected to it (McGowan, 
1991: 15). While Ceylon is a Western name of colonial origin and thus is devoid of any 
political meaning either for the Tamils or the Sinhalese, the addition of the word ‘Sri’ (which 
means holy) in front of the Sinhala word ‘Lanka’ gives a Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocratic 
twist to the island, and thus the impression that its population belongs to the Sinhala-Buddhist 
community; it legalised Mahavamsa’s all-island sovereignty claim for the Sinhala-Buddhists.  
This ethno-theocratic identity had, however, already been entrenched partially in the 
island’s national identity at independence, in the form of the national flag embedding a 
sword-wielding lion, symbolising Mahavamsa’s ‘Aryan lion race’ myth of the Sinhalese. In 
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1978, the Sri Lankan government amended the republican constitution further and completed 
this move by placing the sword wielding lion in the middle of four Indian fig leaves (under 
which Lord Buddha is believed to have attained enlightenment), symbolising the duty of the 
Sinhalese to uphold Buddhism with the sword (see de Silva and Wriggins, 1988: 196-198). 
Asserting this, the then Sri Lankan President Jayewardene claimed that as the majority, the 
Sinhalese had ‘a duty to protect the Buddha Sasana’ (ideology) and should ‘pledge that every 
possible action would be taken to develop it’ (cited in Kemper, 1991: 174). Defining Sri 
Lanka and Sinhala to be synonymous terms, Jayewardene argued that the ‘Sri Lankan nation 
has stood out as the most wonderful nation in the world because’ it has followed ‘Buddhism 
for an unbroken period of 2500 years’ and had Sinhala, which he claimed to be ‘one of the 
oldest Aryan languages in the world’, as its language (cited in Krishna, 2000:41). 
What links can there be established between this ethno-theocratic war of the post-
colonial state of Ceylon/Sri Lanka against the island’s Tamil population and the Cold War 
policies of Western states under the banner of containment and development? 
 
 
Turning a blind-eye to ethno-theocratic ambitions 
 
Until 1972, while the post-colonial state of Ceylon waged its war against the Tamils, its 
successive governments were headed by the British monarchy. One of the key conditions for 
a state to remain in the Commonwealth, as enunciated in the London Declaration, was co-
operation ‘in the pursuit of peace, liberty, and progress’ (The Commonwealth, 1949), all of 
which Ceylon was violating through its discriminatory policies and practices towards the 
island’s Tamil population. Despite this, the British monarchy neither censured Ceylon’s 
successive governments nor removed the island-state from the Commonwealth. 
When the island-state of Ceylon was created in 1948, its legislature was modelled on 
the Westminster Parliament: it was made up of the Crown (the British monarchy), the Senate, 
and the House of Representatives. Section 4 (2) of Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 
1946, which remained in force until 1972, allowed the British monarchy as well as its 
governor-general for Ceylon to exercise their ‘powers, authorities and functions’ in 
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‘accordance with the constitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of similar powers, 
authorities and functions in the United Kingdom’ by the monarch.56 Moreover, Section 1 (1) 
of the Ceylon Independence Act 1947 (11 Geo. 6, c. 7), while removing the power of the UK 
Parliament to legislate on it own right for Ceylon, continued to vest it with the power to enact 
laws on the request of the state of Ceylon, of which the British monarch and its governor-
general were members. During the debate in November 1947 in the House of Commons on 
Ceylon Independence Bill, in response to a question on guaranteeing British interests (in 
particular defence and economic) in the island after independence, the Secretary of State for 
Colonial Affairs pointed out that even after granting Ceylon dominion status, Britain would 
be able to influence the actions of Ceylon’s governments through the British monarch’s 
governor-general for Ceylon and adapt British laws in the island by Order in Council:  
 
The provision of Clause 4 (1) inter alia enables His Majesty by Order in Council 
to make adaptations of Acts and other instruments in addition to those made by 
the Bill in order that all necessary modifications in Acts and other instruments not 
foreseen may be covered (HC Deb 21 November 1947).  
 
This was in addition to the prerogative that the British monarch held until 1971 to entertain 
appeals from Ceylon through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Although 
Ceylon’s Court of Criminal Appeal ruled in 1963 in the case of R v Hemapala that the Privy 
Council did not have the authority to function as the island-state’s highest court of appeal, the 
latter overturned this decision in the following year in the case of Ibralebbe v. R (1964) and 
asserted its powers. In the latter case, the Privy Council noted that although the British 
monarch only held nominal authority in the legislative and executive branches of Ceylon, it 
nevertheless continued to have the judicial prerogative to deal with judicial matters: 
 
                                                            
56 In May 1958, when Ceylon’s government of Prime Minister Bandaranaike took no action to control Sinhala 
mobs who unleashed violence against Tamil civilians, the governor‐general stepped in and declared a state of 
emergency and used the armed forces to restore order (see US Department of State, 1992: 395). 
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Their Lordships can now summarise what is, in their opinion, the effect of 
Ceylon’s attainment of independence and of the accompanying legislative 
provisions, so far as concerns the present right of Her Majesty to make Orders in 
Council affecting Ceylon. There is no power to legislate for Ceylon: to do so 
would be wholly inconsistent with the unqualified powers of legislation conceded 
by the 1946 Order. There is no power to participate in the government of Ceylon 
through the medium of Orders in Council, since the control and direction of the 
government of the territory are in the charge of the Cabinet of Ministers, 
responsible to the Parliament of Ceylon, and in the Governor-General according 
to his constitutional powers. But the structure of courts for dealing with legal 
matters and the system of appeals existing at the date of independence have not 
been affected by any of the instruments that conferred that status, and it follows 
that, inasmuch as an Order in Council made upon report of the Judicial Committee 
is the effective judgment to dispose of and implement the Committee’s decision of 
an appeal, the power to make such an Order remains unabated (Ibralebbe v R 
1964: 18). 
  
The British monarch’s judicial prerogative in Ceylon was only abolished after the enactment 
of Court of Appeal Act No.44 of 1971 by the island-state’s parliament (Marshall, 1973: 155).  
This occurred only after the Privy Council directed Ceylon’s Supreme Court in 1969 to 
consider the constitutional validity of the ‘The Sinhala Only Act’ (thirteen years after it was 
enacted) in response to a case brought by a Tamil civil servant who claimed that Ceylon’s 
government had violated the island-state’s constitution by enacting and implementing 
discriminatory laws (see Kodeeswaran v Attorney General 1969). This was the only case in 
which the British monarchy exercised its judicial prerogative in favour of the Tamils within 
the twenty-one years period in which the island state was created. With the exception of this 
instance, and the declaration of a state of emergency in 1958 by the governor-general, the 
British monarchy maintained silence over Ceylon’s actions towards the Tamils.   
As a consequence of the British monarchy’s silence, Ceylon’s Sinhala-Buddhist leaders 
were able to claim in public forums that they were upholding liberal values, while at the same 
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time waging an ethno-theocratic war against the Tamils. For example, in his vote of thanks to 
Queen Elizabeth II, during her visit to Ceylon in 1954 in her capacity as the island’s head of 
state, Jayewardene, then a cabinet minister in her government boasted: ‘A citizen of the 
Commonwealth walks through its wide domains without fear of tyranny or oppression, for his 
life, liberty and property are protected by Your Majesty’s writ which operates only with the 
sanction of independent courts of law’ (1974: 38). These claims were made by the cabinet 
minister of Ceylon while his government and the opposition were gearing towards enacting 
‘The Sinhala Only Act’ to prevent Tamils from gaining employment in the public sector and 
deporting the Indian Tamils, having already disenfranchised them and made them stateless. 
Jayewardene even claimed that by remaining as Ceylon’s Head of State, the British monarch 
was performing her ‘regal duty’ to the people of the island through her ‘elected 
representatives’ according to the principles of the Sinhala chronicle Mahavamsa (1974: 39). 
Therefore, although in practice the British monarchy’s role in Ceylon was ceremonial, 
in theory it did have the power to directly influence the actions of the island-state’s 
successive governments as well as exercise its prerogative in judicial matters. Yet it refrained 
from doing so. This was also the case with the British state. Despite being Ceylon’s former 
colonial master, the British state, like its monarch, turned a blind-eye to the plight of Tamils. 
The actions of other Western states were also no different in this regard. 
Why did Western states follow this policy of turning a blind-eye to the Tamils’ plight? 
A study of Ceylon’s post-colonial economic policies in the backdrop of the West’s Cold War 
policy of containment and development provide the key to understanding this. The Sinhala-
Buddhist dominated government to which Britain handed over power at independence was 
opposed to communism and adopted liberal economic policies. The first Prime Minister of 
Ceylon, D.S.Senanayake, claimed that ‘International Communism did not seek peace, but 
sought to bring trouble in other countries’ (cited in Jayewardene, 1974: 44). Senanayake even 
claimed that he was ‘in politics to protect Ceylon from Communism’ and ‘would be born 
over and over again to help in the fight against communism’ (Ibid.). During a speech in 1954, 
Ceylon’s then cabinet minister Jayewardene even claimed that if America ‘is laid low, 
Communism will sweep throughout the world’ (1974: 45). Ceylon government’s pro-market 
and pro-Western approach was so apparent that in 1954 when Marxists sought guarantees 
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that they would not be arrested for protesting against Queen Elizabeth II’s visit to Ceylon, the 
island state’s then Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala had reportedly threatened them that he 
had given instructions to his officers that Marxists who demonstrate against the Queen 
‘should be taken, not to police stations, but hospital’ (cited in de Silva and Wriggins, 1988: 
286-287). In the same year, during his address to the National Press Club in Washington, 
proclaiming himself as the ‘Hammer of the Hammer and Sickle’ in Ceylon, Kotelawala 
expressed his support for the West in its fight against communism in the following terms: ‘if 
there is anything I can do, whether in my own country or anywhere else, to stop the further 
advance of Communism, I shall certainly do it’ (1954/2005: 150). Kotelawala did not shy 
away from claiming that he was making this statement to impress upon the Americans 
Ceylon’s anti-communist stance: ‘I could have spoken to you on another theme, but I want to 
impress on everyone in America over and over again our attitude to Communism’ (Ibid.: 
152). Kotelawala’s efforts to impress upon the Americans his anti-communist stance was not 
in vain. Three months later, applauding Ceylon’s anti-communist policies, in a telegram to 
President Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, the then US Secretary of State noted thus: 
 
My visit to Ceylon is a very happy one with an atmosphere of great cordiality 
prevailing and evidence of strong sympathy for our international policies. I have 
conferred first with the Prime Minister, whom you may recall was in Washington, 
and then with Governor General, who is a former Finance Minister and a very 
astute man. They are 100 percent anti-commie and very apprehensive of Nehru’s 
policies. The Governor General in particular begs the US to stand firm and says 
that any weakening of our position in the Western Pacific would turn the whole 
Asian area over to Communism (1987: 267). 
 
As a former US ambassador to Sri Lanka notes, ‘U.S. engagement with Sri Lanka after 
independence was driven significantly by the Cold War and the worldwide struggle with the 
Soviet Union for influence’ (Lunstead, 2007: 12). The American government did not want 
Ceylon to adopt a ‘statist, closed economic system’ (Ibid.). It was for this reason that ‘the 
U.S. expended substantial resources in Sri Lanka during that period’ (Ibid.). In this regard, in 
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a policy statement circulated internally in 1951, the US Department of State noted: ‘We 
desire increased Ceylonese responsibility for the solution of its problems, and further 
development of economic and political institutions along democratic lines’ (1977: 2013).       
However, at the same time that Kotelawala’s government was espousing liberal 
economic policies and voicing strongly against communism, the opposition led by 
Bandaranaike began to flirt with statist economic policies. In 1956, after winning the general 
election, the new government of Bandaranaike, which also remained under the leadership of 
the British monarchy, began implementing semi-statist economic policies while at the same 
time maintaining the liberal economic system. As Newton Gunasinghe, a Sinhala economist, 
notes, these policies were implemented in order for the ‘upliftment of a fair section of 
middle-level Sinhala entrepreneurs to the position of captains of industry’ (2004: 100). 
Although the West felt uneasy about Ceylon’s flirtations with statist economic policies 
(Lunstead, 2007: 12), given the fact that the island-state continued to remain hostile to 
communism, Bandaranaike’s government was not considered an immediate threat to the post-
war global economic order. Yet, given his semi-statist policies, the West did fear that in the 
long-term Ceylon may come under the influence of communism. In this regard, in the 
National Intelligence Estimate of 1958, the US Intelligence Advisory Committee warned: 
 
Radical leftist and communist influence is likely to expand within the government 
and in the country at large because of Bandaranaike’s tendency to compromise, 
the declining standards of living, and increasing Sino-Soviet Bloc activities. 
However, it is unlikely that communists could win an election or form an effective 
government within the next few years. Over the longer run there is a danger that 
the general leftward tendency in Ceylon may lead to beyond its present neutralist 
policy to a position unfriendly to the West (US Department of State, 1992: 377-
378). 
 
It was in an attempt to ensure that Ceylon did not embrace communism that in the late 1950s 
the West continued its aid programmes to Bandaranaike’s government. In this regard, the US 
government noted in an internal circular in 1958 that if it ceased aid programmes to Ceylon, 
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‘the leftward trend of the government might be accelerated’ (US Department of State, 1992: 
391). In other words, for the West, maintaining friendly relations with Ceylon and continuing 
aid programmes was the most prudent way of disciplining the island-state in the direction of 
liberal economic policies. With the escalation of the Cold War, the last thing that Western 
liberal powers wanted was Ceylon becoming a Soviet satellite state, and thus emerging as an 
obstacle for global commerce in the sea-lanes and trades routes of South Asia. When left with 
the option of turning a blind-eye to Ceylon’s racist policies or allowing the island-state to 
become a Cuba57 in Asia by antagonising it for its action against the Tamils, Western states 
chose the former. The last straw that would break the camel’s back in the West’s relation 
with the government of Ceylon was not to be the latter’s racist policies towards the Tamils.    
Ceylon’s government that disenfranchised one million Tamils and began the process of 
their deportation in 1948 was the same government that stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the 
West in the latter’s fight against communism. In taking away the employment opportunities 
of the Indian Tamils and giving them to the Sinhalese, Ceylon’s government did not damage 
the island’s export trade that depended on the tea and rubber plantation sectors of the central 
hill country; the Sinhalese quickly filled these sectors dominated by the Indian Tamils during 
British colonial rule (de Silva and Wriggins, 1988: 213). The disenfranchisement and the 
deportation of Indian Tamils by Ceylon’s government was also seen by the West as a 
justifiable measure. In this regard, in its internal circular of 1951, the US Department of State 
noted that the Indian Tamils were not only a burden to Ceylon’s economy but also had 
communist leanings: ‘This large group... appears to be more loyal to India than to Ceylon, 
has demonstrated some sympathy toward communism and opposition to the Government, and 
represents a drain on Ceylon exchange through remittances to India’ (1977: 2017). 
Similarly, when the ‘Sinhala Only Act’ was enacted in 1956, both the ruling party and 
the opposition had reached a consensus that Sinhala should be the state’s official language. It 
was especially at this time that the ruling party began to adopt semi-statist policies, while the 
opposition continued to espouse free trade. There was therefore no reason for Western 
powers to push the opposition into an anti-market direction by opposing its language policy. 
                                                            
57 This comparison was made by Karunaratne when I interviewed him on 17 April 2012. 
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In addition, the Sinhalisation projects of the Tamil homeland undertaken by the state in 
the name of developing dry zones into agrarian lands had the funding of the West. It was in 
1956, the same year that pro-statist party of Bandaranaike came to power, that the USAID 
began its operations in Ceylon, which intensified in the 1970s and 1980s, spending on an 
average of $40 million every year on development projects. USAID’s involvement in Ceylon 
during the 1960s and 1970s, as a former US ambassador had admitted, was intended to curtail 
Soviet and Chinese communist influences in the island (Lunstead, 2007: 12 & 18).  
The period, commencing 1972 to 1977, when Ceylon’s government crushed the Sinhala 
Marxist insurgency, brought in legislation to curtail Tamils’ access to university education, 
and legalised and institutionalised its ethno-theocratic ideology was a delicate time in the 
West’s relationship with the island-state. After crushing the Sinhala Marxist rebellion, 
Ceylon’s government of that time turned towards socialist policies and adopted a closed 
economic system. It was at this period of time that the island-state became a republic.  
However, the socialist economic policies of this period were finally reversed in 1977 
with the return to power of the pro-market and pro-Western government of Jayewardene.  
Samuel Huntington, who describes Sri Lanka as a success story of democratisation in 
the 1950s and 1960s, refers to the five years when it adopted a closed economic system to be 
the time when it lost its democratic characteristics. For Huntington, as soon as Sri Lanka 
adopted socialism, it ceased to be a democracy (1991: 19). Despite defining democracy as a 
political system in which ‘its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through 
fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which 
virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote’ (Ibid.: 7), Huntington uses an additional 
economic criteria to define Sri Lanka’s political system during this five years period. This 
argument of Huntington brings us back to the claim of Foucault (2008: 121) that the ‘market 
economy’ remains the ‘the general index for defining all governmental action’ in liberal 
thought and that of Arblaster (1987: 78 & 85) that the will of the demos remains ‘subordinate 
to the nature and processes of capitalist economy’, that I have referred to in Chapter II. 
Western response to Ceylon’s conduct towards the Tamils during the Cold War can 
therefore stated in the following terms: if the security of global commerce was to be assured 
within the borders of Ceylon, Western states had to ensure that they did not antagonise the 
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Ceylon state, and thus had to turn a blind-eye to its actions. It did not matter whether Ceylon 
was waging a war against the liberalised indigenous Tamils or the Indian Tamils who had  
‘communist’ leanings. What mattered was that Ceylon had to be given a free-hand to fight the 
communist ‘bad’ human species who constituted a threat to the security of global commerce 
within the island’s borders. The refusal of the late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 
during her visit to Colombo on 12 April, 1985, to comment on the treatment of Tamils by the 
Sri Lankan government or the political demands of Tamils exemplifies this. While 
applauding the liberal economic policies of Jayewardene’s government, Thatcher announced 
that the ‘matter of the Tamils is a matter for the Sri Lankan Government’ and she would not 
make any comments in this regard (1985; 1985a). This policy of the West demonstrates that 
despite promoting, undertaking, and consolidating liberalisation programmes in the global 
South, the West is also prepared to allow liberalised populations to be killed when the 
security of global commerce is endangered by ‘dangerous’ elements within them. 
This Western policy will be examined further in Chapter VI focusing on the period 
from 1977 – when the free market economic system was reinstated in Sri Lanka – to the end 
of the Cold War. However, before moving on to that chapter, the next chapter will examine 
the liberal origins of Sri Lanka’s emergency laws and how its successive governments have 
used them to crush two Sinhala Marxist insurgencies and the Tamils’ armed struggle. In a 
marked departure from the remaining chapters, the next chapter will take a thematic approach 
rather than a chronological one and will do so by first returning to the colonial period. 
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Chapter V 
 “Anything is fair”: liberal emergency in Sri Lanka 
 
Since the beginning of the Sinhala Marxist uprising in 1971 and the thirty-seven year Tamil 
armed national liberation struggle that followed, the ‘liberal democratic state’ of Sri Lanka 
has almost continuously been governed through emergency laws: within the past forty-two 
years, militarisation, abductions, secret detentions and targeted killing of civilians, journalists 
and political activists have become the norm. Despite these brutal tactics, the Sri Lankan state 
has, notwithstanding frequent lukewarm criticisms, continuously been endorsed by Western 
states as a ‘liberal democracy’ (see US Department of State, 2009; Lunstead, 2011). On what 
basis did Western states endorse Sri Lanka as a liberal democracy when the latter’s brutal 
tactics have resulted in the subversion of human rights and civil liberties? 
Tracing the liberal origins of Sri Lanka’s emergency laws, I will argue that the island-
state had been able to obtain the endorsement of the West for its continued use of emergency 
laws by deploying the same arguments used by Britain in the nineteenth century and the first 
quarter of the twentieth century for its own use of martial law within the borders of the island.  
In the last chapter, I established empirically that law is a way of waging war by 
examining Ceylon’s use of law in its war against the Tamils. In this chapter, I expand on this 
argument further by examining the island-state’s emergency laws. To this end, I utilise some 
of the arguments advanced by Mark Neocleous in ‘The Problem with Normality: Taking 
Exception to “Permanent Emergency”’ (2006) and Critique of Security (2008). In his works, 
Neocleous has brought to light the presence of emergency as a permanent feature of liberal 
governmentality and applied it to a wider context that extends beyond the states of the West; 
this chapter focuses on the use of emergency powers in Sri Lanka for the past two hundred 
and ten years, both during British colonial rule and after the island became independent. 
In the first section, I build on the link that Neocleous (2008) established between John 
Locke’s prerogative and emergency powers and demonstrate the liberal origins of martial 
law. I then show how martial law was used by Britain in colonial Ceylon as part of liberal 
state-building and to overcome threats to commerce within the island’s borders. Thereafter, I 
establish the continuity of martial law in the island-state’s post-colonial emergency regime. 
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Finally, I show that concerns for the security of global commerce within the island’s borders 
was the key factor behind Western states’ endorsement of Sri Lanka’s brutal tactics, both 
during the Cold War and after, notwithstanding the liberal origins of its emergency laws.   
 
 
The liberal origins of martial law 
 
During the nineteenth century, Britain had recourse to martial law – which was ‘indulged’ 
through its common law system (Finlason, 1872: 5) – to deal with threats in its colonies. 
Even though martial law had almost disappeared ‘as a legal concept or practical institution’ in 
nineteenth century England and Britain had at its disposal a number of legislations to deal 
with emergency issues at home, it was nevertheless deployed during a number of occasions in 
its colonies (Rossiter, 1948: 136-137 & 141-142; Neocleous, 2008: 44). Although Britain did 
not always use martial law in its colonies to deal with threats to its commercial interests, 
since rebellions and riots had the potential to disrupt its colonial trade, arguably the use of 
martial law helped it to secure and sustain its commercial interests in the colonies. 
Sixty-three years before Locke wrote The Second Treatise of Government in 1690, The 
Petition of Right 1627 sought to prevent the Crown’s use of terror against its own citizens by 
limiting the application of martial law in England to the military and the state’s enemies (3 
Cha. 1, c. 1; also see Rossiter, 1948: 141; Neocleous, 2008: 42). However, martial law 
continued to be used in England until 1780, even though it never existed in a codified form 
and had sometimes been confused with law governing the military (Rossiter, 1948: 139-140; 
Neocleous, 2008: 42). According to Albert Venn Dicey, a leading British jurist and 
constitutional theorist of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, the 
term ‘martial law’ had two meanings. On the one hand, it meant ‘the suspension of ordinary 
law and the temporary government of a country or parts of it by military tribunals’ 
(1885/1982: 182). Understood in this sense, martial law ‘is unknown to the law of England’, 
Dicey claimed (Ibid.). On the other hand, martial law is ‘the power of the government or of 
loyal citizens to maintain public order, at whatever cost of blood or property may be 
necessary’ (Ibid.: 185). Understood in this sense, ‘martial law is assuredly part of the law of 
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England’, Dicey argued (Ibid.). Despite these distinctions made by Dicey, in relation to the 
use of martial law in Britain’s colonies in the nineteenth century, many eminent English legal 
authorities have understood it as the suspension of ordinary laws by the executive. In this 
regard, Sir David Dundas, UK’s Judge Advocate-General from 1849 to 1852, stated: 
 
It is unwritten law; it arises upon the necessity of the occasion to be judged of by 
the executive. It is unwritten law, it is not law properly so called. There are no 
rules laid down for martial law; it must be executed by those who have to execute 
it, firmly and faithfully, with as much humanity as the occasion will allow of 
according to their sense and conscience (1850, cited in Finlason, 1872: 12). 
 
Affirming Dundas’s definition of martial law, Thomas Emerson Headlam, his successor from 
1859 to 1866, noted that when martial law is proclaimed, ordinary law is suspended: 
 
The effect of a proclamation of martial law is notice to the inhabitants that the 
executive government has taken upon itself the responsibility of suspending the 
jurisdiction of all ordinary tribunals for the protection of all life, person, and 
property, has authorised the military authorities to do whatever they think 
expedient for the public safety (cited in Finlason, 1872: 15). 
 
However, the most clear-cut definition of martial law can be found in The Petition of Right 
1927 itself: ‘such sumary course and order as is agreeable to Martiall Lawe and as is used in 
Armies in tyme of warr’ (3 Cha. 1, c. 1). In his writings on martial law, William Blackstone, 
the leading English jurist of the eighteenth century, also defined martial law in similar terms:  
 
There is a great distinction, though often lost sight of, between military and 
martial law, the former affecting the troops or forces only, to which its terms 
expressly apply equally in peace and war, by previously defined regulations; the 
latter extending to all the inhabitants of the district where it is in force, being 
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wholly arbitrary, and emanating entirely from a state of intestine commotion or 
actual war (1765/1893: 414).  
 
On the basis of the definition of martial law found in The Petition of Right 1627 and 
Blackstone’s writings, William Francis Finlason, a legal writer of the nineteenth century, 
claimed that martial law was understood in the UK Parliament, Courts and among 
constitutional writers as ‘the discretionary exercise of military authority’ which was ‘always 
used and acknowledged in case of any rebellion which required it’ (1872: 3). Citing Lord 
Matthew Hale, Finlason (1872: 4) also claimed that martial law superseded the law and 
constitution of the state, since law and constitution were applicable only in times of peace. In 
this regard, although Blackstone (1893: 413) refused to acknowledge martial law as law, 
citing Hale he nevertheless acknowledged that it was indulged by law: ‘For martial law, which 
is built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is, as Sir Matthew 
Hale observes, in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as law’. 
On this basis, Finlason argued that even though martial law is not common law, because it is 
indulged by common law, it can be understood to be controlled by it (1872: 4 & 27). 
Locke’s writings on the prerogative of the prince are central to understanding the liberal 
origins of martial law (Neocleous, 2008: 7-8 & 14-22; also see Rossiter, 1948: 13 & 138; 
Hussain, 2003: 16). Although when Locke (1980: 84) wrote The Second Treatise of 
Government martial law was losing its significance in England and legislations with similar 
powers were later enacted to deal with emergencies – for example, the Riot Act of 1714 
(Rossiter, 1948: 137) – he nevertheless argued that in times of emergency, the government 
may act ‘without the prescription of the law’. Locke (1980: 84) called this the prerogative, 
which Neocleous (2008: 8) identifies as the foundation of modern liberal emergency powers. 
Locke claimed that the government may exercise the prerogative when the legislature needs 
more time to enact a law to deal with the emergency, or when then law is ‘silent’ on dealing 
with the emergency: the prerogative is ‘nothing but the people permitting their rulers to do 
several things, of their own free choice’ (1980: 86). In Locke’s view, the prerogative may be 
used even against existing law, provided that it is for the common good: ‘for prerogative is 
nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule’ (Ibid.: 86-87). In the interest of 
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‘public good and advantage’ the law should ‘give way to the executive power’ (Ibid.: 84); the 
executive (or the prince) may suspend ordinary laws in the interest of the public.  
Locke also refused to treat the prerogative as existing outside the law. The prerogative 
was, according to Locke, the ‘fundamental law of nature and government’, and ‘the executor 
of law, having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make use of 
it for the good of society’ (1980: 83-84). For Locke, since the prerogative is justifiable under 
the ‘common law of nature’, this provides its legal basis (Ibid.). Rousseau also argued that 
although law cannot always provide for all future events, as long as governmental action 
conforms to the spirit of the law, it would remain a good government: ‘the spirit of the law’ 
must ‘guide decisions in cases which it has been impossible to foresee’ (1999: 12-13).  
 
 
Martial law in colonial Ceylon 
 
The first recorded occasion when martial law was proclaimed in Ceylon was in 1803 
(Schrikker, 2007: 156). It was proclaimed in the coastal territories of the island as British 
troops moved simultaneously into the jungles of Vanni in the Tamil homeland to drive out 
the guerrilla army of the local Tamil prince, and into the Sinhala kingdom of Kandy to 
depose its Tamil ruler. On the one hand, the British military campaign in Vanni was intended 
to complete the expedition began by the Dutch in 1784 to conquer the region and increase 
agricultural revenues (Ibid.: 87). On the other hand, the assault on Kandy was intended to 
bring an end to the last resistance against British rule in the island. Although the British 
managed to defeat the Tamil prince of Vanni, it took them over twelve years to conquer 
Kandy. After a prolonged campaign, and with the help of the local Sinhala nobility, the 
British conquered Kandy in 1815 and deposed its Tamil ruler. Immediately after the conquest 
of the Kandyan kingdom, the British also signed a convention (the Kandyan Convention of 
1815) with the Sinhala nobility. Under the authority of the convention, martial law was 
proclaimed in the kingdom. Article 3 of the Convention justified the proclamation as 
necessary to exclude relatives of the Tamil king from entering or remaining within the 
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borders of the kingdom (1821: 500). More importantly, the convention, guaranteed by the 
proclamation of marital law, signalled the opening of the entire island for British commerce: 
 
His Excellency the Governor will adopt provisionally, and recommend to the 
confirmation of His Royal Highness The Prince Regent, in the name and on the 
behalf of His Majesty, such dispositions in favour of the trade of these Provinces, 
as may facilitate the export of their products, and improve the returns, whether in 
money, or in salt, clothes, or in other commodities useful and desirable to the 
Inhabitants of the Kandyan Country (1821: 502). 
 
As these declarations in 1803 and 1815 demonstrate, as well as using martial law to establish 
their rule in Ceylon, the British also used it to secure their commercial interests in the island. 
Although martial law was also proclaimed from time to time in the other parts of the island to 
deal with various ‘minor emergencies’, it was used extensively at least during three more 
further recorded occasions (in 1818, 1848 and 1915) to crush rebellions and riots. 
In 1818, many months after a Sinhala rebellion that began in Kandy the previous year, 
in which around 200 British soldiers were reportedly killed, martial law was proclaimed and 
remained in force for over a year. While British military officials complained at that time that 
martial law was not proclaimed ‘soon enough’ to crush the rebellion, senior colonial civilian 
officials commented that it was only after the proclamation of martial law that civil power 
was saved from the threat posed by the rebellion (Torrington, 1851: 10 & 14).  
Thirty years later, in 1848, martial law was once again used extensively in colonial 
Ceylon, following another rebellion in Kandy. During this occasion, martial law was imposed 
for some weeks, during which twenty-two individuals were summarily executed, in some 
cases without any evidence of involvement in the rebellion (Finlason, 1872: 11).  
Writing on the rebellion, some scholars have described it as a ‘mass resistance’  that 
reflected the sense of grievances that the Kandyan Sinhalese population had ‘nursed’ against 
‘the British administration’ (see, for example Kostal, 2000: 3-4). However, during a debate in 
the House of Commons a year after the rebellion, Sir W. Molesworth claimed that what had 
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actually taken place in Kandy in 1848 was not a rebellion but a riot. Molesworth argued that 
martial law was proclaimed in Kandy when everything had almost come to an end: 
 
A riotous rabble, acting without concert, entered two small towns, broke some 
doors and windows, and committed various acts of pillage. Two kings were 
proclaimed, both natives of the low country – an inferior class, whom the proud 
chiefs of the interior despise, their own kings being of pure Malabar descent. A 
few troops easily dispersed the mob, killing some scores and wounding some 
hundreds. The damage done to property was inconsiderable; the injury done to the 
persons of Europeans consisted in tying one agent to the railing of a verandah, and 
slightly wounding one soldier. All was nearly over before martial law could be 
proclaimed (HC Deb 20 February 1849). 
 
On the other hand, according to Lord Torrington, the Governor of Ceylon at that time, the 
rebellion ‘was a most serious and most dangerous one’ which ‘would have spread ruin and 
calamity throughout the colony’ and would have been costly had it not been suppressed by 
enforcing martial law (1851: 8). While acknowledging the ‘severe and stringent’ 
characteristics of martial law, Torrington justified its use in Ceylon on the grounds of 
protecting good citizens who abided by the law from the threats posed by ‘dangerous’ ones 
who refused to submit to law: ‘I must say, that martial law, while it is no doubt, a punishment 
to offenders, is equally a protection to the innocent and the well-disposed’ (Ibid.: 12). 
More importantly, Torrington argued that by enforcing martial law to crush the rebellion 
in Kandy, he had thwarted a serious threat to Britain’s commercial interests in the island: 
 
I maintain, my Lords, that if I had taken any other steps, the country would have 
been disorganised; or, at any rate, that a feeling of insecurity would have been 
engendered, and the flow of British capital into the colony would have been 
checked. ...I think that this House and the public at large, the English merchant, 
and the English planter, would have said that I was most unfit for the office I held 
if I had not looked with care and caution to this great amount of property; and if, 
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with these facts before me, I had failed to take all due precautions for its 
protection (1851: 12). 
 
Reinforcing Torrington’s economic rationale for enforcing martial law in the island, soon after 
the rebellion was crushed, Ceylon’s Chamber of Commerce commended his actions: 
 
[T]o express to his Excellency the hearty concurrence of the Chamber in the 
prompt measures adopted by the Government to suppress insurrection, with the 
assurance of the willing and active co-operation of the members in case of need; 
and to pray that his Excellency may adopt measures as may be best calculated to 
avert the impending ruin which threatens the colony (1848, cited in Torrington, 
1851: 13). 
 
Given the fact that Torrington was criticised in the UK Parliament for using excessive force to 
suppress the rebellion of 1848, it may well be that Ceylon’s Chamber of Commerce 
commended his actions upon his own request. However, the very fact that Torrington used the 
vocabulary of commerce to justify his actions and backed his arguments with a commendation 
letter from Ceylon’s Chamber of Commerce show that the use of force to secure Britain’s 
commercial interests in its colonies was understood to be acceptable by British politicians. In 
fact, despite the criticisms levelled against Torrington in the UK Parliament, the then British 
Prime Minister John Russell concluded that the former could not be censured for his actions 
(HC Deb 29 May 1851). Justifying this decision, Russell stated that ‘whenever an insurrection 
springs up’ in the colonies, it will always be ‘a long and bloody contest’ (Ibid.).  
Martial law was once again used extensively in colonial Ceylon sixty-seven years later 
in 1915, following the outbreak of ethnic riots between the Sinhalese and Muslims in Kandy – 
which later spread to other parts of the island. Since the riots took place in the backdrop of the 
First World War and the resurgence of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, they were perceived as a 
threat to the liberal state-order that was being built in the island, and thus treated as a 
rebellion. More importantly, as during previous occasions, the riots were perceived as having 
serious economic implications for Britain’s commercial interests within the island’s borders. 
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Although the riots erupted as a result of a dispute between the Sinhalese and the 
Muslims on a Buddhist procession passing a mosque, they also had strong economic 
dimensions. This was due to the fact that the majority of the Tamil-speaking Muslims who 
dominated the island’s export trade at that time were not permanently settled in the island but 
had South India as their permanent home (Ramanathan, 1916: 1-2). According to Edward 
W.Perera, a Sinhala counsel at that time, the ‘monopoly enjoyed’ by Muslims from South 
India in the island’s economy was one of the two indirect causes of the riots (1915: 5). 
As the riots spread to Colombo, the island’s capital city, not only Muslims were 
attacked, but their properties were either looted or destroyed by Sinhalese mobs. Fearing for 
their lives, a large number of Muslim traders and Tamil workers of South Indian descent 
began to flee the island. Recalling the economic implications of the riots, Sir Ponnambalam 
Ramanathan, a Tamil member of Ceylon’s Legislative Council at that time, noted: 
 
I was informed that it was difficult to buy provisions, and, if things continued in 
the present state for two or three days, the people in the city would have little to 
eat... I had already heard that rickshaw coolies and drivers of carriage horses, who 
are mostly Tamils, had already fled to India without giving notice to their masters, 
and both European and Ceylonese gentry could not go about for want of rickshaw 
men and drivers of horses; and as for the Hambayas and other Indian 
Muhammadans [Muslims], they were leaving Ceylon as fast as possible both by 
rail and ship. My workmen said that the Tamil traders and their assistants and 
clerks were also preparing to go (1916: 38-39). 
 
Subsequently, as the riots intensified, martial law was proclaimed in the western parts of the 
island and lasted nearly three months. According to the British Colonial Office, while the riots 
were racial in character, they were also due to ‘commercial animosity’ of the Sinhala-
Buddhists towards the Muslims (1915, cited in Perera, 1915: 17). Thus, Sir Robert Chalmers, 
Ceylon’s colonial governor at that time, noted that the proclamation of martial law was 
necessary to defend both ‘life’ and ‘property’ (1915, cited in Perera, 1915: 18). 
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The commercial rationale behind the use of martial law by British colonial rulers to 
crush the riots was further exemplified by the fact that many Sinhalese who lived in and 
around the affected areas – including those who did not take part in the riots – were compelled 
by military commissioners appointed by the colonial authorities, with the powers conferred to 
them under martial law, to pay damages to all affected Muslims. To guarantee the payment of 
damages to Muslims, Sinhalese community leaders were also coerced to sign debt-bonds. 
According to a notification issued by the Special Commissioner of the Southern Province: 
‘All Sinhalese living within the division of Police Headmen’ must ‘answer for all damages 
and loss done to the property’ of ‘the Moormen58 in the rioting’ (1915, cited in Perera, 1915: 
27). Those debt-bonds were subsequently legalised in the form of an ordinance enacted by 
Ceylon’s Legislative Council, in order to by-pass the safeguards which the Sinhalese would 
have enjoyed under civil law after martial law ceased to be in force (Ramanathan, 1916: 89). 
Although these actions drew displeasure from the Sinhalese, the swift provision of 
compensation, by-passing ordinary law, facilitated the return and resettlement of Muslim 
traders and thereby assured the security of commerce within the borders of Ceylon.  
The imposition of martial law in 1915 also saw a reign of terror. During the three 
months when martial law was in force, suspected rioters were summarily executed and civil 
liberties curtailed. Britain’s colonial governor at that time claimed that ‘it was necessary to 
display and to exert the force which was at Government’s command’ in order to prevent the 
island from sliding in to anarchy (Chalmers, 1915, cited in Ramanathan, 1916: 69). While the 
imposition of martial law ‘put to flight the rioters’ and ‘glorified the power of Government 
officials’, it also ‘terrorised both the wicked and the innocent’ (Ramanathan, 1916: 74).   
However, this was not the only occasion when martial law was used to terrify the 
population. During the rebellion of 1848, a Buddhist monk – who was one of the leaders of 
the rebellion – was shot dead in his robes and his body hung on a tree for four days (Taylor, 
2000: 165; also see HC Deb 20 February 1849). This was done in accordance with the 
sentence passed by the court-martial tribunal for the execution of the monk (Forbes, 1850: 21; 
also see HC Deb 20 February 1849). In Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues that 
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punishment is ‘a political tactic’ of government, and public execution should be understood as 
‘a political ritual’ through ‘which power is manifested’ (1991: 23 & 47). Thus, the logic 
behind the execution of the Sinhala monk in 1848 and the displaying of his body in public for 
four days was to deter others from rebelling in the future against the liberal state-order that 
was being built by the British Empire in Ceylon. This reign of terror had already been tried 
successfully in Europe for centuries: ‘sometimes the corpses of the executed persons were 
displayed for several days near the scenes of their crimes. Not only must people know, they 
must see with their own eyes. Because they must be made to be afraid’ (Foucault, 1991: 58). 
According to Jonathan Forbes, a British colonial military official, in order to crush the 
rebellion, the authorities had resorted to ‘rule by terror’ and ‘the reign of terror’ had produced 
a successful ‘submission’ from the Sinhalese people of Kandy (1850: 27 & 30). Justifying the 
reign of terror, Sir Alexander Cockburn, Britain’s Attorney-General at that time argued that 
individuals are not punished under martial law ‘simply for the offences they committed’ but 
‘in order to deter others from following their example’ (HC Deb 29 May 1851). 
A similar argument was also advanced during an inquiry into the use of martial law in 
Jamaica in 1866, wherein it was claimed that martial law was necessary to ‘strike terror into 
the disaffected population’ and protect ‘the white population’ from the ‘great danger of 
destruction’ (Finlason, 1872: 17). Justifying the large scale killing of Jamaica’s black 
population under the cover of martial law, Eyre, the British colonial governor claimed that 
when dealing with a rebellion guided by the ‘evil passions of a race little removed in many 
respects from absolute savages’, striking ‘terror’  was the only choice (1866, cited in Finlason 
1868: xxvii). Thus, for Serjeant Spankie, the British Advocate-General of Bengal, the 
objective of martial law is ‘self-preservation by terror’ (cited in Finlason, 1872: 8).  
Although sympathy among British politicians for the idea of reign of terror through 
martial law in the colonies began to wane in the twentieth century, and Winston Churchill, 
UK’s then Secretary of State for War, openly condemned the Amritsar massacre of 1919 in 
British India’s province of Punjab as a ‘monstrous event’ (HC Deb 08 July 1920), military 
officials, however, continued to have faith in martial law and the reign of terror it produced 
(Hussain, 2003: 100). Brigadier-General Dyer, who ordered the massacre using powers 
conferred by martial law, justified the killing of civilians to the Disorders Inquiry Committee 
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headed by Lord William Hunter in the following terms: ‘It was no longer a question of merely 
dispersing the crowd; but one of producing a sufficient moral effect from a military point of 
view not only on those present, but more especially throughout Punjab’ (Hunter, 1920: 188). 
When asked by the Committee whether in carrying out the massacre he actually intended to 
‘strike terror’ in Punjab, Dyer responded: ‘Call it what you like. I was going to punish them. 
My idea from the military point of view was to make a wide impression. ...throughout the 
Punjab. I wanted to... reduce their morale; the morale of the rebels’ (Hunter, 1920: 189-190).  
 
 
Continuity of martial law in contemporary Sri Lanka 
 
The use of martial law and the reign of terror it created during British colonial rule in Ceylon 
cannot simply be dismissed as some unfortunate events of the island’s colonial past. Martial 
law continues to haunt the island’s population in the form of modern emergency laws. If in 
the British Empire’s biopolitics of liberal state-building the Sinhalese who rebelled and rioted 
fell in the category of the ‘bad’ part of the human species, in Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic 
biopolitics, the Tamils, the LTTE, and the Marxist Sinhala youth fell into this category. In the 
biopolitics of liberal peace, because the LTTE and the Marxist Sinhala youth also belonged in 
this category the West refrained from censuring the Sri Lankan state, and thus tacitly allowed 
the state to use emergency laws against the Tamils and the Sinhala youth. On this basis, this 
inaction of the West can be characterised as one of collaboration with the Sri Lankan state.  
A year before transforming Ceylon into an independent, unitary, ‘liberal democratic’ 
state, Britain gifted it with a codified version of its martial law – the Public Security 
Ordinance (PSO) No. 25 of 1947 – initially empowering its colonial governor, and, following 
independence, the island-state’s prime minister as well as the governor-general who 
represented the British monarch in the island, to declare state of emergency at times of crisis. 
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) claims that the PSO was ‘enacted as the final 
law of the colonial era in an attempt to suppress and control political dissent’ (2009: ii). 
However, tacit Western endorsement for Sri Lanka’s emergency regime during the armed 
conflict and the preamble of the PSO itself, which sets out one of its key objectives to be ‘the 
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maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community’, indicates that it 
was enacted by Britain to ensure that the island-state’s future governments would be armed 
with legal provisions to encounter any threats to the security of commercial intercourse.  
As its colonial masters had expected, for over two decades following independence 
Ceylon largely used the emergency regime gifted by the British Empire to deal with threats to 
its market economy from trade unions and Marxists (Coomaraswamy & Reyes, 2004: 274). 
However, with the failed Marxist uprising of the Sinhalese in 1971, led by Janatha Vimukti 
Peramuna (JVP), rule by emergency became permanent; as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, under the cover of emergency, the state’s armed forces and police massacred at least 
10,000 Sinhala youths, and thousands more were held in detention without trial (Harris, 1990: 
214; Tambiah, 1986: 14). Even though the Marxist insurrection was crushed within few 
months, with the emergence of the Tamil armed resistance movement in the following year, 
rule by emergency continued for six years until 1977, when the island-state’s new 
government reinstated liberal economic policies. In 1978, the PSO was embedded into Sri 
Lanka’s second republican constitution, allowing its presidents to ‘enact draconian 
emergency regulations’ (ICJ, 2009: ii). In 1979, as the armed conflict with the Tamil rebels 
escalated, the state brought back its emergency regime in the name of terrorism laws – the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) No. 48 of 1979. Its use was said 
to be justified by the need to defend the island from a Tamil ‘Marxist terrorist’ threat 
(Jayewardene, 1985). Thus, a close examination of Sri Lanka’s emergency regime for the past 
forty years reveals that where the PSO stops, the PTA would take its place, and vice versa. It 
is therefore not an exaggeration to say that the ‘liberal democratic’ state of Sri Lanka has for 
the past forty-two years governed its population through a codified version of martial law. 
During the past four decades, although Sri Lanka has had numerous emergency 
regulations in force, two of them – the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) 
Regulations (ER 2005) No. 1 of 2005, and the Emergency (Prevention and Prohibition of 
Terrorism and Specified Terrorist Activities) Regulations (ER 2006)  No. 7 of 2006 – had 
played a dominant role in the final years of the armed conflict in ensuring the victory of 
state’s armed forces over the Tamil national liberation movement by suppressing dissent. 
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Section 2 (1) of the PSO empowers the head of executive to enact emergency 
regulations or adopt measures ‘in the interests of public security and the preservation of 
public order or for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community’. Adopting the same wordings, Section 2 (1) of the Emergency Regulations 2005 
defines essential services as ‘any service which is of public utility or essential for national 
security or preservation of public order or to the life of the community’. Similarly, the 
preamble to the Emergency Regulations 2006 justifies its enactment as in the interest ‘of 
public security, public order, and the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life 
of the community’. The wordings of the above laws in terms of maintaining essential supplies 
and services to the community are not unique to Sri Lanka’s case since they are also found in 
the Emergency Powers Act 1920, enacted to deal with emergency issues in the UK: 
 
If at any time it appears to His Majesty that any action has been taken or is 
immediately threatened by any persons or body of persons of such a nature and on 
so extensive a scale as to be calculated, by interfering with the supply and 
distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, or with the means of locomotion, to 
deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community, of the 
essentials of life, His Majesty may, by proclamation (hereinafter referred to as a 
proclamation of emergency), declare that a state of emergency exists. ...[I]t shall 
be lawful for his Majesty in Council, by order, to make regulations for securing 
the essentials of life to the community (10 & 11 Geo 5, c.55). 
 
This reflects the reframing of the ‘political effectiveness of sovereignty’ in liberal states since 
the middle of the eighteenth century in terms of ‘an intensity of circulations: circulation of 
ideas, of wills, and of orders, and also commercial circulation’ (Foucault, 2007: 15). Thus, 
the emphasis on maintaining essential supplies and services found in Britain’s Emergency 
Powers Act 1920 and Ceylon’s PSO should be understood in terms of commercial circulation.  
The PTA justifies its enactment on the grounds that ‘other democratic countries have 
enacted special legislation to deal with acts of terrorism’. The Act itself empowers the Sri 
Lankan government, its armed forces and police with sweeping powers to arrest, detain and 
  179   
punish suspects at will, including the use of torture to obtain confessions. It was inspired by 
the ‘apartheid South Africa and Britain’s counter-terrorism legislation of the same name’ 
(Welikala, 2008: 189). Outlining its draconian characteristics, Asanga Welikala notes: 
 
It flies in the face of almost every human rights norm pertaining to the liberty of 
the person, including most prominently, detention without charge for extended 
periods of time at irregular places of detention, the broad denial of detainees’ 
rights, admissibility of confessions in judicial proceedings subject only to the 
most tenuous of safeguards, the shifting of the evidential burden of proof to the 
defendant, and disproportionate penalties. The unchecked detention powers, 
special trial procedures and absence of meaningful review in the PTA facilitate 
arbitrary and capricious official conduct, including torture (2008: 189-190).  
 
For Welikala, ‘the PTA represents an aberration of the rule of law’ of the ‘liberal democratic’ 
state of Sri Lanka (2008: 190). Similar arguments of ‘illegality’ and ‘illiberality’ are also to be 
found in critiques of the post-9/11 counter-terrorism practices of Western states (see, for 
example Agamben, 2005: 1, 4 & 8; Neal, 2008: 64; 2010: 7). In ‘Goodbye War on Terror?’ 
Andrew W. Neal argues that the normalisation of exception in the West is based on the 
Schmittian reading that ‘exceptions will arise because of the structural limits of liberal 
democracy, and the structural limits of liberal democracy will produce exceptions and 
practices of exceptionalism’ (2008: 45-46). For Neal, by invoking exception, liberal states not 
only act ‘illiberally’ but also leave their ‘liberal legitimacy’ to be questioned (2008: 64).  
Challenging these ‘illiberality’ critiques which situate emergency in ‘a space without 
law’, Neocleous argues that emergency does not exist outside the law of liberal states. 
Instead, ‘the legitimisation and constitutionalisation of emergency powers’ is ‘liberalism’s 
gift to the modern state’ (Neocleous, 2008: 41 & 58). The idea ‘that liberty and security are 
antonyms’ and the need to ‘find a balance “between” them’ is not only ‘desperately 
misplaced’, but the ‘the liberal project of “liberty” is in fact a project of security’ (Neocleous, 
2008: 12 & 13). Excavating the hidden aspects in the works of liberal thinkers such as Locke, 
Montesquieu, Smith and Bentham, Neocleous points out that liberal thinkers have always 
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placed security before liberty (2008: 14 & 24-25). In Western liberal democracies, ‘violent 
actions’ of the state which manifest through emergency powers ‘have been legitimated 
through law on the grounds of necessity and in the name of security’: while the UK has 
legalised emergency, the US had been in a state of emergency during most years of the 
twentieth century and remains so in the twenty-first century (Neocleous, 2008: 61-62 & 71).  
Similarly, Claudia Aradau argues that the so called post-9/11 exceptional practices of 
Western states are ‘not constitutive outside of law’ (2007: 491). Those practices not only 
signify the ongoing ‘transformation of the function of law’; they are also ‘governed through 
detailed rules and norms’ (Ibid.). Taking the case of Guantanamo, Aradau notes that law has 
not been suspended there, but rather its function have been changed (Ibid.). Before it became 
a facility for detaining ‘suspected terrorists’, Guantanamo functioned as camp for detaining 
Haitian refugees, many of whom were ‘held for up to three years in makeshift barbed wire 
camps, exposed to heat and rain in spaces infested with rats and scorpions, with inadequate 
water supplies and sanitary facilities’: from ‘asylum seekers to suspected terrorists we are in 
the continuity of the exceptional practices of modernity’ (Ibid.: 494). 
Notwithstanding these, even Carl Schmitt, who claimed emergency to be ‘the actual 
mark of sovereignty’, argued that despite remaining above ordinary law, emergency is 
‘accessible to jurisprudence’ since it remains ‘within the framework of the juristic’ (1988: 9 & 
12-13). For Schmitt, even when emergency ‘defies’ ordinary law, it also ‘simultaneously 
reveals a specifically juristic element’ (Ibid.: 12); it does not exist in a lawless space. 
Within this context, the argument of Welikala that the PTA contravenes the principles of 
the rule of law and liberal democratic values is a misplaced one since the legislation itself 
was enacted, as Welikala (2008: 189) acknowledges, by Sri Lanka’s democratically elected 
Parliament with ‘two-thirds majority’ and ‘in terms of Article 84’ of the state’s constitution, 
which is consistent with the whole history of liberalism. The draconian nature of the PTA 
should therefore be understood as reflecting the governmental practices of all liberal states 
when dealing with ‘emergencies’. As the post-9/11 practices of the US and other Western 
states demonstrate, Sri Lanka is not the only state that claims to be a liberal democracy while 
violating the rights of individuals. The opening of Guantanamo detention facility by the US, 
the practices of extraordinary rendition, torture of terror suspects in custody, and other human 
  181   
rights abuses committed by Western forces in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly indicate that, 
under the guise of ‘emergency’, terror continues to remain a tactic of government in many 
liberal democracies. In this respect Sri Lanka is not an exception. 
Although the title of the PTA states that it consists of ‘temporary provisions’, in 
practice it has remained in force over the past three decades without being repealed or 
suspended; in 1982, four years after it was enacted, it was amended to become a permanent 
measure, thereby becoming part of Sri Lanka’s ordinary laws. In the following year, while the 
PTA was in force, a number of emergency regulations were enacted under the PSO and lasted 
until the end of 2001, with the exception of their suspension for five months in 1989.  
However, Sri Lanka is not the only ‘liberal democracy’ where emergency laws have 
become the norm. As pointed out by Neocleous (2008: 61-62), a similar trajectory could also 
be seen in the way that Britain’s Special Powers Act 1922, the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1973 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 – all of which were initially 
classified as temporary measures – gradually became normalised as ordinary laws.  
During the 1980s, in addition to deploying emergency laws against the Tamils, the Sri 
Lankan state also turned its full force on another Marxist insurgency of the Sinhala youth. In 
the three year period commencing 1987 to 1989, under the cover of emergency regulations 
and the PTA, the state’s armed forces and police massacred over 100,000 Sinhala youth. On 
18 August 1989, justifying his government’s use of emergency laws, in a letter to the UN 
Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, Sri Lanka’s envoy to the UN in New York argued 
that rule by emergency was necessary to defend the island’s economy because Marxist 
(Sinhala) insurgents were ‘making every effort to disrupt government activities and to 
damage the economy of the country’ (Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the UN, 1989). 
In 2002, when the Norwegian-sponsored Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was signed with 
the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government agreed under article 2.12 of the CFA not to conduct 
‘search operations and arrests’ under the PTA (Balasingham, 2004: 496). Despite this 
undertaking, while the CFA was in force, in August 2005 the Sri Lankan state enacted 
Emergency Regulations 2005 under the PSO – following the assassination of its foreign 
minister. In the following year, this was consolidated with Emergency Regulations 2006 and a 
number of other emergency regulations. During both occasions, recourse to emergency laws 
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were justified primarily on the grounds of defending the island’s economy – in defence of the 
‘life of community’ (see Emergency Regulations 2005; Emergency Regulations 2006. With 
the abrogation of the CFA in January 2008, the Sri Lankan government was able to 
simultaneously enforce the PTA and emergency regulations and the PSO. 
With the wide range of powers conferred by its legally sanctioned emergency regime, 
from January 2008 Sri Lanka accelerated its war against the Tamils and within a period of 
over a year emerged triumphant, restoring its writ over the entire island. This one year period 
saw large scale killings – both inside and outside the conflict zones – abductions, arrests, and 
mass detention of Tamil civilians and surrendered Tamil fighters. While the targeted killing of 
thousands of innocent Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan armed forces took place in the 
conflict zones, outside them government forces were engaged – both through covert and overt 
means – in abductions and enforced disappearances of civilians (UN, 2011: ii). 
A number of killings, abductions and enforced disappearance were also carried out by 
Tamil paramilitary groups allied to the government and the state’s military intelligence units. 
According to a US embassy cable released by Wikileaks, a former US ambassador noted that 
the government found Tamil paramilitaries useful in its war against the Tamil rebels: 
 
Paramilitary groups in the North and East help the GSL [Government of Sri 
Lanka] fight the LTTE... These groups also enhance security in Colombo by 
kidnapping and killing those suspected of working with the LTTE. Frequent 
abductions by paramilitaries keep critics of the GSL fearful and quiet. 
...xxxxxxxxxxxx told us that some military commanders in Jaffna xxxxxxxxxxxx 
want to clamp down on paramilitaries but have orders from Defence Secretary 
Gothabaya Rajapaksa to not interfere with the paramilitaries on the grounds that 
they are doing “work” that the military cannot do because of international scrutiny 
(Blake, 2007). 
 
Justifying the killings, abductions, and enforced disappearances of Tamil civilians and 
suspected LTTE cadres, Sri Lanka’s Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa argued that what 
his forces were doing were analogous to the covert counter-terrorist operations of the US: 
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All the militaries do covert operations. When the US does operations they say 
covert operations. When something is in Sri Lanka they call abductions. This is 
playing with the words. What I am saying is, if there is a terrorist group, why 
can’t you do anything? It’s not against a community... I’m talking about terrorists. 
Anything is fair (2007). 
 
Tacitly endorsing Sri Lanka’s brutal tactics during the final phase of the armed conflict, 
Robert O. Blake, the then US Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the current Assistant Secretary of 
State for South and Central Asia, noted that it was ‘understandable’ that the Sri Lankan 
government wanted ‘to use every possible means in its war against LTTE terror’ (2007).  
With the conclusion of the armed conflict in May 2009, the Sri Lankan government 
detained approximately 290,000 Tamils, including 11,696 surrendered LTTE fighters (UN, 
2011: 37-46). While the Sri Lankan government carried out its mass internment of Tamils 
under the PTA and PSO, the camps were funded by the UN and other Western states – in line 
with the pledges made during the final months of the armed conflict; before the conflict 
reached its catastrophic conclusion, Western states persistently demanded the Tamil rebels to 
let Tamil civilians to flee into those internment camps (see Tamilnet, 2009). In the subsequent 
months after the conclusion of the armed conflict, according to The Times, while about 1,400 
Tamils died on a weekly basis in Sri Lanka’s Western-funded internment camps (Blakely, 
2009), The Guardian reported that a large number of Tamil women were sexually abused in 
the camps by the state’s armed forces (Chamberlin, 2009).  
The striking aspect of Sri Lanka’s Western-funded internment camps was the so-called 
rehabilitation of surrendered Tamil combatants. As the ICJ has pointed out, the rehabilitation 
process under the emergency regime involved the ‘deprivation of liberty of the ‘rehabilitee’, 
the ‘denial of the right to challenge the detention and rehabilitation’, and ‘detention without 
charge or trial’ for two years (2010: 14). According to a former Tamil combatant who was 
released from custody, the rehabilitees were disciplined, on a daily basis, to give-up their 
quest for an independent Tamil state and display loyalty to the unitary Sri Lankan state: 
 
  184   
A day in the camp starts by singing national anthem in Sinhalese – the language 
of Sinhala ethnic majority. There’s a boy who had to kneel down under the 
scorching sun all day because he didn’t sing it properly. There’s another boy who 
got kicked because he coughed while the anthem played (Jeya, 2010, cited in 
Kyung, 2010). 
 
This replicates, to a large extent, the practices of Western penal regimes in which prisoners 
were disciplined to become ‘good’ members of the society (Foucault, 1991: 6). Therefore, 
from a biopolitical perspective, Western funding for Sri Lanka’s internment camps (both for 
Tamil civilians and the former Tamil Tiger combatants) can be summarised in the following 
terms: before Tamil civilians from the conflict zones could return to the Sri Lankan society, 
the state had to be allowed to weed-out the ‘extremist’ elements (the former combatants) 
within them; and before the ‘extremists’ can re-qualified as good members of Sri Lankan 
society, they need to be disciplined by the state to accept its sovereignty so that upon their 
release from the camps they do not re-group and launch another secessionist armed struggle 
that would pose a threat to the security of global commerce within the island’s borders. 
Four years after the end of the armed conflict, the ‘liberal democratic’ state of Sri Lanka 
continues to be governed by emergency laws. Tamils living in their homeland and other parts 
of the island are spied upon by the state’s armed forces and police. For Sri Lanka’s Defence 
Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, this is nothing to be concerned about since it is a norm in 
many Western countries. In BBC’s Hardtalk in 2010, commenting on the surveillance of 
Tamils, he questioned the presenter: ‘Can you move from a hotel to hotel in London without 
[being] observed by your security people? We don’t have that technical ability’ (2010).  
 
 
The commercial dynamics of Western endorsement 
 
Can we attribute Western endorsement of Sri Lanka’s continued use of emergency laws 
during the armed conflict to their liberal origins? There can be no doubt, as the statements of 
Sri Lanka’s Defence Secretary cited in the previous section exemplify, that the state 
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understood its recourse to emergency laws as in accordance with Western liberal democratic 
principles: it was not only using emergency laws gifted by Britain at the end of colonial rule, 
but following suit the actions of Western states. As pointed out in the opening paragraph of 
this chapter and the previous section, Western diplomats, in particular two former US 
ambassadors to Sri Lanka, have also noted Sri Lanka’s methods of dealing with ‘terrorism’ as 
acceptable measures of a ‘liberal democracy’ (Blake, 2007; Lunstead, 2011: 71). Even 
Western human rights groups which frequently condemned Sri Lanka’s brutal tactics 
recognised its ‘right’ to use emergency laws in its war against the Tamil armed resistance 
movement. In a report published two months before the end of the armed conflict, the ICJ 
noted that the Sri Lanka had not only the ‘right and duty’ to ‘respond to security threats to the 
nation’, but under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights the power ‘in 
times of genuine emergency to limit or suspend certain rights’ (2009: i). 
Notwithstanding this, the key argument that the Sri Lankan state invoked to obtain the 
endorsement of Western liberal powers for its continued use of emergency laws was 
commercial circulation. As the preambles of the PSO, ER 2005 and ER 2006 cited in the 
previous section exemplify, Sri Lanka used the vocabulary of commerce to justify its 
emergency laws. These mirrored the economic justifications advanced by Britain’s colonial 
governors in the island to proclaim martial law during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Can we then say that in tacitly endorsing Sri Lanka’s continued use of emergency laws 
since 1971, Western states turned a blind-eye to its brutal tactics, as they had done before the 
emergence of the Tamil armed resistance movement? Evidence suggests that the actions of 
Western states’ in this regard were largely collaboratory in character.  
In 1972, despite adopting a closed economic system, the then government of Sri Lanka 
remained hostile to Marxist ideas and communism in general. This was evident by the way 
the government directed its armed forces and the police to crush the Sinhala Marxist uprising 
of 1971 and hunted down suspected Marxist insurgents under the cover of its emergency 
laws. Thus, although Western powers were anxious about Sri Lanka’s decision to adopt a 
closed economic system (Lunstead, 2007: 12), the fact that the state took the lead in crushing 
the Marxist insurgency would certainly have brought them relief and alleviated their fears of 
the island becoming a satellite state of the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding this, since the 
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state’s electoral system continued to remain intact, Western states would have hoped that the 
Sri Lankan government’s economic policies would be reversed in the next election. 
As Western states had expected, a change in Sri Lanka’s government took place in 
1977, and the new pro-Western and pro-market government, led by J.R.Jayewardene, 
reinstated the free market economic system. These economic reforms were in line with the 
liberal principle of minimal governmental intervention in the functions of the market: 
 
[W]ith the introduction of the open economic policy, most of the elements of the 
regulative mechanisms were dismantled. The system of quotas, permits, and 
licences was abolished. The import-export trade was liberalised. The public sector 
monopoly in the distribution of some commodities was abolished; some 
enterprises were denationalised, but more importantly, the management of some 
public sector enterprises were handed over to the private sector. Foreign private 
capital was allocated a major role in bringing about export-led growth. Banking in 
the private and foreign sectors was encouraged, and limits to their expansion were 
removed. A number of “sacred cows” in the meanwhile were slaughtered. The 
subsidised rice ration that the people had been used to since the days of the 
Second World War was discontinued; the free health scheme was subverted, with 
doctors in government hospitals being granted the right to engage in private 
sector. The free education scheme was affected by teachers in the government 
schools being permitted to give private tuition (Gunasinghe, 2004: 101).   
 
As Gunasinghe notes, in reinstating the free market economic system, the objective ‘was not 
merely to remove the bottlenecks of the state-regulated economy but to ensure the 
uncontrolled free-play of market forces in all areas’ (2004: 101). Given the fact that these 
economic reforms were in line with the biopolitics of liberal peace, would Western states 
have had anything to loose from the new regime of President Jayewardene? 
It was at this period of time that the armed conflict began to escalate and the state had 
more and more recourse to emergency laws in its fight against the Tamil armed resistance 
movement. At this moment of opportunity afforded by Sri Lanka’s economic reforms, 
  187   
Western states had no reason to endanger the security of commerce within the island’s border 
by antagonising it for seeking recourse to emergency laws. As the former US Ambassador 
Jeffrey Lunstead (2007: 12) notes, America’s involvement in Sri Lanka ‘grew after the 
election of J.R.Jayewardene in 1977, as Jayewardene took a more free-market and pro-
Western stance’. Close ties between Sri Lanka and the US were further strengthened when 
Jayewardene visited Washington in 1984 and met Ronald Reagan at the White House (Ibid.). 
As Sri Lanka’s successive governments also followed these liberal economic policies, their 
relationship with America continued until the defeat of the Tamil Tigers.  
Thus, while providing lukewarm criticisms of Sri Lanka’s brutal tactics against the 
Tamils through its recourse to emergency laws, Western states continued to tacitly endorse 
and collaborate in its actions by providing diplomatic, military and financial support for the 
island-state in its four decades war against the Tamil armed resistance movement. Even at the 
peak of armed conflict, in the 2008 Human Rights Report, published on 25 February, 2009, 
while noting the human rights abuses committed by the Sri Lankan state, the US Department 
of State endorsed it as ‘a constitutional, multiparty republic’ (2009).  
This can be attributed to the perception among Western states that the Tamil armed 
resistance movement posed a threat to free trade in the island and South Asia. During the 
1970s and 1980s, most Tamil militant organisations espoused Marxism, with the Tamil 
Tigers being no exception. While other militant organisations largely understood the armed 
struggle as part of the global revolution of the proletariat, the Tamil Tigers ‘adopted 
categories and concepts of the Marxist/Leninist thought system to legitimise the armed 
struggle as a political struggle for self-determination’ (Balasingham, 2001: 45). Therefore, 
during the Cold War it was seen to be in the interests of the West to support the pro-market 
government of Jayewardene than the Tamil armed resistance movement. Although ‘with the 
collapse of the communist system’ in 1989 the Tamil armed resistance movement ‘abandoned 
Marxist thought and adopted social equalitarianism’ as its ideology (Balasingham, 2001: 45), 
the West continued to harbour fears on its economic ideology. This was due to the LTTE’s 
dependence on a system of high taxation in the territories it controlled and its monopoly in 
various areas of trade. Thus, even after engaging with the LTTE through Norwegian-
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facilitated peace negotiations from 2001 onwards, the US government raised concerns during 
a number of occasions on their economic policies, as we will see in Chapters VII-VIII. 
This was coupled with a number of high-profile attacks carried out by the Tamil Tigers 
on economic targets in the island. Although the Tamil rebels did not directly target Western 
commercial interests either within or outside the island, a number of attacks they carried out 
on Sri Lanka’s economic targets nevertheless did have an impact on Western investors. One 
such incident was the attack in 1996 on the World Trade Centre in Colombo in which the 
office of an American company was damaged, along with the offices of over one hundred 
local banking and financial institutions, prompting US officials to convey their displeasure 
directly to the Tamil Tigers’ leadership.59 In 1997, the Tamil rebels also attacked a Chinese 
ship manned by the Sri Lankan navy carrying a consignment purchased by an American 
company, prompting a Western diplomat to comment to a Colombo weekly that ‘joint 
retaliatory measures’ would be considered if threats to their ‘commercial interests persisted’ 
(cited in Athas, 1997). Thus, as the former US Ambassador Lunstead notes, despite the LTTE 
not targeting ‘US nationals or other US interests’, America nevertheless considered the 
organisation to be a threat to ‘peace and security in South Asia’ (2007: 14-15; 2011: 62).  
This is not to say that America or other Western countries have substantial commercial 
interests in Sri Lanka. As Lunstead notes, America has limited economic interests in the 
island: US trade with Sri Lanka is not only ‘relatively insignificant’ and that the island is ‘not 
a major market for US goods’, but direct investment by American companies in the island are 
‘also quite small’ (2007: 11). This is also the case with UK. Even though the UK is, after 
India, Sri Lanka’s second largest trading-partner, compared to other parts of the world there 
are only over one hundred British companies operating in the island (see Burt, 2013). Within 
this context, how is it justifiable to invoke commerce centred arguments to explain the 
dynamics of Western endorsement for Sri Lanka’s continued recourse to emergency laws?  
Firstly, neither America nor Britain intervened directly in Sri Lanka during the armed 
conflict precisely because their trade interests were insignificant compared to other parts of 
                                                            
59 This was stated by the former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia during an interview with me in 
2010.  
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the world in which they had carried out direct military interventions. It was due to this reason 
that they, as well as their Western allies, gave Sri Lanka the free-hand to use emergency laws 
to crush the Tamils’ armed struggle, subverting human rights and civil liberties. 
Secondly, despite not having significant trade interests in the island during the armed 
conflict and after its conclusion, both America and Britain have continuously sought to 
increase investment opportunities in the island for their entrepreneurs. As Ashley Wills, 
another former US ambassador, noted, America remains ‘South Asia’s and Sri Lanka’s 
biggest export market’ and therefore would like to see an increase in investment opportunities 
in the island for its entrepreneurs (2001). The current US Assistant Secretary of State Robert 
O. Blake (who was formerly an ambassador to Sri Lanka) has also reiterated this (2011a). In 
this regard, the current British Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt has also stated that 
Britain would like to see Sri Lanka becoming ‘a more attractive market for investors’ (2013). 
Thirdly, given the island’s key position in the sea-lanes and trade routes of South Asia, 
the West believes that Sri Lanka should remain free from manipulation by non-liberal forces 
and internal conflict. A report commissioned by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
United States Senate in December 2009, seven months after the conclusion of the armed 
conflict, has argued that given the island’s location ‘at the nexus of crucial maritime trading 
routes in the Indian Ocean’ the ‘United States cannot afford to “lose” Sri Lanka’ (2009: 3). 
This was also reinforced by the US Assistant Secretary of State Blake who stated: ‘Positioned 
directly on the shipping routes that carry petroleum products and other trade from the Gulf to 
East Asia, Sri Lanka remains of strategic interest to the U.S.’ (2011). In this regard, during 
the armed conflict, Dominic Chilcott, the then British High Commissioner for Colombo, also 
made a similar statement, although he did not directly refer to the position of the island in the 
sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. According to Chilcott: ‘The conflict also directly affects 
British interests by complicating the patterns of trade and investment between our two 
countries and by the threat it poses to British travellers and residents in Sri Lanka’ (2007). 
What conclusions can we then draw from examining Sri Lanka’s emergency laws and 
Western endorsement for their use for over forty-two years? Firstly, Sri Lanka’s emergency 
laws have strong roots in liberal principles. Secondly, underpinned by concerns for the 
security of global commerce, Western states have collaborated with Sri Lanka’s brutal tactics 
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by tacitly endorsing them, thereby allowing their ‘universal’ commitment for liberty, the rule 
of law, democracy, press freedom, and human rights to be subverted in the island.  
The next chapter will develop this argument by examining the commercial dynamics of 
military and political support provided by Western states for Sri Lanka’s war against the 
Tamil armed resistance movement during the Cold War. It will examine how Western 
involvement sparked anger in New Delhi and drew India into the armed conflict, thereby 
turning the island into a battleground of a proxy war between the West and India.   
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Chapter VI 
Fighting the ‘Indira Doctrine’ 
 
The closing years of the 1960s could be characterised as the period when free trade in India 
and Sri Lanka began to be gradually eclipsed by socialism. Although at independence India 
had adopted a mixed economic system and few years later Sri Lanka also began to flirt with 
statist economic policies, it was during the late 1960s that both states began to move in the 
direction of socialism. In 1972, the Sri Lankan government of Srimavo Bandaranaike adopted 
socialism, and thus threatened global commerce within the island’s borders. However, as 
pointed out in Chapters IV and V, in 1977 the new Sri Lankan government of President 
Jayewardene removed this threat within the island by reinstating liberal economic policies. 
Thus, as the armed conflict escalated, in addition to endorsing the island-state’s 
recourse to emergency laws, Western states also began to provide military support to the Sri 
Lankan state in its war against the Tamil armed resistance movement. This irked India, which 
was already agitated with the decision of the US to provide its arch rival Pakistan, in the 
aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, with modern military equipment, 
especially F-16 fighter jets (Jayapalan, 2001: 360). This was also further exacerbated by 
Jayewardene’s frequent anti-Indian statements in international forums that while Sri Lanka 
and the West had mutual ‘financial and trade interests’, India had ‘no rights, or privileges’ to 
interfere in his country’s internal affairs (1974: 42 & 46).  
Western military ties with Sri Lanka were certainly not new because, as pointed out in 
Chapter IV, for seven years after the island-state was created its army and navy were headed 
by British commanders. Most of the ships and patrol vessels of Ceylon’s Royal Navy were 
also provided by the British navy. In 1953, Ceylon’s Royal Navy participated in Queen 
Elizabeth II’s Fleet Review at Portsmouth using a ship lent by the British Royal Navy (see Sri 
Lanka Navy, 2013). Moreover, until 1956 the British Royal Air Force maintained its bases in 
Ceylon (Moorcraft, 2012: 61). During the Korean war and the conflicts in Vietnam, Ceylon 
also permitted ‘ships and aircrafts carrying troops of the Western powers to refuel’ at its ports 
‘on their way to the battlefronts’ (Jayewardene, 1974: 41). This being the case, Western 
military support for Sri Lanka from 1977 onwards was, nevertheless considered by India to 
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be a threat to its ‘national security’ (Dixit, 1998). Firstly, from 1966 onwards, India defined 
its foreign policy within the framework of the ‘Indira Doctrine’ which was intolerant to 
outside influences in South Asia (see the Introduction). Secondly, already angered by US 
military support for Pakistan and its decision to establish ‘a nuclear base on the island of 
Diego Garcia’, India considered America’s actions in Sri Lanka to be a threat to its ‘national 
security’ (Dixit, 1998: 58; Jayapalan, 2001: 360). Thirdly, America’s allies at that time, 
especially Pakistan and Israel which remained hostile towards India, also began to provide 
direct military aid to Sri Lanka (Balasingham, 2004: 50; Dixit, 1998: 58; Rajapaksa, 2013a). 
Even though India, given its size and population, had a much bigger market than Sri 
Lanka, why did the West, especially the US, decide to antagonise the South Asian power by 
enhancing close military ties with its neighbouring island-state? The first and the most 
obvious reason was that at the time the armed conflict began to escalate in Sri Lanka, the 
island-state had become a free market economy and took a pro-Western approach, while 
India tilted towards the Soviet Union and had largely adopted socialist economic policies. 
This was evident from the way that the US President Reagan addressed the Sri Lankan 
President Jayewardene when the latter visited the White House on 18 June 1984:  
 
When your government was first elected in 1997, Mr. President, Americans were 
excited by your bold program for economic development. And you’ve led your 
country in a new direction, and by doing so, you’ve created new opportunities for 
your people and expanded the potential of every Sri Lankan. The accelerated 
Mahaveli River project is part of your effort, as is freeing the Sri Lankan economy 
from the controls and red tape that stifled progress and economic expansion. One 
innovation of particular interest to me, Mr. President, is the creation of a free trade 
zone. This practical approach to development with its open market is attracting 
investment and unleashing the energy of the private sector. And I hope those on 
Capitol Hill who claim enterprises won’t work here in our country will take notice 
of the progress you’ve made (1984). 
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Secondly, Sri Lanka acted as the voice of the West in the Non-Aligned Movement, in which 
India was also a member but acted as the voice of the Soviet Union. Reagan appreciated this 
role of Sri Lanka during his meeting with Jayewardene: ‘We respect genuine non-alignment. 
Your country consistently has been a forceful voice for reason and moderation in non-aligned 
councils’ (1984). The third reason, which many scholars have overlooked, was that socialist 
ideas had eclipsed the Tamil armed resistance movement. This led to a perception in the West 
that the Tamils’ armed struggle was intended to establish a Marxist state in the Tamil 
homeland and then extend it to the rest of the island and India (see Willis, 1987: 180). It was 
further exacerbated by the statements of Jayewardene, who claimed that his government was 
fighting to crush a Tamil Marxist insurgency in Sri Lanka and India (1985). During his 
meeting with Reagan at the White House, Jayewardene characterised the Tamil rebels as a 
‘small group’ of ‘terrorists’ who ‘seek by force, including murder, robberies, and other 
misdeeds, to support the cause of separation, including the creation of a Marxist state in the 
whole of Sri Lanka and in India, beginning with Tamil Nadu in the South’ (1984). Was the 
West correct in its perception, and if so, was the Sri Lankan president telling the truth? 
 
 
The ideological dynamics of Tamils’ armed struggle 
 
Although historically both Marxism and socialism have had a wider appeal among the 
Sinhalese, they failed to have any serious influence within the Tamil community. As noted in 
Chapter IV, with the exception of the Indian Tamils, indigenous Tamils have largely 
benefited from the economic liberalisation undertaken by Britain during its colonial rule of 
the island. This being the case, Tamils became economically marginalised when Ceylon’s 
successive governments from 1956 to 1972 incorporated semi-statist economic policies and 
from 1972 to 1977 adopted socialist economic policies (Gunasinghe, 2004: 101). In addition, 
it is also difficult to find a large working class within the Tamil community as a large number 
of them are either entrepreneurs or white collar elites, while the rest are peasants who also 
aspire to merge into the former two groups. Even though during the 1950s and 1960s Marxist 
Tamil political leaders took to the forefront in the fight against caste domination in their 
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community, Marxism failed to influence the Tamils in general. Some conservative Tamil 
nationalists even equated Marxism with ‘madness’.60 Thus, the Tamil militancy that emerged 
during the early 1970s in response to state oppression was nationalist in character, but was 
hardly inscribed with Marxist ideologies.  
Nevertheless, as secessionist ideas began to grip the Tamil population, both the Tamil 
rebels and politicians began to espouse socialism to be the economic model of the future state 
of Tamil Eelam that they would seek to establish. The very conservative Tamil nationalists 
who denounced Marxism as madness also adopted socialism in their election manifestos. In 
The Vaddukoddai Resolution of 1976 passed by conservative Tamil nationalists, which has 
since then been regarded by Tamil politicians and rebels as the manifesto for secession, the 
aim of the convention was proclaimed to be the ‘restoration and reconstitution of the Free, 
Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam’ (TULF, 1976). In the resolution, it was 
even explicitly spelled out that the future state of Tamil Eelam would prohibit capitalist 
exploitation by placing a limit on the accumulation of wealth by individuals: 
 
That Tamil Eelam shall be a Socialist State wherein the exploitation of man by 
man shall be forbidden, the dignity of labour shall be recognised, the means of 
production and distribution shall be subject to public ownership and control while 
permitting private enterprises in these branches within limit prescribed by law. 
Economic development shall be on the basis of socialist planning and there shall 
be ceiling on the total wealth that any individual of family may acquire (TULF, 
1976). 
 
Despite shunning Marxism, why did conservative Tamil nationalists espouse socialism as the 
viable economic model for the future state of Tamil Eelam? A comprehensive answer to this 
can be found by examining the economic policies of the Tamil armed resistance movement. 
                                                            
60  According  to  a  functionary  of  Ceylon’s  communist  party  (Beijing  faction)  interviewed  by  me  in  2010, 
S.Sivasithamparam, one of  the senior  leaders of  the Tamil conservative nationalist party TULF  (formerly  the 
Federal Party), openly denounced Marxism as madness during a lecture at Ceylon’s Law College in 1972.  
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At the time the armed conflict came to its catastrophic conclusion in May 2009, the 
only organisation that represented the Tamil armed resistance movement was the LTTE. 
However, at its inception in the early 1970s, the Tamil armed resistance movement was made 
up of more than thirty militant organisations, of which the LTTE, TELO, EROS and 
EPRLF61 remained the dominant ones. Of those four dominant militant organisations, the 
EROS and EPRLF were Marxist in character and espoused an island-wide revolution of the 
proletariat, which they claimed would be led by the Tamil ‘working class’. The LTTE and 
TELO, however, were not predisposed to such ideas but espoused secession as their key goal. 
Nevertheless, both organisations also incorporated socialism in their political manifestos. By 
1990, after a series of confrontations with other militant groups, the LTTE emerged 
triumphant, becoming the sole Tamil militant organisation to espouse armed struggle to 
achieve political independence, while other militant groups either became paramilitaries of 
the Indian army, and later the Sri Lankan military, or renounced the armed struggle and 
entered democratic politics, with the exception of EROS which merged with the LTTE. 
Despite advocating socialism, the LTTE made it clear that it could not be applied 
blindly within the Tamil society. During an interview in 1986 to the Indian daily The Hindu, 
Velupillai Pirapaharan, the leader of the LTTE claimed that the socialist society that his 
organisation was seeking to build would be ‘compatible with the Tamil culture and history’ 
and ‘represent the aspirations and welfare of the Tamil people’: the socialist society that the 
LTTE was seeking to build would ‘encourage the productive power of the masses’ 
(Pirapaharan, 1986: 1). Elaborating on this further, the LTTE’s official organ Liberation 
Tigers claimed that their socialism would be unique and would not export foreign models: 
 
Our liberation organisation’s goal is to build a unique society that would respect 
equality and remain revolutionary. The socialist model that we seek to build 
would enhance the political, economic and cultural life of our people. It would 
                                                            
61  The  full  names  of  three major  Tamil militant  organisations  other  than  LTTE  are:  Tamil  Eelam  Liberation 
Organisation (TELO), Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), and Eelam People’s Revolutionary 
Liberation Front (EPRLF).  In addition to those four major militant organisations,  in 1981 a splint group of the 
LTTE emerged under the name People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). 
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become a noble society that would respect democratic freedoms and social justice. 
After eliminating exploitative systems such as class and caste, and after 
annihilating social injustices such as the oppression of women, the socialist state 
of Tamil Eelam would become the paradise of the working masses. Our goal is to 
establish a people’s government that would preserve the fundamental rights of our 
people and allow them to determine their political, social and economic destiny. 
The revolutionary socialist model that we aim to build would not be based on any 
foreign models, but will be unique in character and fulfil the aspirations of our 
people (1986: 2). 
 
Even though the LTTE wanted to effect ‘a fundamental transformation in the economic 
structure’ of the Tamil society, it refused to adopt Soviet or Chinese socialist models. For the 
LTTE, the Tamil society was neither ‘an advanced capitalist society’ nor a ‘pre-capitalist 
feudal formation’ but made up of a ‘unique socio-economic organisation structured by 
combined modes of production with capitalist and feudal elements interwoven with caste 
system’ (LTTE, 1985: 11). Thus, during another interview to the American journal News 
Week, Pirapaharan (1986: 12) announced that his organisation’s socialist model for the future 
state of Tamil Eelam would not represent Soviet or Chinese systems.  
These statements of Pirapaharan were clear indications that despite advocating 
socialists ideas, the LTTE was not interested in enlisting the support of the Soviet Union. In a 
direct attack on communist states (including the Soviet Union), the LTTE’s official organ 
even berated them for treating democratic freedoms as ‘capitalist’ ideologies (Liberation 
Tigers, 1986: 2). In its political manifesto, the LTTE even claimed that while the major 
means of production under its government would be commonly owned by the Tamil people, 
it ‘will not adopt a rigid centralised planning but opt for liberalisation and democratisation in 
the framing and implementing of national economic programmes’ (1985: 15). Therefore, 
despite the LTTE’s commitment to socialism during the 1970s and 1980s, Marxists 
politicians (mainly Sinhalese) in Sri Lanka have consistently denounced it as a ploy. In this 
  197   
regard, Karunaratne notes that the LTTE should be characterised as a bourgeoisie 
organisation, and not as a Marxist one that represented the the working class.62 
These denouncements of the LTTE’s socialism as a ploy could be attributed to its claim 
that the works of Marx did not provide the theoretical basis for understanding the socialist 
dynamics of the Tamil national liberation struggle. For the LTTE, the socialist dynamics of 
the Tamils’ freedom struggle could be better understood by examining the works of Lenin on 
self-determination (Balasingham, 1983: 4). In a short essay written in 1915, entitled Self-
Determination of Nations, Lenin argued that ‘socialists cannot reach their great aim without 
fighting against every form of national oppression’ and should therefore ‘recognise and 
defend the rights of the oppressed nations to self-determination in the political sense of the 
word, i.e., the right to political separation’ (2004: 65). Any socialist ‘who does not defend 
this right is a chauvinist’, Lenin claimed (Ibid.). For Lenin, defending the right to self-
determination of small nations does not in any way ‘encourage the formation of small states, 
but rather ‘leads to a freer, more fearless and therefore wider and universal formation of 
larger states and unions of states’ which would be ‘more advantageous for the masses and 
more in accord with economic development’ (Ibid.). In a document published three years 
prior to Pirapaharan’s statements, Anton Balasingham, the LTTE’s theoretician and chief 
negotiator referred to the works of Lenin in justifying the Tamils’ freedom struggle: 
   
Positing the problem within the theoretical discourse of Marxism, we hold that 
Lenin’s theoretical elucidations and political strategies offer an adequate basis for 
a precise formulation of this question. ...Our reliance on Lenin’s formulations is 
determined by the fact that neither Marx or Engels nor any other theoretician 
offers a systematic theory with a concrete political strategy for proletarian praxis 
in relation to the national question. ...Therefore, the political genius of Lenin 
situates this struggle of the oppressed nations within the realms of socialist 
democracy and proletariat revolution. It is precisely within these two spheres we 
wish to situate the Tamil national question to elucidate the progressive character 
                                                            
62 Karunaratne made this statement to me during the interview on 17 April 2012. 
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of this independence struggle. ...This political objective of our movement is to 
advance the national struggle along with the class struggle, or rather, our 
fundamental objective is national emancipation and socialist transition of our 
social formation (1983: 3, 4 & 9). 
 
In April 1984, during a meeting with M.G.Ramachandran, the chief minister of the South 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu, Balasingham (2003: 10-11) also pointed out that it was incorrect 
to characterise his organisation as a communist movement and it should be better understood 
as an organisation fighting to reform the existing social formation of the Tamils. 
If the LTTE was not a communist organisation and was not interested gaining the 
support of the communist block led by the Soviet Union, what was its rationale behind 
advocating a socialist ideology that would both irk the West and provide justifications for 
Western states’ military support to the Sri Lankan state’s war against the Tamils?  
Firstly, since the West had turned a blind-eye to Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic war from 
the time the island-state gained independence, Tamil politicians and rebels during the 1970s 
came to the conclusion that they would not be able to enlist the support of the West in their 
struggle to establish a Tamil state. Secondly, with its defeat in the Vietnam war, and the 
unpopularity it gained in the third world by conducting both overt and covert military 
operations in democratically elected socialist states, the US had become a villain in the eyes 
of many Tamils.63 Thirdly, the guerrilla mode of the armed struggle launched by a number of 
national liberation movements in Africa and Latin America – many of which espoused 
socialist ideas – became an inspiration for the Tamil armed resistance movement 
(Balasingham, 2004: 26). As Michael Howard notes, during the Cold War, national liberation 
movements in the third world ‘defiantly took the leaders of the liberation movements – 
Castro, Che Guevara – as their heroes and saw in the ‘freedom fighters’ a life-style which 
they attempted to recreate at home’ (2008: 114). Most importantly, however, the rationale 
behind the LTTE, other Tamil militant organisations and conservative Tamil national 
                                                            
63 This was stated by the former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia during an interview with me in 
2010. 
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political elites’ decision in the 1970s and the early 1980s to adapt socialism within the 
framework of the Tamil national liberation struggle was intended to gain the support of India. 
Indira Gandhi, the prime minister of India from 1966-1977 and 1980-1984, whose 
support both the Tamil politicians and leaders of the armed resistant movement sought to 
establish a Tamil state in the island, was more of a socialist in her economic policies. 
However, despite her close relationship with Moscow, she was not predisposed to the idea of 
bringing communist rule in India or its neighbouring countries, and in demonstration of this 
policy, during the Sinhala Marxist uprising of 1971 she sent Indian troops to Sri Lanka’s 
capital to fight the Marxist insurgents (Balasingham, 2004: 16).64 Indira Gandhi spelled out 
her economic policy, in particular what she meant by socialism, during an interview in 1979: 
 
The point is that we have gigantic problems of poverty. Now, how are these to be 
solved? We can’t just leave them to market forces. We can’t leave them to big 
businesses to do what they like. We do leave a great deal to them. But... unless the 
government steps in and helps these poor people... Now this is what people 
probably think in your country that we should leave it to private enterprise. And 
now if we left it we would never get rid of our poverty. So, what we are doing is... 
we are not following... we do call ourselves socialists... but it’s not a socialism 
that is followed by say the communist countries or by Soviet Union... We are 
trying to find our own path, what suits the Indian genius, what’s going to answer 
the questions asked by the Indian people, what’s going to meet the demands of the 
Indian people (1979). 
 
Both Tamil political elites and militants understood this, and in an attempt to rally the support 
of Indira Gandhi, they set out the political and economic ideology of the Tamil national 
liberation movement in accordance with her political and economic principles. Most of the 
                                                            
64 At the time of the Sinhala Marxist insurgency in 1971, the Sri Lankan government of Prime Minister Srimavo 
Bandaranaike was closely aligned with India. In addition to India, Pakistan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and 
even the Soviet Union despatched military assistance to Sri Lanka to crush the Marxist insurgency. 
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clauses in the Vaddukoddai Resolution, in particular those on the secularist and democratic 
nature of the future state of Tamil Eelam, replicated words in the Indian constitution. 
In seeking the support of Indira Gandhi, the Tamil national liberation movement also 
sought to project itself as working in line with the ‘Indira Doctrine’. The claim in the 
Vaddukoddai Resolution that the future state of Tamil Eelam would not allow for capitalist 
exploitation would seem to have been intended to assure the Indian prime minister that the 
Tamil national liberation struggle would not allow Western powers, whom India considered a 
threat to its national security, to operate in the soil of the Tamil homeland. In its first issue 
published in March 1984, berating the decision of the US to provide military assistance to Sri 
Lanka, the LTTE’s official organ Liberation Tigers even warned American troops not 
entertain any idea of fighting alongside the Sri Lankan troops: ‘We would like to point out 
the same warning given by El Salvador’s leftist guerrillas that those American military 
advisors who have landed on their shores to give training to the state’s armed forces would 
return to America in their coffins’ (1984: 2). It was a tacit assurance made by the Tamil 
armed resistance movement to New Delhi that it would fight any anti-Indian foreign troops 
within the shores of the island. In the same month, in an interview to the Indian journal 
Sunday Magazine, Pirapaharan claimed that in the backdrop of US military assistance to Sri 
Lanka, Indian national security interests had converged with those of the Tamils: 
 
Induction of US arms is not only a threat to the Tamil freedom movement but also 
to India’s national security. America’s objective, as you will certainly be aware, is 
not simply confined to helping the Sri Lankan army to crush the Tamil liberation 
struggle. Their ultimate aim is to secure a naval base at Trincomalee. Such a 
happening will convert the Indian Ocean into a war zone, and will increase the 
tension prevalent in the region (1984: 16). 
 
Four years later, the LTTE claimed in an official publication that in waging the armed 
struggle, it functioned as an ally of India in the island and safeguarded the latter’s interests: 
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The Israeli intelligence forces that infiltrated Sri Lanka, and the British, American 
and South African mercenary forces that assisted the Sri Lankan military posed a 
threat to India’s national security... We would like to point out that it was our 
liberation organisation that shed blood in the struggle against Israeli intelligence 
forces and other foreign mercenary forces that set foot in Sri Lanka. Our 
organisation is not a force that remains inimical to Indian interests. Instead, we 
functioned as an ally of India (1988: 14, 15 & 16).   
 
Moreover, the Tamil armed resistance movement also considered Indira Gandhi to be ‘a great 
socialist’ and an ‘anti-imperialist’. In the aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination, in a 
message of condolence sent to her son Rajiv Gandhi, Pirapaharan noted thus: 
 
Mrs Indira Gandhi was a fighter who fought tirelessly for world peace and human 
freedom. She was the voice of the oppressed poor masses. She worked with 
foresight and full commitment to develop India in the path of socialism. She 
whole-heartedly opposed imperialism and the formation of superpower traps in 
the Indian subcontinent. She was in the forefront of supporting national liberation 
struggles conducted globally (1984a: 2). 
 
In its political manifesto, the LTTE even incorporated Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy of non-
alignment and supported her calls for declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: ‘In 
international relations, the LTTE is committed to the policy of non-alignment. In so far as our 
regional political scene is concerned, the LTTE will support the policy of declaring the Indian 
Ocean as a zone of peace’ (1985: 13). The LTTE elaborated on this further by claiming that it 
supported ‘India’s policy of declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace’ as it was ‘a 
revolutionary movement opposed to imperialism’ (1988: 15). The LTTE followed this policy 
of India despite the opposition of Western states. The latter claimed that this policy of India’s 
was unworkable. In this regard, during a press conference in April 1985 after meeting the Sri 
Lankan President Jayewardene in Kandy, the then British Prime Minister Thatcher 
announced that her government would not support the creation of a ‘zone of peace’ in the 
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Indian Ocean: ‘I do not believe it is possible to have a zone of peace... The trouble with zones 
of peace is that they tend not to be honoured by potential aggressors’ (1985). 
Given these policies of the LTTE, and taking its socialist ideas at face value, a number 
of Western journalists claimed that the Tamils’ armed struggle constituted a Marxist threat to 
the free world. Commenting on her perception of the Marxist dynamics of the Tamil national 
liberation struggle, Penelope Willis, a Western journalist who was kidnapped by a Tamil 
militant organisation in 1986 while touring the Tamil homeland and later released, noted: 
 
[T]heir plan is now, and always has been, not the establishment of Tamil Eelam in 
the north and east, but the setting up of a Marxist revolutionary state in the entire 
Island, with its capital in Trincomalee. Their plan was to use nominal Tamil 
Eelam as the base from which they would launch the military operation necessary 
to seize the whole country. They would then declare their revolutionary one-party 
Marxist state – and use the Island as a safe base from which to re-export the 
revolution into Tamil Nadu (1987: 180). 
 
Capitalising on the LTTE’s socialist ideologies, the Sri Lankan government also whipped up 
the idea of a Marxist threat to gain Western military assistance to defeat the Tamil national 
liberation struggle and endorsement for its ethno-theocratic war. During an interview to the 
BBC in 1985, responding to a question on the danger of alienating the Tamil public’s opinion 
by conducting an all-out war on the Tamil rebels, President Jayewardene claimed that he was 
not at all concerned about the opinion of the Tamils, but rather wanted the world to 
understand that he was waging a war to defeat a Marxist threat in the island: 
 
I am not afraid of alienating Tamil opinion. I am afraid of alienating public 
opinion in the world. Your country and other countries including large sections in 
India have a wrong impression of what is happening there: they think it is an 
ethnic conflict. It’s not an ethnic conflict. It’s a conflict of some people who want 
to capture the whole of Sri Lanka. Not a portion... the whole of Sri Lanka and 
make it into a Marxist state (1985).    
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This was coupled with Sri Lanka’s claims that it was a vibrant liberal democracy that upheld 
liberal democratic values. During his meeting with Reagan in June 1984, Jayewardene 
claimed that his country had been ‘for 53 years a practicing democracy, where the freedom of 
speech and writing, of electing governments by universal franchise at regular intervals, and 
the independence of the judiciary and of the opposition’ were ‘safeguarded’ (1984).  
In response, Reagan openly came out against the Tamils’ armed struggle, denouncing it 
as ‘terrorism’ and a ‘cowardly form of barbarism’ (1984a). Reagan claimed that given the 
island-state’s ‘strong democratic tradition and peaceful means to resolve conflict’, there was 
‘no legitimate excuse for any political group to resort to violence in Sri Lanka’ (Ibid.). 
Invoking civilisational arguments, Reagan argued that dividing Sri Lanka into ‘separate 
nations’ was ‘not the solution’ to the ‘communal strife’ in the island and ‘human liberty will 
prevail and civilization will triumph’ in Sri Lanka’s fight against ‘terrorism’ (Ibid.). Thatcher 
also argued that given the fact that Sri Lanka is a democracy, ‘terrorism must never be seen to 
win’: ‘There is a democracy in Sri Lanka and I believe that, as in Britain, the problems must 
be solved through democracy – at any rate by all who believe in democracy’ (1984). 
Recent evidence shows that Western states – in particular the US government – were 
very much aware by the late 1980s that Sri Lanka was not facing a Marxist threat from the 
Tamil armed resistance movement: even the LTTE’s commitment to socialism was 
understood to be ‘rhetorical’. In a cable addressed to the US State Department dated 12 
February 1987 (released by Wikileaks), the then US ambassador to Colombo noted thus: 
 
If the current politico-military ‘management style’ of the LTTE command 
structure is any indication (and we believe it is), then in the unlikely event of the 
establishment of an LTTE-controlled Tamil Eelam we would most likely see an 
authoritarian, heavily centralised administration. The regime is apt to be a military 
dictatorship in the guise of a (rhetorically) socialist one-party system, being 
neither particularly benevolent nor ideological (Spain, 1987).  
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If Western liberal powers understood the LTTE’s commitment to socialism to be rhetorical, 
why did they continue their military assistance to the Sri Lankan state and antagonise India? 
The perception that the LTTE was an ‘authoritarian’ movement that would become a 
‘military dictatorship’ in the future state of Tamil Eelam with a ‘heavily centralised 
administration’ was the key reason behind the continued Western support for the Sri Lankan 
state during the 1980s. As pointed out in Chapters I to III, in Western liberal political thought 
and practice, the security of commerce is understood to be linked to political freedom: 
political and economic liberalisation are understood to be inextricably linked. Perceived as an 
authoritarian movement, the LTTE was therefore considered by the West to be a continuing 
threat to unhindered global commerce within the borders of Sri Lanka. It was thus understood 
to be a ‘prudent’ decision on the part of the West to continue military assistance to Sri Lanka. 
 
 
Western military assistance and the Indian response 
 
Western military assistance to Sri Lanka’s war manifested in two forms: direct and indirect. 
At the direct level, the US set-up ‘electronic intelligence facilities’ in the north of Sri Lanka’s 
capital city Colombo (Balasingham, 2004: 49). The US also supplied the island-state’s navy 
with warships and trained their personnel. This was in addition to financial aid provided by 
America and other Western states to Sri Lanka during the war (Liberation Tigers, 1984: 1-2).  
At the indirect level, the US opened an ‘Israeli “Interest Section”’ at its embassy in 
Colombo and ‘channelled’ through it ‘military and technical assistance to Sri Lanka’ 
(Balasingham, 2004: 49). This indirect military assistance took the form of building up the 
‘naval capacity’ of Sri Lanka and training its armed forces, in particular the state’s elite 
police commandos in ‘counter-insurgency warfare’ (Ibid.). Through the Israeli interest 
section at the US embassy in Colombo, Sri Lanka was also able to acquire weaponry from 
South Africa. Military instructors of Israel also conducted a training programme known as 
Fighting in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA) for the Sri Lankan troops, including live firing 
exercises. Pakistani military instructors were also involved in similar training programmes. 
According to Sri Lanka’s current Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who was an officer 
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in the island-state’s military during the 1980s, the training programmes provided by Israel 
and Pakistan boosted the morale of troops: ‘Ongoing projects at Saliyapura and Maduru 
Oya65 gave us confidence. We felt terrorism could be tackled by military means’ (2013a).    
For its part, Britain also provided indirect military assistance to Sri Lanka through its 
UK-based arms suppliers and the Channel Islands-based Keeny Meeny Services (KMS) Ltd 
(Balasingham, 2004: 50; Liberation Tigers, 1984: 1-2; Moorcraft, 2012: 73; Rajapaksa, 
2013a). Around 100 ex-British Special Air Service (SAS) personnel were involved in these 
military assistance programmes (Moorcraft, 2012: 73). According to Paul Moorcraft, a 
former senior instructor at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst and the UK Joint 
Services Command and Staff College, Britain used the KMS in Sri Lanka as well as in 
Afghanistan, Iran and Nicaragua in the 1980s to ‘pursue useful – but deniable – covert 
policies’ (Ibid.: 73). The military assistance programme of the KMS was not confined to 
training Sri Lankan troops. According to Gotabaya Rajapaksa, KMS personnel, especially 
former RAF pilots, were stationed close to the war zone and acted as pilots for the Sri Lankan 
airforce in military operations (2013a). Although ‘the KMS operation was low key’, it ‘was 
of pivotal importance’ for Sri Lanka in its counter-insurgency efforts (Ibid.). 
The consequences of such direct and indirect military assistance rendered by the West 
were varied. With the development of its naval capacity, the Sri Lankan navy was able to 
launch attacks on rebels boats and interdict their arms and other logistical supplies from the 
Southern coast of India. Imposing an outright fishing ban on the northern seas, the Sri Lankan 
navy also attacked the boats of Tamil fishermen and fleeing refugees, and often carried out 
incursions into the Indian waters attacking the fishing vessels of Indian Tamil fishermen. In 
response, and to protect its own Tamil fishermen, the Indian navy increased its presence in 
the Palk Strait. The Indian naval patrols were aggressive that there were often stand-offs 
between the Indian and Sri Lankan navies. In January 1985, the Indian navy seized a Sri 
Lankan naval patrol vessel for ‘firing on Indian fishing vessels’ (Goldrick, 1997: 181-182).   
At home, with the counter-insurgency training provided by Israeli, Pakistani and the 
British KMS personnel, the Sri Lankan armed forces and the state’s police commando units 
                                                            
65 While Pakistani officials trained Sri Lankan troops at Saliyapura, Israeli officials trained them at Maduru Oya. 
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carried out reprisal attacks on Tamil civilians – in response to hit-and-run attacks of the 
Tamil guerrillas on the state’s military and economic targets. The state’s armed forces also 
conducted large scale arrests, killings and enforced disappearance of Tamil civilians 
suspected of aiding and abetting the Tamil guerrillas. Large tracts of lands in traditional 
Tamil villages and towns were also appropriated by the state’s armed forces and turned into 
military cantonments. In the territories controlled by the Tamil rebels, state’s armed forces, 
deploying modern military equipment, frequently launched aerial and artillery attacks on 
densely populated Tamil villages and towns. As a consequence, while hundreds of thousands 
of Tamils became refugees in their own homeland, tens of thousands of them fled to 
neighbouring India (Bloom, 2003: 65; Balasingham, 2004: 50-51). Since many of the 
counter-insurgency techniques used by Sri Lankan troops to terrorise the Tamil population 
resembled those used by American troops during the Vietnam war and Israeli forces in 
Palestine, and given the fact that the military personnel of America and its allies trained Sri 
Lankan troops, the Tamil rebels accused America and Israel to be the masterminds of Sri 
Lanka’s terror tactics. Articles on the LTTE’s official organ appeared with the titles ‘The 
Eagle Has Landed’ and ‘Mossad in Tamil Eelam’ (Liberation Tigers, 1984a: 6-7; 1984b: 8). 
As the armed conflict escalated and casualties among the Tamil civilian population 
mounted, and with the growing presence of American, Israeli, Pakistani and British military 
personnel in the island, in July 1983 India intervened in the conflict. In this regard, J.N.Dixit, 
a former Indian high commissioner to Colombo and later its national security advisor, noted: 
 
India’s involvement in Sri Lanka in my assessment, was unavoidable not only due 
to the ramification of Colombo’s oppressive and discriminatory policies against 
Tamil citizens, but also in terms of India’s national security concerns due to Sri 
Lankan government’s security connections with the US, Pakistan and Israel 
(1998: 58). 
 
The Indian intervention in the Eelam War took two forms: on the one hand, using its mission 
in Colombo and its New Delhi-based diplomats, India intensified political and diplomatic 
pressure on the Sri Lankan government to end hostilities and seek a negotiated political 
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solution with the Tamils; on the other hand, India also conducted a ‘clandestine military 
exercise to build-up and strengthen the Tamil armed resistance movement’ (Balasingham, 
2004: 52). Tamil rebels were taken to Indian military bases and provided with military 
training on ‘all aspects of modern warfare’, which included ‘map reading, mine laying and 
the use of explosives and anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems’ (Balasingham, 2004: 58-59). 
Although the ‘quantity of arms’ that India supplied to the Tamil rebels was both ‘small’ and 
‘antiquated’, thus remained ‘unusable’, New Delhi nevertheless tacitly allowed them to bring 
in large quantities of arms from outside the Indian subcontinent and store them in their 
training bases in South India. In addition, the Tamil rebels also received direct financial 
assistance from the chief minister of the South India state of Tamil Nadu, and later directly 
from New Delhi itself (Balasingham, 2003: 14, 21-22, 25 & 41 & 60; 2004:61). 
In effect, Sri Lanka became the hotspot in the struggle between the West and India for 
domination of the island. While the West stood by the pro-liberal and pro-Western Sri 
Lankan government underpinned by its Cold War policy of containment and development, 
India, underpinned by the ‘Indira Doctrine’ of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, trained, armed 
and financed the Tamil armed resistance movement on the grounds of its national security.  
As Balasingham put it, India’s support for the Tamil armed resistance was certainly ‘a 
moral, altruistic urgency and geo-strategic necessity’ to ‘contain a ruthless racist state bent on 
genocidal destruction of a minority Tamil nation in collusion with international forces with 
subversive intentions’ (2004: 59). However, in turning the Tamil armed resistance movement 
into ‘a player’ in its ‘covert game’ against the West, New Delhi did not have any intentions to 
help establish a Tamil state in the island, even though some politicians in South India and the 
Tamil homeland entertained such hopes at that time (Ibid.: 59-60).  
Unlike the formation of Bangaladesh, India never considered that the establishment of a 
Tamil state in Sri Lanka would be in its favour. Before the emergence of the Tamil 
secessionist movement in Sri Lanka, India faced similar demands from its Southern state of 
Tamil Nadu, although, as we saw in the Introduction, it was not centred on carving-out a 
Tamil state from India. India managed to contain them by devolving substantial powers to the 
state government (Krishna, 2000: 64). Thus, as Dixit put it in 1990, the formation of a Tamil 
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state in Sri Lanka was considered in New Delhi to have the potential to threaten India’s own 
territorial integrity by reinvigorating demands for secession in Tamil Nadu and other states: 
 
[The] first voice of secessionism in the Indian Republic was raised in Tamil Nadu 
in the mid-sixties.66 This was exactly the same principle of Tamil ethnicity, Tamil 
language. So, in a manner, our interest in the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka, Tamil 
aspirations in Sri Lanka, was based on maintaining our own unity, our own 
integrity, our own identity, in the manner in which we have been trying to build 
our society (cited in Krishna, 2000: 61)   
 
This policy of the Indian government was also officially conveyed to the LTTE’s leadership 
in March 1985 by Girish Chandra Saxena, the head of India’s external intelligence agency – 
the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) – during a meeting with Pirapaharan and 
Balasingham, wherein he stated that ‘India could not support the Tamil aspiration for a 
separate state since it would have far reaching implications’ within its own borders as it 
already had ‘to deal with several secessionist movements’ (Balasingham, 2004: 67-68).  
Instead, India believed that the ethnic conflict could be resolved and Tamils’ 
secessionist demands contained by forcing the island-state to accept a ‘political settlement 
within a united Sri Lanka’ which would ensure that its ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’ 
was not violated. Thus, in terms of meeting the secessionist demands of the Tamils, both the 
West and India held similar views: neither were in favour of the formation of a separate 
Tamil state, although for different reasons. According to Balasingham, in providing military 
assistance to the Tamil armed resistance movement, India expected the Tamil guerrillas to 
‘destabilise Jayewardene’s regime and frustrate his militaristic approach’ (2004: 60). 
Nevertheless, Indian military assistance also had favourable consequences for the 
Tamils’ armed struggle. On the one hand, it provided ‘a morale boost for the Tamil struggle’ 
(Balasingham, 2004: 60). On the other hand, it also stalled Sri Lanka’s military offensives 
                                                            
66 Dixit incorrectly refers to the 1960s as the period when secessionist demands emerged in Tamil Nadu. As we 
saw in the Introduction, the Dravidian secessionist movement rose in the 1930s and died down in the 1960s. 
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against the Tamils and effectively put a check on direct Western military intervention in the 
island. The effects of Indian military assistance for the Tamils’ armed struggle was so 
extensive that in his condolence message sent for the demise of Indira Gandhi, Pirapaharan 
even referred to her as ‘the great guardian of Tamils’: ‘If not for the personal concerns shown 
by Mother Indira, who was the great guardian of Tamils, our nation would have been 
annihilated. She remained the tower of Tamil liberation movement’s moral strength’ (1984a). 
However, after the demise of Indira Gandhi, the power struggle between the West and 
India for domination of the island gradually eased and Indian support for the Tamils began to 
wane. Despite continuing much of his mother’s statist economic policies, Rajiv Gandhi, the 
new Indian prime minister, nevertheless avoided taking a confrontationist approach with the 
West. In addition, he partially eased governmental control of the Indian economy by 
encouraging the private sector and turned to Western technological innovations to develop his 
country’s industries. This prompted the Wall Street Journal to call upon the US President 
Reagan’s administration to cultivate on Rajiv Gandhi’s Western leanings: 
 
Mr. Gandhi represents a new generation in India, the one less burdened by the old 
anti-colonialist and anti-Western bugaboos. He needs the ideas and technology of 
the free world to help him do that. The free world should listen closely to his 
request... [T]he US could help Mr. Gandhi by making its own weapons available 
to India (cited in Jayapalan, 2001: 366-367).  
 
With the easing of the power struggle between India and the West, Sri Lanka also realised 
that it would be futile to continue playing the socialist-capitalist rivalry card. Instead, it 
realised that the Tamils’ armed struggle could be contained by appeasing both India and the 
West. Thus, from 1985 onwards, the Sri Lankan government of Jayewardene took the 
approach of accommodating Indian interests in the island while also continuing its pro-
market and pro-Western approach. This new approach of the Sri Lankan government 
culminated into an accord in July 1987 (Indo-Sri Lankan Accord), which guaranteed India the 
predominant role in dealing with the island state’s security (Balasingham, 2004: 467-473). 
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This is not to say that India’s hostility to Sri Lanka’s close relationship with America 
and other Western states ended after Rajiv Gandhi assumed the office of the Prime Minister 
nor after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. On the same day the accord was signed 
(29 July, 1987), a letter from Rajiv Gandhi addressed to Jayewardene stressed that Sri Lanka 
must take action to ensure that external military forces did not have presence in the island: 
 
1. Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two 
millennia and more, and recognising the importance of nurturing this 
traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm 
the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities 
prejudicial to each other’s unity, territorial integrity and security.  
2. In this spirit, you had, in the course of our discussions agreed to meet some of 
India’s concerns as follows:  
i. Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the 
relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with 
a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan 
relations.  
ii. Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for 
military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests.  
iii. The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm will 
be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.  
iv. Sri Lanka’s agreements with foreign broadcasting organizations will be 
reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used 
solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence 
purposes (cited in Ghosh, 1999: 180-181; also see Lunstead, 2007: 24). 
 
The signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord also did not signal the end of Eelam War.  
With India taking the responsibility to deal with the Sri Lanka’s security, in October 
1987, an all-out war broke-out between the Tamil Tigers and the Indian troops, who landed in 
the island to enforce the accord. The Indian intervention also sparked the second Sinhala 
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Marxist insurgency, explained in Chapters IV and V. In December 1988, as the war between 
the Indian troops and the LTTE continued, Ranasinghe Premadasa succeeded Jayewardene as 
Sri Lanka’s president. While continuing his predecessor’s pro-liberal and pro-market 
economic policies, Premadasa took a distinctively anti-Indian approach. Fearing that ‘Indian 
troops might stay on Sri Lankan soil indefinitely’, he formed an alliance with the LTTE, this 
time providing the latter with military assistance to expel the Indian troops (Balasingham, 
2004: 143 & 176). After months of heavy fighting, and with a regime change in New Delhi in 
December 1989, Indian troops withdrew from the island in late March 1990. However, in 
June 1990 hostilities resumed between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government. 
These rapid occurrence of events took place in the backdrop of Cold War moving 
towards its conclusion. In May 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was killed by a suicidal attacker and the 
new government that came to power in New Delhi liberalised the Indian economy, while also 
taking a strong anti-LTTE stance. A few months before this, both India and Sri Lanka 
allowed their soils, Mumbai and Colombo respectively, to be used as re-fuelling bases for the 
US troops in the First Gulf War. Thus, the final years of the Cold War signalled the end of 
the power struggle between the West and India in the South Asian region. With the end of the 
Cold War, the LTTE also stopped talking about socialism and adopted a pro-Western 
approach, establishing its international secretariat in London and its branch-offices in other 
Western capitals. Thus, Francis Fukuyama’s claim that economic and political liberalism had 
‘conquered rival ideologies’ (1992: xi) was certainly true in the case of India and Sri Lanka.  
However, the end of Cold War did not signal the end of West’s collaboration in Sri 
Lanka’s war. The next two chapters will examine Western collaboration with Sri Lanka from 
the beginning of the 1990s, which from October 1997 was upgraded into a parallel war in 
which the power relations of law, finance, politics, diplomacy as well as military might were 
used to neutralise the Tamils’ armed struggle. It will be established empirically that concerns 
for the security of global commerce was central to this parallel war waged by the West. 
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Chapter VII 
The build-up to the West’s war on the LTTE 
 
Although the GWoT officially began following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the West 
commenced its war against the LTTE as far back as in October 1997 (Nadarajah, 2011). It 
was a war that was conducted on five different fronts: military, legal, financial, diplomatic, 
and political. Initially, the intention was to discipline the LTTE to voluntarily give-up its 
secessionist armed struggle and accept a political solution within a united Sri Lanka. It was a 
continuation of the disciplinary efforts undertaken from the closing months of 1990. From a 
biopolitical perspective, this disciplinary objective could be understood to have been intended 
to facilitate the transformation of the LTTE from a group that belonged to the ‘bad’ part of 
the human species to a ‘good’ member of the ‘liberal democratic’ state of Sri Lanka.  
However, in mid-2006, when the West came to the conclusion that this disciplinary objective 
could not be realised, the war was upgraded for the LTTE’s defeat which actually resulted in 
its annihilation. The build-up to this war, however, can be traced to the end of the Cold War. 
In this chapter, I examine the build-up to the West’s war on the LTTE during the 1990s. 
 
 
Enticing towards negotiations 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, during the Cold War, largely driven by the power 
struggle with India to dominate Sri Lanka, the West provided military support to the island-
state. However, with the end of the Cold War and the having re-established friendly ties with 
India, Western states began to express an interest in bringing about a political settlement to 
the ethnic conflict in the island through negotiations. While continuing to provide Sri Lanka 
with political, military, and financial support, the West also established contacts with the 
Tamil Tigers, both through official and unofficial channels. Commenting on Western 
mediatory efforts of the 1990s, Anton Balasingham noted its commercial dynamics: 
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Substantial amount of money is being wasted in this war in which the Tigers 
cannot be defeated. War continues as an endless drama. This in turn threatens Sri 
Lanka’s security. This prolonged war also continues to be a threat to large scale 
investment efforts in Sri Lanka and an obstacle to transforming the island into a 
trade zone of global capitalism. It is for this reason that the West is expecting Sri 
Lanka to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict (1994: 7). 
 
Despite these reservations, given the fact that it no longer had the support of India, and with 
no other global power to turn to, the LTTE had no choice but to accept Western mediation.  
The first official contact that the West established with the LTTE to mediate a political 
settlement to the conflict was at the end of 1990. Although in Pawns of Peace, the report 
commissioned by the Norad in 2011 (see the Introduction), it was claimed that the first time 
Norway offered its services for peace mediation to be in January 1991 (Sorbo et al., 2011: 
29), according to an article published in 1994 by Balasingham, who represented the LTTE 
during those talks, the first official contact between Norway and his organisation was in the 
closing months of 1990. Balasingham notes that in the closing months of 1990 (date not 
specified), a senior official from Norway’s foreign ministry travelled to Jaffna, the then 
administrative capital of the de-facto state of Tamil Eelam the LTTE had established, and 
held talks with his organisation’s peace delegation (1994: 3). This notwithstanding, the 
Norad’s report notes that as the negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the 
LTTE began to ‘founder in June 1990’, the island-state’s foreign minister approached Arne 
Fjortoft, a retired Norwegian politician and the secretary general of a Western NGO, to 
‘establish a back-channel’ with the rebels. When Fjortoft conveyed this to the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, an informal and secret channel was established 
between the LTTE and Norway (Sorbo et al., 2011: 29). As Balasingham notes, the talks in 
the closing months of 1990 with the senior Norwegian official was in essence centred on a 
permanent ceasefire, Western mediation, and political negotiations in a Western capital:  
 
The Norwegian government was the first to step through the Tigers’ doors of 
peace. In the closing months of 1990, a senior official from Norway’s Foreign 
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Ministry visited Jaffna: he held talks with us; he informed us that the international 
community wanted peace talks to resume; Norway was willing to mediate; the 
talks could be held in the Norwegian capital Oslo; before talks resume, both 
parties should agree for a ceasefire, he stressed. We agreed to the proposal. He 
further told us: ‘If you wish to demonstrate to the world that you are sincerely 
committed to peace, you must first declare a ceasefire; it should be a unilateral 
ceasefire. Then we can pressurise the Sri Lankan government to agree for a 
ceasefire.’ We agreed to this proposal as well (1994: 3).  
 
At the same time that Norway made its offer directly to the LTTE, Australian, British, 
Canadian and Swedish officials in Colombo also made public statements expressing their 
desire to mediate (Liberation Tigers, 1991; Sorbo et al., 2011: 29). Following these offers, 
officials from Quakers peace group also visited Jaffna several times and held talks with the 
LTTE’s political leaders to organise Western mediation. They also held talks in London with 
the LTTE’s then international head, Sathasivam Kittu, and prepared a peace plan. Part of the 
peace plan was to arrange political negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the 
LTTE in London, with the facilitation of the British government (Balasingham, 1994: 3). 
These offers were clearly intended to entice the LTTE to move in the path of 
negotiations by creating the impression that opting for a peaceful political settlement would 
mean international recognition for the movement. It was also intended to persuade the LTTE 
to give-up its secessionist demands and the armed struggle. As a political official of the 
organisation put it, the LTTE’s leadership was very much aware that it was not possible to 
discuss secessionist demands at the negotiating table and the only viable settlement that could 
be brought about through negotiations was a political solution based on regional autonomy 
for the Tamils.67 These mediatory offers could therefore be construed as Western efforts to 
entice the LTTE to give-up its secessionist armed struggle and become a political party. 
                                                            
67 This was stated by the former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia during an interview with me in 
2010. 
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However, these mediatory efforts did not take off the ground as the Sri Lankan 
government continued to demand the disarming of the LTTE as the pre-condition for talks, 
which the organisation rejected outright (Liberation Tigers, 1992: 1). Arguably these 
demands also seemed to have had the tacit endorsement of the West, which continued its 
military and financial assistance to the Sri Lankan state’s war effort (Balasingham, 1994: 3). 
This was evident from some of the actions taken by the West in the backdrop of the failure of 
its mediatory efforts. One of such actions was Britain’s decision at the end of 1991 to expel 
the LTTE’s international head from the UK. Having officially allowed Kittu to visit the UK 
for medical treatment in 1989, with his presence bearing no fruit in terms of bringing a 
peaceful political settlement to the conflict in Sri Lanka, two years later Britain decided to 
expel him. Subsequently, on his sea-voyage to Jaffna, Kittu died at mid-sea during a 
confrontation with the Indian navy. The decision of Britain to expel the LTTE’s international 
head can therefore be construed as an early sign of how Western action against the LTTE was 
to manifest if the organisation continued to pursue its armed struggle for secession.   
In these efforts of the West to discipline and transform the LTTE, India, having 
embraced economic liberalisation, also played its part. With the pro-market and pro-Western 
approach of New Delhi, the US and other Western liberal powers revised their anti-Indian 
approach in the Eelam War and were careful in ensuring that their peace mediatory efforts 
did not antagonise India. As the former Norwegian minister Solheim noted, throughout its 
engagement with both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state, Norway kept India informed of its 
peace mediatory efforts (2011). In the 1990s, unlike during the Cold War, America was also 
cautious that its actions did not irritate India (Lunstead, 2007: 11). However, in 1991 India 
became more of an unofficial partner in the West’s build-up to its war on the LTTE when it 
proscribed the movement as a terrorist organisation, in the wake of Rajiv Gandhi’s 
assassination, effectively forcing the organisation to go underground in India. At the same 
time, New Delhi’s proscription also compelled the LTTE to accommodate Western demands 
for finding a political a solution to the conflict, since at that time the organisation had it 
international offices in Western capitals and was conducting its political campaigns and 
fundraising activities among the Tamil Diaspora: the LTTE could not simply also risk going 
underground in the West by opposing Western mediation. Thus, despite continuing its 
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secessionist armed struggle, the LTTE leader Pirapaharan also made official announcements 
that his organisation was ‘keeping the doors for peace open’ (2009: 10 & 23). 
 
 
Sri Lanka’s ‘war for peace’ 
 
However, the West’s build-up to the war on the LTTE could arguably be said to have 
gathered momentum from November 1994 when Chandrika Kumaratunga became the island-
state’s president. Compared to her predecessors, she took a more pro-market and pro-Western 
approach. Having ascended to power with the promise to ‘work for economic “globalisation 
with a human face” and to negotiate peace’ with the LTTE, she downsized ‘the economic role 
of government’ and ‘propelled the economy towards greater global interdependence and 
growth’ (Shastri, 2004: 73-76). Although Kumaratunga’s coalition also included a number of 
leftist parties, she made public pronouncements that her government would not ‘nationalise 
or expropriate private property’ and ‘would honour all bilateral investment protection 
agreements and relevant international treaties, and that there would be no restrictions placed 
on repatriation of dividends and capital’ (Ibid.). Kumaratunga also followed ‘the advice of 
the IMF and allied international actors more closely’ in her economic policies (Ibid.).  
Coupled with her pro-market approach, Kumaratunga also made numerous public 
pronouncements, both during the elections and after ascending to power, that her government 
was interested in bringing a peaceful political solution to the ethnic conflict and would 
‘promote a package of constitutional reforms that would treat members of all communities in 
a fair manner’, prompting commentators to claim that her government was adhering ‘more 
closely to democratic norms and did not engage in belligerent rhetoric’ towards other ethnic 
communities in the island (Shastri, 2004: 88). As a consequence, Kumaratunga’s ‘regime was 
generally perceived as one with a better record of governance’ than its predecessors (Ibid.). 
More importantly, Kumaratunga’s approach to resolve the ethnic conflict through 
economic and political reforms resembled in many ways the post-Cold War liberal 
‘peacebuilding’ strategy outlined in An Agenda for Peace of the then UN Secretary General 
Boutros-Ghali (1992). Boutros-Ghali argued that ‘poverty, disease, famine, oppression and 
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despair abound’ were ‘both sources and consequences of conflict that require the ceaseless 
attention and the highest priority’ (1992). In her speech to the United Nations’ World Summit 
for Social Development in Copenhagen, four months after ascending to power, Kumaratunga 
also claimed that ‘poverty and unemployment’ were some of ‘the underlying causes of social 
conflict and violence’ (1995). Proclaiming that her government would give ‘the highest 
priority to free market policies’ and calling for end to ‘protective barriers on free trade’ 
across the globe, Kumaratunga argued that an increase in ‘trade and capital flows’, in 
addition to ‘development and transfer of technology, labour migration and foreign direct 
investment’ would help to overcome economic problems (Ibid.). In the same way that 
Boutros-Ghali (1992) claimed that ‘commitment to human rights with a special sensitivity to 
those of minorities’ would help to resolve ethnic conflicts and bring ‘stability’ to states, 
Kumaratunga (1995a) also maintained that the ethnic conflict in Sri Lankan could be resolved 
by building a national identity within which the ‘Sinhala-Buddhists’ and other ‘minority 
communities and religions’ could ‘live together as one people bound by a sense of 
brotherhood’ with ‘equal rights’. Kumaratunga was also quick to point out the economic 
potential of the island in terms of global commerce: given the island’s strategic location at the 
foot of the Indian sub-continent, she argued that Sri Lanka ‘attracts trade-driven flows of 
foreign investment’ and ‘with the acceleration of the economic reform process in the sub-
continent, especially in India, this market would continue to expand rapidly’ (1996). 
The ‘good government’ impression that Kumaratunga’s pro-market arguments created 
in the West was so extensive that the LTTE had no choice but to negotiate with her, in order 
to demonstrate to Western states that it was committed to peace. Despite long being aware of 
her treatment of the ‘Tamil problem’ as ‘a minority issue’ and her belief that the ethnic 
conflict was ‘not a nationality question and that the Tamils were not entitled to the right to 
self-determination and statehood’, the LTTE agreed to talk with Kumaratunga (Balasingham, 
2004: 201 & 204). According to Balasingham, even though Pirapaharan was not convinced of 
the possibility of reaching a negotiated political settlement with Kumaratunga, he 
nevertheless agreed that it would be ‘politically prudent’ to initiate dialogue with her: 
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From the outset, Mr Pirapaharan, the leader of the LTTE, was sceptical of 
Chandrika’s gesture. He felt it was a political gimmick to win the support of the 
Tamils and Sinhalese for the forth-coming presidential elections. I advised him to 
respond to her positively. ‘She is a new leader emerging on the Sri Lankan 
political horizon articulating progressive politics. It would be politically prudent 
on our part to initiate a dialogue with her government to find out whether or not 
she is genuine in resolving the problems of the Tamils,’ I told Mr Pirapaharan. He 
agreed (Balasingham, 2004: 204). 
 
In a further attempt to gain the support of the West, a few weeks after Kumaratunga’s rise to 
power, the LTTE leader even made an official public statement that his organisation was 
‘willing to consider a political solution based on regional autonomy’ (Pirapaharan, 2009: 29). 
Despite these gestures towards the West, when peace talks broke down and hostilities 
resumed in April 1995, it was the LTTE that took the blame. One of the reasons for this was 
that it was the LTTE which first walked away from the negotiating table, claiming that 
Kumaratunga’s government, instead of dealing with the ‘urgent existential problems’ of the 
Tamil people, was preoccupied with developing the ‘Sri Lankan military machine as a 
formidable force’ by purchasing modern weapons, conducting large-scale recruitment and 
training programmes and expanding its navy and air force (Balasingham, 2004: 199 & 329). 
This was further compounded by the fact that Western media remained ‘inaccessible’ to the 
LTTE and was at that time ‘detached and uninvolved’ with the Eelam War (Balasingham, 
2004: 332-333). However, three further reasons could be given for the one-sided approach 
taken by the West in the Eelam War following the break-down of peace talks in 1995. 
Firstly, as a former US ambassador to Sri Lanka has admitted, one of the key reasons 
for the American government’s support for Kumaratunga’s regime was her ‘market-driven’ 
economic policies (Lunstead, 2007: 14). This was coupled with the fact that despite the 
resumption of hostilities, Kumaratunga continued to reiterate at international forums her 
government’s commitment to liberal democratic principles and resolving the conflict by 
devolving power to the Tamils. In her keynote address at a business forum in Seoul, 
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Kumaratunga hinted there to be a link between the success of her market-driven economic 
reforms and her commitment to liberal democracy and devolving power to the Tamils: 
 
I now propose to present you important elements of our new policy framework 
and our future socio-economic perspectives, which I consider will be useful to 
investors among you who may decide to chose Sri Lanka as the base, targeting the 
rest of the world and particularly the emerging Asian Markets.  
My Government is committed to a truly operative democracy, in which the 
rule of law is firmly entrenched. We have implemented important steps to restore 
democracy... The Government is fully committed to restore democracy and peace 
in the North and East. Our policy on the ethnic question and the war in the North-
East has been enunciated clearly and courageously, from the outset. We have a 
vision of Sri Lanka where all communities can live in safety and security, where 
human dignity is valued, and equality of treatment is the accepted norm of public 
life. We
 
believe that all communities must be given the opportunity to express 
their identity and to participate fully in the life of the nation, at the national, 
provincial or local level... 
The theme of the proposals is the devolution of power to Regions while 
safeguarding the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation. We feel 
that the ideal of democracy is better served, by the sharing of power with local 
representative units which will enable persons to determine their own destiny 
(1996).  
 
Although Kumaratunga (2001) did not claim that the LTTE was a Marxist movement (as 
Jayewardene had claimed), she nevertheless argued that the armed struggle it waged 
constituted a serious threat to the island’s ‘economy’ and thus ‘the forward march of the Sri 
Lankan Nation’ as a whole. These arguments of Kumaratunga were in turn endorsed by 
Western states, in particular the US. According to the former US Ambassador Jeffrey 
Lunstead, while successive Sri Lankan governments worked towards building ‘a more 
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market-driven economy’, the presence of the armed conflict continually hampered their 
ability to achieve the island’s ‘economic and commercial potential’ (2007: 11 & 14). 
In addition to advancing market-oriented arguments to gain the support of the West, 
Kumaratunga also unveiled her devolution proposal around the same time that Tony Blair’s 
government decided to devolve power to Scotland in 1997. Her proposals also came out 
around the time when there was a perception in the Western academia that the ethnic conflict 
could be resolved if the Tamils accept their status as a minority (see Hannum, 1996: 306). 
Thus, ‘impressed’ by Kumaratunga’s proposals on ‘substantial devolution in relation to 
finance, law and order, land, education’ and the ‘division of power on the basis of regional 
and central government lists’, the West gave her its blessings (Balasingham, 2004: 337). 
Secondly, the economic policy of the LTTE at that time, in contrast to Kumaratunga’s 
purely market-driven approach, was laissez faire in principle but largely autarkic in practice. 
While no longer advocating socialist economic policies of the 1970s and 1980s, in response 
to the severe economic embargo imposed by the Sri Lankan state since the resumption of 
hostilities in June 1990, the LTTE advocated self-sufficiency as the means for the survival of 
the Tamil nation. In addition to encouraging local production and the opening of its own bank 
for the de-facto state of Tamil Eelam to control the local finance, the LTTE’s police also took 
punitive action against traders who hoarded goods to increase their profits, effectively 
bringing down the price of essential goods sold in its territories (Liberation Tigers, 1992a: 12; 
1994: 2). In effect, in contrast to laissez faire liberalism, the LTTE carried out intervention in 
the market mechanism. Stressing the need for self-sufficiency, Pirapaharan noted: 
 
The establishment of the separate state of Tamil Eelam is the goal of our struggle 
for self-determination. A self-sufficient economic system is the prerequisite for 
establishing this separate state. Therefore, our objective of attaining political 
independence is intertwined with economic independence. The state that we 
intend to establish should not be interdependent but be able to stand on its own 
feet. We must build the foundation for this from now (1994: 9). 
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According to a former head of the LTTE’s economic development arm,68 his organisation 
adopted autarkic economic policies during the early 1990s in response to the Sri Lankan 
state’s economic embargo and not due to any ideological opposition to free trade. Had they 
been given the chance, the Tamil Tigers would have turned to free trade, he claimed: 
 
The Sri Lankan government strangled our economy by imposing an economic 
embargo. Targeting harvests, the government deliberately launched offensives on 
our agricultural lands. The economic embargo also prevented us from transporting 
surplus produce. We therefore turned towards self-sufficiency. 
Nevertheless, we did not devise a centralised economic system in the 
Marxist sense. It was never modelled on Soviet Union’s centralised planning 
system. It was more of a people’s economy than a centralised economy that we 
devised. It was not centralised. Necessity forced us to seek self-sufficiency. We 
wanted equitable development.  
If there was no economic strangulation, we would have opted for open 
market economic policies. Why should we not have done so? Except for Cuba, 
every country in the world follows open market economic policies.  
 
A pronouncement to this effect was also made in March 1995 by Balasingham when he was 
visited by group of Western diplomats. According to a US embassy cable released by 
Wikileaks, Balasingham ‘portrayed free trade (unencumbered by the presence of security 
forces) and the achievement of peace as essential for the successful fulfilment of a 
rehabilitation and reconstruction program’ (Schaffer, 1995). Seven years later, during a press 
conference in April 2002, chaired by Balasingham, Pirapaharan also reiterated the LTTE’s 
post-Cold War commitment to adopting free market economic policies (Tamilnet, 2002).  
However, the LTTE’s commitment to free trade in principle failed to convince the West 
both during the 1990s and in the millennium since the organisation continued in practice to 
                                                            
68 I interviewed this former official of the LTTE, currently exiled in London, in May 2012. He was also a member 
of the LTTE’s peace delegation in the negotiations with Kumaratunga’s government. 
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implement autarkical welfare and development measures in the territories it controlled. As 
Kristian Stokke has noted, ‘rooted in and committed to the rights, welfare and development 
of the Tamil community’, the LTTE’s ‘state institutions’ had ‘authoritarian and technocratic 
tendencies’ that provided ‘a certain administrative efficiency’ but prevented ‘democratic 
accountability’ (2006: 1024). As a consequence, some Sri Lankan academics had even opined 
that since the LTTE was a ‘statist’ organisation, it ‘would not opt for an economic policy 
based on free markets and privatisation’ (Shanmugaratnam and Stokke, 2004: 10). The fact 
that the West continually harboured strong doubts on the LTTE’s economic policies 
throughout the armed conflict was evident by the series of hard-hitting questions posed in 
2003 by Ashley Wills, the former US ambassador to Colombo, a year after the public 
statement made by Pirapaharan on the LTTE’s commitment to free market economic policies:  
 
And in today’s world, my government believes that the right policies are those 
that favour the private sector and individual initiative. On this important point, it 
would be a good thing for the LTTE to declare its intentions. The Sri Lankan 
Government must do a much better job of delivering services and assistance. It’s 
way too slow and bureaucratic. We are not blind to the faults of the Colombo 
Government. But what is the LTTE’s economic ideology? Is it going to try to 
control everything? Is it hoping to pursue autarkic policies that isolate the north 
and east from the rest of Sri Lanka? I’m confident the donors will not agree with 
that (Wills, 2003: 3). 
 
Balasingham once again responded to those questions by reiterating the LTTE’s post-Cold 
War economic policy: ‘I can only say that we are in favour of an open market economy based 
on liberal democratic values’ (2003a: 3). It was a clear indication of the understanding on the 
part of the LTTE’s leadership that if it was to gain political recognition from Western states, 
it had to adhere to the principles of liberal peace, which included accepting an economic 
system based on free trade. Nevertheless, given the consistent pro-market and pro-Western 
approach of successive Sri Lankan governments since 1977, Western states continued to act 
favourably towards the island-state rather than towards the LTTE. 
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Thus, following the breakdown of talks in 1995, unlike Kumaratunga’s government 
which was able to demonstrate both in word and deed its commitment to market-driven 
economic policies, the LTTE was not successful in persuading the West that the Tamil state it 
intended to establish through armed struggle would uphold free trade and private enterprise. 
Thirdly, Western antagonism towards the LTTE seemed to have had exacerbated 
following the breakdown of talks as the West was convinced that the organisation had used 
peace talks as an opportunity to rearm and regroup. Despite Pirapaharan’s announcement in 
November 1994 that his organisation would consider a political solution based on regional 
autonomy, and the statement by Balasingham in March 1995 to Western diplomats that his 
organisation would consider a federal solution modelled on the American or Australian 
systems, the West remained sceptical about the LTTE’s commitment in this regard. This was 
evident from a US embassy cable released by Wikileaks, wherein Teresita Schaffer, the then 
American ambassador to Colombo, not only expressed her doubts on the genuinity of the 
LTTE’s readiness to abandon its secessionist goals and opt for a federal solution, but also 
pointed out that ‘the true extent of the shift’ from a separate state to a federal state was 
‘unlikely to be apparent unless and until serious political negotiations begin’ (1995). 
Thus, during a public speech delivered in July 1995 in Colombo, three months after the 
resumption of the hostilities, Kumaratunga boasted her government’s victory in turning 
Western opinion against the LTTE. Claiming that her government was very well aware from 
the outset that the LTTE would never accept a peaceful political settlement to the conflict, 
she nevertheless opted to talk with them in order to demonstrate to the international 
community that the organisation cannot be persuaded to abandon its violent course: 
 
As we have been very honest in seeking peace; as we as a government went to the 
maximum limit possible to realize peace, the whole world has come to the 
conclusion that it is the LTTE that is at fault. It was at a time when all aid-giving 
countries and organizations, including the World Bank had refused to give even a 
red cent in way of aid since the two previous years to the then existing UNP 
government, that our government came into power. ...
 
But now, these countries 
are eagerly offering generous aid to us. At the Paris conference of the aid-giving 
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countries, just 10 days after the LTTE resumed its war, breaking the cessation of 
hostilities agreement, we were able to secure more aid than the UNP government 
was able to secure in respect of one whole year. In fact, the negotiations for 
obtaining aid was in progress when the LTTE re-started the war. We were still in 
Paris happily reflecting on our success at our aid negotiations and hardly 12 hours 
had elapsed since that event when we heard that two of our aircraft had been shot 
down at the Palaly airport. We continue to receive the agreed aid for development 
(Kumaratunga, 1995a). 
 
Having turned Western opinion against the LTTE, the Sri Lankan state aggressively pursued 
its ethno-theocratic war against the Tamils, claiming it to be a ‘war for peace’ (1995).  
While the full force of the state’s military might was unleashed on the Tamil homeland, 
under the cover of emergency laws, Kumaratunga’s armed forces conducted mass scale 
arrests, killings, and enforced disappearance of Tamil civilians. In 1995, as the government 
forces invaded Jaffna, half a million Tamils were uprooted from their homes. The LTTE 
called it ‘a huge exodus reminiscent of biblical times’ (Balasingham, 2004: 338). Within two 
years following the invasion of Jaffna, at least 350 Tamils became victims of killings and 
enforced disappearances by the Sri Lankan army. Three years later in 1998, a Sri Lankan 
soldier convicted of raping a Tamil school girl ‘claimed that he had knowledge of mass 
graves at Chemmani in Jaffna where the bodies of up to 400 persons killed by security forces 
in 1996 had been buried’ (US Department of State, 1999). While Kumaratunga (1995a) 
claimed to the outside world that her government’s war was not directed at the Tamils, her 
armed forces constantly carried out aerial and artillery attacks on Tamil civilians settlements, 
resulting in high casualties among the Tamil civilian population (Balasingham, 2004: 311). 
Despite being aware of Sri Lanka’s annihilatory tactics against the Tamil population, 
the West continued to demand that the LTTE return to peace talks, while continuing to 
provide military and financial assistance to the state’s war efforts. Once again, history 
repeated itself in Sri Lanka. In a fashion reminiscence of the covert and overt military 
training programmes of the 1980s, the US armed forces began training Kumaratunga’s 
military in counter-insurgency operations. In March 1996, four months after the invasion of 
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Jaffna, the Pentagon launched a military programme codenamed Operation Balanced Style to 
train Sri Lankan troops to fight the LTTE. In 1996, while the US land forces trained the Sri 
Lankan military in jungle warfare, US navy seals conducted ‘a joint exercise off the high 
seas’ (Jansz, 1997). In 1997 this was increased to seven training programmes involving the 
US Green Berets and Navy Seals (Ibid.). The objective was twofold: to drive the LTTE out of 
its final stronghold Vanni,69 and to interdict its international arms shipments at mid-sea. 
As the war intensified, the LTTE also carried out a series of attacks intended to 
destabilise Sri Lanka’s economy. A suicidal truck-bomb attack carried out by the LTTE in 
January 1996 on Colombo’s World Trade Centre saw over one hundred local banking and 
financial institutions sustaining damages. Another attack by the LTTE in the following month 
in Colombo brought destruction to Sri Lanka’s oil reserves. In April the same year, the LTTE 
also attacked Colombo harbour with the objective of reducing the state’s shipping revenue 
(Varatharajan, 1996: 3; Liberation Tigers, 1996: 1). These attacks on Sri Lanka’s economic 
targets posed a serious threat to the flow of foreign capital into the island. In response, the US 
government contacted the LTTE’s leadership in Vanni through unofficial channels and 
conveyed their displeasure. One of the warning issued during such unofficial meetings was 
that if the LTTE did not give up its armed struggle for secession and accept Kumaratunga’s 
devolution proposals, America would move to proscribe it as a terrorist organisation.70  
This warning of America was a clear indication, after the expulsion of the LTTE’s 
international head from the UK in 1991, that the West’s war on the movement was about to 
begin and would converge with Kumaratunga’s ‘war for peace’. The next chapter will 
examine the manifestations of the West’s war on the LTTE from October 1997 to May 2009. 
                                                            
69 After the occupation of Jaffna in 1995 by the Sri Lankan army, the Vanni region became the last stronghold 
of the LTTE. 
70 This was stated by the former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia during an interview with me in 
2010. 
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Chapter VIII 
The West’s war on the LTTE 
 
There were indications in 1995, after peace talks between Kumaratunga’s government and 
the LTTE broke down, that the West’ war against the LTTE would initially manifest on the 
legal front. In October 1995, Manickavasagam Suresh, the LTTE’s chief representative in 
Canada, was arrested on the allegations of being associated with a terrorist organisation. Six 
months later, in April 1996, Nadarajah Muraleetharan, the LTTE’s chief representative in 
Switzerland was also arrested with fourteen other activists on the allegations of raising funds 
for a terrorist organisation. However, as the LTTE was not proscribed as a terrorist 
organisation in both countries, criminal charges could not brought by the authorities against 
the arrested individuals and all of them were eventually released without any charges.71 
Although these arrests were of political significance to the Sri Lankan government, in 
that they took place in two Western countries with large Tamil populations that provided the 
LTTE with funds to continue its armed struggle, they nevertheless cannot be construed as 
wars against the movement. Firstly, the arrests and detention of LTTE officials in Canada and 
Switzerland did not have any effect on the organisation’s ability to continue the armed 
struggle in Sri Lanka. This was because Canadian and Swiss authorities did not take further 
punitive action against the LTTE on their soil, thus allowing the organisation to continue its 
fundraising and political activities unabated in both countries.72 Secondly, there was a lack of 
consensus among Western states on taking concerted action against the LTTE. Although 
America had threatened to ban the LTTE in 1996, neither Britain nor other Western countries 
were in favour of proscribing it. During a press conference in August 1996 in Colombo, 
Malcolm Rifkind, the then British foreign secretary, stated that UK was in not favour of 
proscribing the LTTE because there was no evidence that the funds it was raising in Britain 
were being used for terrorist purposes (cited in Ismeth, 1996). Rifkind even went to the extent 
of claiming that not all the activities of the LTTE can be construed as terrorism:  
                                                            
71  In Canada,  Suresh was  released without  charges  after being detained  for  two  years  and  five months.  In 
Switzerland, while Muraleetharan’s associates were released immediately, he was detained for eight months. 
72 This was stated by a Switzerland‐based former LTTE official during an interview with me in 2009. 
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Clearly they have indulged in terrorist acts and we unreservedly condemn terrorist 
acts that have been carried out by that organisation, just as we would condemn 
terrorist acts committed by any organisation. They may have other activities as 
well, they may have political activities, that one has to be aware of (1996, cited in 
Ismeth, 1996).  
 
Given these factors, the brief legal actions taken by Canadian and Swiss authorities in 1995 
and 1996 against the LTTE can be better conceptualised as war exercises. They were war 
exercises in the sense that they provided Western states with a valuable lesson that if they 
were to wage war on the legal front against a foreign armed resistant movement, they had to 
first enact terrorism laws that would broadly define all armed struggles as terrorism. 
  
 
Converging with Sri Lanka’s ‘war for peace’ 
 
Although by 1997 the LTTE’s attacks on Sri Lanka’s economic infrastructures declined, on 
the military front it continued to flex its muscles, engaging in conventional warfare with the 
Sri Lankan armed forces. This was the consequence of shipments of conventional weaponry 
that it managed to import using funds raised from the Tamil Diaspora in the West. In contrast, 
despite obtaining new military technology and upgraded counter-insurgency training from the 
US, Sri Lankan troops continued to suffer heavy human casualties in the battlefield.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the LTTE was largely a guerrilla outfit and its military 
offensives were hit-and-run in nature. This continued to be the case up until 1997, although 
some of the military offensives launched by the LTTE were also semi-conventional in 
character. However, in May 1997, when the Sri Lankan military launched a major offensive 
code-named Operation Victory Assured, which was portrayed as the final offensive to crush 
the Tamils’ armed struggle, the LTTE revealed its ability to engage in conventional warfare.  
It was against this backdrop that the West’s war on the LTTE began in October 1997. 
In addition to continuing its collaboration in Sri Lanka’s war on the military and financial 
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fronts, the West also waged its own war against the LTTE on the legal, financial and 
diplomatic fronts. There was an unofficial division of roles among Western states in the 
initial stages of this war. The former US Ambassador Lunstead claims that this unofficial 
division of roles developed from the end of 2001 when Norway undertook efforts to sponsor 
a ceasefire between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government:  while the US took a harder 
line towards the LTTE, other Western states, IGOs and IFIs took a softer role (2007: 5-6 & 
35). However, a closer examination of the roles played by America, Britain, and other 
Western states (joined by IGOs and IFIs) in the Eelam War in the post-Cold War period 
indicates that this division of roles had a genealogy going as far back as to October 1997.  
America took the lead in this war against the LTTE by becoming the first Western 
country to proscribe the latter as a foreign terrorist organisation on 10 October 1997. 
Commenting on the proscription of the LTTE, Lunstead notes that although the majority of 
foreign insurgent organisations proscribed by America in 1997 ‘were Islamic/Middle Eastern 
groups which could clearly be seen as threatening the security of U.S. nationals, or the 
national security of the U.S.’, this was not the case in relation to the LTTE, since it ‘had 
never targeted U.S. nationals’ (2007: 15). The American government’s decision to proscribe 
the LTTE, Lunstead notes, was instead ‘based on a determination that peace and security in 
South Asia were important to U.S. national security, and that they were threatened by the 
LTTE’ (Ibid.: 15). What were these national security interests of the US in Sri Lanka?  
Unlike during the Cold War, in the 1990s the US did not have any military interests in 
the island. Both officially and unofficially, the US was not at war with any state in the South 
Asian region. As Lunstead notes, in contrast to ‘the musings of various South Asian 
theorists’, the US did not have any interests in the use of Sri Lanka, in particular ‘the harbour 
at Trincomalee for military purposes’ (2007: 11). Having also developed a ‘strategic 
relationship with India’ there was ‘little reason for the U.S. to irritate India by setting up a 
base in one of its neighbour countries’ (Ibid.). Therefore, America’s proscription of the LTTE 
cannot be attributed to any military interests the former had in the island of Sri Lanka or the 
South Asian region in general, even though it took place against the backdrop of the LTTE’s 
emergence as a national liberation movement capable of engaging in conventional warfare. 
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Instead, America’s proscription was centred on the perceived threat posed by the 
LTTE’s armed struggle to global commerce in Sri Lanka. This was evident from the wording 
of the American statute that proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. Section 301 (a) 1 
of America’s Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 claimed that 
‘international terrorism’ was a threat to America’s global commercial interests: ‘international 
terrorism affects the interstate and foreign commerce of United States by harming 
international trade and market stability, and limiting international travel by the United States’ 
citizens as well as foreign visitors to the United States’. As far as America was concerned, the 
armed struggle that the LTTE waged constituted a threat to global commerce in Sri Lanka.  
The commercial dynamics of America’s decision were also evident from some of the 
actions taken by Washington in the run-up to the proscription of the LTTE. A month before 
proscribing the LTTE, America appointed Shaun E. Donnelly, an economist and a former 
businessman as its ambassador to Sri Lanka. A week before the LTTE was proscribed, the 
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright even announced, after meeting her Sri Lankan 
counterpart Lakshman Kadirgamar, that her government’s ‘appointment of a businessman as 
the new ambassador to Sri Lanka could be taken as a signal for increased commercial co-
operation between the two countries’ (1997, cited in The Sunday Times, 1997).  
Despite being the first Western country to proscribe the LTTE as a terrorist 
organisation, in the initial years America remained reluctant to expend substantial resources 
at the global level against the organisation. This was evident from some of the public 
statements made by Kadirgamar in the wake of the US ban, who claimed that while ‘other 
states will be requested by the government of United States to give due heed’ to the 
proscription of the LTTE and ‘to take supportive measures in their own countries’, it would 
not launch ‘a global crusade’: ‘I don’t think the United States is going to deploy teams all 
over the world to look into LTTE activities. They will primarily be concerned, I think, with 
LTTE activities in the United States’ (1997 cited in, Vittachi 1997). The proscription, 
Kadirgamar noted, would however have ‘an enormous psychological impact’ on the LTTE as 
it was made by the US, the ‘sole superpower’ of the post-Cold War period (Ibid.).  
Moreover, in spite of the ban, the US also continued to communicate with the LTTE 
through backdoor channels. US intelligence agents affiliated with Western NGOs often 
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conveyed the American government’s messages directly to the LTTE in Vanni. The US State 
Department also continued its dialogue with the US-based LTTE supporters, often conveying 
to them messages intended to reach the LTTE in Vanni. Two notable supporters of the LTTE 
whom the US used as its backdoor channels in America were Visvanathan Rudrakumaran, a 
US-based Tamil attorney for the LTTE, and Nagalingam Ethirveerasingham, a US-based 
eminent Tamil athlete.73 In this regard, the former US Ambassador Lunstead notes: 
 
While the U.S. maintained this hard line, it tried to communicate, at several levels 
and both publicly and privately, that a change in LTTE behaviour could lead to a 
change in the U.S. approach. This message was sent through the Norwegians in 
their facilitator role. It was also made repeatedly to various contacts who could 
pass it on to the LTTE. These contacts took place both in Sri Lanka, through 
prominent Tamil politicians; and in the U.S., through Tamil expatriates who were 
known to have close connections to the LTTE (2007: 16). 
 
However, in line with the promises made to the Sri Lankan government, the US stepped-up 
its surveillance of the activities of the LTTE in America, thereby constraining the latter’s 
ability to raise funds in the US. As Lunstead notes, ‘the legal restriction were clear’ that 
America ‘had to block LTTE funds’ (2007: 15). Thus, with the proscription of the LTTE, the 
US government was officially at war with the organisation on the legal and financial fronts.  
Despite the US ban on the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government did not immediately 
follow suit, even though it continued to refer to the movement as a ‘terrorist’ organisation.74 
Kadirgamar claimed that a domestic ban would only keep the LTTE away from negotiations: 
 
One has to weigh up the advantages and the disadvantages. There could be an 
argument that if you ban the LTTE, you are sending a signal at this moment that 
                                                            
73 These were revealed to me by the former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia during the interview 
in 2010. 
74 Four months after  the US ban,  in February 1998,  following a suicidal attack by  the LTTE  in Kandy,  the Sri 
Lankan government proscribed it as a terrorist organisation, closing the doors for political negotiations. 
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you are shutting the door to the possibility of any kind of negotiations. We have 
made it clear over and over again that the question of talking to the LTTE really 
depends, in a sentence, on the LTTE providing us, discretely or otherwise, with 
credible evidence that it is willing to adopt the path of peace, rather than war 
(1997 cited in, Vittachi, 1997). 
 
In essence, the Sri Lankan government believed that the US ban would compel the LTTE to 
give up its secessionist armed struggle and turn towards negotiations. It was therefore seen to 
be imprudent for the Sri Lankan government to take measures that would jeopardise this. 
Almost nine years later in 2006, during his farewell press conference in Colombo, the 
US Ambassador Lunstead acknowledged that America proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist 
organisation in order to compel the latter to give-up its secessionist armed struggle: 
 
The goal is not to ban or not ban the LTTE. The goal is not to get or not get 
money to the LTTE. The goal is for the LTTE to enter the political process, to 
negotiate with the government. And the result, if that happens, if they give up 
violence and do that, will be a different kind of relationship with outside actors. 
Organizations that are banned can be un-banned. The United States has removed 
organizations from the Foreign Terrorist List. In fact, that’s what our goal is – our 
goal is to get the LTTE off the list, not to put them on the list. Because if they 
came off the list it would mean that things were going well (2006).  
 
In making this statement, Lunstead implied that America was using law to achieve the 
objective of disarming the LTTE, which the Sri Lanka state could not do using its military 
might. In other words, the US mobilised law against the LTTE to produce an effect of battle. 
While the US waged war against the LTTE on the legal and financial fronts, for over 
three years until February 2001 Britain took a softer approach towards the movement. In 
following this policy, Britain allowed the LTTE to use its soil to protest against the US ban as 
well as mount a legal challenge. While the LTTE’s leadership in Vanni came out against the 
US proscription by issuing a statement through its international secretariat in London, 
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instructions for its US-based lawyers to mount a legal challenge were issued by its Paris-
based international representative, Velummylum Manoharan, also using the organisation’s 
London address. Unlike in the 1980s when the LTTE denounced America as an imperial 
power, in its public statement in response to the US ban, the organisation only characterised 
the proscription as a ‘regrettable’ decision (Tamilnet, 1997). Thus, in allowing the LTTE to 
use its soil to protest and mount a legal challenge against the US ban, Britain created 
conditions for the movement to adopt liberal democratic forms of dissent. In continuing to 
allow the LTTE to function in the UK, Britain also kept its doors open for directly engaging 
with the organisation, thereby signalling its willingness to mediate in the Eelam War. 
Britain’s softer approach in the West’s war became more apparent when it began 
interacting directly with the LTTE’ chief negotiator Anton Balasingham75 on the feasibility of 
resuming peace talks, upon the latter’s return to London in May 1999 for medical treatment. 
Following Balasingham’s arrival in London Norway also re-entered the scene, also following 
a softer policy towards the LTTE. Norway not only arranged a kidney transplant operation 
for Balasingham in Oslo, but also, with Britain playing a complimentary role, began 
mediating between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.  
The key objective of Britain and Norway following this policy was spelled-out in a 
speech given in Colombo at that time by the then British Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain: 
 
I am convinced that both the Government’s insistence upon the territorial 
sovereignty of the whole island, and the LTTE’s objective of autonomy, can be 
secured. But for that to happen the shooting must stop and the talking must start.  
This is a war neither side can win militarily. It is a conflict that cannot be 
resolved without elected leaders being prepared to sit down with people who may 
well be responsible for barbarous assassinations, but who do have a legitimate 
political programme which needs to be engaged, not shunned. It took far too long 
                                                            
75 Balasingham was  the LTTE’s  theoretician, political advisor, and chief negotiator  from 1979  to his death  in 
2006. He was also a British citizen. 
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for us to learn that lesson in Britain and far too many lives were lost as a 
consequence. 
Equally, the LTTE, like the IRA, need to acknowledge that, whilst a Tamil 
Kingdom constitutionally split from the rest of the island will not receive 
recognition by Europe, the USA or indeed India, the principle of self-
determination and control over most if not all the key policies affecting daily life 
would be supported by the international community (2000). 
 
Through this speech, Hain spelled-out clearly to the LTTE that neither the West nor other 
members of the international community would support its secessionist goal. However, if it 
desired the support of the West, it had to opt for a political settlement under the principles of 
the right to internal self-determination of nations through peace negotiations.  
As Norwegian and British mediatory efforts continued, from November 1999 onwards, 
in a sudden turn of events, the LTTE launched a wave of military offensives recapturing vast 
swaths of territories that it had lost in the previous years to the Sri Lankan armed forces. For 
over six months the military balance turned in the LTTE’s favour. However, from June 2000 
onwards, the ground situation reached an impasse, and the LTTE’s military offensive to 
recapture its former administrative capital Jaffna was stalled in its tracks. Pirapaharan 
attributed this to the ‘unilateral intervention by international states who injected massive 
military assistance to the Sri Lankan military forces at a crucial time in the battle of Jaffna’ 
(2009: 77). When Kumaratunga’s government called for external assistance to prevent Jaffna 
from falling in the hands of the LTTE, while Russia, Ukraine, China, India, Pakistan, and 
Israel despatched military assistance, the US sent a warship which remained in international 
waters off Sri Lanka while the battle for Jaffna continued (The Sunday Times, 2001). Western 
states also stepped-up their collaboration in Sri Lanka’s war by continuing their financial 
assistance to the state, prompting the LTTE to point out that the ‘reins’ for directing Sri 
Lanka ‘towards the path of peace’ was ‘in the hands’ of ‘international states’ which ‘feed the 
economic needs of the country’ (Pirapaharan, 2009: 86)  
In October 2000, Norway initiated a direct dialogue with the LTTE’s leadership in 
Vanni, and submitted a month later a proposal for Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to 
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be adopted by the belligerents. While the proposal stipulated that the Sri Lankan government 
should lift its economic embargo on the flow of non-military items to the LTTE held 
territories, in return the latter had to refrain from carrying out ‘assassinations, bomb 
explosions, sabotage’ and ‘violent intimidation of political groups or individuals’ 
(Balasingham, 2004: 341). Although the MoU was beneficial to the LTTE in that it proposed 
to make living conditions for the Tamil civilian population in its territories better by 
removing Sri Lanka’s economic embargo, it also sought to achieve what Sri Lanka had failed 
to do through military action: had the proposal been implemented, the military threat that the 
LTTE posed to Sri Lanka’s economy and its political leadership would have been removed. 
In other words, the Norwegians tried to use diplomacy to produce an effect of battle. 
However, Norway’s proposals did not take off the ground because Sri Lanka refused to 
accept them. Meanwhile, as the impasse on the battlefield continued, Britain began relaying 
messages to the LTTE that it was contemplating a ban on the organisation.76 In light of this 
warning of Britain, and in an attempt to capitalise on Sri Lanka’s refusal to accept Norway’s 
proposal, the LTTE announced a month-long unilateral ceasefire commencing from the 
Christmas Eve of 2000 to pave the way for the MoU to be implemented (Balasingham, 2004: 
343-344). Although the LTTE extended its unilateral ceasefire for another three months, it 
only remained in force in theory as the Sri Lankan government refused to reciprocate it and 
continued its military offensives. It was in the middle of this unilateral ceasefire that Britain 
gave-up its softer approach and took a harder line towards the LTTE. 
On 28 February 2001, Britain proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation under the 
Terrorism Act 2000, extending the West’s war on the legal and financial fronts to the British 
soil. Section 1 of the Act defined terrorism to be ‘the use or threat’ of ‘action’ that is 
‘designed to influence’ the ‘government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United 
Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom’ (Terrorism Act 2000). By broadly 
defining all forms of violence against states as terrorism and placing the Tamils’ armed 
struggle within this category, Britain sent two messages to the LTTE: on the one hand, the 
LTTE had to abandon its secessionist armed struggle and opt for a political settlement 
                                                            
76 This was stated by the former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia during the interview in 2010. 
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through negotiations if it was to be decriminalised in the international arena; on the other 
hand, like America, Britain would also seek to curb the LTTE’s fundraising activities in the 
UK in order to place constrains on the movement’s ability to engage in conventional warfare.  
The LTTE seemed to have understood this. Thus, despite noting that the British ban 
would ‘impose severe restraints’ on Norway’s peace efforts by encouraging ‘the repressive 
Sri Lankan regime to be more uncompromising, intransigent and to adopt a military path of 
State violence, terrorism and war’, Balasingham declared on behalf of the LTTE that 
‘irrespective of the British ban, the Tamil Tigers would continue with the peace process and 
co-operate with the Norwegian facilitatory efforts’ (2001, cited in Tamilnet, 2001). 
Britain’s desire to push the LTTE towards the negotiating table by clamping down the 
ban became apparent in some of the lenient measures it adopted towards the organisation. 
When the ban came into force, Balasingham cautioned that the ‘peace initiative’ depended 
‘precariously on the leniency or the harshness’ in which the proscription would be 
‘implemented by the law enforcing agencies in Britain’ (2001, cited in Tamilnet, 2001). In 
response, the British government tacitly approved the LTTE to use the British soil to move 
towards the negotiating table by allowing Balasingham to interact with the LTTE leader in 
Vanni and meet Norwegian and other Western officials involved in peace facilitatory efforts 
in London. Despite the ban and being very well aware that Balasingham was a leading 
member of the LTTE, officials from the British Foreign Office, Special Branch officers, 
cabinet ministers in Tony Blair’s government such as the Clare Short, and a number of junior 
ministers were in regular contact with him. As Short herself later acknowledged, the UK 
government allowed Balasingham to use the British soil to take forward the peace process 
and interacted with him to ‘achieve a peaceful outcome’ to the conflict, having ‘realised that 
Balasingham was the most likely person’ who was capable of persuading Pirapaharan ‘to 
reduce his demands for a completely independent state’ (cited in Saunders, 2009: 12-13).  
The leniency of the British authorities in allowing the LTTE to use their soil to move 
towards negotiations was not extended to other activities of the organisation. As a result of 
the British ban, the LTTE had to shift its international secretariat from London to Vanni. Its 
UK branch also had to cease its official functions. Consequently, the LTTE’s fundraising 
capacity in the UK dropped drastically. According to a former Europe-based LTTE official 
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from its international secretariat, the year before the ban came into force, the organisation’s 
UK branch raised more funds than its other overseas branches. However, after the ban came 
into force in 2001, the LTTE’s UK-based funding dropped drastically.77 In addition, British 
Special Branch officers also advised the LTTE’s UK representatives to refrain from 
conducting pro-LTTE cultural and memorial events, and not to use the symbols adopted by 
the LTTE, such as the Tamil Eelam national flag, in rallies and demonstrations.78 This advice 
seemed to have had the intention of preventing the Tamil Diaspora from adhering to a 
national identity based on the LTTE’s secessionist ideology. Until the British ban came into 
force, Tamils in the UK used the Tiger flag as their national flag in public rallies and events. 
However, following the ban, and until the conclusion of the armed conflict, British police 
officers threatened legal action against Tamil protesters who carried the Tiger flag.79 The 
British police also took covert actions against suspected front organisations of the LTTE by 
‘privately encouraging, even pressurising, the owners of halls, sports fields and other venues 
to refuse to hire their sites to pro-independence Tamil organisations’ (Nadarajah, 2009: 121). 
However, these financial and political constraints caused by the West’s war did not 
affect the LTTE’s ability to engage in conventional defensive operations and conduct 
commando-raids against the Sri Lankan military and the state’s economic infrastructures. 
On 28 April 2001, the LTTE thwarted a major offensive launched by Sri Lankan 
troops, code-named Operation Rod Fire, in the southern Jaffna peninsula, effectively 
crippling the ability of the state’s armed forces to launch further military offensives. Despite 
spending millions of dollars to re-arm by purchasing battle-tanks, multiple rocket-launchers 
and other military equipment, Sri Lankan troops could not take on the LTTE (Athas, 2001). 
The decisive nature of the LTTE’s counter attack became evident when a week later 
Colombo-based Sinhala newspapers claimed that the battle had brought about a ‘battlefield 
truce’ (Athas, 2001a), and Colin Powell, the then US secretary of state urged the Sri Lankan 
government, during a meeting with Kadirgamar in Washington, to ‘cease hostilities and start 
                                                            
77 This was stated to me by a former official of the LTTE in Switzerland during an interview with me in 2009. 
78 These were stated by UK‐based Tamil Diaspora activists to me during discussions. 
79 Witnessed by me during a number of rallies and events conducted by the Tamil Diaspora in the UK. 
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peace talks as soon as possible’ (2001, cited in The Sunday Times, 2001a). While reaffirming 
America’s commitment for a negotiated political settlement ‘within the framework of the 
unity and the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka’, Powell was not hesitant to point out that the 
‘conflict cannot be settled with military means’ (2001, cited in The Sunday Times, 2001a). 
During the unilateral ceasefire observed by the LTTE from 24 December 2000 to 24 April 
2001, the US made no such demands to Kumaratunga’s regime. Therefore, Powell’s calls can 
be construed as recognition on the part of Washington that Kumaratunga’s regime was not 
militarily capable of maintaining order within Sri Lanka; the US reached the conclusion that 
Sri Lanka had to abandon its ‘war for peace’ and instead negotiate with the LTTE.  
On 24 July 2001, the LTTE dealt another devastating blow to the Sri Lankan state’s 
war effort by carrying out a major suicidal commando raid on the island-state’s main airforce 
base and the adjoining international airport in close proximity to the capital city of Colombo, 
destroying a total of eleven military and commercial aircraft estimated to be worth five 
hundred million dollars (Balasingham, 2004: 351). This commando raid of the LTTE also 
‘had a crippling effect on the Sri Lankan economy’ (Winslow & Woost, 2004: 1; also see 
Balasingham, 2004: 352). Subsequently, the Annual Report published by Sri Lanka’s Central 
Bank noted that the country’s economy could no longer bear the burden of war (2001).  
As a result of these military victories, the LTTE achieved strategic parity with the Sri 
Lankan armed forces (Solheim, 2011). However, the continuation of the West’s war on the 
legal and financial fronts also meant that the LTTE could no longer engage in conventional 
offensive operations against the Sri Lankan armed forces.80 With the onset of the GWoT, 
Canada and Australia joined forces with America and Britain in the war on the LTTE. 
Although both Canada and Australia did not proscribe the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, 
they placed curbs on its ability to raise funds within their borders. The onset of the GWoT 
also placed constraints on the ability of the LTTE to procure conventional weapons. 
According to Selvarajah Pathmanathan, the LTTE’s former head of overseas arms 
procurement and shipping network, 9/11 had a negative effect on the overseas operational 
                                                            
80 The last major conventional offensive operation that the LTTE launched against the Sri Lankan armed forces 
was on 26 September 2000, which was code‐named Operation Unceasing Waves IV. After this, the LTTE never 
launched any major conventional offensive operations against the Sri Lankan armed forces.   
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capacity of the LTTE: ‘Within 24 hours, the international community led by Western powers 
moved against all armed groups causing immense damage to our operations’ (2010). 
The LTTE only avoided the heat of the West’s military might in the GWoT by 
distancing itself from al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups. In London, Balasingham 
condemned the al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks of 9/11 as ‘a colossal human tragedy’ and a 
‘brutal crime’ (2001, cited in Tamilnet, 2001a). Even though Sri Lanka tried to capitalise on 
9/11 and there was speculation in Colombo that the GWoT would also be extended to the 
LTTE (Kleinfeld, 2004: 121), the US responded by reiterating Powell’s call in May 2001 for 
peace talks. In this regard the US embassy in Colombo noted: ‘There is a distinction between 
the LTTE and the terrorist in the Middle East. So the US has not changed its stand in calling 
on the Sri Lankan Government to go for peace talks’ (2001, cited in de Silva, 2001). 
It was against this backdrop that in December 2001 the pro-Western and pro-market 
party of Ranil Wickremasinghe came to power in Colombo. The LTTE welcomed the new 
regime by announcing a month-long unilateral ceasefire, which Wickramasinghe’s regime 
reciprocated. Two months later in February 2002, with the facilitation of Norway, a ceasefire 
agreement was signed between Pirapaharan and Wickremasinghe (Balasingham, 2004: 355-
358). Wickremasinghe clearly understood that if his government was to rebuild the country’s 
devastated economy, he had no choice but negotiate unconditionally with the LTTE. In his 
first address to the Sri Lankan Parliament after assuming office, Wickremasinghe claimed 
that since the ‘objective of the LTTE’ to set up ‘a separate state in the North East by chasing 
away the Security Forces’ and the state’s goal of ‘eliminating the LTTE through a military 
solution’ had failed, it was prudent for both parties to turn to negotiations (2002). 
Although Kumaratunga’s ‘war for peace’ that began in April 1995 failed to achieve its 
objective, the West’s war on the LTTE partially achieved its goal of bringing the organisation 
back to the negotiating table. With the coming into force of the Norwegian-sponsored 
ceasefire, there was a perception among Colombo-based Western diplomats that their actions 
on the LTTE on the legal, financial and diplomatic fronts had bore fruit. Four months after 
the ceasefire agreement came into force, Wills, the US ambassador to Colombo, noted thus: 
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One of the new factors in the equation here in Sri Lanka is that the Tigers seem 
to have reached the conclusion that they will do a better job of representing the 
interests of Tamil people by pursuing a peaceful solution rather than by 
continuing the so-called armed struggle. ...There is an opportunity for 
negotiations that will give them a respected, secure place in a united Sri Lanka. 
We hope that the Tigers recognise this and will use this opportunity of 
negotiations to push for such an outcome. ...One of the problems with the Tigers 
is that they have in the past taken advantage of legitimate Tamil grievances to 
pursue an extreme, separatist agenda, using violent means. This has brought 
international condemnation to them, the Tigers, and discredited the Tamil cause, 
which otherwise has merit. Now, we are convinced that the Tamils can have 
protection and find respect in a united Sri Lanka, and it is our fervent hope that 
the Tigers realise this too (2002). 
 
The next step that was left for the West was therefore to push the LTTE to accept a political 
settlement as the alternative to secession. To achieve this, however, the West sought to 
continue its war on the LTTE, this time using peace negotiations as a form of coded war. 
Thus, the Norwegian facilitated peace negotiations in Sri Lanka became war by other means. 
 
 
War through ‘peace’ 
 
Having brought the LTTE to the negotiating table, why did the West decide to continue its 
war on the LTTE? A clear answer to this was provided by the former US Ambassador 
Lunstead. They key reason he attributes to the US support for the Sri Lankan state was the 
economic policies of the government of Wickremasinghe: ‘In addition to its willingness to 
engage in a risky peace process, that government was generally friendly to the U.S., in favour 
of market-oriented economic reform, and pro-free trade and globalization’ (Lunstead, 2007: 
5). Wickremasinghe not only ‘came to power with a clear economic reform program, based 
on free market principles’, but his ‘approach was largely in line with U.S. government 
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thinking on economic and international development’ (Ibid.: 14). During his discussions with 
Western officials, Wickremasinghe, while showing an interest in the peace process, also 
‘became really enthused when he talked about free trade’ (Ibid.: 27). 
The West’s decision to continue its war on the LTTE was therefore clearly guided by 
continuing concerns for the security of global commerce in the island. In the same way that 
the West turned a blind-eye to Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic war during the late 1940s, 1950s, 
and 1960s, and then provided military assistance to crush the Tamil armed struggle during the 
1970s, 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, so it continued its war on the LTTE in the 
millennium. Thus, while Wickramasinghe’s government was officially at peace with the 
LTTE, a number of leading Western states were unofficially at war with the movement in 
order to secure the free trade order that was being reinstated in the island.  
In an attempt to ‘deter the LTTE from returning to war’ and to ‘ensure that the Sri 
Lankan military would be more capable if the LTTE did resume hostilities’, the US 
government enhanced its military relationship with the Sri Lankan government. Before 
Wickramasinghe’s government came to power, only low-level military officials of the US 
visited the island – with the exception of the US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s visit 
to Sri Lanka in 1983 during Jayewardene’s government – and these visits were once a year. 
However, after Wickramasinghe’s government came to power, high-level US military visits 
to the island took place, often every month. These visits were not confined to the island’s 
capital but also to the frontlines where the LTTE’s fighting formations and the Sri Lankan 
troops held their lines while the uneasy ceasefire continued. US naval ships also frequently 
visited the island, bringing small American military units to conduct joint exercises with the 
Sri Lankan navy and train its personnel. In addition, Sri Lankan military personnel were 
taken to US military schools and trained there. In September 2002, at the same time that 
formal peace negotiations between the LTTE and Wickramasinghe’s government began in 
Thailand, a military team from the U.S. Pacific Command visited Sri Lanka and spent several 
weeks examining Sri Lanka’s entire military apparatus, providing advice on their weaknesses 
and ways to address them better (Lunstead, 2007: 13, 17, 18). The key advice provided by 
this team to the Sri Lanka military was to enhance the latter’s deep-sea fighting capabilities to 
interdict the LTTE’s arm shipments (Moorcraft, 2012: 110). According to Paul Moorcraft, Sri 
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Lanka’s military victories against the LTTE in the following years depended on 
implementing this advice: ‘The Americans had correctly identified the supply of arms by sea 
as the LTTE’s centre of gravity (although traditional COIN theory usually would select the 
population, the sea in which the fish swim)’ (2012: 110). The Americans also recommended 
that the Sri Lankan airforce should enhance its night-fighting capabilities by upgrading with 
avionics and guided weapons, and purchase more fighter jets from its ally Israel rather than 
from Russia. The Americans also suggested the use of cluster bombs (Moorcraft, 2012: 110). 
US military assistance to Sri Lanka did not stop with this. Two years later, in June 2004, the 
US donated a large warship to Colombo, boosting the Sri Lankan navy’s deep-sea fighting 
capabilities against the Sea Tigers, the LTTE’s naval wing (Lunstead, 2007: 17).  
Following the advice of the US military, the Sri Lankan navy increased its patrols to 
prevent international arms shipments reaching the LTTE. In addition to conducting the deep-
sea operations outside the island’s territorial waters, the Sri Lankan navy also carried out 
incursions into the shallow waters close to LTTE territories. In 2003, while the ceasefire was 
on and negotiations continued, the Sri Lankan navy destroyed two of LTTE ships in 
international waters. In addition, there were also a number of confrontations at mid-sea 
between the Sri Lankan navy and the Sea Tigers (Balasingham, 2004: 419 & 423).  
Before the ceasefire came into force, Wickremasinghe wrote to Pirapaharan claiming 
that the peace process could be strengthened if both parties ‘freeze the ground situation’ 
(Balasingham, 2004: 358). However, with the continuation of the West’s war on the LTTE, 
the military balance began to tilt in favour of the Sri Lankan state. Sensing this, Pirapaharan 
lodged a strong protest with the head of European ceasefire monitors in Vanni: 
 
The ceasefire agreement had severely restrained the freedom of mobility of the 
LTTE’s naval unit, Pirapaharan said. Furthermore, while the Sri Lankan 
government continued to spend millions of dollars to modernise its armed forces 
and weapons systems, the LTTE was not allowed to strengthen its military 
structure, he said. Pointing out General Furuhovde’s theory of ‘balance of forces’ 
as a cardinal factor for the maintenance of ceasefire, the LTTE leader argued that 
Sri Lanka’s build up of military assets, while suffocating the LTTE’s naval force, 
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would shift the balance of forces in Sri Lanka’s favour, and the ceasefire 
agreement would be undermined as a consequence (Balasingham, 2004: 420-421). 
 
The military dimensions of the West’s war against the LTTE also became apparent when 
Western states refrained from prevailing on the Sri Lankan government to implement key 
clauses of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) intended to de-escalate the conflict.  
While Article 1.8 of the CFA stipulated the disarming of Tamil paramilitaries allied to 
the Sri Lankan government forces, Articles 2.2 to 2.4 required the Sri Lankan armed forces to 
withdraw from places of worship, school buildings and private properties and return them to 
their respective owners (Balasingham, 2004: 493-495). However, while Tamil paramilitaries 
continued their covert operations for the Sri Lankan state, government troops also refused to 
abide by Articles 2.2 to 2.4 of the CFA by continuing to occupy privately owned Tamil lands. 
Withdrawing troops from occupied private lands, the Sri Lankan military feared, would 
provide uneven advantage to the LTTE militarily. Thus, Lt.General Sarath Fonseka, the then 
commander of the Sri Lankan army refused to implement the clauses claiming that his troops 
would only consider returning occupied private Tamil lands once the LTTE agreed to ‘disarm 
its cadres and decommission of its long range weapons’ (2003, cited in Balasingham, 2004: 
409). Justifying this tough stand, during a conversion with the US Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage during his tour of the frontline in Jaffna, Fonseka pointed out that the 
LTTE had to be defeated militarily in order for a political settlement to be reached: 
 
General Fonseka had taken me to the front. He told that all the way up on the 
helicopter, all the way as we toured the frontline: ‘No military solution, you know. 
That’s right, there is no military solution to a political problem. But there is a 
military solution to a military problem’ (Armitage, 2011). 
 
Although the US and other Western countries made it clear long before the signing of the 
CFA that the ethnic conflict could not be resolved through military means and the US deputy 
secretary of state even reiterated this point directly to Fonseka (see Armitage 2011), there 
was nevertheless an understanding among Western officials that for this to happen the 
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military balance had to be tilted in the Sri Lankan state’s favour. The decision of the US to 
enhance the fighting capabilities of the Sri Lankan military and the reluctance of Western 
states to prevail upon the Sri Lankan state to withdraw its troops from private Tamil lands 
were clear indications of this. Assuring foreign investors, the then US Ambassador Lunstead 
made this a point in 2006 at the American Chamber of Commerce in Colombo: 
 
Through our military training and assistance programs, including efforts to help 
with counter-terrorism initiatives and block illegal financial transactions, we are 
helping to shape the ability of the Sri Lankan government to protect its people and 
defend its interests. Let me be clear, our military assistance is not given because 
we anticipate or hope for a return to hostilities. We want peace. We support peace. 
And we will stand with the people of Sri Lanka who desire peace. If the LTTE 
chooses to abandon peace, however, we want it to be clear, they will face a 
stronger, more capable and more determined Sri Lankan military. We want the 
cost of a return to war to be high (2006, cited in Lunstead, 2007: 37). 
 
Western efforts to tilt the military balance in Sri Lanka’s favour did not end with these. 
Norway and other European countries, in particular Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and 
Sweden, also took direct efforts to place constraints on the ability of the LTTE to develop its 
military capabilities. These efforts were undertaken through former military officials of those 
European countries who acted as ceasefire monitors. Although the CFA did not stipulate that 
the LTTE should not import arm shipments or conduct recruitment drives for its military 
forces, European ceasefire monitors repeatedly argued that if the organisation sought to 
develop its fighting capabilities during the ceasefire, it would contravene the spirit of the 
ceasefire and thus violate the CFA.81 In 2005, Hagrup Haukland, the then head of European 
ceasefire monitors, even argued that while the Sri Lankan government was justified in 
developing its armed forces during the ceasefire as it ‘had the legitimate responsibility for the 
defence of Sri Lanka and all of Sri Lanka, its land, sea and air’, the LTTE could not follow 
                                                            
81 The former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia told me this during the interview in 2010.  
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suit as it was ‘recognised only in so far as the ethnic conflict and the peace process’ (cited in 
Tamilnet, 2005). Thus, while the US sought to tilt the military balance in Sri Lanka’s favour 
by developing the latter’s military capabilities, in the name of enforcing the ceasefire Norway 
and other European countries also played their part by placing constraints on the LTTE’s 
ability to develop its military forces in par with the Sri Lankan state’s armed forces. 
Norway’s facilitatory efforts in the conflict were also not conducted in isolation. Every 
time Norwegian officials visited Colombo and Killinochi,82 they also travelled to New Delhi, 
and thereafter to Washington before returning to Oslo. According to Suthaharan Nadarajah, 
in making such trips around the world every time they visited Sri Lanka, the Norwegians 
demonstrated to the belligerents that their role in the conflict had the backing of the world’s 
superpower and they were keeping India informed of their moves.83 The US was also careful 
in ensuring that it kept Norway and other Western countries informed of its actions towards 
the LTTE. As Lunstead put it, the US not only maintained ‘a close working relationship’ with 
Norway and other Western countries, ‘there was a conscious effort by the U.S. to maintain 
close consultations with Norway to avoid surprise actions or statements’ (Lunstead, 2007: 
23). Commenting on Norway’s close co-ordination with the US, Pirapaharan reportedly told 
his cadres that while during the Cold War America showed its ‘violent’ face through Israel, in 
the post-Cold War period it revealed its ‘charming’ face through Norway.84 
As before the ceasefire, the West’s war on the LTTE also continued on the legal front. 
One of the key demands of the LTTE to participate in peace negotiations was that the Sri 
Lankan government must lift the ban on the organisation. Thus, the first round of negotiations 
between both parties commenced in September 2002 only after Wickramasinghe’s 
government delisted the LTTE. However, despite Sri Lanka’s delisting, the US and UK 
governments did not lift their bans on the LTTE. This was also the case with enforcement 
actions taken by Canada and Australia on the LTTE since 9/11. In the UK, in which 
Balasingham continued to reside and from where he led the organisation’s peace activities, a 
                                                            
82 The administrative capital of the LTTE during the ceasefire. 
83 This was stated by Nadarajah, during an interview with me in September 2011. 
84 This was also stated by the former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia in 2010. 
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representative of the LTTE who sent non-military equipments to Vanni in 2004 was 
explicitly warned by the British Special Branch officers not to do so (Saunders, 2009: 8). 
Making an official announcement on his government’s decision to continue the ban on the 
LTTE despite Wickramasinghe’s decision to delist it domestically, the then US Ambassador 
Wills noted that Sri Lanka’s action would not have any influence on America’s proscription:  
 
[W]e will make our own decision about taking the LTTE off our list of so-called 
foreign terrorist organisations (FTO). So a decision by Sri Lanka to de-ban the 
LTTE will be noted by our government, but it will have nothing to do with our 
own sovereign decisions. We have been pretty open about what it would take 
from the Tigers to qualify for being de-listed by the United States. Renouncing 
terrorism, renouncing the use of violence. These would be statements by the 
Tigers that would be favourably noted by our government. But then, this would 
have to be followed up by a period when we would match the LTTE’s deeds with 
its words (2002). 
 
In continuing their bans on the LTTE, Western states made it clear that regardless of the 
former’s engagements with the Sri Lankan government for a political settlement through 
negotiations, their war would continue until the desired outcome (the LTTE giving-up its 
secessionist armed struggle and demonstrating this in both word and deed) is achieved.  
The West’s war on the LTTE on the financial front was also extended in the form of 
development aid. Despite recognising that the LTTE controlled 80% of the Tamil homeland 
and was operating a de-facto state at that time, Western states refused to channel 
development funds either directly to it or through joint mechanisms established by 
Wickramasinghe’s government and the organisation. Most of Western funding to the LTTE 
controlled territories were channelled through the Sri Lankan government’s civil service. The 
only direct international funding that the LTTE received from the West was Norway’s 
financial assistance for the organisation’s peace secretariat and funds from the UNICEF for 
the demobilisation and integration of child soldiers in the LTTE’s ranks. Although the Tamil 
Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), the LTTE’s rehabilitation arm, did receive some direct 
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funding from Western states and INGOs for demining and reconstruction activities, strong 
conditions were attached to such aid (Saunders, 2009: 10-12). One of such conditions was 
that TRO must purchase its goods from Sinhala traders and employ Sinhala workers in 
reconstruction work. Another condition that was imposed on LTTE affiliated NGOs for 
receiving foreign aid was their radical transformation in accordance with Western liberal 
principles (Walton, 2008: 153). There were also attempts by Western officials to entice the 
LTTE to set up a free trade zone in Vanni in return for developing its territories.85  
In essence, the West’s war on the LTTE during the ceasefire was intended to achieve 
two effects: on the one hand, the LTTE had to be prevented from taking advantage of the 
ceasefire and peace negotiations to develop its financial and thus military capabilities 
(Lunstead 2007:15-17); on the other hand, the limited financial support rendered to the 
LTTE, both directly and through its affiliated NGOs, was intended to enhance free trade 
within the island as well as to compel the organisation to adhere to liberal principles. 
The West’s objective in continuing its war on the LTTE became apparent during a 
mini-donor conference in Oslo in November 2002. At the conference, the then US Deputy 
Secretary of State Armitage demanded the LTTE to renounce its secessionist armed struggle:  
 
We urge the LTTE to go one step further and add to this commitment a public 
renunciation of terrorism and of violence – to make it clear to the people of Sri 
Lanka and indeed to the international community – that the LTTE has abandoned 
its armed struggle for a separate state; and instead accepts the sovereignty of a Sri 
Lankan government that respects and protects the rights of all its people (2002).  
 
Although a few days after the mini-donor conference in Oslo the LTTE agreed to explore a 
federal political solution to the conflict, the continuation of the West’s war exacerbated the 
situation by creating suspicions within the organisation about the motives of the West in 
engaging with it. In this regard, the LTTE’s chief negotiator Balasingham noted:  
 
                                                            
85 This was stated by the former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia in 2010. 
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The Oslo Donor Conference signalled a significant turning point in the Sri 
Lankan peace process. It created a space and an opportunity for powerful 
international states to become more involved in the peace process with divergent 
economic and geo-political interests. ...Following the Oslo Donor Conference 
with America, the European Union and Japan playing dominant roles, the 
development aid was tied to the progress of the talks; the peace dividend was 
pledged as reward for the renunciation of armed struggle and quest for secession 
(2004: 400).  
 
As the ceasefire and peace negotiations also failed to deliver tangible results to the Tamils, 
some hawkish elements within the Tamil community began to accuse the LTTE of betraying 
the Tamil cause by opting to explore a federal solution. Dharmaratnam Sivaram, a Tamil 
military analyst claimed that ‘India and the US-UK-Japan Bloc’ were trying to influence and 
manage Sri Lanka’s peace process to promote and consolidate their respective strategic and 
economic interests’, and if the LTTE continued to remain in ‘semi-statehood’, that would 
become ‘an entrapment’ for the organisation (2003; 2003a). The actions of the West thus 
weakened the case of peace ‘doves’ within the LTTE and the Tamil community and 
‘reinforced the hawks’ arguments of a ‘peace trap’ (Nadarajah & Vimalarajah, 2008: 45). 
This had far reaching consequences in terms of bringing peace to the island and 
realising the political aspirations of the Tamils. In April 2003, in retaliation for America’s 
refusal to grant visa for its delegation to attend a donor conference in Washington, the LTTE 
withdrew from peace negotiations and demanded Wickramasinghe’s government to fulfil its 
election promise of setting up an interim administration for the Tamil homeland. The crisis 
was further exacerbated in June 2003 when Western states set up an informal mechanism, 
known as the Tokyo Co-Chairs, during an international donor conference in Tokyo to manage 
peace negotiations and the disbursement of international aid in Sri Lanka. The Tokyo Co-
Chairs also outlined a ‘road-map’ for future negotiations. The LTTE not only boycotted the 
donor conference but also rejected the road-map (Balasingham, 2004: 460).  
A notable aspect of the Tokyo donor conference was the upgrade in the role of Western 
states in the Eelam War. Norway first entered the conflict as the facilitator of a ceasefire and 
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peace negotiations. After the signing of the CFA in 2002, Norway and its European partners 
assumed the role of ceasefire enforcers. A year later in 2003, in forming the Tokyo Co-
Chairs, Norway, America, the EU and Japan assumed the role of arbitrators. 
Among other things, the Tokyo road-map had two key milestones that angered the 
LTTE: one of the milestones was that the LTTE had to renounce its secessionist goal and 
accept a federal political solution; the other milestone that drew fire from the LTTE was 
demilitarisation of the organisation (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003).  
However, the Tokyo road map also had strong commercial dynamics. It not only 
endorsed Wickramasinghe’s pro-market economic reform programme entitled Regaining Sri 
Lanka as a ‘sound macro-economic policy’, but also claimed that the island’s economic 
growth can be ensured if this programme was implemented (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, 2003). In the Preface to Regaining Sri Lanka, Wickremasinghe claimed that the 
island’s ‘economic performance’ could have improved decades ago had the ‘process of 
liberalisation and reform’ brought in by Jayewardene in 1977 not ‘lost its momentum’ 
(Government of Sri Lanka, 2002: iii). Therefore, the key to regaining control of Sri Lanka’s 
‘economic future’, the document noted, was the acceleration of ‘the process of privatisation 
of commercial activities’, the introduction of ‘new legislation in many key economic areas’, 
and reducing ‘trade and regulatory barriers’ (Ibid.: 2). When Wickramasinghe first published 
his economic reform plan, the US, other Western states and IFIs showed their enthusiasm in 
seeing its implementation (Lunstead, 2007: 27). The Tokyo road-map, however, went a step 
further by endorsing it as a sound economic policy, revealing the commercial dynamics of the 
West’s war on the LTTE and the Norwegian-led Western intervention in general. 
When the Tokyo road-map was published in 2003, Western donors had come to the 
conclusion, based on Wickramasinghe’s ‘pro-peace, pro-reform, and pro-Western’ program, 
that Sri Lanka would become a ‘potential liberal peacebuilding success story’ (Sorbo et al., 
2011: 44). This was evident from the Tokyo road-map itself. While upholding 
Wickramasinghe’s economic liberalisation programme, the road-map also demanded that the 
federal political settlement to the conflict ‘should be based upon respect for human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003). Had the LTTE 
accepted the Tokyo road-map, it would have effectively abandoned its secessionist armed 
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struggle and accepted a federal political solution adhering to the key tenets of liberal peace: 
human rights, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and a globalised free market economy. 
However, given the West’s decision to continue its war against the LTTE by tilting the 
military balance in the Sri Lankan armed forces favour, and with no tangible result being 
achieved through negotiations for the Tamils, the organisation took a hardline. This was 
further compounded by Wickramasinghe’s claims that he had set up an ‘international safety 
net’ to prevent the LTTE from returning to war if peace talks failed (2003, cited in 
Balasingham, 2004: 450). Thus, in its response to the Tokyo road-map, the LTTE lambasted 
Wickramasinghe’s government ‘for complicating the peace process by allowing undue and 
unwarranted interference by extra territorial forces in the ethnic conflict’ (Balasingham, 
2004: 460). The LTTE further claimed that by seeking refugee in the ‘international safety 
net’ Wickramasinghe’s ‘regime had shifted the peace process from third party facilitation to 
the realm of international arbitration by formidable external forces’ that would in the future 
have ‘far-reaching consequences to the political and economic destiny of the island’ (Ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the war of words that ensued between Wickramasinghe’s government and 
the LTTE did not immediately turn-out to be an all-out confrontation, and the ceasefire 
continued to hold its ground. A few months later, the LTTE’s eastern commander 
Vinayagamoorthy Muraleetharan, who also represented it in peace talks, defected to the 
government’s side with his loyalists. One and a half years later, Naveen Dissanayake, an aide 
to Wickremasinghe, claimed that it was their government that engineered the split within the 
LTTE, and as a consequence of the international safety net they created ‘American and 
Indian forces will fight the LTTE if Liberation Tigers’ leader Pirapaharan opts to wage a war’ 
(2005, cited in Uthayan, 2005: 1 & 16). Muraleetharan’s defection to the government side 
took place at the same time that Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the island-state’s president, 
dissolved the parliament and held new elections. Wickremasinghe lost the election and 
Kumaratunga’s party returned to power. Immediately after coming to power, while the 
ceasefire continued, Kumaratunga’s government capitalised on Muraleetharan’s defection 
and turned his men into a paramilitary unit to launch a proxy war against the LTTE. 
The proxy war was both violent and bloody. While Sri Lanka’s new paramilitary group 
conducted targeted assassination of Tamil journalists, academics and moderate politicians 
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allied to the LTTE and the organisation’s political and military leaders, the Tamil Tigers also 
responded by directly targeting the government’s paramilitary and intelligence personnel and 
launching guerrilla attacks on the armed forces using their civilian militia. The only event 
that temporarily halted the proxy war from becoming an all-out war was the Boxing Day 
tsunami of 2004. The tsunami destroyed the coastal bases and assets of both the LTTE’s 
naval wing and the Sri Lankan navy. Fearing that taking advantage of the tsunami the LTTE 
may launch an offensive to capture government held territories, under the cover of tsunami 
rescue operations, American naval ships swiftly moved near Sri Lanka’s coastal territories.86 
Although no such offensives of the LTTE took place, within weeks the proxy war escalated. 
The most high-ranking casualty of the proxy war was Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister 
Kadirgamar. Even though the LTTE denied involvement in his killing, it was with 
Kadirgamar’s assassination that the West endorsed Sri Lanka’s return to emergency laws.  
With Kadirgamar’s assassination, the West also seemed to have come to the conclusion 
that if the LTTE did not opt to voluntarily give-up its secessionist armed struggle, concerted 
international action had to be taken to defeat it both politically and militarily. This was 
evident from a tough-worded letter sent to Pirapaharan by the then Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Jan Peterson in the wake of Kadirgamar’s assassination in August 2005: 
 
The killings and counter-killings over the last few months have been watched with 
mounting concern by Norway and the international community. Along with the 
continued recruitment of children to the LTTE, this has created distrust about the 
LTTE’s intentions as regards the peace process.  
The assassination of Foreign Minister Kadirgamar has exacerbated the 
situation. It is not up to Norway to draw conclusions about the criminal 
investigations now under way in Colombo, or on any other judicial matter in 
relation with the killings. However, public perception both in Sri Lanka and 
internationally is that the LTTE is responsible. This public perception is a political 
reality.  
                                                            
86 This was stated by the former political official of the LTTE exiled in Malaysia in 2010. 
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The LTTE needs to respond to this situation in a way that demonstrates 
continued commitment to the peace process. I see it as my obligation to make 
clear to you the political choice now facing the LTTE. If the LTTE does not take a 
positive step forward at this critical juncture, the international reaction could be 
severe (2005).  
 
In issuing this warning, Peterson delivered two important messages to the LTTE: firstly, if 
the organisation continued engage in actions intended to tilt the military balance in its favour, 
Norway and its other Western partners, like America, Britain, Canada and Australia, would 
take a harder line towards it; secondly, the West was losing its patience in expecting the 
movement to give-up its secessionist armed struggle through peace negotiations.      
However, as there was only a few months left for the island-state’s presidential 
elections to take place, Western states held back from taking concerted action against the 
LTTE. With Kumaratunga retiring from office,87 Western states expected Wickremasinghe to 
return to power at the presidential election. For this to happen, though, Wickremasinghe 
needed the support of the LTTE, which held both political and military monopoly over the 
votes of the island’s Tamil population. Therefore, Western states limited their retaliation for 
Kadirgamar’s assassination to imposing an EU-wide travel ban on the LTTE’s peace 
delegation, while also warning at the same that the EU was ‘actively considering the formal 
listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation’ (European Union-UN, 2005). 
Contrary to the expectations of the West, Wickremasinghe lost the presidential election 
in November 2005, and Kumaratunga was succeed by Mahinda Rajapaksa who advocated 
statist economic policies. In his election manifesto Mahinda Chintana, Rajapaksa promised 
to overturn a number of key free market policies that his predecessors, commencing with 
Jayewardene, brought into force in the island. Claiming that the ‘the short-sighted policies’ of 
his predecessors contributed to the ethnic conflict, with ‘foreign countries unnecessarily 
intervening’ in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs, Rajapaksa announced that upon coming to power 
                                                            
87 Under Sri Lanka’s constitution  in  force at  that  time, an  individual was only allowed hold  the office of  the 
president for two terms. However, this was amended in 2010 by the Sri Lankan Parliament. 
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he would ‘arrive at an agreement in relation to regional security and peace’ with India and 
‘obtain an Asian cooperation with China, Russia and Pakistan’ (2005: 34). Although 
Rajapaksa promised to ‘hold open and frank discussions’ with the US, EU, Japan and 
Norway, he refrained from suggesting the possibility of forging an alliance with them (Ibid.: 
39). In terms of the island’s economy, Rajapaksa promised to formulate a ‘national economic 
policy’ by ‘integrating the positive attributes of free market with domestic aspirations in 
order to ensure a modern and balanced approach where domestic enterprises can be supported 
while encouraging foreign investments’ (Ibid.). These announcements were a marked shift 
from his predecessor Kumaratunga and rival Wickramasinghe’s free market economic 
policies. The Mahinda Chintana without doubt set out Rajapaksa’s intention to interfere in 
the market mechanism. Making further announcements on his intention to extend his 
interference into the global markets, Rajapaksa promised to launch a programme ‘to provide 
capital, technology, and knowledge required by the local entrepreneurs to penetrate into 
international markets’, and take measures ‘to supply goods to consumers’ in the island ‘at 
reasonable prices’ (Ibid.: 40). Rajapaksa also ruled out the privatisation of the ‘enterprises of 
banking, power and energy and transport and ports as well as national assets’ (Ibid.). 
Although Rajapaksa came to power through Sri Lanka’s democratic electoral process, 
his victory became possible only after the LTTE decided to boycott the election, effectively 
directing 2.5 million northeastern Tamils to refrain from casting their votes. Given 
Rajapaksa’s hardline attitude towards the Tamil national question, had the Tamils voted in 
the election, there was no doubt that Wickremasinghe would have won with a landslide 
victory. The narrow margin of 180,786 votes that Rajapaksa gained over his rival was a clear 
evidence for this (Tamilnet, 2005a). The LTTE boycotted Sri Lanka’s presidential election 
for two reasons: firstly, it did not want Wickremasinghe to win the elections as it was angered 
by the announcement of his aide that it was his government that engineered the split within 
the organisation, and that American and Indian troops would fight the LTTE on behalf of Sri 
Lanka (Uthayan, 2005: 1 & 16); secondly, given Rajapaksa’s anti-Western stance, the LTTE 
also expected Sri Lanka to lose Western support once he assumed office.88 
                                                            
88 This was  the belief of  the LTTE’s  leadership, according  to  the  former political official of  the LTTE exiled  in 
Malaysia, who stated this to me in 2010. 
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This decision of the LTTE to tacitly bring Rajapaksa to power and defeat the pro-
market and pro-Western Wickremasinghe, however, caused anger in the West. Condemning 
the LTTE for engineering the defeat of Wickremasinghe, the US noted thus: 
  
The United States regrets that Tamil voters in the northern and eastern parts of the 
island did not vote in significant numbers due to a clear campaign by the LTTE. 
As a result, a significant portion of Sri Lanka’s people were deprived of the 
opportunity to make their views known. The United States condemns this LTTE 
interference in the democratic process (2005, cited in The Sunday Times, 2005a). 
 
From the inception of the Tamil armed national liberation struggle, the West considered the 
LTTE to be threat to global commerce in Sri Lanka. However, the LTTE’s decision in 2005 
to tacitly bring Rajapaksa to power was seen by the West, as the wordings of the US 
statement indicate, to have had the motive of interfering in the democratic process and bring a 
statist government that would pose an additional threat to global commerce within the island. 
On the other hand, in order to avoid being isolated by the West, until the conclusion of 
the armed conflict Rajapaksa was careful in ensuring that he did not reverse much of his 
predecessors’ free market economic policies. As a consequence, when Norwegian-facilitated 
talks between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government in Geneva in February 2006 failed to 
move beyond the first round, while tacitly giving Rajapaksa the green light to launch an all-
out war on the rebels, the West’s war on the LTTE was also accelerated and extended to all 
domains of power. It was a war of concerted Western action on all fronts to defeat the LTTE. 
 
 
Towards the annihilation of the LTTE 
 
Canada was the first Western government to accelerate the West’s war on the LTTE on the 
legal and financial fronts. In April 2006, the Canadian government proscribed the LTTE, 
claiming that its action had been ‘long overdue’ (cited in Tamil Week, 2006). A month later, 
the EU followed suit, imposing a ban on the LTTE’s fundraising and political activities in its 
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member states. The EU ban came into force a few weeks after the LTTE’s assassination 
attempt on Sri Lanka’s army commander Fonseka. According to a US embassy cable released 
by Wikileaks, few days before the EU ban came into force, Amandeep Singh Gill, the Indian 
first secretary in Colombo, had agreed with his American counterpart that if the LTTE was to 
be forced to abandon its armed struggle, ‘greater international cooperation on interdicting the 
Tiger fundraising and weapons procurement’ should be initiated: the LTTE had to be made to 
understand that the the international community would not ‘fire paper missiles’ and therefore 
it was necessary to take action beyond mere proscriptions (Lunstead, 2006a). 
Two more US embassy cables by released Wikileaks have brought to light that from 
2006 onwards, India and a number of South East Asian countries actively participated in the 
West’s war on the LTTE. According to the first cable, in May 2006, at the same time the EU 
ban on the LTTE came into force, America and India formed ‘parallel demarches’ to deal with 
the Eelam War (Mulford, 2006). According to the second cable of the US embassy, the US 
Department of State took the initiative to curb ‘the LTTE’s activities of illegal fundraising 
and illicit arms procurement’ by establishing an international Contact Group made up of 
sixteen countries,89 ten of which were from the West (Pyatt, 2006).  
Thus, in August 2006, as the LTTE launched offensive operations against the Sri 
Lankan troops in Trincomalee and Jaffna, a series of raids and sting operations were 
conducted by the FBI in collaboration with the Canadian authorities, which resulted in the 
arrest of a number LTTE activists, both in America and Canada. Further arrests were also 
made in the following month in Singapore on the information provided by American law 
enforcement authorities. The majority of the individuals arrested during these operations were 
accused of attempting to procure anti-aircraft missiles for the LTTE to cripple the Sri Lankan 
airforce. The Sri Lankan airforce commander Air Chief Marshal Roshan Goonetilke 
appreciated this action of the US to prevent the LTTE from acquiring anti-aircraft missiles: 
 
                                                            
89 According to the US embassy’s cable, the International Contact Group to counter the LTTE was made up of 
representatives  from Australia, Belgium,  Canada,  France, Germany,  India,  Indonesia,  Italy,  Japan, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom and United States (Pyatt, 2006). 
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They [the LTTE] had Stingers and SAM-7 Strelas. They also had SAM-14s and 
16s and were trying to get the SAM-18s. A low-flying helicopter would have 
found it difficult to survive an 18. We are grateful to the US for stopping that 
procurement of SAM-18s (2012, cited in Moorcraft, 2012: 70). 
 
In 2007, when the LTTE launched airstrikes using light aircrafts converted into bombers in 
Colombo, additional arrests were made in France, Australia and the UK. In June 2008, as the 
armed conflict intensified, further large scale arrest of LTTE activists also took place in Italy.  
The West’s war on the LTTE was also extended to the military domain in the form of 
providing intelligence and technical equipment to the Sri Lankan navy to interdict the 
organisation’s arms ships (Rajapaksa 2013b; Moorcraft, 2012: 59). Between 2006 to 2007, 
with the help of Indian and US intelligence, and using deep-sea vessels donated by India and 
America, the Sri Lankan navy attacked and sunk eleven arm ships of the LTTE (Moorcraft, 
2012: 59). Of these, four of them were sunk 1,620 nautical miles southeast of Sri Lanka, off 
the coast of Indonesia and close to Australia’s Cocos Islands (Ibid.: 60). In this regard, the Sri 
Lankan Secretary of Defence Gotabaya Rajapaksa stated: ‘The Americans were very, very 
helpful. Most of the locations of these ships were given to us by the Americans’ (2013b). 
According to a cable released by Wikileaks, in December 2006, the American 
Ambassador Robert O.Blake (2006) conveyed to his Indian counterpart in Colombo his 
government’s intention to ‘help Sri Lanka interdict LTTE arms shipments’. Blake also briefed 
his Indian counterpart the American government’s intention to ‘install by mid-2007 land-
based radars in Trincomalee, Point Pedro (in Jaffna), and Mannar to improve Sri Lanka’s 
capability to detect and track sea-based weapons and other smuggling by the LTTE’ (Ibid.). 
Eleven months later, in November 2007, the US government donated to the Sri Lankan navy 
‘a radar-based maritime surveillance system and several Rigid Hull Inflatable boats (RHIBs)’ 
to ‘help the Sri Lankan navy to interdict arms shipments to the LTTE’ (Tamilnet, 2007). In the 
previous month, when one of LTTE’s suicidal commando raids destroyed seventy percent of 
Sri Lankan air force’s ‘airborne surveillance capacity’, US defence contractors, with the 
blessings of the American embassy in Colombo, moved to replace them within a month (see 
Blake, 2007a). In January 2008, Canada also sold a high-frequency surface wave radar to the 
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Sri Lankan navy to enhance its surveillance capacities against the LTTE (Tamilnet, 2008). 
The UK also played its role in this war by licensing arms exports to Sri Lanka. According to 
Joan Ruddock, a Labour MP, in the year 2007 alone seven million pounds worth of ‘arms 
were licensed for delivery to Sri Lanka’ (cited in Tamil Guardian, 2007). In August 2009, 
four months after the conclusion of the armed conflict, four House of Commons committees 
even expressed concerns that British weapons may have been used by the Sri Lankan 
government forces against Tamil civilians (Prince, 2009). Thus, unlike when the West’s war 
on the LTTE began in October 1997, wherein the objective was to compel the LTTE to 
voluntarily give-up its secessionist armed struggle and accept a political solution, from 2006 
onwards the objective of this war became the organisation’s military defeat.  
This was also evident from the way that Rajapaksa’s government accelerated its war 
from September 2006 onwards. Reports in the Sinhala media have even claimed that 
Rajapaksa intensified his war against the LTTE after the US President George Bush told him 
at a private meeting in New York in September 2006 to ‘finish off’ the LTTE (Fernando, 
2011). Although these reports have not been officially confirmed either by Washington or 
Colombo, there are credible indications that such a statement may have been made personally 
by Bush himself. According to the LTTE’s official organ Liberation Tigers, during the second 
round of peace talks held in Geneva in October 2006, when its peace delegation refused to set 
a date for the third round of negotiations, the then Norwegian minister Erik Solheim told the 
rebels’ delegation that ‘American President George Bush would not consider it to be a wise 
decision for the LTTE to avoid determining the date for the next round of talks’ (Kaviyalagan, 
2007: 7). This was a clear indication that if the LTTE did not remain in the path of peace and 
voluntarily give-up its secessionist armed struggle, the West would seek to defeat it.  
Two years after the armed conflict reached its conclusion, the US Assistant Secretary of 
State Blake officially acknowledged that his government ‘wanted to see the defeat’ of the 
LTTE (US State Department, 2011). A similar admission was also made by Alistair Burt, 
UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office minister for South Asia in the same year: ‘Let there 
be no doubt that for the UK the end of the military conflict, and the removal of terrorism as a 
daily threat to the lives of the Sri Lankan people is without question a good thing’ (2011). 
According to a US embassy cable released by Wikileaks, a day before Sri Lanka announced 
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its victory over the LTTE, America’s mission in Colombo sent a draft statement to be 
published upon the official announcement on the end of armed conflict by the US Department 
of State in Washington. The draft noted: ‘The United States welcomes the fact that the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) an organization that has terrorized the people of Sri 
Lanka for decades, no longer control any territory within Sri Lanka’ (Blake, 2009). 
The West’s desire to see the defeat of the LTTE became more apparent in the final 
months of the armed conflict. In the closing months of 2008, when the LTTE requested the 
Norwegian minister Solheim to visit their territory to discuss the possibility of bringing about 
a ceasefire and prevent a major catastrophe in the Vanni region, he responded by stipulating 
the organisation to agree for disarmament and demobilisation (2011). Similarly, in January 
2009, when the LTTE’s political head Balasingham Nadesan directly contacted the American 
Deputy Assistant Defence Secretary James Clad to help arrange a ceasefire, he responded by 
making the same demands and warned that if the rebels failed to heed to his call, they would 
meet their ‘cul-de-sac’.90 The following month, when the LTTE’s delegation met Tore 
Hattrem, the Norwegian ambassador to Colombo, in Malaysia, they were told that unless the 
‘LTTE agreed to lay down arms’ and ‘surrender’ there would be no ceasefire (Pathmanathan, 
2012). Later, during a media interview, Solheim  (2012) claimed that had the LTTE agreed to 
lay down its arms and surrender, America and India would have ‘forced’ the Sri Lankan 
government of Rajapaksa to stop the war and Tamil civilian lives would have been saved. 
As the armed conflict reached its catastrophic stage, Tamil Diaspora lobby groups 
repeatedly requested Western states to invoke R2P (Responsibility to Protect) and save Tamil 
civilians. Commenting on the reluctance of the West to carry out a Kosovo-style military 
intervention in Sri Lanka to save Tamil civilians, Simon Hughes, the deputy leader of Liberal 
Democrats argued that no one in the West contemplated such a move as ‘Sri Lanka was half-
way across the world’.91 However, V.Ravi Kumar, the Secretary General of British Tamils 
Forum (BTF), a UK based Tamil lobby group, claimed that he was able to infer from his 
                                                            
90 Direct e‐mail exchanges between  the  LTTE and  the American government obtained  from  the archives of 
Paris‐based Tamil weekly, Eelamurasu, in 2011. 
91 Hughes stated this to me during the interview on 28 September 2010. 
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organisation’s discussions with Western diplomats that the West had given the green light for 
Rajapaksa’s regime to defeat the LTTE long before it realised that the conflict would reach its 
catastrophic proportions. Thus, when the armed conflict reached its catastrophic stage, it was 
too late for the West to reverse its earlier decision.92 However, according to a senior official 
of a UK-based human rights group, Western states did not heed to the Tamil call for an 
intervention to save civilian lives in the last phase of the armed conflict because the Tamil 
Diaspora took a pro-LTTE approach: instead of condemning the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government in equal terms, the Tamil Diaspora only condemned Rajapaksa’s regime while 
not raising a word against the LTTE. Had the Tamil Diaspora shunned the LTTE, the West 
would have certainly intervened and saved the Tamil civilians, he claimed.93   
These are clear indications that despite having the leverage to stop Sri Lanka’s war and 
bring a ceasefire, the West did not do so in order to ensure the defeat of the LTTE, allowing in 
the process mass-scale civilian deaths. As the statement of Solheim exemplifies, as far as the 
West was concerned, the LTTE had two choices: either it had to agree for its defeat by opting 
to abandon its secessionist armed struggle and agree for surrender, or face annihilation from 
the Sri Lankan military. Thus, as the UN’s Humanitarian Co-ordinator Sir John Holmes noted 
three years after the end of the armed conflict, although Western states did not want to see 
huge casualties on the part of the Tamil civilian population, they were not prepared to 
intervene and save them because they wanted to see the LTTE’s defeat: 
 
There was a bit of a diplomatic dance around all this, with everybody knowing 
that the end of this was going to be an inevitable military victory for the 
government and the inevitable defeat of the LTTE, and it was a question of 
waiting for that to happen, hoping it happened as quickly as possible and that it 
happened with as few civilian casualties as possible (2012). 
 
                                                            
92 Kumar made this statement to me during an interview on 26 April 2012. 
93 This was stated to me in May 2010 by a senior official of a leading UK‐based human rights organisation who 
wished to remain anonymous. 
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The final moment for realising the West’s desire to see the defeat of the LTTE came on 18 
May 2009. Both Sri Lanka’s war to eliminate the armed threat to its ethno-theocratic 
ambitions and the West’s war to defeat the LTTE reached their conclusion on that day. The 
organisation was defeated on the battlefield. But it was also politically annihilated. In these 
wars, 146,679 Tamils also became unaccounted, either dead or missing (UN, 2012). This was 
in addition to around 100,00 Tamils who were killed in the six decades ethnic conflict. 
In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
justified some of the crimes committed by US troops in the country in the following terms:  
 
‘Stuff happens! ...And it’s untidy and freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to 
make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. They’re also free to live 
their lives and do wonderful things, and that’s what’s going to happen here’ 
(Rumsfeld, 2003). 
 
Coming close to this statement of Rumsfeld (2003), in a recent report co-authored with 
Richard Williamson, the former US Secretary of State Albright portrays the inaction of 
Western states to save Tamil civilian lives in the following terms: ‘The case of Sri Lanka 
exemplifies a challenge for implementing R2P when sovereign states confront an internal 
threat from a group that is designated as a terrorist organization’ (Albright & Williamson, 
2013: 21). In making this statement, Albright implies that when Western states join forces 
with their Southern counterparts to eliminate non-liberal actors, it is difficult for them to 
undertake interventions to save civilians and thus civilian deaths become inevitable. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to develop a biopolitical perspective on the opposition of Western 
states to the formation of the state of Tamil Eelam in the island of Sri Lanka, and the 
collaboration of those same states with the Sri Lankan state’s efforts to transform the island 
into an ethno-theocracy. Given the fact that since the end of the Second World War Western 
states have in other parts of the world promoted under the banner of liberal peace civil 
liberties, human rights, and other democratic freedoms, including the right to self-
determination of nations, the central question of this thesis was whether Western opposition 
to the formation of the state of Tamil Eelam and their collaboration with the Sri Lankan state 
was a consequence of liberal peace metamorphosing into the power calculations of political 
realism, or whether there is a deeper contradiction within the concept itself. 
As we saw in the Introduction, given the fact that there is no convergence of Sri 
Lanka’s national interests with those of Western states, realist theories based on the 
conventional wisdom of national interest failed to explain Western policy in the Eelam War. 
This was also the case with liberal theories of international relations in that while 
rationalising the manifestations of the concept of liberal peace in terms of promoting liberal 
values and establishing global peace, they could not explain the rationale behind the West’s 
collaboration with Sri Lanka, which had liberal democratic institutions but used them to 
further Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-theocratic ambitions, subverting in the course civil liberties, 
human rights, and other democratic freedoms of the island’s Tamil population. In this respect, 
the same can be said of existing Foucauldian critiques. Even though existing Foucauldian 
critiques have explained the manifestations of the concept of liberal peace using biopolitical 
perspectives, their reluctance to recognise the central role that commerce plays in 
international relations has rendered them unable to explain Western policy in the Eelam War. 
In particular, despite rationalising wars undertaken by Western liberal democracies as 
intended to make life live and liberalise global populations, these critiques could not explain 
why those wars often result in the elimination of liberalised populations, as in the case of the 
Tamils. Western policy in the Eelam War also exposed the limitations of the arguments 
advanced in these critiques that Western interventions are partly underpinned by moral 
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impulses and a commitment on the part of the West to bring peace and prosperity to the 
humankind. Another weakness in these critiques is their failure to comprehend war beyond 
military action, partly attributable to their tendency to ignore the manifestations of law in 
power relations. In this regard, although Marxist critiques came close to explaining Western 
policy in the Eelam War in that they recognised the commercial dynamics of the concept of 
liberal peace, their key weakness was, as we saw in the Introduction as well as in Chapter II, 
their heavy reliance on theories of imperialism to explain the concept and Western 
interventions underpinned by it as imperial endeavours of the capitalist West to exploit the 
South. As the history of the concept of liberal peace since the end of the Second World War 
has demonstrated, it is not only opposed to imperialism but also cannot co-exist with it. 
Moreover, as Sri Lanka’s post-colonial history shows, since decolonisation no Western state 
has shown any interest or made any effort to have direct or indirect imperial control over the 
island for capitalist exploitation. In fact, from 1956 to 1972 when Ceylon adopted semi-statist 
economic policies and from 1972 to 1977 when it adopted socialist economic policies, in 
turning a blind-eye to the island-state’s ethno-theocratic war against the pro-capitalist and 
liberalised Tamils, the West actually worked to the detriment of capitalism. 
In contrast, using Foucault’s account of the concept of liberal peace, his concept of 
biopolitics, and his expositions on war to develop a biopolitical perspective on Western 
policy in the Eelam War, this thesis has been able to establish both theoretically and 
empirically that it was as practitioners of the biopolitics of liberal peace centred on the 
security of global commerce that Western states opposed the formation of the state of Tamil 
Eelam and collaborated with the Sri Lankan state’s efforts to transform the island into an 
ethno-theocracy. In developing this biopolitical perspective, this thesis has addressed some of 
the deficiencies in existing theories and critiques of the concept of liberal peace in the 
discipline of International Relations. Moreover, it has also turned the Foucauldian focus to an 
area thus far unexplored by scholars who have sought to engage with Foucault’s work. 
As we saw in Chapters I and II, liberal peace first emerged in the eighteenth century as 
a concept for ending military confrontations between European powers through commercial 
globalisation (Foucault, 2008: 54-58). It was understood that ‘the opening up of a world 
market allows one to continue the economic game and consequently to avoid the conflicts 
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which derive from the finite market’ (Ibid.: 55). As we further saw in Chapter III, in the post-
Second World War period, realising that their individual monopolistic economic policies 
contributed to war, Western states came together to establish a global economic order centred 
on unhindered commerce. With this, the concept of liberal peace became embedded in the 
foreign policies and practices of Western states. Commercial globalisation was understood to 
be the key to ending military confrontation between states. In order to sustain this state of 
affairs between them, and possibly extend this in their relationship with their Southern 
counterparts, Western states sought to create conditions for unhindered commerce by 
promoting, undertaking, and consolidating political and economic liberalisation in the states 
of the global South. From the inception, the manifestations of the concept of liberal peace has 
been biopolitical in that it has been centred on the assumption that commercial globalisation 
is the key to making life live. In the biopolitics of liberal peace, military confrontations 
between states are understood to constitute a major threat to the existence of the humankind. 
In contrast, commercial globalisation is understood to be the key to removing this threat and 
thus capable of making the humankind live. It is in this biopolitical endeavour of making life 
live through commercial globalisation that since the end of the Second World War Western 
states have promoted, undertaken, and consolidated liberalisation in the states of the South. It 
is also as the practitioners of this biopolitics that Western states have waged wars as well as 
collaborated in the wars of their Southern counterparts to eliminate all forms of threats, i.e., 
non-liberal forces and ideologies, to the security of global commerce, allowing the subversion 
of civil liberties, human rights, and democratic freedom that they have simultaneously been 
promoting, often collaborating with non-liberal forces and ideologies that they have also been 
seeking to eliminate, and in some cases condoning the killing of already liberalised 
populations. In this biopolitics of liberal peace, as in all forms of biopolitics today, wars are 
not only waged through military might but also through the power relations of law, finance, 
politics, and diplomacy (as well as all other power relations that produce the effects of battle). 
On this basis, it is no exaggeration to say that even though bringing an end to military 
confrontations between states remains a key objective of liberal peace, this may not mean the 
eradication of war. Liberalisation may eventually lead to the expansion of the current Western 
liberal zone of ‘peace’ into a global liberal zone of ‘peace’ (in the sense that in this global 
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liberal zone of ‘peace’ there will be an absence of military confrontation between states). 
However, as the history of the manifestations of the concept of liberal peace and the way that 
wars are increasingly being waged through means other than military might show, creating 
this global liberal zone of ‘peace’ may not mean the eradication of war. 
Using this biopolitical framework, Western policy in the Eelam War can be summarised 
in the following terms. Given the fact that the Tamils and the Sinhalese have for a long time 
competed for control of the entire island, the West is opposed to the formation of two states in 
that it fears that such a state of affairs will only fuel ancient ethnic and religious rivalries and 
thus lead to economic monopolies, which would in turn endanger global commerce within the 
island. As we saw in Chapter IV, it is on this basis that during colonial rule the British Empire 
sought to forge a common Ceylonese identity for the island’s populations and at 
decolonisation created the ‘liberal democratic’ state of Ceylon. During the Cold War, given 
the fact that the state of Ceylon stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the West in its fight against 
communism, despite adopting between 1956 to 1972 semi-statist economic policies and from 
1972 to 1977 socialist economic policies, the West considered it to be prudent to turn a blind-
eye to the former’s ethno-theocratic war against the liberalised Tamils. With Sri Lanka 
reinstating liberal economic policies in 1977 and the Tamil armed resistance movement 
incorporating socialist policies at around the same period, the West saw it fit to render 
assistance to the Sri Lankan state in its fight to eliminate the Tamil ‘Marxist’ threat in the 
island. Although during the post-Cold War period the Tamil armed resistance movement was 
no longer understood to be a Marxist threat, given the fact that it posed an armed threat to the 
‘liberal democratic’ state of Sri Lanka it was considered to be a continuing threat to global 
commerce within the island’s borders. It was on this basis that the West continued its 
assistance to Sri Lanka’s counter-insurgency efforts in the post-Cold War period and from 
October 1997 launched a parallel war to neutralise the Tamils’ armed struggle. In order to see 
the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the West allowed tens of thousands of Tamil civilians 
to become unaccounted (either dead or missing). Understood from a biopolitical perspective, 
Western collaboration with Sri Lanka’s efforts to transform the island into an ethno-theocracy 
and allow Tamil civilians to be killed is neither a contradiction inherent to the concept of 
liberal peace nor a demonstration that the concept metamorphoses in practice into the power 
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calculations of political realism. Instead, it is a state of affairs that is consistent with the 
history of the manifestations of the concept of liberal peace in biopolitical mode.  
In building on from Foucault’s expositions on war and conceptualising law to be a way 
of waging war, Chapter I demonstrated that it is possible to undertake a study on the 
manifestations of law using Foucault’s methods, without going against his suggestion that we 
must conduct a study of power beyond law (1998: 90). As well as developing a theory of the 
biopolitics of liberal peace, the chapter also established that this biopolitics has continuity 
with the British Empire’s biopolitics of liberal state-building in its Eastern colonies. 
Moreover, by situating Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic ambitions within Foucault’s concept of 
biopolitics, the chapter has also been able to theoreticise it as another form of biopolitics. 
Though the biopolitical perspective developed in this thesis is centred on Western policy in 
the Eelam War, and not the Sri Lankan state’s policies towards the Tamils, it had to examine 
the latter’s dynamics in order to reveal the extent of the former’s collaboration with it. 
Examining the normative and institutional operations of the concept of liberal peace, 
Chapter II demonstrated that commercial globalisation remains central to the concept today 
as it was in the eighteenth century. Challenging existing liberal, Marxist and Foucauldian 
conceptualisations of the concept of liberal peace as imperialism, the chapter also established 
that even though the concept has a genealogy in the thoughts of liberal thinkers who 
supported imperialism, this does not constitute a sufficient ground to theoreticise it as such.  
In examining the manifestations of the concept of liberal peace since the end of the 
Second World War, Chapter III established that during the Cold War it was embedded in the 
West’s policy of containment and development. The chapter also established that in the post-
Cold War period it was embedded in most of the Western-led humanitarian interventions, 
‘peacebuilding’ missions, conflict resolution efforts, aid programmes, and the GWoT. 
Applying the theoretical arguments developed in Chapters I and II, Chapter IV 
established empirically the continuity of the biopolitics of liberal peace with the British 
Empire’s biopolitics of liberal state-building. The chapter also established empirically the 
biopolitics of the Sri Lankan state and demonstrated how before the emergence of the armed 
conflict law became a way of waging war to further its ethno-theocratic ambitions. Moreover, 
the chapter also demonstrated that it was as practitioners of the biopolitics of liberal peace 
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that Western states turned a blind-eye to Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic biopolitics. For the Sri 
Lankan state, the Tamils and the communists constituted a threat to its ethno-theocratic 
ambitions. Although in the biopolitics of liberal peace the liberalised Tamils did not 
constitute a threat, given Sri Lanka’s collaboration in the West’s war to eliminate the 
communists, turning a blind-eye to the plight of the Tamils was considered prudent.  
Tracing Sri Lanka’s emergency laws to martial law used by the British Empire as part 
of its biopolitics of liberal state-building in colonial Ceylon, Chapter V established the liberal 
origins of the island-state’s emergency regime and provided further empirical insights on how 
law has remained a way of waging war for the past two hundred and ten years in the island. 
The chapter also established that in the same way that martial law was used by the British 
Empire against the Sinhalese who rebelled and rioted during liberal state-building, the Sri 
Lankan state used liberal emergency laws against the Sinhala Marxist youth, the LTTE, and 
the Tamils who challenged its ethno-theocratic biopolitics. On the basis of the West’s 
opposition to the Tamils’ armed struggle and the endorsement that it accorded to Sri Lanka 
during the armed conflict to have continued recourse to emergency laws to defeat the LTTE, 
the chapter revealed that Western actions in this regard were not merely those of turning a 
blind-eye to Sri Lanka’s war, but that of collaborating with its ethno-theocratic biopolitics. 
Chapter VI demonstrated that it was as practitioners of the biopolitics of liberal peace 
that from 1977 to the end of the Cold War that Western states collaborated with Sri Lanka’s 
ethno-theocratic war by providing the latter with counter-insurgency support to defeat the so-
called Marxist threat posed by the Tamil armed resistance movement, thereby turning the 
island into a hotspot of the power struggle with India. Examining the West’s continuing 
collaboration with Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic war in the post-Cold War period, Chapters 
VII and VIII established that, as in the Cold War period, the biopolitics of liberal peace was 
central to this collaboration. Conceptualising the actions taken by Western states from 
October 1997 against the LTTE as a parallel war waged by the West, those two chapters also 
established empirically that as well as law and military might, the power relations of politics, 
diplomacy, and finance are also ways of waging war in that they produced the effects of 
battle in the Eelam War. In particular, Chapter VIII demonstrated how peace negotiations can 
become war by other means – a coded war. It was this parallel war waged by the West using 
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the power relations of law, finance, politics, and diplomacy that helped Sri Lanka defeat the 
LTTE on the battlefield and thus bring about its political death. Western states have never 
remained shy in admitting that their actions contributed to the eventual destruction of the 
Tamils’ armed struggle. According to Michele J. Sison (2013), the current US ambassador to 
Sri Lanka, it was the decision of the American government to designate the Tamil Tigers as a 
terrorist organisation in October 1997 that ‘played a key role in helping to dry up the LTTE’s 
overseas support networks’, and thus contributed to the organisation’s ‘ultimate demise’.  
A distinction must be drawn between Sri Lanka’s ethno-theocratic war and the West’s 
parallel war as well as its collaboration with the island-state. While Sri Lanka considered the 
Tamils, the communists and the LTTE to be threats to its ethno-theocratic ambitions, the West 
considered only the communists, the Sinhala Marxist youth, and the LTTE to be threats, and 
not the Tamils. Nevertheless, in turning a blind-eye to the plight of the Tamils before the 
emergence of the Tamil armed resistance movement, in collaborating from 1977 with Sri 
Lanka’s counter-insurgency efforts to neutralise the Tamils’ armed struggle, and waging a 
parallel war from 1997 for the same purpose, the West allowed tens of thousands of Tamil 
civilians to be killed. In the biopolitics of liberal peace, it is acceptable not only to kill life to 
make life live but also to allow liberalised life to be killed so that life can live. 
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